This is eleven pages (and note that it's a pdf), so it's not short, but it does a better job than I could do:

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.informationphilosopher.com/books/scandal/Dennett.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwizgpmXhtLgAhXsUt8KHWAYChYQFjAAegQIARAB&usg=AOvVaw1r1kYNkO3806RmdNo-sIod

Thanks

If you're asking whether someone is going to choose something they're not aware of then no (and I noted that we don't experience that phenomenon in the latter part of the post). That doesn't mean that the other choices aren't possible. It's not impossible to know that pumpernickel is available, it's not predetermined that you don't know it's available, it's not impossible to choose it if you know about it, etc. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how it would be possible for pumpernickel to be chosen if they arent aware of it.

At any given moment of decision you have a limited time and limited options. If you're not aware of an option, then it isnt really an option. You can only choose what you are aware of at that moment. Some other moment might be different with different options coming to mind.

I don't see how it would be possible for pumpernickel to be chosen if they arent aware of it. — Harry Hindu

I'm guessing because you're conflating possibility and actuality. Is it impossible for the person to know about pumpernickel/to know that it's available? In actuality, contingently, they may now know about it, may not know that it's available, but is it impossible for them to know?

I'm guessing because you're conflating possibility and actuality. Is it impossible for the person to know about pumpernickel/to know that it's available? In actuality, contingently, they may now know about it, may not know that it's available, but is it impossible for them to know? — Terrapin Station

This was the example you gave:

Say that it's not predetermined that Joe chooses rye bread instead of whole wheat when he orders his sandwich. Well, pumpernickel could be available, too, but Joe might not be aware of this--he didn't look at the menu very carefully, maybe he's never even heard of pumpernickel, etc. — Terrapin Station

In this moment of decision, Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel for some reason or another. Is it possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel in this moment of decision?

Your possibilities are just "what-ifs" for that particular moment, which isn't the case at that particular moment. What is the particular case at that moment is that Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel, and therefore it would be impossible for him to choose pumpernickel in that moment of deciding.

Is it possible for the waiter to interrupt his decision-making and recommend the pumpernickel bread? Sure, but that would still be BEFORE Joe actually made his decision, and would make him aware of pumpernickel and then it would be possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel. My emphasis is on what you are aware of at the moment you decide.

free doesnt mean infinate

Once something from the set of possibilities is actualized, then the other possibilities are no longer possible with respect to that particular actuality, sure. None of that has anything to do with determinism, by the way.

Wikipedia:
Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes.

Your decision is determined partially by the choices you are aware of at any given moment. Of course there are other factors (like time available). Like I said, it's a complex algorithm you're using when making decisions.

Wikipedia:
Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes.

Your decision is determined partially by the choices you are aware of at any given moment. Of course there are other factors (like time available). Like I said, it's a complex algorithm you're using when making decisions. — Harry Hindu

You just asked if other possibilities are available at the moment a decision is made.

Again, that has nothing to do with determinism.

Why not?

Well, say that we have four possibilities, a, b, c and d, and a completely random, acausal mechanism for selecting them. Once one is selected, the others are no longer a possibility for that particular iteration. But this has nothing to do with determinism.

So that the occurrence of a decision precludes all other possibilities has nothing to do with determinism.

Well, say that we have four possibilities, a, b, c and d, and a completely random, acausal mechanism for selecting them. Once one is selected, the others are no longer a possibility for that particular iteration. But this has nothing to do with determinism. — Terrapin Station

This is just more of your unnecessary mental gymnastics.

What I asked was if someone could choose something that they aren't aware of, and if not, then your limited knowledge, just like your limited time are determining factors (along with others) in the outcome (your decision). You only seemed concerned about what label we use to refer this causal process.

What I asked was if someone could choose something that they aren't aware of — Harry Hindu

Actually, the way you phrased it was this: "If not pre-determined, then are the only choices that are possible are the ones we are aware of?"

The answer to that question is "No," There are other choices possible. It can be the case that someone isn't aware of them, but that doesn't imply that those other choices aren't possible. Say that Pete's Diner offers five different types of bread for sandwiches. Joe isn't aware of all of them. The fact that Joe isn't aware of all of them doesn't imply that the other choices aren't possible.

Then you changed to focusing on the moment of decision: "In this moment of decision, Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel for some reason or another. Is it possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel in this moment of decision?"

The answer to that is "no" (which you agree with), because it's a truism for actualizing something versus the possibilities for that occasion. As I pointed out, this has nothing to do with determinism. Part of the reason why is that what's actualized could even be random.

Now you're focusing on this instead: "if someone could choose something that they aren't aware of."

I wouldn't say that would be impossible, but it would be very bizarre. So "no," practically. (Which again you agree with.) That doesn't imply that the choice is determined if there's a choice, just that for that particular chooser, it's limited to the options one is aware of.

If not pre-determined, then are the only choices that are possible are the ones we are aware of? — Harry Hindu

As I pointed out, this has nothing to do with determinism. — Terrapin Station

LOL. Well, I guess I did say "NOT pre-determined", and then asked a question that could be seen as circular.

What we are trying to do is determine if determinism is the case or not. I'm saying that it is because you can only choose options you are aware of. You are also faced with a limited amount of time. These factors, along with many others depending on the situation and the person deciding, determine the choice. When we point to a reason for our decision, we are pointing to the cause of our decision, and our decisions are ultimately based on the pleasure and suffering predicted as the outcome, even those for which we can't really seem to point to some reason, or may not want to admit it to ourselves.

I'm saying that it is because you can only choose options you are aware of. — Harry Hindu

I don't know what sort of determinism that's supposed to be. It seems odd to call making a choice from a pool of many thousands of things things, say (if one is choosing an album to listen to, for example), "determinism."

As I've pointed out many times, I make some choices that are phenomenally random--no reason for them, just pure whim.

I don't know what sort of determinism that's supposed to be. It seems odd to call making a choice from a pool of many thousands of things things, say (if one is choosing an album to listen to, for example), "determinism." — Terrapin Station

Are you aware of all the options within the given amount of time? If you were, then how could you ever make the wrong choice?

As I've pointed out many times, I make some choices that are phenomenally random--no reason for them, just pure whim. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how that is possible. It's easy to just make that claim without really exploring an example, isn't it?

Are you aware of all the options within the given amount of time? If you were, then how could you ever make the wrong choice? — Harry Hindu

Make a wrong choice about something like what bread you're choosing or what album you're putting on? I wouldn't say I could make a wrong choice about things like that. The only choices I'd call wrong would be something like an answer in a multiple choice quiz, where there's a correct answer.

I don't see how that is possible — Harry Hindu

Weird (that you wouldn't see how that's possible).

A very simple example: I'm riding my bike. I come to point where I need to make a choice to go right or left. I pick on a whim, doing the mental equivalent of "flipping a coin."

When we look at the outside world, we organize it so that all future states are fully consistent with all past states. This is necessary for us to make predictions, which we need in order to be able to act. When we do act, though, we consider that action to be guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind. This is also necessary to be able to act.

...guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind.

What a fantastic definition for 'free will', I thought at first. Then I realized it's not excluded those future goals be in fact determined by the past state of mind. The circle closes and we conclude no free will.

But what other possibility is there? If the future goals are determined by anything but the past state of mind, the freedom of intention is that much more restricted.

As I understand things, libertarians will typically mainain that substance causation is an essential ingredient of free will. Not all do - some think indeterministic event causation is what's needed. But anyway, what I have trouble with in what you say is your suggestion that substance causation is somehow incompatible with free will.

What often motivates a commitment to libertarianism about free will is the idea that, to be free, we need to be the ultimate explanation of why we made one decision rather than another. If my decisions are caused by events, then because I am not an event I will therefore not be the originator of my decision. Thus, to be the originator I - I, a thing rather than an event- need to be the cause of my decision. Substance causation - whose existence can be independently motivated - allows for this to be true and is this is why so many think free will requires it.

So I do not yet see a problem for the substance causal libertarian.

What a fantastic definition for 'free will', I thought at first. Then I realized it's not excluded those future goals be in fact determined by the past state of mind. The circle closes and we conclude no free will. — Zelebg

This response was intended less as a definition of free will and more as a baseline for such a definition. The idea I was trying to communicate is that "causality" and "freedom" are both human perspectives on the world. We don't know whether, and to what extent, either perspective is "objectively real". This, as the first step, opens up the possibility of freedom.

But what other possibility is there? If the future goals are determined by anything but the past state of mind, the freedom of intention is that much more restricted. — Zelebg

I think the problem when searching for a mechanism for free will is that the very question presupposes a deterministic perspective. Outside of such a perspective, the question is meaningless, there are no fixed processes of how things work, events are not structured according to causes and effects within time.

You simply have actors, and the reasons they have for acting.

I'm searching for new definition of 'free will' since I realized "ability to choose otherwise" doesn't really cut it. The more I think about "setting future goals" the more certain I am to not have heard it before in the context of 'free will', and to me it feels very much like it.

Ability to set future goals, is this not free will in itself?

Ability to set future goals, is this not free will in itself? — Zelebg

I think it's close. I would add some notion of self-actualisation, i.e. free will is the ability to set future goals in accordance to a set of self-given rules.

Yeah, sounds good to me.

Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will?

I think actions must be self-caused in order to allow free will. This is where the debate around free will gets murky for me, because it always leads me to think the notion of free will is a 1-to-1 ratio with the body, and it becomes more a problem of identity. if it isn’t me causing my heart to beat, then what is causing my heart to beat? In the sense that my body—me—is regulating every process therein, from the heart beat to the secretion of hormones, it could be said I am controlling, “willing”, each and every action I perform.