I haven't brought the government into this. In fact, all I suggested was that there is indeed a correct answer to the question of whether or not vaccines are harmful/worth the risk. At first I didn't even give an explicit answer to the question, although I did allude to my own position. I was just using it as an example to make the point that some courses of action are objectively morally superior/inferior to others per our values, and that sometimes when we disagree about matters of fact, we disagree about which choices are best as a result. — VagabondSpectre

That's fine, it didn't come across that way, but that must have been my misunderstanding.

I should add, however, that even on the understanding that you are not claiming we have a moral duty to trust some particular data source over another, I'm still not quite following how you got from the valuing of children's health to there being a fact of the matter about whether vaccines are 'good'.

To get there, even in a world in which we could all know personally that vaccines were safe and effective, you're still making a whole load of presumptions that others might legitimately disagree with.

For a start you presuming that safety and effectiveness are the only factors someone might like to consider. Someone might, for example, simply consider it an inadvisable risk to have a private company, overseen by a single government organisation, responsible for injecting every child in the county with a chemical mixture. Its current safety might not enter into it. Evil Kineval used to jump flaming buses on a motorbike and remain whole, doesn't make it safe or advisable, it just means he happened to get away with it.

Others might object on religious grounds such as the Amish, having their ethics based on the divine command.

People might hold strongly a virtue of 'do no harm' which would prevent them from ethically giving any kind of prophylactic drug, not because of a utilitarian calculation of harm, but on a principle designed to accommodate uncertainty.

Values (by which you seem to mean objectives) and facts together still are not enough to make a moral path objectively true, we're not all utilitarians.

Cauliflower is good either is a fact in respect of some criteria, — tim wood

How would it make sense to say that anything is good in respect to some criterion/criteria? That would never capture what "good" refers to. For example, say that one criterion is "Cauliflower is good if it's not moldy." If all that amounts to is that "good" is a synonym for "not moldy," then it doesn't at all capture the conventional sense of "good."

It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong. — Noah Te Stroete

No, it's true or false that cauliflower has x effect on nutrition. Having x effect on nutrition isn't objectively good versus having not-x effect on nutrition.

Likewise, boiling babies might have x effect on society (a fact that would be much, much harder to establish than the fact that cauliflower has whatever effect on nutrition, by the way). But it's not objectively good to have x effect on society versus having not-x effect on society.

Objectively, there are just facts. All possibilities, if actualized, would make particular facts obtain rather than other facts. No facts are objectively preferable, better, worse, etc. than any other facts.

How would it make sense to say that anything is good in respect to some criterion/criteria? — Terrapin Station

then it doesn't at all capture the conventional sense of "good." — Terrapin Station

The sense in which you are correct is a narrow one. When it is said (by anyone) that something is good, the word "good" is a shorthand, a code, that the speaker presumably supposes that his auditor will understand, that if understood saves much periphrasis. But this same thing is true of all language acts meant as communication.

It seems to me, reading your various posts, that you're caught in a whirlpool of destructive relativism at least such that your perspective is skewed. Meaning is a community project. Look too closely at it, then as with the detail in a newspaper photograph, it disappears into its own pixellation. Perhaps the right way when hearing that something is good is not to ask what "good" is, but instead how it is good.

A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong. — Noah Te Stroete

Why is it morally wrong?

The categorical imperative

Why should one obey the categorical imperative?

Because one has a duty to do babies no harm.

The categorical imperative ensures the working of society.

The sense in which you are correct is a narrow one. When it is said (by anyone) that something is good, the word "good" is a shorthand, a code, that the speaker presumably supposes that his auditor will understand, that if understood saves much periphrasis. But this same thing is true of all language acts meant as communication. — tim wood

Say what? How does this answer how anything is good with respect to some criterion, where we'd be at all capturing the conventional sense of what we're referring to with "good," rather than simply using the term as an "empty" synonym for some objective state?

It seems to me, reading your various posts, that you're caught in a whirlpool of destructive relativism — tim wood

I'm definitely a relativist. Nothing destructive about it in my view, though.

Meaning is a community project. — tim wood

No, it isn't, but I don't want to go off on that tangent yet again. Let's stick to how it would make sense to link "good" to some criterion or other.

How do you define “good”? Is something good merely in the capacity of someone approving of it?

Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them?

How do you define “good”? Is something good merely in the capacity of someone approving of it? — Noah Te Stroete

"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer.

Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them? — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, it's a term of approval or preference. "Yaying," accepting, sanctioning, etc. the thing in question.

Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them?
— Noah Te Stroete

Yes, it's a term of approval or preference. "Yaying," accepting, sanctioning, etc. the thing in question. — Terrapin Station

I tend to think it is more than just approval. If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity. It’s a hypothetical imperative. If one wants a sturdy structure, then one would want it to have “good bones”. Just as there are hypothetical imperatives, there is the Categorical Imperative. One does not say “if one wants a working society” though. Society is a given to social creatures as ourselves. So, in order for society to continue (something that’s objectively in our biological and cultural DNA), there must be duties to act or abstain, such as the duty to not boil babies.

If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity. — Noah Te Stroete

But that only follows if one prefers "bones" that tend toward structural integrity. Insofar as individuals do not prefer that, what would be good about that? The notion of "good" makes no sense outside of preferences, approval, etc.

If one wants a sturdy structure, then one would want it to have “good bones”. — Noah Te Stroete

Right, and what one wants one prefers.

So, in order for society to continue (something that’s objectively in our biological and cultural DNA) — Noah Te Stroete

There is nothing outside of our minds thatprefers society to continue rather than not continue. The world outside of us couldn't care less either way.

Let's stick to how it would make sense to link "good" to some criterion or other. — Terrapin Station

Do I understand you correctly as saying that "good" is explicitly itself not to be understood with respect to, or by, some standard or standards?

By that rule, nothing is good, nor bad, nor anything else. Not even what it is, because of course that's criteriological. Is that what you mean?

Statements like, "this orange is good," or "that is a good pocket-knife," are ordinary and meaningful. Criteria, such as they are, are implied, and it's assumed the hearer or reader knows what they are. Do you disagree? Do you deny this?

Statements like, "this orange is good," or "that is a good pocket-knife," are ordinary and meaningful. Criteria, such as they are, are implied, and it's assumed the hearer or reader knows what they are. Do you disagree? Do you deny this? — tim wood

Obviously I disagree, because I just said that it's not possible to make any sense of that.

The challenge I proposed to you was to make sense of it.

So what criteria, for example, would you say "This orange is good" refer to?

Can a society function well if its inexpert members do not trust the most expert available opinion when it comes to scientific, medical, ecological and economical matters?

If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented.

Societies cultivate their citizens' moral dispositions. Modern democracies are largely founded on the notion of the competition of the individual against the rest, and the idea of the natural world as a mere resource to be exploited. Even human subjects are fair game to be exploited for individual gain within merely legal constraints. This means that they are not well suited to provide the best conditions for human and natural flourishing. The problem is how to fill the vacuum left by the (justifiable) rejection and (welcome) decline of organized religion.

Mores are shared values that unify societies and yield solidarity among their members. The more morally bankrupt, the more corrupt, a society is, the more laws will be required to protect each citizen from the predatory behaviors of the others. The US is a paradigm case of a society that is rotten to the core. It is not alone, but is just the most extreme exemplar of moral bankruptcy.

The gap does not require explaining why some do one thing and others do another in response to the question of what is arbitrary in moral judgements. The activity is either a process that is a perception of what is happening or it is not.

The phenomena is framed by one means or another. That one or another frame lets us hear and see a certain way either is involved with actual beings or they are dreams, projected against a screen.

Your results may vary.

When I say that morality is mere preference, what I'm saying is that "x is good" and the like are mental phenomena and do not occur elsewhere. That's all that I'm saying. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm simply focusing on a very specific ontological claim.

Some people believe that "x is good" occurs in the world extramentally. It does not. — Terrapin Station

This is a fair enough point. You're right; some people suppose morality is some tangible set of laws that exist in some kind of ultimate and universally applicable moral realm (see: God), and they're wrong.

Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us.

I should add, however, that even on the understanding that you are not claiming we have a moral duty to trust some particular data source over another, I'm still not quite following how you got from the valuing of children's health to there being a fact of the matter about whether vaccines are 'good'. — Isaac

I didn't expect any push back about the effectiveness of vaccines, so perhaps we could substitute the example for something else:

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced for a myriad of confused reasons, and among them is the belief that it will improve the quality of life of victims. Ostensibly it is performed because it is believed to be good, and they don't happen to trust medical authorities who insist otherwise. From our enlightened ad-vantage point, it's clear to us that FGM does not actually improve the lives of victims (hence: "victim".)

So in what ways might we say FGM is objectively immoral? Well it objectively undermines the preferences of victims, and it also reasonably undermines the values of perpetrators as well (in some cases, villages can't remember why they started doing it, and can't say why they choose to carry on with it). When we look at the most fundamental moral values of everyone involved, it's quite clear that FGM undermines them, which is why not practicing FGM is an objectively-morally superior practice.

Others might object on religious grounds such as the Amish, having their ethics based on the divine command. — Isaac

Such people are confused, but thankfully these types of beliefs are assailable by science, logic, and an appeal to their human values.

People might hold strongly a virtue of 'do no harm' which would prevent them from ethically giving any kind of prophylactic drug, not because of a utilitarian calculation of harm, but on a principle designed to accommodate uncertainty. — Isaac

There's really not much difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalizations. What do you think causes such moral maxims as "do no harm" to evolve? Because they're useful.

We have many fancy calculi for navigating the many moral landscapes we inhabit (and the mix of moral games we play upon them), but ultimately, serving humans - utility- is the only real and reliable perspective to adopt. Where dilemmas become too complex for other frameworks to solve, we all intuitively revert to utilitarianism.

I want to point out that straight-forward utilitarian calculus often amounts to a vast oversimplification of moral dilemmas, which is why we have other frameworks which can account for contextual nuance (e.g: the broader implication that organ-harvesting the random hobo has on society, and on the very agreement that social moral cooperation is based on)

Values (by which you seem to mean objectives) and facts together still are not enough to make a moral path objectively true, we're not all utilitarians. — Isaac

As I keep stating, the values component is subjective, but the way they relate to others and the world is not subjective. Once we've settled on a definition of exactly what morality is supposed to do, we can assess whether or not the actions we propose will actually achieve our individual or communal moral goals.

How do you define "morality" exactly? In my view, boiled down, it amounts to a realm of strategic knowledge intended to help us make decisions (decisions which impact others, and in a way which considers their values). I think some moral strategies/choices are objectively better or worse than others for a given set or sets of subjective values, just like how some chess strategies/moves are objectively better or worse than others for given arrangements of the chess board.

Obviously I disagree, because I just said that it's not possible to make any sense of that.
The challenge I proposed to you was to make sense of it.
So what criteria, for example, would you say "This orange is good" refers to? — Terrapin Station

All right. According to you, the statements, "this orange is good," or, "that is a good pocket-knife," not only do not make any sense, but that "it's not possible to make any sense" of them. Tell us, do you ever yourself engage in this nonsense?

As to criteria for the orange, that depends on the context or situation. The orange in question might taste good, look good, be good. We don't even know if it's fruit or a colour. Nor do we know if the good is categorical or comparative, But none of that makes the statement nonsense or meaningless.

What is your point with this?

I didn't expect any push back about the effectiveness of vaccines, so perhaps we could substitute the example for something else: — VagabondSpectre

I find that hard to believe, given the range of opinion on the matter, but I'm happy to go with another example.

With regards to FGM, I only know what the Who has to say on the matter, which is "for these women this is part of their identity and failure to undergo this procedure can lead to condemnation and ostracism within their own community". They also seem to suggest that in some cultures and there's a religious element, and in others women will be unable to find a husband without it, which, in extremely patriarchal societies, can seriously reduce their well-being, even their lifespan.

So again, the actual single individual carrying out this violence is not 'mistakenly' doing so for the woman's well-being, they very likely actually are doing so for the woman's well-being. They basically have a choice between complete social ostracisation and being mutilated. A brutal choice, but not one we 'enlightened' westerners can just sweep in and point out how the idiot natives are getting it wrong as if they'd made a mistake in their maths.

So when you say...

it objectively undermines the preferences of victims, — VagabondSpectre

... it tragically does not. Not unless their entire culture changes around them and not everyone, even victims of FGM, wants their whole culture changed.

Such people are confused, but thankfully these types of beliefs are assailable by science, logic, and an appeal to their human values. — VagabondSpectre

This seems to be closer to the thrust of what you're saying. The Amish believe in God and that certain practices here on earth (which may include the refusal vaccines) are necessary to ensure a good afterlife for the rest of eternity. How exactly do you propose to assail that belief with "science, logic, and an appeal to their human values."? Have scientists recently visited the afterlife and I missed the story? Has CETI just picked up some communication from God saying its OK?

There's really not much difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalizations. What do you think causes such moral maxims as "do no harm" to evolve? Because they're useful. — VagabondSpectre

There's a massive difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalisations. It's just not one you can see because of your blind faith in the 'truth' of modern Western culture. The difference is in how they deal with uncertainty. Utilitarian calculus (or more properly consequensialist), no matter how complex, takes all the 'known' facts about a matter and uses them to work out the best strategy to achieve a goal. It takes no account of how small a proportion of all there is to know about a matter the amount we actually do know is.

Virtue ethics, by contrast, presumes (in some manifestations at least), that such calculations are so fraught with error, that it makes more sense to focus on doing what feels right, given that we will never fully establish whether it actually was right in the long term.

Once we've settled on a definition of exactly what morality is supposed to do, we can assess whether or not the actions we propose will actually achieve our individual or communal moral goals. — VagabondSpectre

No. We absolutely cannot do this. It is arrogant beyond belief to suggest that the calculus that those in cultures practicing FGM can be mistaken, but our knowledge is so exhaustive and accurate that we can have this level of certainty about whether certain actions will achieve our goals in the long term. We can't even predict our own ecomony, let alone the long term consequences of every cultural and personal change in behaviour.

You're basically saying that it is very possible for ethnic cultures to have made a clear mistake in their calculus (which, just for the record, I agree they have, in case that's not clear), but that we in the 'enlightened' West are so unlikely to make a mistake in ours that we can claim our choices are practically 'objective fact'. You realise how that sounds?

How do you define "morality" exactly? — VagabondSpectre

Personally, I think of morality as that particular collection of subjective feelings about one's actions which relate to a potential negative effect on others. I'm not a moral relativist though, because I don't believe the subjective mental realm is a mystical, or supernatural place. It is amenable to science, it is subject to natural selection, sexual selection (and all manner of other selection pressures) and it responds in an (at least theoretically) predictable manner to environmental stimuli. All this put together makes these subjective feelings very homogeneous in large part and practically universal in some cases. These I take to be moral facts.

It doesn't matter in the sense that morality would be no less important. The problem is getting the other side to see it that way. I see the same errors repeated over and again. They seem to see preference as some kind of affront... It's a quite ridiculous and unproductive way to react. — S

Will this truth stand against the destructive tendencies of relativism? I do not think so, but neither will anything else. — tim wood

First it was "mere" and "nothing". Now it is "destructive".

These are clear examples of loaded language. Maybe try to be more reasonable and less emotional. I know that that might sound ironic coming from me, given my position on the role of emotions in morality, but they're appropriate in normative ethics, not in meta-ethics. It's appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging whether or not slavery is wrong, but it's not appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging which meta-ethical position is true. The latter is fallacious.

I'm not getting notifications from your post for some reason, so apologies in advance if I miss a response.

Can a society function well if its inexpert members do not trust the most expert available opinion when it comes to scientific, medical, ecological and economical matters? — Janus

A difficult question for sure, but I think that one would have to balance the advantages of people being more likely to be right about stuff, with the disadvantages of the power that authorities would then wield to manipulate events. In most areas of science, we have mechanisms in place to prevent such a misuse of power, mainly having a large enough number of people involved and an uncensored publishing industry, but that is only a pragmatic issue. If we start saying that the mere pragmatism of being able to trust our experts (because we have good safety measures in place) becomes a moral obligation to do so (which is what I was arguing against) then we run the risk of it becoming enculturated and we can't by any means guarantee the continued good functioning of our system.

If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented. — Janus

In theory, yes. But I don't see how either of those 'if's are ever going to be the case.

The more morally bankrupt, the more corrupt, a society is, the more laws will be required to protect each citizen from the predatory behaviors of the others. — Janus

True, but this presumes the law-makers are not also so afflicted, and the law-makers are just people. If society is morally bankrupt, then surely law-makers, scientists, experts in general, who are drawn from that society will be morally bankrupt too?

So again, the actual single individual carrying out this violence is not 'mistakenly' doing so for the woman's well-being, they very likely actually are doing so for the woman's well-being. They basically have a choice between complete social ostracisation and being mutilated. A brutal choice, but not one we 'enlightened' westerners can just sweep in and point out how the idiot natives are getting it wrong as if they'd made a mistake in their maths. — Isaac

Oh but we can. FGM is indeed erroneous...

There's no good reason for anyone to ostracize a woman who had her clitoris forcibly removed at puberty. Basically, we get to call the people who do the ostracization "stupid" because their relevant beliefs are based in nothing but the dogma of tradition. A practice that is useful only when nested within anti-utility and stupidity isn't necessarily useful per se.

What if a society society expected mothers to sacrifice their first born children to Quetzalcoatl? Their well-being would be affected if they refuse, so who are we to scoff at such necessity?

The whole practice is based in ignorance, and your argument relies on the ignorant making the boons of FGM into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Inter-generational extortion isn't an adequate moral justification for the practice of FGM, me thinks.

If a drug addict believes a certain dose of drugs is the best amount they should take, but you know that to be a fatal dose, do you have no grounds upon which to convince them it is not a good decision?

The individuals being unwillingly extorted into carrying out FGM aren't who I'm calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened...

It is arrogant beyond belief to suggest that the calculus that those in cultures practicing FGM can be mistaken, but our knowledge is so exhaustive and accurate that we can have this level of certainty about whether certain actions will achieve our goals in the long term. We can't even predict our own ecomony, let alone the long term consequences of every cultural and personal change in behaviour. — Isaac

I think we can safely say that removing clitorides doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.

Frankly I'm flabbergasted that you would try to put up any defense of FGM whatsoever. Sure, indigenous knowledge and all that; "spirits" too while we're at it, but genital mutilation? Really? You are aware that human stupidity has existed prior to western civilization right? That not every action humans have taken was in their own interest or the interest of others? That even hunter-gatherers, with all their ancient wisdom, didn't know some of the things that we now know? (That, for instance, deities aren't sitting around making good/bad things happen based on whether or not we pray at the right rock, or whatever; that superstition only works as a morale-boosting placebo because humans are so fallible).

You're basically saying that it is very possible for ethnic cultures to have made a clear mistake in their calculus (which, just for the record, I agree they have, in case that's not clear), but that we in the 'enlightened' West are so unlikely to make a mistake in ours that we can claim our choices are practically 'objective fact'. You realise how that sounds? — Isaac

It's not clear at all that you agree FGM is morally errant. Why else would you object so profusely when I condemn the practice?

When did I say that the west is perfect? The west is "enlightened" in that we know better than to practice or tolerate FGM. From our vantage point, we can see why FGM is not good. Do you disagree? If not, what is your point? That I'm arrogant or racist? (If that is your point, why bother making it? It doesn't make my point wrong, and if you're right about my arrogance or racism, then it won't matter because I won't give a shit).

The Amish believe in God and that certain practices here on earth (which may include the refusal vaccines) are necessary to ensure a good afterlife for the rest of eternity. How exactly do you propose to assail that belief with "science, logic, and an appeal to their human values."? Have scientists recently visited the afterlife and I missed the story? Has CETI just picked up some communication from God saying its OK? — Isaac

The idea that god exists and has some intentions about how we ought behave is an empirical claim, and it can be tested with empirical science and evidence based reasoning (science isn't in the business of proving negatives with objective certainty, it's in the business of making what amount to statistically strong (inductive) predictive models. It turns out that with sufficient education people tend to abandon superstition. Not always, but it is observable that exposing people to evidence based reasoning and science tends to persuade them toward not possessing hard theological beliefs. I bet if I could catch an Amish person out for Rumspringa, in the right setting, I would have a very good chance of persuading them away from theology and toward a more secular set of beliefs (although, the Amish are so tight-knit that I think many children stick around due to familial ties alone).

In any case, I feel no qualms about telling Amish people that their beliefs are factually incorrect, just as I have no qualms telling a Buddhist or Hindu or Muslim or Mormon or Jew or Rasta or any other religious person. They certainly can't all be right, so statistically I'm in a strong position.

Your move Abraham.

There's a massive difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalisations. It's just not one you can see because of your blind faith in the 'truth' of modern Western culture. — Isaac

You've gone off the deep end... You just can't see it because of your blind resentment of western culture... (Does this ever work?)

The difference is in how they deal with uncertainty. Utilitarian calculus (or more properly consequensialist), no matter how complex, takes all the 'known' facts about a matter and uses them to work out the best strategy to achieve a goal. — Isaac

If you could do less grand-standing against your humble racist interlocutor, perhaps you would be able to address his point:

Virtue ethics is really only good so far as it is useful to the people who wield it. Yes, people have all sorts of highfalutin beliefs about where good comes from, but overtime, people with non-useful beliefs have tended to die off, and their beliefs forgotten, while people with useful beliefs (such as the "jesus said: do unto others" virtue) have tended to stay alive and pass on their useful ideas. Beliefs and practices which are useful to human well-being tend to perpetuate themselves while useless beliefs do not; harmful beliefs tend to destroy themselves. But beliefs that perpetuate are not always conducive to well-being. Sometimes beliefs that once had utility cease to be useful when the environment changes; sometimes a belief or behavior is harmful to some and beneficial to others; sometimes people do things for inexplicable and stupid reasons.

I don't respect magical, supernatural, or superstitious beliefs, even when they're useful; I like my utility without any junk in it.

Virtue ethics, by contrast, presumes (in some manifestations at least), that such calculations are so fraught with error, that it makes more sense to focus on doing what feels right, given that we will never fully establish whether it actually was right in the long term. — Isaac

Ah Ah Ah, you said virtue ethics wasn't utilitarian! Where's the contrast? You've just described utilitarianism by intuitive guesswork.

Personally, I think of morality as that particular collection of subjective feelings about one's actions which relate to a potential negative effect on others. I'm not a moral relativist though, because I don't believe the subjective mental realm is a mystical, or supernatural place. It is amenable to science, it is subject to natural selection, sexual selection (and all manner of other selection pressures) and it responds in an (at least theoretically) predictable manner to environmental stimuli. All this put together makes these subjective feelings very homogeneous in large part and practically universal in some cases. These I take to be moral facts — Isaac

By defining morality as only a collection of subjective feelings about hurting others, you've gone into the relativist deep-end (where facts don't matter). Deep-end-relativists don't realize that when they broadly question and rhetorically undermine our general ability to gather facts about the external world and make objective predictions about the future (e.g: we can't even predict the eCoMoNy!!!), they simultaneously undermine their own ability to perform moral suasion. Consider how instinctively you leapt to the defense of genital mutilators and anti-vax parents (although the latter might be a bad example if you're ignorant of the science). You know FGM is wrong, but you won't allow yourself to cast judgment upon the practice because it's not universally "true" that FGM is immoral, 'cause subjective preference. Wouldn't it be better (morally, even) if you had an argument that could persuade the perpetrators of FGM that it is wrong? (Let's say, a utility-inclusive argument?)

Once you've undermined "morality" to such a degree, there's nothing useful left-over. Functionally, it's anarchic nihilism; if it's all subjective feelings, why not attempt moral suasion through interpretive dance?

Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us. — VagabondSpectre

We can value the same things (nominalism aside). And we can cooperate with each other. I'm not sure why that would need a special classification ( "inter" or "intra").

"this orange is good," or, "that is a good pocket-knife," not only do not make any sense, but that "it's not possible to make any sense" of them. Tell us, do you ever yourself engage in this nonsense? — tim wood

We're talking about your notion that those statements are about meeting some specific criteria, no? It's like all of a sudden you forgot the specific idea at issue, even though you brought it up and we'd been going back and forth about it for a few posts.

The orange in question might taste good, look good, be good. — tim wood

So you're saying that rather than being an utterance of preference, approval etc. "X is good" utterances imply meeting a criterion that . . . x is good??? Seriously?