I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." — Metaphysician Undercover
There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. — Metaphysician Undercover
So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover
Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one. Or again, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to himself”. [my emphasis] — PI 32
I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
A description of how our language actually works is not necessarily an explanation of this type (i.e. an hypothesis or theory). However, it is another way of removing misunderstanding, which can therefore be considered as a more general type of explanation. — Luke
think you have misread. He says at §31 that we can imagine someone who has learnt the rules without ever having been shown a chess piece (therefore, not by observation); or we can imagine someone having learnt the game "without ever learning or formulating the rules". The purpose of this example is to support what he says at §30, that an ostensive definition can only explain the meaning of a word "if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear". — Luke
You appear to assume, along with Augustine, that a child can reason before it has been taught language; that it can already think, only not yet speak. Your attribution of this "possibility" to Wittgenstein is antithetical to the text. — Luke
think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not trying to do any such thing, assuming that by "bottom" or "foundations" you mean something like the "essence" of language; something beneath the surface or hidden from view. As Wittgenstein states at §97: "We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language." — Luke
He clearly states at 31: "One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones." It is incorrect for you to say that this is "not by observation". — Metaphysician Undercover
This is an incorrect interpretation of what I said. It isn't even close. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is incorrect to say that the foundation of a thing and the essence of a thing are the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you prefer to disagree rather than to understand, then my efforts are pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry Luke, I can't even begin to understand what you're saying about "explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover
120. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is another one to be constructed? -- And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!
In giving explanations I already have to use language full -- blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shows that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.
Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? -- Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask!
And your scruples are misunderstandings.
Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)
contrast: money, and its use. — W
SO, could it be done? — Banno
Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosophical) explanation that he mentions at §87. — Luke
Sorry Luke, I can't even begin to understand what you're saying about "explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose our everyday language is inadequate to answer the questions asked by philosophers. We might consider constructing a new language in which to set out such issues with complete clarity.
But how could such a language be constructed, except in using our existing language? — Banno
Sorry MU but I found Luke's explanation of different kinds of explanation clear and correct. — Fooloso4
Ideal. A word no so much encumbered by baggage as buried in it. Your use of it makes your point obscure. — Banno
Do you agree with Wittgenstein here? — Banno
Russel thought we could build a faultless language could be based on sense data. Wittgenstein I thought it could be built from names for simple objects. Davidson thought we might translate English into a first order language.
SO, could it be done? — Banno
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth. This order is a super-order between — so to speak — super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”. [§97]
...we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still had to be constructed by us. [§98]
When we believe that we have to find that order, the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called “sentences”, “words”, “signs”. [§105]
When philosophers use a word a “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition/sentence”, “name” — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? —
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. [§116]
When I talk about language (word, sentence, etc.), I must speak the language of every day. So is this language too coarse, too material, for what we want to say? Well then, how is another one to be constructed? — And how extraordinary that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!
In giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this is enough to show that I can come up only with externalities about language.
Yes, but then how can these observations satisfy us? - Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask! [§120] — PI
I would like to see a thread called "What is a door?". — Banno
...it really is a form of language use actually in practise. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there!
He wasn't there again today,
Oh how I wish he'd go away!
When I came home last night at three,
The man was waiting there for me
But when I looked around the hall,
I couldn't see him there at all!
Go away, go away, don't you come back any more!
Go away, go away, and please don't slam the door...
Last night I saw upon the stair,
A little man who wasn't there,
He wasn't there again today
Oh, how I wish he'd go away...
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.