What about the rest of the argument?

You can't make an "is" into an "ought" that is morally relevant without a hidden premise which needs to be justified, and which hasn't been justified, and which you can't justify.

And equivocation is a fallacy.

A feather is light.
What is light cannot be dark.
Therefore, a feather cannot be dark.

All jackasses have long ears.
Carl is a jackass.
Therefore, Carl has long ears.

If morality came from the individual, there would be no need for socialization.
There is a need for socialization.
Thus, morality doesn’t come from the individual. — Noah Te Stroete

The first premise is obviously false, so the argument is unsound. This is child's play.

Who gives a fuck? The topic is morality. Say something relevant to the topic. — S

I added another premise followed by the conclusion.

Also:

Society is the necessary conclusion of social creatures with linguistic meaning and communication.

Society has the goal of survival and flourishing of the community.

In order for this survival and flourishing, moral laws must be formed.

Moral laws are also grounded in moral feeling.

That moral feeling has as its basis the avoidance of pain.

Moral laws dissuade the inflicting of pain, which also helps to ensure the survival and flourishing of society.

If moral laws didn’t exist, then society would not have lasted this long.

Society has lasted.

Hence, MORAL LAWS EXIST.

The first premise is obviously false, so the argument is unsound. This is child's play. — S

Why is it false?

I'm not particularly interested in you simply throwing together an argument like that, even if valid.

You begin with premises about society as if it is taken for granted that morality is all about society, which you know that I reject from the get go.

Why is it false? — Noah Te Stroete

No, you don't get to do that. You haven't demonstrated that it is true, and I'll retract my claim that it is false until you bother to attempt to support your own argument properly instead of deflecting.

I don't do:

P1. Blah blah

P2. Blah blah

P3. Blah blah

Now prove me wrong!

So stop trying, people. Do not take me for a fool.

You begin with premises about society as if it is taken for granted that morality is all about society, which you know that I reject from the get go. — S

It seems we are at an impasse. I believe my premises are true. You don’t. Oh well.

It seems we are at an impasse. I believe my premises are true. You don’t. Oh well. — Noah Te Stroete

Only if you think that they're brute facts. Do you? Otherwise the burden is on you and you should stop making excuses.

If morality came from the individual, then there would be no need for socialization.

Socialization ensures the smooth working of society.

Society is the necessary conclusion of social creatures with shared linguistic meaning and communication.

Followed by:

Society has the goal of survival and flourishing of the community.

In order for this survival and flourishing, moral laws must be formed.

Moral laws are also grounded in moral feeling.

That moral feeling has as its basis the avoidance of pain.

Moral laws dissuade the inflicting of pain, which also helps to ensure the survival and flourishing of society.

If moral laws didn’t exist, then society would not have lasted this long.

Society has lasted.

Hence, MORAL LAWS EXIST. — Noah Te Stroete

Only if you think that they're brute facts. Do you? Otherwise the burden is on you and you should stop making excuses. — S

I don’t know how to prove to you that we are social creatures sharing linguistic meaning other than ...

Why would you think that repeating the problem helps to resolve it? I have narrowed down the problem to your first premise. Either try to defend it or do not. The burden is with you, and if you don't take it up, then that is tantamount to conceding, and your argument will be destined to remain meaningless to anyone who doesn't already agree with it.

Morality is taught just like any other form of linguistic knowledge. I don’t know how to prove that to you.

I don’t know how to prove to you that we are social creatures sharing linguistic meaning other than... — Noah Te Stroete

That doesn't contradict anything that I've claimed. I don't think that engaging with you further is going to be productive. You probably have something else entirely in mind to what I have in mind when you say that morality comes from the individual, because otherwise there is no logical link whatsoever to that somehow preventing socialisation altogether. I have not got the energy to draw out all of these problems. It's horses are cats, and I'll just end up really annoyed when it's finally revealed that you're talking about cats when I'm talking about horses.

I have narrowed down the problem to your first premise. Either try to defend it or do not. The burden is with you, — S

As I said, morality is taught just as any other linguistic knowledge. Socialization teaches the shared moral norms of a society. Any other function of socialization is secondary to and meaningless without the teaching of morals.

As I said, morality is taught just as any other linguistic knowledge. Socialization teaches the shared moral norms of a society. Any other function of socialization is secondary to and meaningless without the teaching of morals. — Noah Te Stroete

I don't care. You haven't given me any reason to. You're getting way ahead of yourself. My advice would be to slow down, try to regain relevance in relation to something I've actually said, and make explicit any key differences in interpretation. Otherwise this is going to be very unproductive, like my example in "Horses Are Cats".

I don't care. You haven't given me any reason to. You're getting way ahead of yourself. My advice would be to slow down, try to regain relevance in relation to something I've actually said, and make explicit any key differences in interpretation. Otherwise this is going to be very unproductive, like my example in "Horses Are Cats". — S

I don’t know what else I can say. I thought I laid it out before you.

I don’t know what else I can say. I thought I laid it out before you. — Noah Te Stroete

No, we're still stuck at the very first hurdle. Namely, the question of why morality can't stem from the individual in the sense that I meant that, and not any different sense which you might mean in place of that. If I assume my sense, then there's a giant logical gap between that as the antecedent, and no possible socialisation as the consequent, in the conditional of your very first premise.

Like I said, I suspect you aren't doing it right, because I suspect that you're probably talking past me. To avoid that, you should clarify key statements where I've indicated a problem, or seek clarification from me in order to check whether you mean the same thing as I do.

But all of this is time consuming and requires effort, and you've already wasted so much time and effort getting way ahead of yourself typing up formal arguments full of problems, and drifting off to bring up different points which don't help with the first problem, but only add to the number of problems you expect me to sort through and analyse and work on.

Just being honest and nothing to do with spiritual enlightenment. I wouldn’t blame others for saving humanity in this way, although it would still be an evil act. I just don’t have the stomach to harm a baby. — Noah Te Stroete

Evil is a tremendously loaded word that I would think has no place in a rational discussion of morality...but I will try. So boiling babies is evil. So is killing all humans. But given a choice between the two, one choice seems better in any measurable way. And based on your description, I think I would view most important morality as "picking between the lesser of two evils."

For example, there was only one war with a Hitler. Most of the rest are nothing but moral ambiguities.

Oh, and sorry for the Spiritual Enlightenment bit, I was half-joking based on your description sounding very much like a Buddhist monk who seeks to achieve enlightenment, but this requires that they are disconnected from the world and its problems. Good for them, but I sure hope they don't think the world would be better off if everyone thought like them.

For example, there was only one war with a Hitler. Most of the rest are nothing but moral ambiguities. — ZhouBoTong

I don’t know why you would say that other wars were “nothing but moral ambiguities”. But maybe you know more about the history of warfare than I do. For what it’s worth, Sun Tzu once said that no protracted war ever benefited a country. Were other wars not also evil? Sorry, “morally wrong”.

Or do you mean that the Allies were morally justified in fighting Hitler but other wars lacked moral justification?

How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.

If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other. — Rank Amateur

Have a look at the page number at the bottom of the page. I make it sixteen. That's about 200 posts. No one here is a relativist regarding logic, no one a solopsist. "Moral realism" brings up 203,000 results on Google Scholar.

So please, what blind faith leads you to believe that if all moral views are objective, one can be shown to be better than the other?

And if that is not possible (as it evidently is not), then in what way do you imagine the fact that it is also not possible with moral relativism serves as an argument against it?

If I assume my sense, then there's a giant logical gap between that as the antecedent, and no possible socialisation as the consequent, in the conditional of your very first premise. — S

In your view morality is about sentiments? If so, I disagree if that’s all there is to it, and I can see how you would not have socialization as the consequent. I believe in rationalism if by “innate knowledge” one means instinct. I believe in empiricism if one believes that the blank slate is a really complex and convoluted matrix that experience “writes on”. Moral sentiments are more than just feelings, though. One has to learn what one is feeling about. One learns through experience that pain is bad. It may also be instinctual or at least partly? Socialization (reports from elders or peers) teaches us that hitting someone causes pain in them, and this is reinforced when someone hits us and we feel pain. We learn through experience (also part of the socialization process) what pain feels like. In this way, we learn that hitting people unprovoked is bad. Now, you might feel that hitting someone unprovoked is satisfying, but socialization (reports from elders and peers that it causes pain) and experience should tell you it is bad. If with this you still feel that hitting someone unprovoked is good, then you are simply mistaken about a moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs. If one harmed a community member unprovoked, then one should expect to be harmed in return. This is neither good for the individual (pain sucks), nor is it good for the community. One harm can lead to two. Two harms can lead to three, etc. Usually, the loved ones feel through empathy the harm done to the harmed party. This can lead to further aggression, and soon large parts of the community are at strife. This is not good for individuals or the community (remember how individuals rely on the community for survival, wants, and needs) because cooperation soon breaks down and it becomes more difficult to survive and satisfy wants and needs. I would then conclude that harming someone unprovoked is morally wrong. “Objectively” wrong. Whatever “objective” really means.

I will say more if you have objections or questions.

You've got to be kidding me. "Popular," in context, is about admiration you'd say? The argument ad populum fallacy has something to do with liking or admiring the claim in question? lol

Isn't "frequently encountered or widely accepted" a common definition of "popular"?

Through shared meaning, communication, socialization. — Noah Te Stroete

Re shared meaning, for example, is your view that people are literally given meanings from others, kind of like you might hand a football to them, say, so that you share that same football with them?

Nice attempt to shift the goalposts from the original point in question, i.e. the inaptness of the term 'popular' as opposed to 'prevalent' in context and the difference in senses between the two words. @Janus originally used the term 'all but universal' and you switched that to 'popular' so you could use the argumentum ad populum to undermine his position. But that doesn't work because you misrepresent what he was saying by using an inapt synonym. 'Prevalence' and 'universality' share the meaning he intended whereas 'popular' muddies the waters. Deliberately.

So, I'll explain again in more detail, not so much for you, but for those actually interested in having a real conversation on the issue: What people tend to feel and do in terms of interpersonal behaviour cross-culturally, what's prevalent taking a holistic view, is constitutive of what's moral because it reflects commmonalities in the human condition unbeholden to the local, i.e. it's an appeal to the broadest level of intersubjectivity. Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. Or at the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.

But then this type of wordplay is probably the only slim chance you have of getting any mileage of your utterly confused and self-contradictory position re morality where you've stated yourself you recognize pain and harm as salient, but only when it's inflicted physically, refuse to acknowledge all sense of degree re other forms of pain, refuse to offer any justification and then immunize yourself against any possibility of a rational challenge by claiming there's no recourse to reason possible and the only justification for moral claims is what we feel about them. Now that sequence of silliness is worthy of a lol. In short, you have zero of sense to offer on the subject and when that's pointed out you retreat into the usual nonsense, 'it's just an opinion' etc. That is literally all you've got.

Nice attempt to shift the goalposts from the original point in question, — Baden

Nice attempt to cover not understanding context.

is constitutive of what's moral because it reflects commmonalities in the human condition unbeholden to the local, i.e. it's an appeal to the broadest level of intersubjectivity. — Baden

This amounts to forwarding an argumentum ad populum. Basically, "It's the answer because it's popular."

by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', — Baden

Some sort of language expert you are when you're not even familiar with ""frequently encountered or widely accepted" as a definition of "popular."

and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain — Baden

Yeah, it can, because your argument, particularly in light of the word "truth," is simply an argumentum ad populum. You might not understand that, or maybe you do and you'll just deny in the vein of a political strategy, but that doesn't change the fact that it's an argumentum ad populum.

Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here — Baden

To not be an argumentum ad populum, the prevalence of pain, and either the mention of opinions about it, or an analysis of it in terms of preferences about it (a la "it's not pain if someone likes it"), can't be presented as if it has something to do with "pain is morally bad" being a "moral truth."

Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here — Baden

What is the P that I'm both asserting and denying?

you recognize pain and harm as salient, but only when it's inflicted physically, — Baden

Even when "physical" (in quotation marks because "as if anything is not physical"), I don't frame any moral stances simply on the notions of pain or harm.

immunize yourself against any possibility of a rational challenge — Baden

Ultimately there can be no rational challenge for morality, as moral foundations can't be rationally derived.

Now that sequence of silliness is worthy of a lol. — Baden

Too bad you don't feel it's worth a counterargument that holds water and that isn't simply a bunch of posturing and attitude.

In short, you have zero of sense to offer on the subject and when that's pointed out you retreat into the usual nonsense, 'it's just an opinion' etc. — Baden

And here you don't even understand the most basic things I'm claiming. My metaethical views are not at all "just opinions." They're reporting the objective facts of what ethics/morality is.

Some sort of language expert you are when you're not even familiar with ""frequently encountered or widely accepted" as a definition of "popular." — Terrapin Station

For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe* concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting. — Baden

*"Popularly believe" means "widely accepted". I've covered that. But you saying that pain is "popular" because it is "frequently encountered" will rightly result in people laughing in your face, and your language will be inapt. Do you get it yet?

But you saying that pain is "popular" because it is "frequently encountered" will rightly result in people laughing in your face, — Baden

This underscores your philosophical Achilles' heel. You formulate views based on popular belief, popular behavior. Conformity to the norm, to the status quo, is your arbiter.

Is pain popular?

Is pain popular? — Baden

Yes.

Maybe you should trying learning more than one sense of a term?