By consulting with a know-it-all on reddit, I can officially say that Wittgenstein was talking about how the logical structure of language and the logical structure of the world are the same.
How do we know this, though? The statement implies a transcendental vantage point. Or maybe Wittgenstein was an anti-realist. — frank
113 & 114: we feel it must be like this, but we are only looking at the frame.
and the resolution: 115: A picture held us captive. — Banno
apparently W began writing it in the trenches in WW1 — csalisbury
He disregarded meaning in favour of use.
I don't see how this might be compatible with a segregation of expression and meaning. And it's a long way from the topic here. — Banno
You might add that I should decide if your OP is a simile or an analogy. In either case, it's use here is to show how such thinking can lead one down a false trail. — Banno
§116 in preference to grasping essences of abstract, philosophical concepts, look to their use in ordinary language. — Banno
He changed his mind, — csalisbury
There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. — Metaphysician Undercover
He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
119 Philosophers get bumped on the head by running up against the limits of language. Ubiquitous quote. — Banno
Deficient in what respect? — Luke
As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections. — Luke
That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. — Luke
Consider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the hallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is not about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to doubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’ the ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However, skeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not involve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use of dubitari, see Section 3.3). — SEP (Ancient Skepticism)
you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know. — javra
He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). — Metaphysician Undercover
He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
Doubt is clearly not an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty... — Metaphysician Undercover
He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation. — Luke
Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs? — Luke
Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself. — Luke
You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. — javra
Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. — Banno
The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover
Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover
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