So what counts as linguistic meaning?

Meaning expressed via language use, I presume.

Using language requires following the rules of language. Linguistic meaning requires following the rules of language.

There is no rule against coining new terms or using existing terms in novel ways. So, I would think that so long as enough people use the term in the same way, then eventually it would be - by definition - an accepted use.

That is, all linguistic meaning is existentially dependent upon following the rules of language... new and novel uses notwithstanding. There are no examples to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground . Rules are clearly necessary.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same?

Well I probably missed it in the thread, but with all this discussion of "rules", I don't think there was ever a definition, so...

rule: one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct within a particular activity or sphere.

Looks like @Janus wins!

@Terrapin Station and @Metaphysician Undercover: Which part of that seems to disagree with anything Janus and @S have been saying? I see no requirement of consequences and it is explicitly stated that it does NOT have to be explicitly stated (notice "or understood").

I think I agree with @S that all of us are really just whining about semantics (someone said that in this thread anyway, sorry if it was not S).

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same? — creativesoul

These are interesting questions quite apart from any specific definition of the term "rule".

The rules would have to depend on some kind of communication. Otherwise they cannot be shared. That communication is not yet language, but it allows connections to be made on the part of observers.

The rules then consist of a bunch of connections of symbols (in any form) to observations, and connections of symbols to other connections and other symbols.

Alright, enlighten me then, smarty-pants. Gimmie the lowdown. — S

Baden beat me to it.

I'm gonna quote in it full, only because I don't know how to link to a post:

It's trivially true that language originated in humans, but it was not "invented" as if there was some conscious effort at design involved. Language develops organically. The world's most recently developed language, Nicaraguan Sign Language, is a case in point. The route from creole to full language occurred through the children of parents who used the creole and added grammatical complexity spontaneously.

So the process there is something like rudimentary tools of communication being automatically transformed into a language, which allows for more advanced communication and from which rules are retroactively inferred and codification occurrs. The communication comes first then becomes more complex. And only at that point can you start to talk about a set of rules which defines how the language functions.

So, the quote

With English, in a nutshell, it seems to me that people invented the language, made up the rules, agreed on them, started speaking it, started using it as a tool for communication
— quoted in the OP, unattributed

is senseless from a linguistic point of view (and really from any point of view to the extent it implies people invented and debated rules with each other before using language as a tool for communication).

It's true we don't know for sure how quickly or gradually language developed (there are competing theories), but there does seem to be an in-built capacity that kicks in with children to the extent that they can unconsciously create complex linguistic form. It's important though to stress the lack of purposeful design / agreement.

That more or less covers what I was gonna say.

Fine. As you would put it, I was "playing extremely fast and loose with 'invent', 'agree' etc.". Just as there's a bad way to interpret what Rousseau was trying to do, there's a bad to interpret what I'm trying to do.

But I will award you and Baden a point each if that's what you're after from me.

Why not play slow and tight with your words, instead of putting them out there in a way that almost guarantees misinterpretation? I think you meant exactly what you said, terrapin's 'origination' thing nonwithstanding.

Why not play slow and tight with your words, instead of putting them out there in a way that almost guarantees misinterpretation? — csalisbury

I'm only human? Sorry I'm not perfect. You do know I'm only playing around when I say otherwise, right?

We all make mistakes. But I think you were suggesting a very specific kind of situation, and are backing out w/ plausible deniability.

We all make mistakes. But I think you were suggesting a very specific kind of situation, and are backing out w/ plausible deniability. — csalisbury

No, I think that I could have left out the talk about the origins of language, and in hindsight, maybe I should have. What I'm trying to get at is deeper than that. Even if the origins were or are a mystery, surely I can still enquire about what it is, ontologically, and how it works, and things like that. The clue is in the title. It says "Ontology", not "Origins".

The clue is in the title. It says "Ontology", not "Origins". — S

Am I dense for focusing on the text of the OP rather than the title? All the 'ontology' here is bound up with 'origins.' There's no mystery here. That's how the OP was structured. It's a poisoned well.

Am I dense... — csalisbury

You shouldn't begin questions like that with me. Are you trying to get me in trouble?

Am I dense for focusing on the text of the OP rather than the title? All the 'ontology' here is bound up with 'origins.' There's no mystery here. That's how the OP was structured. It's a poisoned well. — csalisbury

And what is that ontology? How does that quote even begin to address that?

It talks about origin and development, and then it ends by saying that "only at that point can you start to talk about a set of rules which defines how the language functions". It also says a little bit more, after quoting what I said, in that same vein about development and suchlike, and about how language functions.

So, what the heck is a set of rules, ontologically? What's what? How do the ontological relations work?

So, what the heck is a set of rules, ontologically? What's what? How do the ontological relations work? — S

Alright, so, bracketing genesis, and given that a language exists --- a set of rules is a set of rules. Ontologically? I guess the being of a set of rules is the being of a set of rules?

Are you asking if rules have heft?

Terrapin Station and Metaphysician Undercover: Which part of that seems to disagree with anything Janus and @S have been saying? I see no requirement of consequences and it is explicitly stated that it does NOT have to be explicitly stated (notice "or understood"). — ZhouBoTong

How does a convention or something merely understood but not explicit govern conduct? You don't have to follow any convention. There's no punitive action for not doing so. What sort of government is it if there's no punitive action for not following any of its rules? Under that government, I can do absolutely anything I like. Other folks may not like it, and they might bitch and moan, but so what? I can do whatever I want, including murder, rape, etc. I'd not be controlled in any way. I'm only controlled if there is specific punitive action for breaking rules. Otherwise I'm not really governed, am I?

And yeah, obviously it's semantics. Semantics is philosophy of meaning. And we're talking about different ways that we use a word.

Alright, so, bracketing genesis, and given that a language exists --- a set of rules is a set of rules. Ontologically? I guess the being of a set of rules is the being of a set of rules?

Are you asking if rules have heft? — csalisbury

Tautologies like that aren't helpful, and I don't even understand your last question about what I'm asking.

I'm asking what kind of thing a set of rules is, fundamentally. What kind of thing is a set, fundamentally? What kind of a thing is a rule, fundamentally? What kind of thing is language? What kind of thing is meaning? What do they consist of, on a fundamental level? Physical? Mental? Abstract? Concrete? Objective? Subjective? Location? No location? Is location a category error? How does interaction work? How does it all tie together to result in language use?

A set of rules, ontologically, requires meaning assignments, and that only happens via people thinking about the utterances, the text, etc. in specific ways--which is their brain functioning in particular ways.

Re our meaning dispute, I'm not sure if you're imagining people literally being taken out of the picture. If we have something like a dictionary, say, where there are ink marks like this: "dog - a domesticated carnivorous mammal that typically has a long snout, an acute sense of smell, nonretractable claws, and a barking, howling, or whining voice," if people are literally out of the picture, how do those ink marks amount to anything other than a set of ink marks on paper?

A set of rules, ontologically, requires meaning assignments, and that only happens via people thinking about the utterances, the text, etc. in specific ways--which is their brain functioning in particular ways. — Terrapin Station

It requires meaning assignments for what, though? This was the reoccurring problem before, in the other discussion, if I recall correctly.

Re our meaning dispute, I'm not sure if you're imagining people literally being taken out of the picture. If we have something like a dictionary, say, where there are ink marks like this: "dog - a domesticated carnivorous mammal that typically has a long snout, an acute sense of smell, nonretractable claws, and a barking, howling, or whining voice," if people are literally out of the picture, how do those ink marks amount to anything other than a set of ink marks on paper? — Terrapin Station

Because it's also a statement, a definition, and it means something. The difference is that you think that this requires a subject there at the time to understand it, and I do not. I don't think that you ever justified that in a logical manner. Maybe this amounts to just another fairly trivial semantic disagreement. You use those words differently.

Because it's also a statement, a definition, and it means something. — S

That's your claim. The question is how it does any of that when we just have a set of ink marks on paper and no people exist. The justification for my position is the complete absence of any account or explanation how it amounts to anything aside from a set of ink marks on paper.

That's your claim. The question is how it does any of that when we just have a set of ink marks on paper and no people exist. The justification for my position is the complete absence of any account or explanation how it amounts to anything aside from a set of ink marks on paper. — Terrapin Station

You know my argument, though. Or you should do. So we shouldn't just start from scratch.

About @S: You can lead a horse to the trough, but it’s illegal to hold its head down and drown it. :P

You know my argument, though. Or you should do — S

I don't remember you ever trying to explain just how it would be/become something other than a set of ink marks on paper. It always seemed that you just avoided confronting that problem

I don't remember you ever trying to explain just how it would be/become something other than a set of ink marks on paper. — Terrapin Station

My argument set out what it was beforehand and rejected that it would magically change. The only possible reason for it to change without magic is if your hidden premise is true, but if you haven't justified your hidden premise and I can find no justification by my own assessment, then I have no reasonable basis for believing your hidden premise to be true.

I can give you countless examples of rules which exist in the form of language, and could not exist without language to express them. In order to disprove my inductive conclusion, that rules require language to express them, you need to present some rules which do not require language to express them, or demonstrate how the rules which we express in language could exist without language. Otherwise you might reject my inductive conclusion, but your rejection is rather meaningless. And, an inductive conclusion is based in observation and reason, it is not a matter of "begging the question" as you are wont to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you call your inductive conclusion is an irrelevant conclusion. It is both true and beside the point that rules require language to express them. I'm not going to keep repeating that. And I certainly don't need to meet your unreasonable criterion of expressing rules without expressing them.

What you need to validly demonstrate is not that rules require language to express them, but that rules do not exist independently of their expression in language, which is to deny that there can be a rule at a given moment in time, and at that time it is not being expressed in language.

Please be careful not to misunderstand the relevant sense of independence here. It is either the sense described above, or it is your own sense, and your own sense is not relevant to my argument, and if you go by it, then you'll just be talking past me, as you are wont to do.

You providing countless examples of rules expressed in language - which I can do myself - doesn't meet your burden of proof, just as showing me lots of white swans doesn't meet the burden of proof that there are no black swans.

An abstraction requires language, because a symbol is required to represent the thing abstracted. Otherwise the thing abstracted has no presence, and there is no such thing as the abstraction. You are using "abstraction" as a noun, not a verb. — Metaphysician Undercover

The existence of a symbol doesn't require that it be expressed in language, which is sufficient reason to believe that if abstractions are symbols, and rules are abstractions, then rules don't require to be expressed in language in order to exist. Even though that conclusion is obvious and a matter of common sense to begin with, so it shouldn't really need a logical argument behind it.

Also, a rule presupposes a language for its expression. — Mww

How are some people going so spectacularly wrong here in terms of logical relevancy? No one here should be talking about language being necessary for a rule to be expressed.

Right, I think this is the important point here. And to relate this to what I say above, it is this expression in language which gives the principle, or rule its particularity and this is its existence as a thing. That's what I told S, in the question about abstraction. An abstraction only exists as a thing, if there is a symbol. The symbol is what allows the abstraction to have actual existence as a thing. One might try to separate the principle or rule, from the language which expresses it, like one might try to separate the abstraction from the symbol which represents it, but there is no sense to this unless we allow that the symbol is prior to the principle represented, and then what is the symbol at that time before it represents something? It can't be said to be a symbol. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to be muddling up representation and expression. That a symbol represents a thing is obviously a representation. Whereas if I say, "This symbol represents that thing", that's obviously an expression. I'm not saying that a rule doesn't need to represent or correspond to anything. I'm saying that it doesn't need to be expressed. The rule and the expression of a rule are two different things, obviously. Why else would we have different words at our disposal for distinguishing between the two? How are you going to explain that one away? Do you really interpret me to be saying that the rule and the rule are two different things? I don't think so. I think that that would require a conscious effort on your part. It seems very disingenuous.

Sure, I agreed with Janus on this point. But not all cases of behavioural patterns are cases of rule following. So the premise "if there is behavioural patterns, there is rule following" is not a true premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, but it makes sense to call the behavioural patterns in question rule following, as Janus plausibly argued. If you don't want to call them that, then you're free to do so, but if you were to say that it doesn't make sense to call them that, then that would ring hollow.

I don't see your argument here. Both, "he has eggs for breakfast", and, "people should respect others and wait their turns", are written in words. The fact that you say "it is an unwritten rule" does not negate the fact that it is actually written in words.

Try this. Take away the words "he has eggs for breakfast", Now, the person gets up every morning and has eggs for breakfast, nice pattern. How does this pattern become a rule, unless it is stated as such? Or do you think the person gets up and thinks there is a rule that I must have eggs every morning for breakfast therefore I must have eggs, and so decides to have eggs? And try the other, so-called unwritten rule, "people should respect others and wait there turn". Take away those words, and what are you left with? It's certainly not "a rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this amounts to nothing other than a) expressed rules are expressed rules, and b) I assume that rules must be expressed, therefore they are. That's a tautology which misses the point, followed by begging the question.

That you claim that you can't comprehend a rule that isn't expressed is not a logically valid basis for concluding that rules must be expressed, just as you claiming that you couldn't comprehend a potato that isn't mashed would not be a valid basis for concluding that potatoes must be mashed. The fallacy this time around is known as an argument from incredulity.

It's not very productive to engage with that, except as a game of spot the fallacy to keep us on our toes. But if you want to move beyond that, then you would have to up your game. A lot.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?
— creativesoul

The rules would have to depend on some kind of communication. Otherwise they cannot be shared. — Echarmion

For their existence? So for there to be rules, there must be communication? They must be able to be shared? Which obviously necessitates subjects to do the communication. To do the sharing.

That was after all what the question was explicitly asking about: existence. If so, then that's a controversial assumption which would require justification.

The rules then consist of a bunch of connections of symbols (in any form) to observations, and connections of symbols to other connections and other symbols. — Echarmion

But when you say that, it becomes boring, because you're forcing idealism through defining rules in terms of observations.

If there are rules, then by definition there are observations, and if there are observations, then there must be observers. :yawn:

Is this really all that idealism has to offer? One can define virtually anything into being true. But that's trivial.

How about this? Rules are supposed to be followed, and following has a connection with our Creator. So, since there are rules, our Creator exists. There can't be the one without the other.

It's just like with rocks. I take a normal dictionary definition. You then add the interpretation that it's about observations. I could just as well take the additional interpretation that it's about our Creator, so that where there are rocks, there is our Creator. Or, alternatively, we could be sensible and cut that out with Ockham's razor.

My argument set out what it was beforehand and rejected that it would magically change. The only possible reason for it to change without magic is if your hidden premise is true, but if you haven't justified your hidden premise and I can find no justification by my own assessment, then I have no reasonable basis for believing your hidden premise to be true. — S

So first, we're going to assume that it doesn't "magically change" when there are no people around.

If it doesn't magically change, and meaning exists independently of people once it's created, then once people are absent, there should still be meaning. So, the question becomes this: in a world with no people, how exactly does a dictionary, for example, amount to meaning, when all we're talking about is a set of ink marks on some paper?