It's okay if your answer is that we can't point at meanings contra expressions of meanings, but if so, that's one important difference between meaning and potatoes or oranges. — Terrapin Station
Trying to parse the op:
A mashed potato is a potato that's been physically modified.
We can express (a very specific meaning of express) an orange to produce orange juice.
Meaning can be expressed in language.
Idealists think that mind is necessary for the existence of a thing.
[the thrust of the post? I'm lost here] — csalisbury
Given congruent, re: similarly constructed, rationalities, if to “point at meaning” is to indicate an origin for it, or if to “point at meaning” is to summarize its possibility, I can offer such pointing to be none other than reason itself, in the form a judgement whereby a conception conforms to its object or it does not. Here, it is judgement that points to, or in effect, mediates, meaning. Meaning is merely a product of reason and in no way is a property of that which reason examines.
As you say, you have to do something theoretical. — Mww
Some things are their expression. Pain is the canonical example. — csalisbury
And a mashed potato isn't an expression of a potato in the way a rule made explict expressed the rule. — csalisbury
The move from potato to orange juice to rules seems to rely on the linguistic quirk that one meaning of 'expression' is squeezing out. — csalisbury
The problem with this for S's view is that S claims that meaning would exist if no people existed. — Terrapin Station
The expression of pain is not pain. I cry out or grimace - the expression - because I am in pain. I can make that same expression even when I'm not in pain.
That seems to make as little sense as all of the other examples when conflated.
Even Wittgenstein claimed that the word "pain" does make reference to a sensation (not an expression). But he didn't think that it described it.
I don't know where you're getting this from or why you think it. — S
Some people on the forum deny certain distinctions. They claim that a rule is the expression of a rule, or that an orange is the appearance of an orange. The opening post reinforces the distinction, and shows why it matters. They say things like all rules are expressed in language, and that there is nothing but appearance. — S
As I understand it, the common thread linking the examples in the OP is a particular tripartite structure.
For example, with expression, you have
(1) the thing expressed (say, a meaning)
(2) the expressing (say, the writing down of the word)
(3) the expression itself (say, a word)
Expression is taken as a particular example of a more general structure:
(1) something
(2) Something that happens to that something
(3)something else. — csalisbury
But, being charitable, it seems to me that if people have been talking about rules in the way you describe, what they mean is that a rule simply is an statement about what's allowed, what's prohibited etc etc. They are denying that there is an antecedent (1) that undergoes a (2) to become a (3). (I'm not saying I agree - I don't - but I think this is what they must mean.) — csalisbury
Likewise, the idealist (or one type of idealist) is saying the apple is its appearance. There is not some antecedent thing, which then appears. The idealist probaly wouldn't say 'you're not eating an apple, you're eating its appearance' in the same way a nonidealist wouldn't say 'you're not eating an apple, you're eating its being'. They'd say 'you're eating an apple.' (Again, I'm not taking a stance here.) — csalisbury
Any talk of expression butts up, ultimately, against some kind of bedrock - otherwise you have a situation where everything is an expression of something else. Some things must be primitive - they may or may not be expressed, but they are not themselves expressions. — csalisbury
Another way to say this would be that they only express themselves. It seems like these people talking about rules consider rules to be things of this sort. Idealists consider appearance to be something of this sort. (I was talking about pain in this way, as well). — csalisbury
As a non-idealist, I'm happy to clarify that by eating an apple, you're eating a particular object. That doesn't seem absurd to me at all. It seems true. That's not the case with eating an appearance. — S
An idealist could also say that in eating an apple, they're eating a particular object. — csalisbury
There's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it. The expressing of it produces expressed meaning in the form of language. A statement is an expression of meaning in language. The meaning isn't necessarily expressed. The expressed meaning is necessarily expressed. The meaning is different in ways to the expressed meaning, so they're not the same. — S
There's the orange, and there's the experience of it. There's the orange, and then there's how it appears.
...
We all know, at least deep down, that this makes perfect sense. — S
I eat the orange. Have I eaten the experience? Have I eaten how it appears? — S
There's the orange, and then there's how it appears. — S
an orange just is the experience. — Michael
Sure, but they wouldn't mean what they say, and what they really mean doesn't make sense. — S
Another way to say this would be that they only express themselves. It seems like these people talking about rules consider rules to be things of this sort. Idealists consider appearance to be something of this sort. (I was talking about pain in this way, as well). — csalisbury
And I disagree with all of you. — S
shake your head and ignore it. — Theorem
all physical objects also happen to be objects of experience! — Theorem
But the proper use of the gem, imo, is to show us that whatever there is, beyond our thought and experience, it is confused to think of it as something that's basically like how we experience the apple, only unexperienced — csalisbury
I think that's the best way to approach it, yeah, but It's true that in my last post I was only speaking for myself, rather than for others interested in Idealism. That said, it doesn't seem to me that most 'postmodern' philosophers are advocating something along the 'same, but mind not matter' lines - all that preoccupation with The Real & alterity etc.Is it though? — Theorem
The problem with this for S's view is that S claims that meaning would exist if no people existed. — Terrapin Station
sufficiently complex — Terrapin Station
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.