You're just wrong, full stop. — Echarmion

That's a great argument you've got there. How long did it take you to come up with? Hours, I'm guessing.

Without an argument from you, I am clearly in a stronger position here, given that at face value it's clearly absurd to say that Earth is an observation. Earth is a planet. A planet is not an observation. The contrary can easily be lead to even more absurdity if we assume it to be true and apply logic.

Then, by definition, the majority of observers are mistaken about rocks, because that's what the word "illusion" means. — Echarmion

But they can't be mistaken by your own definition of what a rock is, because the definition would fit. It can't be both. That's the problem. To avoid contradition, you would be forced into to either rejecting your ill-considered definition, or the far greater absurdity of accepting that such an illusory scenario would be impossible.

Your definition here would be that a rock is what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. We have what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. So that would be a rock by your definition. The problem with that, is that, really, it could be anything. You might be imagining an actual rock when you do this, but really, it could be a glass of water, a cat, or a microwave, that looks, feels, etc., like a rock.

If a rock is what it looks like to you, and you die, a rock is still what it looked like to you. This is just running in circles with words. — Echarmion

No, you're fallaciously moving the goalposts by switching from present-tense to past-tense. You can't do that. You need to be consistent. If a rock is what looks like a rock to me, then a rock is what looks like a rock to me, not what looked like a rock to me. If I died, then nothing would look like a rock to me. Therefore, there wouldn't be a rock, by your own definition.

Saying a rock is what it looks like to X is not an idealist position, it's a realist position. To an idealist, the rock is nothing in and of itself. — Echarmion

That's come out of nowhere, and doesn't address what I said. Why are you saying that in reply to what you quoted above it? It just looks like a red herring or missing the point.

If we no longer see rocks as rock, there must still be rocks, because by the terms of that very sentence, rocks both are a thing in and of themselves and something that people see.

You're entangling yourself in your own word salad. — Echarmion

I'm trying to make the point in a way that will get you to see sense. Your definition allows for a situation with "rocks" (in your sense), that aren't actually rocks (in my sense, which is the normal sense). So, we could take the dictionary definition I gave, and imagine a scenario where there's a rock by that definition, but so long as it doesn't look, feel, etc., like a rock, then it's not one by your definition.

I think that that's a problem. And I'm guessing that I'm not the only one. It removes the requirement that reality matches up with our language, and instead goes by a model whereby language matches up with mere appearance, which of course can be illusory, which causes problems for the model, as I've shown.

Of course it's counterintuitive if you say things that are contradictory. Your definition is not a definition, but a tautology. — Echarmion

It's easier just to say that a rock is a rock, but what I really mean is that a rock is a solid mineral material... (i.e. a rock).

(That's an analytic a priori statement, like all such definitions).

This contrasts with your "rock", which isn't really a rock, it's merely an appearance.

All good. Half of irrational is still irrational. — Mww

Rather than this way is half of irrational, I'd say the other way is doubly irrational.

So, when I ask how many hours would pass in a year after we've all died... — S

It's just as nonsensical, to talk about years when there's no human beings, as it is to talk about hours, and as it is to talk about rocks. So this approach gets you nowhere. What "a year" is, is a human idea, and without human beings there are no such ideas. So without human beings there is no such thing as what a year is, nor is there what an hour is, nor what a rock is. And the op is nonsensical.

It's just as nonsensical, to talk about years when there's no human beings, as it is to talk about hours, and as it is to talk about rocks. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except it isn't, because to do so demonstrably makes sense to other people, which shows that you're just interpreting it in a way that doesn't make sense.

"I'm unable to make sense of what you're saying because I'm not interpreting it right" is not a sensible criticism. It's not a criticism at all, it is an admission of failure. And although you won't admit this, you tacitly do this whenever you make comments like the quote above. It's self-defeating. All I have to do is point this out, and I've done that here in this comment, and once is enough, so even if you repeatedly make the same error, I would've already dealt with it. Whenever you make those comments, you can simply return here to this reply.

Q.E.D.

That's a great argument you've got there. How long did it take you to come up with? Hours, I'm guessing. — S

The argument has already been made. Until you put in some effort to actually understand it, you'll get nothing else from me.

But they can't be mistaken by your own definition of what a rock is, because the definition would fit. It can't be both. That's the problem. To avoid contradition, you would be forced into to either rejecting your ill-considered definition, or the far greater absurdity of accepting that such an illusory scenario would be impossible. — S

Or maybe the problem is that you are using a term - "illusion" - that's already predetermining the answer. It only makes sense to speak of illusions if you consider rocks to have a definition independent of the observations in question. It's a form of begging the question.

Your definition here would be that a rock is what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. — S

Again this is a realist position. An idealist would say that a rock is the looks, feelings etc.

We have what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. So that would be a rock by your definition. The problem with that, is that, really, it could be anything. You might be imagining an actual rock when you do this, but really, it could be a glass of water, a cat, or a microwave, that looks, feels, etc., like a rock. — S

You're still assuming there are things like rocks, cats and microwaves that are things in and of themselves, and then someone comes along and looks at the things and sees a rock. But to an idealist, there are no cats or microwaves either. These words refer to collections of subjective observations. The sentence "I observe a rock, but it really is a cat" makes no sense from that position.

No, you're fallaciously moving the goalposts by switching from present-tense to past-tense. You can't do that. You need to be consistent. If a rock is what looks like a rock to me, then a rock is what looks like a rock to me, not what looked like a rock to me. If I died, then nothing would look like a rock to me. Therefore, there wouldn't be a rock, by your own definition. — S

My point above applies here. The way you phrase your example presupposes that rocks are things in and of themselves, and that your observations conform to these objects.

I'm trying to make the point in a way that will get you to see sense. Your definition allows for a situation with "rocks" (in your sense), that aren't actually rocks (in my sense, which is the normal sense). So, we could take the dictionary definition I gave, and imagine a scenario where there's a rock by that definition, but so long as it doesn't look, feel, etc., like a rock, then it's not one by your definition. — S

If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist.

I think that that's a problem. And I'm guessing that I'm not the only one. It removes the requirement that reality matches up with our language, and instead goes by a model whereby language matches up with mere appearance, which of course can be illusory, which causes problems for the model, as I've shown. — S

For appearance to be illusory, we'd need to be able to compare it to something, and conclude the two don't match. What are we comparing appearances to?

The argument has already been made. Until you put in some effort to actually understand it, you'll get nothing else from me. — Echarmion

:rofl:

A bare assertion is not an argument, and it can rightly be dismissed. Make your argument, and then I will consider addressing it.

Or maybe the problem is that you are using a term - "illusion" - that's already predetermining the answer. It only makes sense to speak of illusions if you consider rocks to have a definition independent of the observations in question. It's a form of begging the question. — Echarmion

Can there be an illusion? Yes or no?

Again this is a realist position. An idealist would say that a rock is the looks, feelings etc. — Echarmion

Again, that doesn't matter. Don't send us around in circles. I'm still disagreeing with you. Realists can disagree with each other, ya know.

You're still assuming there are things like rocks, cats and microwaves that are things in and of themselves, and then someone comes along and looks at the things and sees a rock. But to an idealist, there are no cats or microwaves either. These words refer to collections of subjective observations. The sentence "I observe a rock, but it really is a cat" makes no sense from that position. — Echarmion

Yes, I know that. I'm making the case that that makes very little sense for anyone outside of their crazy little world. There are things like rocks, cats, and microwaves. The real things, that is, not mere appearance, which is something else entirely. My finger pointing at the moon is not the moon.

No, you're fallaciously moving the goalposts by switching from present-tense to past-tense. You can't do that. You need to be consistent. If a rock is what looks like a rock to me, then a rock is what looks like a rock to me, not what looked like a rock to me. If I died, then nothing would look like a rock to me. Therefore, there wouldn't be a rock, by your own definition.
— S

My point above applies here. The way you phrase your example presupposes that rocks are things in and of themselves, and that your observations conform to these objects. — Echarmion

As can be seen, we were talking about your definition there. You keep changing the subject. Don't do that. I like to stay on point.

Address my point first, then maybe I will address yours in return. Quid pro quo.

If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist. — Echarmion

That would be a massive problem if you claim that you can't even imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to.

For appearance to be illusory, we'd need to be able to compare it to something, and conclude the two don't match. What are we comparing appearances to? — Echarmion

Hold on a minute. Don't you think that it's absurd that illusions are impossible? That needs to be accounted for.

Can there be an illusion? Yes or no? — S

No.

Yes, I know that. I'm making the case that that makes very little sense for anyone outside of their crazy little world. — S

You are making, to use your own words, bare assertions.

There are things like rocks, cats, and microwaves. The real things, that is, not mere appearance, which is something else entirely. My finger pointing at the moon is not the moon. — S

And I say there aren't. What now? Are we done?

As can be seen, we were talking about your definition there. You keep changing the subject. Don't do that. I like to stay on point. — S

Sigh. If rocks are what you think rocks are, and you die, the nature of rocks doesn't change. They still have the same attributes which, were you alive, would conform to your thoughts about rocks.

That would be a massive problem if you claim that you can't even imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to. — S

I did not say that I can't imagine it.

Hold on a minute. Don't you think that it's absurd that illusions are impossible? — S

No.

So, how do you explain what seems like an illusion? When for example, evidence suggests that I see red as blue? That I see visible light with a dominant wavelength of approximately 625–740 nanometres, but it looks like blue to me? If I didn't know any better, I'd think it was blue? Is it blue or isn't it? :brow:

That would be a massive problem if you claim that you can't even imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to.
— S

I did not say that I can't imagine it. — Echarmion

Then I didn't mean you, personally, did I? :roll:

I meant them. Those of the position we're talking about.

Even if it's down to bare assertion vs. bare assertion, it doesn't have to end there. One can consider what makes the most sense, what better conforms with our common language use, what has greater explanatory power, etc. Are you interested in that or not?

Wouldn't they still be meaningful in the sense that these languages would consist in rules about meaning? — S

Well, first, I don't believe that languages consist of "rules about meaning" period. I don't know what a "rule about meaning" would even be. I don't believe it's possible to actually speak meanings, by the way --remember that meanings are different than definitions in my view. ("In a language, it would be the case that this word means such-and-such"--that's not a meaning, it's a definition. Also, definitions aren't rules. They're reports--journalism, basically, about conventional usage.)

But even aside from that, I wouldn't say that languages are about rules, period. There are conventions in languages, but those conventions aren't rules in the same sense sense of rules of a game, or laws, or rules that some business might have for its employees or patrons ( "no shirt, no shoes, no business") or anything like that. (Even though some folks prone to persnickettiness would like to treat the traditional conventions that they prefer as if they're rules.)

At any rate, on my view, x only has meaning insofar as S assigns meaning to x.

What I'm asking in what you're quoting is basically this (exaggerated for a moment to make this clearer): why isn't L (consisting of words/expressions x, y, z, grammar G, etc.) a language at time T1 if at T2, S doesn't understand anything about L? In other words, why does L need to be a language at T2, T3, T4 ad infinitum in order for L to be a language at T1? And if L is a language at T1, and it's a private language at T1, then a private language is possible. It would be irrelevant whether any L exists in perpetuity (or at least for the lifetime of the previous users of L, or whatever temporal claim someone would be trying to sneak in).

I actually asked with respect to not understanding particular words at T2 rather than the language wholesale (hence the above being an exaggeration), but that was the idea. The assumed "It needs to be the same over time" requirement is untenable--since no language is, and all of the skepticism points about memory etc. apply just as much to public language. Plus the temporal sameness requirement would have to be made explicit, anyway.

What even is a language if not basically a set of language rules about symbols or sounds or whatever — S

Languages are tools utilizing symbols (often but not necessarily sounds or marks) to represent objects, concepts, etc. They tend to change, to evolve over time. When they're public, conventions develop, but various conventions occur at the same time, and the conventions can be skirted very easily without any significant detriment to the usefulness of the tool.

So, how do you explain what seems like an illusion? When for example, evidence suggests that I see red as blue? That I see visible light with a dominant wavelength of approximately 625–740 nanometres, but it looks like blue to me? If I didn't know any better, I'd think it was blue? Is it blue or isn't it? :brow: — S

Illusions such as optical illusions are theories about the world that conflict with other observations, and are therefore inconsistent (have poor predictive power). If you observe that something is blue, but also observe that other people tell you they observe it as red, your theory now has to account for these observations. One way to do that is to form the theory that your perception of colors is different from that of other people.

Then I didn't mean you, personally, did I? :roll:

I meant them. Those of the position we're talking about. — S

I don't understand what you are trying to tell me.

Even if it's down to bare assertion vs. bare assertion, it doesn't have to end there. One can consider what makes the most sense, what better conforms with our common language use, what has greater explanatory power, etc. Are you interested in that or not? — S

You are describing different arguments, are you not (argument from language, argument from predictive power etc.)? If you think the question can be solved with arguments, then we ought to argue. If it can not then arguing is pointless.

I’m back. I packed a lunch, got my walkin’ shoes on, went looking for cats and optical illusions. Didn’t find any.

"I'm unable to make sense of what you're saying because I'm not interpreting it right" is not a sensible criticism. It's not a criticism at all, it is an admission of failure. — S

The problem here though, is that I've asked you to explain what you mean, in a way that does make sense me, and you've failed to do that. You keep resorting to unconventional and improvised definitions of your terms, which indicates that what you are saying doesn't even make sense to yourself. If you have to improvise fabricated meanings of the words you use, in order to convince yourself that what you are saying makes sense, then it's quite clear that you do not even know what you are trying to say, yourself.

The use of fabricated, improvised, unconventional definitions of your terms indicates that there is a problem with what you are trying to say, the meaning you are trying to purvey, not with my interpretation of what you have said. It's evident that you cannot say what you want to say in a way that makes sense. And it's not just me, but other people have told you that in this thread as well. This is evidence that there is a problem with what you are saying, rather than a problem with my interpretation of it.

All I have to do is point this out, and I've done that here in this comment, and once is enough, so even if you repeatedly make the same error, I would've already dealt with it. — S

To insist "the problem is yours if you can't make sense of what I am saying", is pure selfishness. There is no point to even trying to communicate with an attitude like that.

Here's the problem, see if you can resolve the problem in a way that makes sense. How can there be such a thing as "what a rock is", or "what an hour is", if there are no human beings with those ideas? And if there is no such thing as 'what a rock is", when all the people are dead, it doesn't make sense to speak as if there is. If you admit to "Platonic Realism", under this ontology there is an Idea of "Rock", and an Idea of "Hour", independent of human existence, I will accept this as a reasonable explanation.

Well, first, I don't believe that languages consist of "rules about meaning" period. I don't know what a "rule about meaning" would even be. I don't believe it's possible to actually speak meanings, by the way --remember that meanings are different than definitions in my view. ("In a language, it would be the case that this word means such-and-such"--that's not a meaning, it's a definition. Also, definitions aren't rules. They're reports--journalism, basically, about conventional usage.) — Terrapin Station

Very weird. What's a language without rules? I don't even think that that's possible. There are rules everywhere you look. Rules that this word means that, rules that this combination of letters is that word, rules about punctuation, etc., etc. What's linguistic meaning, then? What's the linguistic meaning of a word like "hat"? It's that it's a shaped covering for the head worn for warmth, as a fashion item, or as part of a uniform. I can demonstrably speak that meaning.

But even aside from that, I wouldn't say that languages are about rules, period. There are conventions in languages, but those conventions aren't rules in the same sense sense of rules of a game, or laws, or rules that some business might have for its employees or patrons ( "no shirt, no shoes, no business") or anything like that. (Even though some folks prone to persnickettiness would like to treat the traditional conventions that they prefer as if they're rules.) — Terrapin Station

Just because you don't have to follow them, or that they're also convention, that doesn't mean that they're not rules. They're rules because they're what's required for you to play the language game properly.

At any rate, on my view, x only has meaning insofar as S assigns meaning to x. — Terrapin Station

Very weird. It's evidently not a continual thing. The act of assignment is a temporary act. Once the linguistic meaning has been assigned, the x has that meaning.

What I'm asking in what you're quoting is basically this (exaggerated for a moment to make this clearer): why isn't L (consisting of words/expressions x, y, z, grammar G, etc.) a language at time T1 if at T2, S doesn't understand anything about L? — Terrapin Station

Why would a language depend on me understanding anything about it at the time? I can only ask you that in response. Necessary dependency, necessary dependency, wherefore art thou, necessary dependency? Without this assumed necessary dependency, it wouldn't make any sense to think that there'd be this change over time.

In other words, why does L need to be a language at T2, T3, T4 ad infinitum in order for L to be a language at T1? — Terrapin Station

That's not my reasoning. If L is a language at T1, then for it not to be a language at T2, something relevant would have to change. I accept the change, e.g. we cease to understand it at T2. But I reject that it would be a relevant change in the sense you suggest. No necessary dependency has been reasonably established. Instead it has just been assumed or asserted. So it would be unreasonable of me to think that a relevant change would occur over time. You expect me to be unreasonable?

And if L is a language at T1, and it's a private language at T1, then a private language is possible. It would be irrelevant whether any L exists in perpetuity (or at least for the lifetime of the previous users of L, or whatever temporal claim someone would be trying to sneak in). — Terrapin Station

This doesn't seem relevant. I'm just saying that a language would continue to have linguistic meaning over time, because linguistic meaning is objective. I don't see how it would be any different for a private language. A private language would be some language I made up which no one else knew the meaning of. I set the meaning, then it would cease to apply because...? Because of some irrational belief about subjective dependency which hasn't been reasonably supported, but instead merely assumed or asserted?

I actually asked with respect to not understanding particular words at T2 rather than the language wholesale (hence the above being an exaggeration), but that was the idea. The assumed "It needs to be the same over time" requirement is untenable--since no language is, and all of the skepticism points about memory etc. apply just as much to public language. Plus the temporal sameness requirement would have to be made explicit, anyway. — Terrapin Station

The linguistic meaning is as set, unless it has been changed. Why would it be otherwise? Because of the irrational belief about a necessary dependency on there being a subject understanding the language at the time?

You're just begging the question, then bizarrely expecting me to go along with it. How is it reasonable to expect me to make sense of a problem you've created by assuming something that I don't? I can only point out the error in you doing that.

Languages are tools utilizing symbols (often but not necessarily sounds or marks) to represent objects, concepts, etc. They tend to change, to evolve over time. When they're public, conventions develop, but various conventions occur at the same time, and the conventions can be skirted very easily without any significant detriment to the usefulness of the tool. — Terrapin Station

Sure, languages are tools. Tools designed for communication. And they consist in rules. That's what makes communication through language possible.

Your account is incomplete.

Very weird. What's a language without rules? I don't even think that that's possible. There are rules everywhere you look. Rules that this word means that, rules that this combination of letters is that word, rules about punctuation, etc., etc. — S

I want to just do a small bit at a time, especially because some of this I already addressed. Even this little bit is a few different topics.

"Rules that this word means that"--again, this isn't meaning, it's definition. They're different. Definitions aren't rules. They're reports of common usage in some population.

Likewise, spelling, grammar, etc. present conventions. Conventions are different than rules.

Wait, why the heck are you specifying empirical knowledge?! That's doing it wrong. I'm not asking about empirical knowledge of the rock! I thought I made that clear, multiple times. Empiricism is a useful tool, but it is not suited for all jobs, and it is the wrong tool for this job. I'm just asking about whether we know that there'd be a rock. — S

I am specifying empirical knowledge because you are demanding knowledge of a physical object. Asking about whether there would be a rock must use empirical knowledge because you’re still asking about a physical object. Hence the dialectical conundrum, re: empirical knowledge a posteriori is not suited because there’s no direct experience, we’re all dead remember, and empirical knowledge a priori cannot give the answer you insist is correct.

You’ve asked a million times, and got back the same answer every time......it can’t be empirically known whether there would be a rock; reasonably believed, sure; known.....nope.

Obvious to the most casual idealist observer.
————————

please don't interpret "reasonable enough" or "knowledge" as requiring absolute certainty — S

Nobody does that. “Reasonable enough” and certainty are mutually exclusive, and “knowledge” is never absolute.
———————-

Actually, I did know that. — S

Riiiighhhttt. 1921 Solvay Conference?
———————

Proof generally seems to be about sufficiency, — S

No. No it doesn’t. Proof has to do with necessity. That which is contingent cannot be a proof.
——————-

I might call that "knowledge", whereas you might not. — S

I call “knowledge” the condition, or the state, of the intellect. What do you call it?

I think that that's a problem. And I'm guessing that I'm not the only one. It removes the requirement that reality matches up with our language, and instead goes by a model whereby language matches up with mere appearance, which of course can be illusory, which causes problems for the model, as I've shown. — S

The methodology for remedying the possibility of illusion has already been given.

On the modern idealist model, which is still in force philosophically:

“....We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but—if they are to become cognitions—must refer them, as representations, to something, as object, and must determine the latter by means of the former, here again there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to the object—and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects they are cognized, conform to my conceptions—and then I am at no loss how to proceed....”

I’d be interested in how you think this model causes problems. Problems with what? What problems?

I don't understand what you are trying to tell me. — Echarmion

Okay, then I'll go back and explain. You said:

"If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist."

That means that if you were an idealist, then you couldn't even reasonably imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, because, if what you say is true, that's realist territory.

But if an idealist can't even do that, then that's a big problem. I can. Lots of other people can. It seems to make sense. The idealist is abnormal, and this requires an explanation. I think that the best explanation is that they're doing something wrong.

You are describing different arguments, are you not (argument from language, argument from predictive power etc.)? If you think the question can be solved with arguments, then we ought to argue. If it can not then arguing is pointless. — Echarmion

The question can be solved with arguments, yes. I've made them throughout the discussion and I'm not exactly in any rush to repeat them from scratch with you.

I want to just do a small bit at a time, especially because some of this I already addressed. Even this little bit is a few different topics.

"Rules that this word means that"--again, this isn't meaning, it's definition. They're different. Definitions aren't rules. They're reports of common usage in some population.

Likewise, spelling, grammar, etc. present conventions. Conventions are different than rules. — Terrapin Station

Okay, so in your language game, you call them something different. Those are your rules.

I am specifying empirical knowledge because you are demanding knowledge of a physical object. Asking about whether there would be a rock must use empirical knowledge because you’re still asking about a physical object. Hence the dialectical conundrum, re: empirical knowledge a posteriori is not suited because there’s no direct experience, we’re all dead remember, and empirical knowledge a priori cannot give the answer you insist is correct.

You’ve asked a million times, and got back the same answer every time......it can’t be empirically known whether there would be a rock; reasonably believed, sure; known.....nope.

Obvious to the most casual idealist observer. — Mww

I'm getting back an answer to your misunderstanding of what I'm asking. That's the problem, and that's why I've asked you more than once.

I'm not asking about empirical knowledge, so don't tell me about empirical knowledge. It's not my fault if you apparently can't help but misinterpret the question. I've tried to warn you about misinterpretation and taking a blinkered approach.

Nobody does that. “Reasonable enough” and certainty are mutually exclusive, and “knowledge” is never absolute. — Mww

You seem to suggest something along those lines frequently, and I'm not the only one to have remarked on that.

No. No it doesn’t. Proof has to do with necessity. That which is contingent cannot be a proof. — Mww

Whatever.

I call “knowledge” the condition, or the state, of the intellect. What do you call it? — Mww

I call what we know "knowledge", and that can be things like how to ride a bike, what chocolate tastes like, and that there would be rocks.

I’m back. I packed a lunch, got my walkin’ shoes on, went looking for cats and optical illusions. Didn’t find any. — Mww

Son of a... So you want me to go back and get it, I suppose? Would you like me to construct a half-decent argument for your position whilst I'm at it? Is there anything else I can do for you, sire? A cold beer? A back massage?

"If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist."

That means that if you were an idealist, then you couldn't even reasonably imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, because, if what you say is true, that's realist territory.

But if an idealist can't even do that, then that's a big problem. I can. Lots of other people can. It seems to make sense. The idealist is abnormal, and this requires an explanation. I think that the best explanation is that they're doing something wrong. — S

I did not mean to imply that an idealist cannot imagine realist scenarios.

What I wanted to point out is this: you're constructing thought experiments to serve as arguments against idealism. If you begin those thought experiments with the phrase "let's say rocks are what most people think rocks are" then your thought experiment starts with a realist assumption.

So if, in the course of your thought experiment, you come across a contradiction or an absurdity, you have constructed an argument against realism. Which, presumably, is not what you intended.

If I’m misunderstanding over and over, why aren’t you telling me how? Your experiment is really simply worded, which implies simple responses. Now, I did find reference to “hidden premises” on my search for cats and optical illusions, but I’m going to ignore those because hidden premises amounts to a guessing game along the lines of Russell’s teacup, which doesn’t interest me.

It's not my fault if you apparently can't help but misinterpret the question. — S

WTF is the gawddamn question?????????
——————-

Your calling what we know “knowledge. “Knowledge” is what we know. “Thoughts” are what we think. “Feelings” are what we feel. “Experiences” are what we experience. “Anything” is any thing.

Yikes.

The problem here though, is that I've asked you to explain what you mean, in a way that does make sense me, and you've failed to do that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I have failed to get through to you. You've proven unbreachable. And you explain away your own failure in understanding by rationalising that I'm talking nonsense.

There is no point to even trying to communicate with an attitude like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Believe me, I've tried. I've tried for fifteen pages. I kept on trying when many others would have long since given up. If you don't recognise or appreciate that, then it's you who has the bad attitude.

Okay, so in your language game, you call them something different. Those are your rules. — S

It's not a rule, just the result of analysis.

I did not mean to imply that an idealist cannot imagine realist scenarios.

What I wanted to point out is this: you're constructing thought experiments to serve as arguments against idealism. If you begin those thought experiments with the phrase "let's say rocks are what most people think rocks are" then your thought experiment starts with a realist assumption.

So if, in the course of your thought experiment, you come across a contradiction or an absurdity, you have constructed an argument against realism. Which, presumably, is not what you intended. — Echarmion

But a strength of my argument is that I'm not saying anything controversial on the face of it. If the idealist can't even handle a hypothetical scenario of a rock (as defined by the dictionary) after we've died, then that's a big failing for idealism. I'm not suggesting that they can't bite the bullet, I'm suggesting that it's wrong to. It's a failing if you have to go to such lengths in order to explain away something as simple and easily understandable as post-human rocks. Again, what would the guy on the street think? He'd get it straight away, wonder why you were making such a fuss, and think you peculiar. So idealism has to invent a whole new way of interpreting language just to account for it's wacky premise? Why should we speak their peculiar language? These problems stem back to the wacky idealist premise, do they not? Isn't that the real problem?

It's not a rule, just the result of analysis. — Terrapin Station

Okay, so in my language, it's a rule, and in your language it's just the result of an analysis, even though we're talking about the same thing. The two languages translate.

Okay, so in my language, it's a rule, and in your language it's just the result of an analysis, even though we're talking about the same thing. The two languages translate. — S

There's, for example, a term--"cat," say, and a definition, "a small domesticated carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractable claws . . . "

Objectively, that's a set of ink marks on paper, or activated pixels on a screen (however it works, exactly, re computers), or sounds someone uttered, etc. It's handy to have a term that cleaves the difference between this and the mental activity we engage in to make an association between "cat" (the ink marks or sounds) and "a small domesticated carnivorous mammal" (other ink marks, sounds, etc.), as well as the mental activity of picturing and conceiving and so on.

So I don't know that we're talking about the same thing. There are different phenomena to pick out.

If I’m misunderstanding over and over, why aren’t you telling me how? Your experiment is really simply worded, which implies simple responses. Now, I did find reference to “hidden premises” on my search for cats and optical illusions, but I’m going to ignore those because hidden premises amounts to a guessing game along the lines of Russell’s teacup, which doesn’t interest me. — Mww

So we're playing the game where we pretend like I haven't told you how you're misunderstanding, are we? I don't like that game. I gave you the short version when I told you that I'm not asking for empirical knowledge. What don't you understand about that? I'm asking instead for what we could call metaphysical knowledge. I gave you an example of the distinction earlier, remember? Am I asking how we can know what a rock looks like? No. Am I asking whether there would be a rock? Yes.

Or, if you do understand what I'm asking, then do you have an answer that isn't either a bare assertion that I don't accept, or something that I've already been over which will send us back around in circles? You say that the opening post is simplistically worded, but we've had fifteen pages of discussion where I've explained myself in detail and multiple times, so that seems like a flimsy excuse. You should know by now that I'm asking whether there would be a rock, and addressing related questions like how I know that there would be a rock, and that I reach my conclusion through a reduction to the absurd, and through a practical use of the term "know", which doesn't exclude common sense stuff it makes sense to say that we know.

It's really bad that you're making me repeat all of this.

I see that you've said that you're specifying empirical knowledge because it's a physical object. And my assessment of why you're doing that is because you either a) go by a premise which doesn't miss the point, but is false and unsupported, where for me to know that there would be a physical object, I must be there to experience it; or b) you're going by a true premise which misses the point, where you point out something I've never denied, since I too am an empiricist, and I accept that I must have had some experience of rocks, or some experience related to rocks, in order to make meaningful claims about rocks. But that's clearly not relevant to my claim, although it might well be relevant to a different claim which I haven't made.

You have the nerve to make those remarks of yours about hidden premises in my argument, yet you surely must have hidden premises of your own here, because what you've given me just doesn't add up. It looks like you make a logical leap in order to reach a different conclusion to me here.

Your calling what we know “knowledge. “Knowledge” is what we know. “Thoughts” are what we think. “Feelings” are what we feel. “Experiences” are what we experience. “Anything” is any thing.

Yikes. — Mww

All of that is true, you're just making my point seem less helpful by taking it out of context. I gave examples. I don't need to give you a definition beyond what I gave, and accompanied by enough examples for you to grasp my meaning. Giving any other sort of definition will risk opening up a can of worms, causing a needless and avoidable hindrance to the discussion.

There's, for example, a term--"cat," say, and a definition, "a small domesticated carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractable claws . . . "

Objectively, that's a set of ink marks on paper, or activated pixels on a screen (however it works, exactly, re computers), or sounds someone uttered, etc. It's handy to have a term that cleaves the difference between this and the mental activity we engage in to make an association between "cat" (the ink marks or sounds) and "a small domesticated carnivorous mammal" (other ink marks, sounds, etc.), as well as the mental activity of picturing and conceiving and so on.

So I don't know that we're talking about the same thing. There are different phenomena to pick out. — Terrapin Station

There's a third thing you're missing out, which is the whole point I'm making here in the discussion related to Part 2. There's the set of ink marks on paper, or activated pixels on a screen: which is objective. And there's the mental activity of picturing and conceiving and so on: which is subjective. And there's also what a word means: which is objective. The meaning isn't objective in the sense that it never required any subject or subjects at any point previously, because it did: that's how it got a meaning in the first place. But it's objective in the sense that it doesn't need there to be any subject or subjects at the time, or all the time. It simply means what it does, and would continue to do so an hour later, even if we all suddlenly die in five minutes. Once the meaning has been set, it is retained, unless there's any reason for that to change, and no one here, yourself included, has been able to reasonably provide such a reason. They've instead assumed or asserted a reason which is inadmissible. There's an unwarranted link that they make.