Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values — Joshs
“Man is something that shall be overcome. Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end.” — Avro
But tell me, my brethren, what the child can do, which even the lion could not do? Why hath the preying lion still to become a child?
Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea.
Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: ITS OWN will, willeth now the spirit; HIS OWN world winneth the world’s outcast.
But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.
The summary of Will to Power and Nihilism that Heidegger wrote, and that I mentioned above, was Heidegger's attempt to understand Nietzsche in his own terms. Only later in the piece does Heidegger then introduce his critique of Nietzsche. — Joshs
Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values, it's the concept of valuation itself understood through the metaphysical tradition of the West. — Joshs
Opposing them is a community of Nietzscheans(including kauffman) who see him within an existential orbit. I'm getting the sense you are reading him this way. — Joshs
Getting back to your Zarathustra passage, "the man on the tightrope has rejected what was but has not reached the other side", my guess is from your reading, 'the other side', the 'yes' is a new valuation to replace the old discarded one, along a developmental trajectory. — Joshs
The overman on the far side of the abyss of metaphysical nihilism is salvation as madness. — Joshs
I'm not talking about what applies to all men — Joshs
Do you see the history of science as developmental trajectory ...the replacement of one paradigm with another ... — Joshs
Is the aim of science the correspondence of our theoretical representations with a real world? — Joshs
Is there a dialectical movement to ideas? — Joshs
Are you making a distinction between the trajectory of the history of science
and Nietzschean metamorphosis of values? — Joshs
is this revaluation a move toward 'better' values in the sense of being more adaptive to an environment? — Joshs
It is also the overcoming of truth as a superior value to falsity — Joshs
Does Platonism include the Kuhnian philosophy of science that says that science evolves through revolutions, via the overthrow of extant paradigms by new ones? — Joshs
Nietzsche wrote:"Our faith in science is still based on a metaphysical faith, – even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire from the blaze set alight by a faith thousands of years old, that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth, that truth is divine." — Joshs
I think it has to do with the Overman's world being that of "mad chaos of confusion and desire". — Joshs
Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness! — Joshs
Metaphysicians believe "things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, – — Joshs
Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values, it's the concept of valuation itself understood through the metaphysical tradition of the West. — Joshs
As far as Heidegger's critique of Will to Power, for Heidegger Nietzsche is the last metaphysician because he determines truth in relation to the establishment of value-scheme. — Joshs
Starting from beings as value-structures turns Will to Power itself into a value, the highest value. — Joshs
"The greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and still hovers over it is the eruption of madness – which means the eruption of arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind’s lack of discipline, the joy in human unreason ..." — Joshs
The question I have for you is , if Nietzsche's objection to metaphysics is its attachment to Platonism, then which modern philosophical traditions qualify as Platonic? I think you and I can agree that Kantian and Hegelian Idealism fit the bill, as well as Husserl's transcendental ego. But what about Kierkegaard? Gadamerian hermeneutics? Are Marxist and Frankfurt school accounts Platonic(Adorno? Feuerbach,?Habermas?)? — Joshs
When Shaun Gallagher says :“Radical or deconstructive hermeneutics
[Heidegger, Derrida , Foucault] , following Nietzsche, would argue that the only truth is untruth, that all interpretations are false, that there is no ultimate escape from false consciousness, that the whole metaphysical concept of truth requires deconstruction", is he describing Nietzsche's response to Platonism?. — Joshs
You say part of science is correspondence to a real world. Isn't the correspondence theory of truth a Platonism, truth as the mirror of nature, according to Rorty? — Joshs
Doesnt the practical orient itself in relation to interpretive accounts of meaning? — Joshs
Don't most scientists today still operate under Kantiann assumptions concerning the nature of objectivty as subjective constructions attempting to correspond to what is out there? — Joshs
My key question for you is , do you think Nietzsche was a radical relativist? — Joshs
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