Sure, so is Herbert Hoover president now?

It seems like a tautology isn't sufficient to make ontological claims about what obtains at a particular time, no?

Sure, so is Herbert Hoover president now?

It seems like a tautology isn't sufficient to make ontological claims about what obtains at a particular time, no? — Terrapin Station

What's your point? That wasn't what I intended. I was contrasting my logic with psychologism logic to show you why it wouldn't change from beforehand to afterwards. There is nothing in my logic to imply that it would change. If it obtains beforehand, and the same conditions for it obtaining remain in place, then obviously it will obtain afterwards. That was my point.

And it obtains in correspondence to the language rule. I don't think that the language rule would magically disappear or magically cease to apply. You draw different conclusions because you go by different premises. How many times are we going to have to go over this? It always comes back to you, but you always turn it back on me, so it ends up being a pretty pointless back and forth.

Oh my god, what a joke. It's just a way of wording it which is relative or conditional, and yet maintains objectivity. Meaning is relative to the language rule. It's also a very common way of speaking: "What does 'chein' mean in English?", "It means 'dog' in English", "Sorry, I'm unfamiliar with that word in English, what does it mean?", "The word 'dog' in English means a furry creature with four legs and a tail which barks". — S

So what about the other very common way of speaking that I pointed out? Is that not relevant? And if it isn't, why not?

What's your point? That wasn't what I intended. I was contrasting my logic with psychologism logic to show you why it wouldn't change from beforehand to afterwards. There is nothing in my logic to imply that it would change. — S

Likewise, there's nothing in "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president" to imply that that will change, is there?

If it obtains beforehand, and the same conditions for it obtaining remain in place, then obviously it will obtain afterwards. That was my point. — S

The conditions for it obtaining are exactly the point, though. What are they? Simply stating the tautology doesn't tell us anything about that. SImply stating the tautology is just the same as stating "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president." Yep--that's a tautology alright. But it doesn't imply that Herbert Hoover is president for all time, because there are certain things that need to be the case for Herbert Hoover to be president, and those things don't remain unchanged for all time, they wouldn't obtain if no people existed, etc.

And it obtains in correspondence to the language rule. — S

And how does the language rule obtain? If it does via something written, for example, then we're right back to asking how something written amounts to anything other than, say, ink marks on paper. Hence why I asked that question. Just repeating some tautology doesn't help. It doesn't tell us anything. No more than repeating the Herbert Hoover tautology.

There's also a rule that Herbert Hoover is president when he is, by the way.

And there was a rule (per your analysis) that "flirt" meant what I noted above. It no longer does. But there was a rule about that.

So what about the other very common way of speaking that I pointed out? Is that not relevant? And if it isn't, why not? — Echarmion

It's only relevant in a particular context, and it isn't relevant in the context I have set up. The subjective interpretation is useful in a subjective context, such as "What do you mean?", but it is obviously inappropriate in the context I'm talking about. I'm obviously talking about the objective angle, which you might well reject, but your rejection doesn't effect me. The objective context is as I set out, for example "What does it mean?". Again, it would be very silly to apply the subjective angle in a necessarily objective context, such as the post-subject scenario, but that doesn't stop idealists from frequently doing so. Metaphysician Undercover is a perfect example of that: "But who would be there to understand it?", "But how would it sound?", etc. These are frankly stupid questions to ask an objectivist, or anyone really, given that there's explicitly no subjects there.

How very “Xenophan-ic” of you!!

Can you spell “categorical error”?

The mashed potato thing is nothing but a form of “I know you are but what am I”

Try harder.

It's only relevant in a particular context, and it isn't relevant in the context I have set up. The subjective interpretation is useful in a subjective context, such as "What do you mean?", but it is obviously inappropriate in the context I'm talking about. I'm obviously talking about the objective angle, which you might well reject, but your rejection doesn't effect me. The objective context is as I set out, for example "What does it mean?". Again, it would be very silly to apply the subjective angle in a necessarily objective context, such as the post-subject scenario, but that doesn't stop idealists from frequently doing so. Metaphysician Undercover is a perfect example of that: "But who would be there to understand it?", "But how would it sound?", etc. These are frankly stupid questions to ask an objectivist, or anyone really, given that there's explicitly no subjects there. — S

Isn't accepting an objective context for meaning already the conclusion you want to draw? Your conclusion that meaning is objective is inherent in your premise that there is an objective context in which to discuss meaning.

How very “Xenophan-ic” of you!!

Can you spell “categorical error”?

The mashed potato thing is nothing but a form of “I know you are but what am I”

Try harder. — Mww

I will try harder to ignore you when you reply like that.

Isn't accepting an objective context for meaning already the conclusion you want to draw? Your conclusion that meaning is objective is inherent in your premise that there is an objective context in which to discuss meaning. — Echarmion

I didn't mean to suggest that the context necessarily is objective. But it at least makes sense to call it that, because it makes sense as an objective context, even if you disagree and decide to read subjectivity into it. If you read subjectivity into it, then of course it won't make sense to you as anything other than that, but that'd be a result of what you yourself are doing. It would be a problem of your own creation.

That's different from what I called a subjective context, where we both agree that a subject is necessarily implied. If you ask, "What do you mean?", then obviously that assumes a subject there who is being asked a question.

If you were to ask, "What does it mean?", then that removes the subject from the equation. I can give an answer to that in objective terms.

The former is about me and what I mean, whereas the latter is about it and what it means. That's an important difference.

If you don't assume a subjective interpretation of what I'm calling an objective context, then how else would you interpret this context? If you say that it's either subjectivism or it's not possible, then you'd be demonstrably wrong, because myself and others can make sense of it in objective terms. It would just be an argument from incredulity on your part. Likewise with the post-human rock scenario. And it would be disingenuous, too. We all know that you can imagine the hypothetical scenario. You're just as capable as the rest of us in that regard.

Ok.

Likewise, there's nothing in "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president" to imply that that will change, is there? — Terrapin Station

So you're agreeing with me?

The conditions for it obtaining are exactly the point, though. What are they? Simply stating the tautology doesn't tell us anything about that. Simply stating the tautology is just the same as stating "If Herbert Hoover is president, then Herbert Hoover is president." Yep--that's a tautology alright. But it doesn't imply that Herbert Hoover is president for all time, because there are certain things that need to be the case for Herbert Hoover to be president, and those things don't remain unchanged for all time, they wouldn't obtain if no people existed, etc. — Terrapin Station

Herbert Hoover is president if he's president. But he's obviously not. Someone else is.

The word "dog" in English means those furry things which bark, if that's what it means in English. And that is what it means in English.

You obviously agree with me on both of these points, so your criticism seems superficial. If you know the language, then you know what it means. You're just dancing around the real issue of your complete lack of justification for your supposed necessary dependence.

I've already given the conditions for it obtaining. And they're obvious anyway. Is there such a thing as the English language? Yes. Is there such a word in the English language as "dog"? Yes. Is it such that this word has a meaning? Yes. How do you know this? Because I know the language. What is the meaning of the word? It means those furry things which bark.

Quit acting like you're an extraterrestrial who has just landed on planet Earth.

None of this is at issue. The only thing at issue here is your unjustified premise, so stop deflecting and start attempting to support it.

And how does the language rule obtain? If it does via something written, for example, then we're right back to asking how something written amounts to anything other than, say, ink marks on paper. Hence why I asked that question. Just repeating some tautology doesn't help. It doesn't tell us anything. No more than repeating the Herbert Hoover tautology.

There's also a rule that Herbert Hoover is president when he is, by the way.

And there was a rule (per your analysis) that "flirt" meant what I noted above. It no longer does. But there was a rule about that. — Terrapin Station

Why does it matter how it obtains when we can know that it does and would? I know this. I don't need to explain how it is that I can ride a bike. The fact is that I can ride one, and I know it.

You need to show that your doubt is reasonable, and you haven't done that. What are you waiting for?

And old rules don't do anything to my argument. There's either a particular meaning relative to a corresponding rule or there isn't. It doesn't matter if you pick an old one that's barely used or a current one that's frequently used. You can even make up your own rules and language. It doesn't make a difference.

Let's see if we agree on a couple things so we don't have to go back over them:

We agree that "If x is/means/etc. y, then x is/means/etc. y" is tautological.

And we agree that the tautology in question doesn't imply that any x is/means/etc. y for all time, right? We agree that there is more required for an x being/meaning/etc. y to obtain for all time than just that tautology.

Let's see if we agree on a couple things so we don't have to go back over them:

We agree that "If x is/means/etc. y, then x is/means/etc. y" is tautological.

And we agree that the tautology in question doesn't imply that any x is/means/etc. y for all time, right? We agree that there is more required for an x being/meaning/etc. y to obtain for all time than just that tautology. — Terrapin Station

Yes, and the problem is still nothing on my end, but rather your irrational belief that the change of circumstances results in a cessation of meaning.

Things don't magically change without reason. If there were no justified reason for us to believe that Herbert Hoover had ceased to be president, then it would be rational to believe that he is still president.

Your belief is irrational because it is founded on an unjustified premise.

All of your questions, and all of your criticisms, and all of your challenges, stem back to this.

If you disagree that it's irrational, which you probably do, then you need to try to justify this premise, which you probably won't. Hence I am considering whether I should just give up trying.

It remains the case that if something obtains beforehand, and the same conditions for it obtaining remain in place, then obviously it will obtain afterwards.

By my logic, and by my reasoning, the same conditions for it obtaining would remain in place. Therefore, it would obtain.

Your logic contains an unjustified premise that there's a necessary dependence relating to meaning and the circumstances. And because of this unjustified premise, you reach a different conclusion. You really don't want to focus on this, because you'll be exposed as irrational. So you constantly deflect attention away from this and back on to some aspect of my position.

Again, my analysis from before is apt: Beforehand, x means y. And, absent any contradiction, afterwards, x still means y. You create your own contradiction because of your additional premises. But I don't have that problem. You keep trying to make your problem my problem: this actually seems to be what a lot of problems in philosophy boil down to.

You're right and in saying that the text is nothing but "some marks on some paper",Terrapin is emitting (figurative) turds form his (figurative) mouth; the dictionary preserved in the cave, say, when humans have all disappeared, could indeed be deciphered by a visiting alien race in the future. If there is something to be deciphered, then there is meaning there, QED.

You're right and in saying that the text is nothing but "some marks on some paper", Terrapin is emitting (figurative) turds from his (figurative) mouth; the dictionary preserved in the cave, say, when humans have all disappeared, could indeed be deciphered by a visiting alien race in the future. If there is something to be deciphered, then there is meaning there, QED. — Janus

Indeed. :up:

He seems to erroneously believe that simply calling it "a set of ink marks on some paper", and/or simply assuming his beliefs about physicalism in relation to meaning, is a reasonable way to go about making his case.

His argument here is basically:

"Given all of my controversial assumptions, you're wrong".

And that's what his other argument seems to have boiled down to also. Something along the lines of:

"Given that when I assess your argument, I run into contradiction in light of my own unjustified premise, your argument is unsound".

These are the very same problems that Metaphysician Undercover got stuck on in the other discussion, and they sent us around in circles for page after page after page.

The big problem for them is not realising that their problems are their problems, and not my problems. Ironically, my reasoning in my argument with Terrapin applies here as well. If the conditions for this being the case haven't changed, which they haven't, then it will continue to be the case; and, lo and behold, it is!

Another irony is that I actually agree with what they are effectively saying. Yes, given all of your controversial assumptions, I'm wrong. Yes, given that when you assess my argument, you run into contradiction in light of your own unjustified premise, you do indeed believe that my argument is consequently unsound.

But do I grant these controversial assumptions and unjustified hidden premises? No, certainly not.

What I'm going by is empirical evidence. There's no empirical evidence of meaning obtaining outside of people thinking in particular ways. There's no evidence of meaning obtaining in any closed environment devoid of people, and there's thus no reason to believe that meaning would obtain in a world absent people.

That could very well be wrong. What would support that it's wrong would be empirical evidence of meaning obtaining outside of thought.

The empirical evidence is that we can decipher ancient texts and tablets etc that have been discovered after being hidden for millennia. If they consisted only in merely meaningless marks we could never decipher them, because there would be, in that case, no meaning there to decipher.

The empirical evidence there is of us doing something. There's zero evidence of meaning obtaining outside of that.

We obviously do not think of the marks as being meaningless. The question is whether they have meaning outside of that. There's no evidence that they do.

What I'm going by is empirical evidence. There's no empirical evidence of meaning obtaining outside of people thinking in particular ways. There's no evidence of meaning obtaining in any closed environment devoid of people, and there's thus no reason to believe that meaning would obtain in a world absent people. — Terrapin Station

And going by empirical evidence where it's inappropriate is what I call extreme empiricism. I reject extreme empiricism because it's unreasonable.

The idea that it would ever be inappropriate, especially when we're talking about ontology, is ridiculous.

The idea that it would ever be inappropriate, especially when we're talking about ontology, is ridiculous. — Terrapin Station

No, it's ridiculous that people in our contemporary stage of philosophy still go by these outdated views with similarities with logical positivism which has long since been refuted.

No one is saying anything about "verification" or anything like that.

No one is saying anything about "verification" or anything like that. — Terrapin Station

If you're not suggesting something along the lines that we'd need to experience it in some way to verify whether or not there's meaning, then what are you suggesting? Just vaguely mentioning empirical evidence isn't very helpful, and you sure sound like a logical positivist from what you've said.

What happened to what I just typed? There's zero evidence of meaning outside of thought. That has nothing to do with logical positivism.

What happened to what I just typed? There's zero evidence of meaning outside of thought. That has nothing to do with logical positivism. — Terrapin Station

You specified empirical evidence. Don't backtrack.

I made a reasonable argument. Consider that your evidence. And get your wording right: the argument is that it would obtain.

Yes -- evidence, empirical evidence. Why do I have to spell that out completely every time? You can't remember what I said?

Yes -- evidence, empirical evidence. Why do I have to spell that out completely every time? — Terrapin Station

Wow. If you only meant empirical evidence, then we're back to square one in three seconds flat. That was a very fast lap.

And going by empirical evidence where it's inappropriate is what I call extreme empiricism. I reject extreme empiricism because it's unreasonable. — S

Otherwise, consider my reasonable argument evidence.

Wtf? I just said that it's ridiculous in my opinion to think that empirical evidence is ever inappropriate, especially when we're doing ontology. That has nothing to do with logical positivism.

Wtf? I just said that it's ridiculous in my opinion to think that empirical evidence is ever inappropriate, especially when we're doing ontology. That has nothing to do with logical positivism. — Terrapin Station

Why should I care? I think it's ridiculous that you think it's ridiculous. Elaborate or we won't get anywhere.

Why should I care? — S

That's how conversations work, dude.