It's not true or false that you ought to achieve y if you want y. — Terrapin Station

You're misreading, and in a way that's odd. The ought being derived is that which prescribes a path, the destination having been chosen. It says nothing about the choice of the destination.

You're misreading, and in a way that's odd. The ought being derived is that which prescribes a path, the destination having been chosen. It says nothing about the choice of the destination. — tim wood

So why ought you pursue x if you want y, just in case x is a prerequisite for y?

Not when it comes to hurting people's feelings, because I don't think that's a moral issue.
— Terrapin Station

Interesting. Is there something that you think hurting people is, if not immoral? Perhaps you think it's nothing at all...? — tim wood

It's hurting people, for one. That's something, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

Hurting people is hurting people? Ok, granted. What is that something? — tim wood

That something is hurting people. — Terrapin Station

Can we get off of your merry-go-round this way? Anything wrong with hurting people?

Anything wrong with hurting people? — tim wood

Hurting people is not categorically, morally wrong, no.

Only certain actions that fall under that heading are things that I consider morally wrong.

They have to be because you can't derive an ought from an is. You can't derive a value statement from a factual statement. — Terrapin Station

I mean other moral principles. You can hold that it is morally wrong to steal, not because you find stealing repugnant, but because you find the thought of living in a world where everyone steals repugnant and you think that avoiding stealing yourself might help avoid this.

This is the basic principle by which we sacrifice some pleasures for greater gains, surely we don't disagree on that?

But, in the scenario above, you could well be mistaken about many aspects. You could fool yourself into think the reason you have an aversion to stealing is because you dislike the kind of world it might bring about, but actually it's just that you're scared of getting caught. As I've tried to demonstrate above, we can be wrong about why we don't like things, and if morals are just a category of dislike, then we can be wrong about why we see them as morals.

You said (in the post I first responded to) that some morals may be foundational, whilst some might be built out of others, presumably by logical inference (if I do x it will cause y and I don't like y).

The case I'm trying to build is that a) you claiming a moral is foundational (not built on others) may not be an accurate report, and that b) morals built on others from logical inference can be objectively wrong because the inference can be wrong (x does not in fact cause y).

Put these two points together, and any moral point becomes worth discussing as you may find what you thought was a foundational moral was actually built from one by logical inferences and those inferences are wrong. Hence it is entirely possible to be wrong about any moral position.

Hurting people is not categorically, morally wrong, no. — Terrapin Station

I might enjoy breaking your arm. Why might you or any third person object to my pursing my pleasures if there's nothing wrong with them? Do you hurt people?

So why ought you pursue x if you want y, just in case x is a prerequisite for y? — Terrapin Station

Maybe X is something good. Your claim was categorical, no ought from is. But there are oughts from ises all day long.

I didn't say that I don't consider any hurting of other people wrong. In fact, I explicitly said otherwise.

Again, "hurt/harm" etc. are too broad/vague in my opinion.

And yeah, I'm sure I hurt some people's feelings. No one can avoid doing that, especially as there are some folks around with unusual quirks, whose feelings will be hurt by things that most other folks would never imagine would hurt someone's feelings.

You could fool yourself into think the reason you have an aversion to stealing is because you dislike the kind of world it might bring about, but actually it's just that you're scared of getting caught. — Isaac

How would that work where we avoid positing unconscious mental content?

Maybe X is something good. — tim wood

What? That's a value judgment. Not an "is."

I didn't say that I don't consider any hurting of other people wrong. — Terrapin Station

Why wrong? You've amputated from your thinking the usual answers most folks would give. If you had not done that, then those answers would probably suffice and this discussion would be too trivial to pursue. But in as much as you've taken yourself off that ground, the question arises as to just what your ground is.

How would that work where we avoid positing unconscious mental content? — Terrapin Station

That's where we started, with your rather controversial claim that there was no such thing as unconscious mental content (or, in fact a gradation of conscious awareness of mental states). The evidence seems overwhelmingly to show that there is sub- or un- conscious mental content. What do you think was going on in the damaged part of the brain such that those for whom it was removed no longer showed a brand bias they were consciously unaware of?

I have no problem with people holding opinions which are contradicted by the evidence, evidence is rarely that good, but I'm always interested in why people choose to.

What? That's a value judgment. Not an "is." — Terrapin Station

Proposition K: If P is something you want, and to get P you have to do Q, then if you want P, you ought to do Q.

Please point out in Proposition K just above where the value judgment occurs.

Why wrong? You've amputated from your thinking the usual answers most folks would give. If you had not done that, then those answers would probably suffice and this discussion would be too trivial to pursue. But in as much as you've taken yourself off that ground, the question arises as to just what your ground is. — tim wood

It's annoying that people don't understand that everyone's ground is simply their feelings about interpersonal behavior.

The evidence seems overwhelmingly to show that there is sub- or un- conscious mental content. What do you think was going on in the damaged part of the brain such that those for whom it was removed no longer showed a brand bias they were consciously unaware of? — Isaac

Wait--how would they have a brand bias that they're not aware of? You mean that people aren't aware that they're preferring one brand to another (when they know what the brand is)?

then if you want P, you ought to do Q. — tim wood

I just pointed out to you that for one, this has packed into it the claim that "You ought to achieve what you want."

It's annoying that people don't understand that everyone's ground is simply their feelings about interpersonal behavior. — Terrapin Station

I want to break your arm. Probably you do not want me to break your arm. Of course your feelings are just your personal problem and you need to work on those. So I get to break your arm, and no third person gets to intervene for any reason - yes?

And how do you get from the fact that I want something to I ought to get it?

Wait--how would they have a brand bias that they're not aware of? You mean that people aren't aware that they're preferring one brand to another (when they know what the brand is)? — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure I'm following your objection. We're talking about what factors people are consciously aware of affecting their likes/dislikes. In the study, people claimed that they preferred the taste of Coke. When blinded to the brand, they preferred the taste of Pepsi. So they were wrong about preferring the taste of Coke, what they actually preferred about Coke was the brand. The second study showed that when a part of the brain responsible for things like brand preferences was removed, people no longer preferred Coke at all, they simply prefer whichever brand tastes best.

What this strongly suggests is that people can be wrong about the reason why they prefer things and that such reasons can be delivered by very specific parts of the sub-concious brain.

I want to break your arm. Probably you do not want me to break your arm. Of course your feelings are just your personal problem and you need to work on those. So I get to break your arm, and no third person gets to intervene for any reason - yes?

And how do you get from the fact that I want something to I ought to get it? — tim wood

It's just a matter of what we're able to enact or not. Factors include how much power each of us has, how common the views are, what our persuasive abilities are like, etc.

It's just a matter of what we're able to enact or not. Factors include how much power each of us has, how common the views are, what our persuasive abilities are like, etc. — Terrapin Station

So there's nothing wrong with my breaking you arm? Or you mine, for that matter?

So they were wrong about preferring the taste of Coke, — Isaac

I already discussed this part (hence why I dislike doing longer posts and like to focus on one thing at a time until it's settled):

You're reading this situation as "I prefer the taste of x" where packed into that is a claim about what x really is objectively, so that if one gets the objective identification wrong (per whatever metric), then one's statement re "I prefer the taste of x" can be wrong.

I'm saying that "I prefer the taste of x" is about the person's experience, qua their experience, qua their understanding, etc.--so that whatever is really the case objectively is irrelevant, their identification is irrelevant, etc., and where it's either a present or historical claim. (Because otherwise it's a prediction--"I will prefer the taste of x," and I'd agree that they can get the prediction wrong (even on x as their experience, understanding, identification, etc.)

We were supposed to be talking about the idea of unconscious mental content here, though--specifically anything that would count as evidence of the same, and this has nothing to do with that.

The thing about "wrong for the reasons" presumably assumes that people are explicitly making statements like "I prefer x for reason y alone," and for some reason we're assuming that the statements are 100% accurate (and we're ignoring all of that stuff we were discussing before about meaning, etc.) and there isn't anything else going on consciously in their minds that they're not expressing or that they can't articulate very well?

So there's nothing wrong with my breaking you arm? Or you mine, for that matter? — tim wood

What's wrong with anything morally is that someone disapproves of it as interpersonal behavior.

Do you understand this?

You're reading this situation as "I prefer the taste of x" where packed into that is a claim about what x really is objectively, so that if one gets the objective identification wrong (per whatever metric), then one's statement re "I prefer the taste of x" can be wrong.

I'm saying that "I prefer the taste of x" is about the person's experience, qua their experience, qua their understanding, etc.--so that whatever is really the case objectively is irrelevant, — Terrapin Station

OK, so firstly, it's not about what x really is, but what the reason really is. I don't think that entirely matters for what you're saying, but I thought I ought to get it clear. Taste is a specific identifiable type of sensation which can identified. The gustatory complex, if removed, leaves one with no sense of taste, its not something that people can feel in different ways. The information is taken from there to the orbitofrontal cortex which combines it with other factors to make decisions about preference. Again, we know this because if that part of the brain is wired removed, it simply doesn't happen. A report is then sent to the pre-frontal cortex about the decision (which is the first 'concious' thought we have about it. Again, we know this because if we block those pathways with chemicals it just doesn't happen.

So I understand you're saying a person's "experience" of a sensation of preference, as they report it can't be wrong in that sense and I'm happy to go with that, but the point I was originally making was that it can be of value to a person to discus morality even though they are just likes/dislikes because there are factors affecting likes/dislikes which are not well reported to the conscious brain and becoming aware of them can help a person achieve what it is they actually like.

That, and what @tim wood is saying about x causing y where y is something one likes. It is possible to be wrong about causation and that is often relevant to non-foundational moral positions.

Basically, to re-iterate I think you can be wrong about whether a moral stance is foundational, your pre-frontal cortex may report it that way, but the actual preference it is based on my not be revealed accurately by the orbitofrontal cortex. Given that we are preference seeking creatures, I think finding such a thing out is of value.

the point I was originally making was that it can be of value to a person to discus morality even though they are just likes/dislikes — Isaac

No disagreement with this.

But it's simply the case that one can state a foundational ethical stance, where there's not some other sentential reason behind or beneath it. It's not always the case that there's some other sentential reason behind every stance we state. There can't be because that's obviously an infinite regress. And people can start at the bottom so to speak. There sometimes seems to be an assumption that one never would, but that makes no sense.

Basically, to re-iterate I think you can be wrong about whether a moral stance is foundational, — Isaac

Whereas I do not agree with this, because I don't believe that there is any good reason to buy the notion of unconscious mental content, and you've not presented any good reason to buy that idea yet.

In any event, by the way, let's say that some moral stance, m, is not foundational for S at time Tx, but some unconscious moral stance, n. is rather the foundational stance for S at time Tx. Well, what good does this do us, since S by definition isn't aware of n at Tx? If we ask him at Tx if there's another sentential stance that m is a consequence of for him, he can't very well tell us n--it's unconscious.

Whereas I do not agree with this, because I don't believe that there is any good reason to buy the notion of unconscious mental content, and you've not presented any good reason to buy that idea yet. — Terrapin Station

I think you and I must have different definitions of unconscious mental states. I mean by it a state in which the brain can be which affect behaviour/decisions but which the subject, by self-reporting or location, is unaware of. There is literally direct a pretty incontrovertible evidence for this.

I think you and I must have different definitions of unconscious mental states. I mean by it a state in which the brain can be which affect behaviour/decisions but which the subject, by self-reporting or location, is unaware of. There is literally direct a pretty incontrovertible evidence for this. — Isaac

For it to be an unconscious mental state, it can't be just any brain state. It has to be a mental state, just one that the subject is unaware of. It has to be akin to a thought, desire, idea, concept, etc.--anything mental.

Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic.

For it to be an unconscious mental state, it can't be just any brain state. It has to be a mental state, just one that the subject is unaware of. It has to be akin to a thought, desire, idea, concept, etc.--anything mental.

Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic. — Terrapin Station

Seems odd to say that evidence for such states existing unconsciously is problematic epistemically but you seem fine with the existence of them conciously. Can you easily define a thought, desire, idea, concept in a way that there is clear evidence for the existence of such things?

I can understand something like 'desire", for example, as a disposition to act toward a certain goal, but such a definition causes no problems at all for identifying it sub-conciously.

Seems odd to say that evidence for such states existing unconsciously is problematic epistemically but you seem fine with the existence of them conciously. Can you easily define a thought, desire, idea, concept in a way that there is clear evidence for the existence of such things? — Isaac

And this seems like an odd comment when I had just said, and you just quoted "Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic."

The important difference for conscious mental states is that the bearer has clear epistemic evidence of them. But we don't have that for unconscious mental states.

I can understand something like 'desire", for example, as a disposition to act toward a certain goal, — Isaac

That suggests defining it behavioristically and ignoring the conscious aspect when it's conscious. (It also doesn't capture conscious desires very well, because lots of people have desires that they never or almost never act on.)

The bottom line, though, is that if you believe there's good evidence of unconscious mental states, present it and I'll look at it. Otherwise I'm not about to think that's there's good evidence of unconscious mental states.

And this seems like an odd comment when I had just said, and you just quoted "Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic."

The important difference for conscious mental states is that the bearer has clear epistemic evidence of them. But we don't have that for unconscious mental states. — Terrapin Station

I guess this is the point of our axiomatic disagreement. I don't accept that my knowledge of my mental states extends to being able to describe them with a shared language, so all I know that can be shared is that I feel/think something.

When it comes to shared language, such as is required in discussions like these, I think we simply have to resort to the best objective evidence we have to define and categorise brain states. There's little point in me saying I have a desire x if we're going to define 'desire' as that thing I'm feeling that I so call, but could not define objectively.

We do have some perfectly serviceable objective definitions for many of the brain state equivalents of mental sensations. We can verify from self-reports that these states correlate well with those people experience, it might not be perfect, but to dismiss it as useless seem rash.

That suggests defining it behavioristically and ignoring the conscious aspect when it's conscious. (It also doesn't capture conscious desires very well, because lots of people have desires that they never or almost never act on.) — Terrapin Station

I wouldn't define it entirely behaviouristically, it's just one tool. We're trying to correlate things which can be objectively verified with subjective experience. Behaviour is one tool, neural imaging is another, psychological experiment a third, examining the consequences of brain damage a fourth. It is nonsense to dismiss all this as "no evidence".

The bottom line, though, is that if you believe there's good evidence of unconscious mental states, present it and I'll look at it. Otherwise I'm not about to think that's there's good evidence of unconscious mental states. — Terrapin Station

The evidence is basically the whole of modern neuro-psychology. If you're genuinely interested, I'd start with the work of Vilyanur Ramachandran. He has written some very approachable books for non-specialists and works with brain damage victims. As I said, I'd rather you think me a fantasist than spend my time finding citations, but his work would be a start.