Agreed; subjective idealism went out with continental German idealism, which advocated a necessary external material reality.

greed; subjective idealism went out with continental German idealism, which advocated a necessary external material reality. — Mww

I don't know that reality is properly material, or even completely physical. It's something with those sorts of properties and relations, but it's not anything like what we get in everyday experience. Maybe its quantum fields with a touch of proto-consciousness or it's mathematical structures all the way down. I don't know. But it's something very far removed from our human experience. Or at least the fundamental (ontological) reality making everything up is.

I guess that means Kant was kind of right. As were the ancient Greek metaphysicians in the sense that reality had to be something counter-intuitive, even if they were mostly wrong about the actual ontology, with some exception for the atomists and Heraclitus.

I don't know that reality is properly material, or even completely physical. It's something with those sorts of properties and relations, but it's not anything like what we get in everyday experience. Maybe its quantum fields with a touch of proto-consciousness or it's mathematical structures all the way down. I don't know. But it's something very far removed from our human experience. Or at least the fundamental (ontological) reality making everything up is.

I guess that means Kant was kind of right. As were the ancient Greek metaphysicians in the sense that reality had to be something counter-intuitive, even if they were mostly wrong about the actual ontology, with some exception for the atomists and Heraclitus. — Marchesk

Whatever it is, let's not throw ordinary language philosophy out with the rubbish.

Dunno how reality can be all that far removed from our human experience, when we’re right smack dab in the middle of it. Actually, all our experiences are of material reality, or, the appearance of it anyway. But yes, the ontology behind reality is far removed, I’ll give you that.

Max Tegmark, 2007, thinks it’s mathematical structures all the way down.

Kant is always right!!!!! (Grin)

You need to read more Wittgenstein.

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Now S. is resorting to handwaving.
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Not a quote from Wittgenstein, but just a name-dropping, the invocation of a holy-name.
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So, does S. mean that Wittgenstein provided a definition of an objective, general, noncontextual “There is…”?
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Then quote it.
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Or is does he mean that Wittgenstein said somewhere that that “There is…” has a meaning that is unspeakable, but which we all know anyway?
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S. doesn’t say, but merely (as I said above) invokes a holy-name.
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Wittgenstein has been quoted in these forums as saying something that uses “There is…”. He was quoted as saying that there are no things, just facts.
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For one thing, facts are things. Presumably the quote means that there are no things other than facts.
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What might someone mean when saying that?
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I won’t speculate, because I don’t use that term or claim a meaning for it.
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In any case, whatever Wittgenstein said, to which S. is referring, the saying of something by Wittgenstein doesn't make it true.
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S. has now resorted to thumping his scripture and waving it at me.
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This isn’t complicated:
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1. S. asked a question.
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2. I said that the question is meaningless because it contains and depends on an undefined term.
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3. S. then said that that term has a meaning, though he’s unable to say what it is.
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4. I acknowledge that S. believes that that term has a meaning that S. is unable to express.
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In other words, I acknowledge that S. believes that, and I agree to disagree.
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There’s nothing more to be said on the matter. Argument concluded.
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Michael Ossipoff
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10 M

Ergh. Horrible formatting. You should sort that out. I can't do it for you now that I'm not a moderator.

Point number two is so obviously wrong that it speaks for itself.

And you keep getting point number three wrong in spite of my corrections. Yet you say that this isn't complicated. Why then do you appear to find such a simple correction so complicated that you presumably cannot understand it, and presumably keep wording it wrong as a result?

Dunno how reality can be all that far removed from our human experience, — Mww

I should have specified that the ontological makeup that results in the reality of the human experience (everyday objects, time, space and what not) are pretty far removed from everyday experience.

Whatever it is, let's not throw ordinary language philosophy out with the rubbish. — S

So what does that entail? My problem with ordinary language philosophy is that it seems to stick it's head in the sand regarding the difficult metaphysical and epistemological problems. We know from science that reality can't be simply what we experience. Ancient philosophers knew that as well. Everyday objects of experience aren't enough. There's a reason why naive realism isn't tenable (and by that I mean unreflective naive realism not sophisticated attempts to defend direct realism).

So what does that entail? My problem with ordinary language philosophy is that it seems to stick it'\s head in the sand regarding the difficult metaphysical and epistemological problems. We know from science that reality can't be simply what we experience. Ancient philosophers knew that as well. — Marchesk

It means that whatever it is, or whatever the science says it is, that doesn't mean that we have to start talking funny.

You keep getting point number three wrong, by the way, in spite of my corrections. — S

No, S. did say that the term has a meaning.

...and that he knows what it is.

He won' say what it is.

Either that's because he can't say, or is unwilling to say. It has to be one or the other.

So now is he saying that he can say the meaning, but is unwilling to?

Alright, I'll change # 3 to say:

3. S. then said that that term has a meaning, though he’s either unable or unwilling to say what it is. — Michael Ossipoff

Why then do you appear to find such a simple point so complicated that you cannot understand it? — S

Alright, maybe I misunderstood S. when I thought that he meant that he couldn't say the meaning, when actually he meant that he doesn't want to say it.

But maybe S. meant something else? Forgive me for trying to guess what S. meant to say.. Only S. knows. :D

Michael Ossipoff

10 M

I’m cool with all that.

That's better. Shall we give the next step a shot, so that you don't deliberately make me look unreasonable by taking this out of context? The following question can help with that:

Do you remember the short version of the explanation I gave as to why my unwillingness or inability to do so is unimportant?

Do you remember the short version of the explanation I gave as to why my unwillingness or inability to do so is unimportant? — S

I remember various versions. But I've taken the time to go through your various replies in this conversation, and, lo, your explanations that I found consist only of the ones that I remember.

1. You said that, in reality, I know what you mean, but I'm lying about that.

...and that, because we both know what you mean, it's unnecessary for you to say what it is that you mean.

Here's a quote:

Whether I can or can't, defining it isn't necessary if we understand the meaning, which we do.

2. You kept invoking a census of other members.

3. You mistakenly tried to claim that unqualified, noncontextual, absolute, objective "There is..." is one of those words (like "on" or "this" or "taller", that we know the meaning of from the context of physical pointing or physical-reference. ...that it's one of those terms that, for that reason, needn't be defined in terms of other words.

There's constant disagreement about whether the (infinitely-many) digits of the decimal expression for pi exist, or whether the square-root of 2 exists, or whether abstract facts "exist", etc. There will always be those disagreements, because of the undefinedness of "Exist" and "There is..."

If someone wants to make the broad statement that it all exists, that's fine (but, not making any distinction, it might not be real useful). But not everyone agrees. There's no such accepted definition of "Exist" or "There is..."

As for myself, I avoid using those terms and don't advocate a definition for them or a dividing-line for "existence" or "real".

By the way, that means that i don't believe in any metaphysics or ontology. What I've been mistakenly calling "my metaphysics" isn't really any metaphysics or ontology at all. It's non-metaphysics, non-ontology.

Materialists, for example, believe in a metaphysics. I don't.

Given the lack of accepted definition for the contested term, a definition is called-for if you want to use unqualified "Exist" or "There is"

As I said, I acknowledge that you believe that the term in question has a meaning and that you believe that you know that meaning.

There's nothing more to say.

Michael Ossipoff

10 M



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If it weren't for the involvement of those such as yourself and Janus, I would feel much more like I am in a madhouse! :lol: — S

I have been reading sites like this (including this one) for years. In the past, as long as there was one person per thread (like you in this one) arguing my line of reasoning, then I was content to simply linger. But lately the urge to add my thoughts has been growing, so I am happy that my ego satiation contributes to your sanity :smile:

Oh, and just know that even if you are the ONLY one presenting a certain line of reasoning, there could be some socially awkward person that entirely agrees but will always just lurk (I think you may have done that for me a few times in the past), so thanks and keep it going.

Just realized I am 3 pages behind on this thread. Got some reading to do.

Ok, no prob. It is true there are apt to be rocks in the future. No different in principle than believing there will be rocks in the future. No different in principle than having no reason to think there wouldn’t be rocks in the future, all else being equal. None of those are congruent with the truth statement in the OP. And, truth-apt statements can be false, which means the statement there are no rocks when all the humans are gone is truth-apt. — Mww

Ok, so below is the OP (I think I put enough):

"There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously.

Is there a rock? Yes or no?"

Are you saying if it was phrased this way:

"There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously.

Do you think there is a rock? Yes or no?"

Then it is totally fine?

But post-human rocks are not simple and easily understandable if you actually think about it. — Echarmion

Until I have access to new evidence, I will just assume that "post-human" is rather similar to "pre-human". That's what happens when I actually think about it. I can also invent all sorts of hypothetical possibilities (like "maybe this is all just in my mind"), but actually "thinking" leads me to be agnostic toward those claims.

This is a bit like saying quantum physics "fails" because it goes to great lengths to explain away such simple and easily understandable concepts as discrete objects, or measurements that don't affect that which is measured. — Echarmion

Quantum physics has led to stuff. It has some predictive and explanatory power. Can you give concrete examples of the "gains" of Idealism? See, I would not say quantum physics "fails" because it has "succeeded" in some areas. Aside from sounding good (or bad) in our minds, what has Idealism contributed? By the way, if you can point to hard gains of Idealism, you will be going a long way toward convincing me your position has merit.

Expain to me how this is not just an argument from ignorance? — Echarmion

I had to think about this quite a while, as I am sure I am somewhat ignorant of idealism. I think if you can explain how it is (an argument from ignorance), then that will help. What information do I not know? Like I said, I know of NO "gains" of Idealism. I certainly CANNOT disprove Idealism, but I can't disprove god either. Is there a hypothesis that would allow us to test whether idealism is real? Maybe that pixelated universe thing is a related experiment (although that seems FAR more specific than general idealism)?

@Mww @Echarmion

I just responded to a post from each of you, but realized they are a couple of days old and S may have already replied. If there is nothing new (or worthwhile, hehe) in my posts, feel free to ignore. I will read the rest of the thread and catch up before adding more.

Until I have access to new evidence, I will just assume that "post-human" is rather similar to "pre-human". That's what happens when I actually think about it. I can also invent all sorts of hypothetical possibilities (like "maybe this is all just in my mind"), but actually "thinking" leads me to be agnostic toward those claims. — ZhouBoTong

Agnosticism is a perfectly acceptable position. I agree that we cannot actually know about the objective reality of rocks. I agree with Kantian metaphysics in this regard. But this means that, unlike S, I accept that idealism is at least coherent.

That there were rocks in the past is not an effective argument against idealism, because we only conclude that rocks existed in the past based on observing them in the present. But if we don't know whether present rocks are real, our conclusion about the past isn't warranted, either.

Quantum physics has led to stuff. It has some predictive and explanatory power. Can you give concrete examples of the "gains" of Idealism? See, I would not say quantum physics "fails" because it has "succeeded" in some areas. Aside from sounding good (or bad) in our minds, what has Idealism contributed? By the way, if you can point to hard gains of Idealism, you will be going a long way toward convincing me your position has merit. — ZhouBoTong

Well idealism precedes the scientific method, and certainly influenced it's formulation, so in this sense it has part in it's discoveries. Of course, idealism is not directly concerned with producing predictive models. It'd be unreasonable to expect all philosophy to have predictive power. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of the idealist position is necessary for a proper understanding of the scientific method. This is especially true with regards to Quantum mechanics, which has given rise to a bunch of bad metaphysics trying to square it's findings with a naive realism.

I had to think about this quite a while, as I am sure I am somewhat ignorant of idealism. I think if you can explain how it is (an argument from ignorance), then that will help. What information do I not know? Like I said, I know of NO "gains" of Idealism. I certainly CANNOT disprove Idealism, but I can't disprove god either. Is there a hypothesis that would allow us to test whether idealism is real? Maybe that pixelated universe thing is a related experiment (although that seems FAR more specific than general idealism)? — ZhouBoTong

I was specifically responding to S' post, in which he maintained that idealism wasn't intuitive to him and therefore wrong. That isn't a textbook argument from ignorance, but it's the same kind of thinking.

Idealism cannot be proven or disproven the way that an empirical hypothesis can. It can be argued against. The core of idealism is that at the core of everything we know are our thoughts. Mental phenomena. This includes what we know about things outside of us. The world is a picture in our minds. This much I think, is hard to argue with.

Whether I can or can't, defining it isn't necessary if we understand the meaning, which we do.

@Michael Ossipoff, yep, that's it. I don't want to be like that lawyer in the video, whilst you act like the guy being questioned about a photocopier. (See here).

Your needlessly lengthy ramblings miss the point. It's far more simple than you're making out. It's just a matter of whether or not you understand me when I ask whether there would be a rock. And you do. So that's the end of it.

Are you saying if it was phrased this way:

"There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously.

Do you think there is a rock? Yes or no?"

Then it is totally fine? — ZhouBoTong

It would be funny if that solved his problem, because in asking whether there is a rock, I'm implicitly asking what you guys think.

But post-human rocks are not simple and easily understandable if you actually think about it. — Echarmion

Why not? I've actually thought about it. I'm not the average guy on the street. We're both philosophy-types, remember? I just talk more sense. If I wanted to, I could argue from your position, but I don't agree with it.

Rocks are rocks. They are as defined in English. It's not the rocks that change, it's just the status of our existence that changes: as in, we do or we don't. We know that there are rocks in space that we've never even seen, or felt, or tasted, and suchlike. There were rocks before us, there are rocks now, and there would be rocks after us.

You're just creating problems for yourself. That's all. It's what philosophy-types frequently do without realising it. I'm offering you the resolutions, but you're rejecting them. Psychologically, this could be because it would ruin your image of yourself as a special philosophy guy with lots of insight here which turns our world upside down. You view me as someone who is trying to burst your bubble.

But this means that, unlike S, I accept that idealism is at least coherent. — Echarmion

I don't think that this is the first time in this discussion that someone has falsely claimed that of me. That is, if you mean something like logically possible. I don't like the term "coherent". It's ambiguous.

That there were rocks in the past is not an effective argument against idealism, because we only conclude that rocks existed in the past based on observing them in the present. But if we don't know whether present rocks are real, our conclusion about the past isn't warranted, either. — Echarmion

It's absurd to deny that present rocks are real. It's either genuinely absurd, in the logical sense, or absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use.

I was specifically responding to S' post, in which he maintained that idealism wasn't intuitive to him and therefore wrong. — Echarmion

Wow. That's a gross oversimplification which misrepresents my argument, otherwise known as a straw man.

This is always a massive problem in a debate. If someone sees my argument like that, then it is much more understandable why they reject it, or at least they think they do. Of course, it's not actually my argument that they're rejecting.

The world is a picture in our minds. This much I think, is hard to argue with. — Echarmion

No, it's definitely not. You can come up with clever arguments, sure. You can make it all internally consistent, sure. But if you have a false premise, then your argument is fucked from the start!

As I said in the beginning, there’s nothing inherently wrong with thinking there would be rocks, because sentience is not a requisite for existence. That is to say, just because we’re gone doesn’t imply rocks left with us, which permits the continuance of them. To say anything more than that, especially in a declarative affirmation, is irrational, for the painfully simple reason the proposition, “Is there a rock? Yes”, translatable without loss of coherence to “There is a rock”, is not susceptible to falsification.

Nevertheless, opinions rendered of idealistic bent had already been “reduced to the absurd” by the author, which immediately cauterized any rational argument predicated on pure reason alone.

Can you give concrete examples of the "gains" of Idealism? — ZhouBoTong

Great care is advised here, because there are many disciplines listed under Idealism as a philosophical domain, just as there is in Realism. The purely subjective idealism of Descartes has been pretty much refuted, the Monadology of Leibniz was constructed with insufficient explanatory power and Christian Wolff was far too dogmatic to survive criticism. In short, plain ol’ Idealism, without qualification, can’t be said to have offered much of anything except background for what came after. Just as Realism, in and of itself, is much too ambiguous to have any substance.

And what came after was a paradigm shift, the single greatest such shift in history, with respect to philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. And this shift was predicated on the absolutely necessary attributes of the human subject, in and of itself, which is of course, an idealist position. The difference was how the subjective condition unites with the objective, in a complete theoretical derivation which for the most part still stands today.

Here the gains are most important, to wit: when we talk about the world, it is us telling the world how we understand it, not the world telling us in fact what it is. In other words, it was classically thought that the image in the mind of, say, star, was because of the object itself and knowledge of the star was given by it. The new way says the image “star” belongs to the mind alone, hence the mind is responsible for everything having to do with “star”, meaning we tell ourselves how it is to be known by us. While we are not responsible for the existence of the star, whatever the star is will be determined by us and not by the star.

There’s also the aspect of the new Idealism in the reinstatement of a priori knowledge as being both real and substantial, whereas classically, and even mid-Enlightenment, a priori knowledge was generally either disavowed or at least misunderstood. Like, everybody knew mathematics was always true but nobody knew how it could always be true, what made it always true, with respect to human cognition. It wasn’t the instance of “ideas” in the mind for rememberance of things not in immediate attention, but a very real kind of actual knowledge by means of which intuitions based on extant experience are brought forth.

The greatest gain, if one wishes to think of it that way, is the ground being laid for the dissolution of the church’s stranglehold on philosophy. While religion was still primary in everyday life, the seeds were sown for academia to stand on a different soapbox. The power of the mind began to overshadow the power of the Establishment.

The rest is all downhill.

Rocks are rocks. They are as defined in English. It's not the rocks that change, it's just the status of our existence that changes: as in, we do or we don't. — S

Rocks, as defined by the English language, are a bunch of human observations. So the status of the observer is relevant. But I know you disagree with that.

We know that there are rocks in space that we've never even seen, or felt, or tasted, and suchlike. There were rocks before us, there are rocks now, and there would be rocks after us. — S

All of these are conclusion we have drawn based on observations. So it's true that, in the world we observe, rocks exist independently of any specific observer. It just doesn't follow that they exist independently of observation, period.

You view me as someone who is trying to burst your bubble. — S

My view of you is not that charitable any more, but that's beside the point.

I don't think that this is the first time in this discussion that someone has falsely claimed that of me. That is, if you mean something like logically possible. I don't like the term "coherent". It's ambiguous. — S

I do like the term "coherent" though. Since your position is that idealism is absurd on the face of it and a deviation from ordinary language, I think "coregent" with it's connotation of something being incomprehensible as language, is apt. But I know you refuse to let anyone summarize your position.

It's absurd to deny that present rocks are real. It's either genuinely absurd, in the logical sense, or absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use. — S

Didn't you just say it's logically possible? Anyways I don't accept that "absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use" is a relevant criticism.

No, it's definitely not. You can come up with clever arguments, sure. You can make it all internally consistent, sure. But if you have a false premise, then your argument is fucked from the start! — S

You could show us how the premise is false. But you won't, will you?

Wow. That's a gross oversimplification which misrepresents my argument, otherwise known as a straw man.

This is always a massive problem in a debate. If someone sees my argument like that, then it is much more understandable why they reject it, or at least they think they do. Of course, it's not actually my argument that they're rejecting. — S

One wonders why everyone misunderstands you.

It means that whatever it is, or whatever the science says it is, that doesn't mean that we have to start talking funny. — S

I voted for realism and rocks in your poll. My thinking would be that everyday objects exist more or less as we experience them (with the addition of scientific facts), but they're not ontologically primary. Something else is, which is approximated by physics.

Well this one got long. I really am working on being more concise on this site...very slow progress :grimace:

@S This post got rather long and I may have attempted to represent your view a couple times. I think if you just read the last 2 sentences of the post, you will see what I am getting at (and either agree or NOT).

That there were rocks in the past is not an effective argument against idealism — Echarmion

Maybe this is part of our problem. I do not think I have once in this thread attempted to argue against idealism. I am more asking, "why idealism?" "what does it explain?" (I get that these questions could be seen as an argument against idealism, but that takes an extra step) Similarly, before I engage in an argument against god, I will want someone to show me something that god does. Until then, I will remain agnostic.

I agree that rocks in the past does not refute idealism (as you mentioned some idealist could easily say we don't "know" there were rocks in the past - I suppose the king idealist would say we don't "know" there are rocks now, even this one I am holding in my hand), but I just view this as one of those extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence. Surely to say "there is a rock", is far more ordinary (far less extraordinary) than "you know there might not even be such a thing as those entities we erroneously label as rocks". So not evidence, but decent reasoning...no?

But this means that, unlike S, I accept that idealism is at least coherent. — Echarmion

If S admitted that it is possible we are all in the Matirx (he did so in this thread), then I think that places him more in line with me (sure idealism is possible, but it is meaningless whether it exists or not). I also think the varying degrees of idealism also vary in how coherent they are, and so you may have noticed S vehemently attacking a particular interpretation of idealism.

This is especially true with regards to Quantum mechanics, which has given rise to a bunch of bad metaphysics trying to square it's findings with a naive realism. — Echarmion

This is interesting. I do not have advanced degrees in physics so I do not feel all that qualified to have a strong opinion, but recently I was reading the Wikipedia entry on the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (damn, I must be fun at a party) and one line stood out to me as suggesting the exact opposite of what you have said - ie bad metaphysics attempting to square it's finding with naive idealism. Take a look and let me know what you think:

"It must be emphasized that measurement does not mean only a process in which a physicist-observer takes part, but rather any interaction between classical and quantum objects regardless of any observer." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

This line can be found at the end of the second paragraph (attached to reference #10).

By mentioning that "measurement" exists outside of any observer, it seems the author is worried about what idealists will do with his ideas...right? (I really am wondering if I am right or not here, not just driving my point home)

And if I am reading that correctly, I think it addresses an important distinction in how idealism can be interpreted. If this is a definition of idealism (I tried to find a simple general one, please correct me if it is wrong or incomplete): Idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. This could be interpreted as "we can not know reality except through the mind" which I would say is fine and I think S would agree (how else would we know anything?), but so what? It changes nothing, and explains nothing. However, if the above definition is interpreted as "nothing exists outside the mind" then we have a problem (and I think this is where S starts saying things that imply idealism is incoherent). I am not even saying I know it is false. But if it is true, it implies (directly states?) that we have NO IDEA WHAT REALITY IS. I am fine with being agnostic toward a claim like that. However, how SHOULD one live if they have no idea what reality is? Do you see the question itself becomes meaningless. Again, I am not arguing against idealism, just saying "why should I care?"

The core of idealism is that at the core of everything we know are our thoughts. — Echarmion

Yep, and as long as that means "we can only observe reality through the filter of our mind", I am find with it. If it means "reality only exists in the mind" it has become a hindrance and not a useful tool.

This thread seems as good a place as any to bring this up. Been thinking about this for a while.

There's a way of talking about idealism that most of us on the forums are familiar with. It's a no-nonsense wryness. It's meant as a corrective to out-there thought that's lost its grounding. & that can be a good thing.

Here's the problem:

Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as river. — Qingyuan Weixin

The wryness only really works for the transition from non-mountain back to mountain. It doesn't work if you never understood the 'more intimate knowledge' to begin with, if you've always only seen mountains as mountains. Kurt Vonnegut went to war, Mark Twain was knee-deep in life, before retiring from it to reflect ironically. Their wryness was earned.

What I see in this thread, and many thread like this, is common sense masquerading as a knowing wryness, one it hasn't earned. It's mimicry, a borrowed veneer of knowingness.

“There is a rock”, is not susceptible to falsification. — Mww

So it sounds like adding, "do you think" would have solved the whole thing. Surely, I can not give my opinion without thinking? So isn't adding "do you think" to "is there a rock" redundant?

Great care is advised here, because there are many disciplines listed under Idealism as a philosophical domain, just as there is in Realism. — Mww

Indeed. I am learning as the thread goes along.

And what came after was a paradigm shift, the single greatest such shift in history, with respect to philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. — Mww

And that shift was so complete and profound and that those of alive today have made idealism a part of our lives without even knowing it? Becuase how come, when I hear the philosophy of idealism (the modern one you refer to), I think yeah that seem true, so what? How is it such a massive paradigm shift? It seems to me nothing changed. I few well-educated people just started admitting certain "truths" right?

The new way says the image “star” belongs to the mind alone, hence the mind is responsible for everything having to do with “star”, meaning we tell ourselves how it is to be known by us. — Mww

A nice example of admitting certain "truths" but changing nothing. How did that change how we study the stars?

There’s also the aspect of the new Idealism in the reinstatement of a priori knowledge as being both real and substantial, whereas classically, and even mid-Enlightenment, a priori knowledge was generally either disavowed or at least misunderstood. Like, everybody knew mathematics was always true but nobody knew how it could always be true, what made it always true, with respect to human cognition. It wasn’t the instance of “ideas” in the mind for rememberance of things not in immediate attention, but a very real kind of actual knowledge by means of which intuitions based on extant experience are brought forth. — Mww

I don't think I understand this. Are you saying concepts like math were a priori in that they already existed and humans discovered them (I hope). Or are you saying that knowledge of math was(is) already inside people's minds (I hope not, but please do your best to explain - I can let you know now that I will likely be a terrible student as I am struggling to make any sense of that).

The power of the mind began to overshadow the power of the Establishment. — Mww

And here I had to think my way out of the church without even knowing what idealism was :grin: Doesn't this suggest that I didn't NEED idealism to do that - I would also point out that my becoming atheist was very tied to no longer NEEDING god to explain how I exist, or how the universe operates.
I suppose that you would say that I was using idealism without knowing it. But if I already had/have the same benefits, why do I NEED to know idealism? It happens to be interesting, so I may WANT to know, but I do not expect it to benefit me in any way.

Rocks, as defined by the English language, are a bunch of human observations. So the status of the observer is relevant. But I know you disagree with that. — Echarmion

Yes, I disagree with that because it's obviously wrong. It's ludicrous for human observations to have preexisted humans, yet rocks did. They did so for millions of years. So, again, you're doing something wrong.

All of these are conclusion we have drawn based on observations. So it's true that, in the world we observe, rocks exist independently of any specific observer. It just doesn't follow that they exist independently of observation, period. — Echarmion

Who was observing rocks when no one existed for there to be any observation of anything at all? Ludicrous.

I do like the term "coherent" though. Since your position is that idealism is absurd on the face of it and a deviation from ordinary language, I think "coregent" with it's connotation of something being incomprehensible as language, is apt. But I know you refuse to let anyone summarize your position. — Echarmion

No, it's okay for people to summarise my position when they're competent enough to do so correctly.

I'm not claiming that it's incomprehensible as a language. I'm making points that it's unsound or a bad way of speaking or a combination of the two.

Didn't you just say it's logically possible? Anyways I don't accept that "absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use" is a relevant criticism. — Echarmion

There was an "either" there. That clearly means that I don't think that it's necessarily impossible. And it doesn't matter whether or not you accept it, because you're wrong either way.

You could show us how the premise is false. But you won't, will you? — Echarmion

The world preexisted us, so it preexisted our minds, so your premise that the world is a picture in our minds is false.

One wonders why everyone misunderstands you. — Echarmion

It's not everyone. Some understand me better than others.