if I thought any of that was true I would happily admit it. So take one of those, and in a complete though, that shows you actually took a second to understand the point I am making, show my error I will be happy to admit error if you show it.

If I thought any of that was true I would happily admit it. So take one of those, and in a complete though, that shows you actually took a second to understand the point I am making, show my error I will be happy to admit error if you show it. — Rank Amateur

Here's the problem: I am not your tutor in logic. If I am, I demand that you pay me for my time and effort. Especially since you are a pupil who demands that logical errors be shown and explained over and over again, in various different ways, until you finally grasp the error, which you might never actually do, because your psych is clearly interfering.

The irony is that these demands from you are themselves suggestive of a fallacy, namely an argument from repetition, which means that you repeatedly demand a demonstration or explanation that has already been provided, with the hope that your interlocutor just ends up sick and tired and gives up on you as a result.

Just refer to my previous replies, and look up the fallacies which I've identified, and compare them to what you've said, and use your brain. If that doesn't work, then too bad.

you make a claim, I challenge you to defend it, you dodge. Rinse repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please.

You make a claim, I challenge you to defend it, you dodge. Rinse repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please. — Rank Amateur

I identify a logical error in something you've said, I show you the error and explain why it is an error, you deny the error or demand I do the same thing again or try to change the subject. I eventually get fed up and stop trying. Rinse, repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please.

Refer back to the answer, use your brain. Don't demand that I repeat the answer until I get tired and give up trying to get you to see the error. You are a bad pupil. Try harder, and don't blame your tutor.

Also, you will get the bill in the post.

what I am saying is there is a truth about murder being good or bad, right or wrong. — Rank Amateur

Agreed. The statement has a truth value. There is a truth *about* any empirical concept which doesn’t concern the concept itself, but simply the origin of it.
——————-

We can disagree what the truth is, but it is important if both parties believe there is a truth. — Rank Amateur

Agreed. The disagreement presupposes something enabling it, and also indicates the presence of, not just parties, but, morally inclined parties. Otherwise, there would be no need for a truth value at all.
——————

If we don't believe there actually is a truth, it is just preference. — Rank Amateur

Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists.
———————

Then we can see if we think that truth is different than opinion. — Rank Amateur

We can, and it is. A logical truth, which is what we’re actually working with here because we are considering a relative truth vale of a simple proposition and not a objective reality, is predicated on both necessity and universality, regardless of the contents of the proposition being examined. Anything necessary and universal cannot be mere opinion, because opinions have no subjective validity, being possibly nothing more than a notion or an idea. And universal herein meaning given for any possible condition pertaining to rational humans. It may well be opinion, but even then only in the context of a dialectic, which decides good/bad, right/wrong with respect to the empirical concept contained in the predicate of the proposition, but that’s not what’s being asked. To a human moral agent, it is not opinion as to whether or not there is a good/bad, right/wrong value contained in the proposition itself.

And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).

Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that.

Ok let me see if I can guess at one

For some reason you thought I said murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate

And you called that a false equivalence

My point was, and is.

There are somethings that are true
I propose it is true that murder is wrong

There are two people, like yourself believe moral judgments are mostly subjective
One says, to me, my moral relative thought is murder is wrong.
The other says, my moral relative thought is murder is fine.

Both tell each other they disagree with the other one.

If you believe there is a possible truth about the moral nature of murder they both
Can not be right. And if you believe in mostly subjectivity, there is no standard to judge
If wrong.

If it is not right or wrong, it is just different. Like the choice of vanilla or chocolate.

I have no issue with the moral relativist as long as they acknowledge they lose the right to judge the moral judgments of others.

If two people are having a debate about whether horses have wings, and the first person says "Horses have wings", and the second person says, "But horses have wings!", and the first person replies, "And?", and then a third person comes along and explains that the second person's reply lacked logical relevance, is it appropriate or reasonable for the second person to refuse to acknowledge that their reply lacks logical relevance, or to change the subject, or to demand a repeat of the explanation when they can easily refer back to it?

I think that the third person is being helpful, and the second person is being wrongheaded.

I care because the whole point of doing philosophy is to get right what the world is like. — Terrapin Station

No! The whole point of philosophy is to get right what it means for us to be us, and to be in the world as us as we are and can be. What the world is like is the business of science.

Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists. — Mww

The point I was going for, was if there is no truth value in opinion a or b, either choice is just preference. There is no truth value that vanilla is better than chocolate. It is just preference, chose as you wish. We don't have that luxury with is murder bad or good.

And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).

Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that. — Mww

I am struggling with how we can believe that it is true that murder is either good or bad. And there can be a significant subjective judgment on which it is. Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition

For some reason you thought I said murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate — Rank Amateur

Because that is what you said. Word for word. Sweet Mary mother of Jesus, does your denialism know no bounds?

And you called that a false equivalence. — Rank Amateur

Understandably so. They are no more the same than chalk and cheese, and it is already known that they are both considered preferences, so if that was your point, then it is a point which lacks logical relevance. You would actually need to take it somewhere logically relevant, otherwise it is not worth even making to begin with. That is why when you make a point like that, you get a response like "And?". I really shouldn't have to explain this.

My point was, and is... — Rank Amateur

I bet you a thousand dollars that whatever you say your point was and is, it has already been dealt with. The only problem here is your problem in understanding what the problem is. It is a meta-problem, and it is really only your problem, but it is also a problem for anyone who is trying to help you see what the problem is, and how it can be resolved. You have blamed me for trying to help you, but the resolution requires the ability to understand the problem and understand how it can be resolved. I cannot just simply give you that ability if you don't have it. It can be hard work, and there's no guarantee of success.

There are somethings that are true
I propose it is true that murder is wrong — Rank Amateur

That's already a problem for Terrapin, because he is a noncognitivist. And I'm guessing it will be a problem for me also, but for a different reason. It will be a problem for me because I go by a moral relativist interpretation of moral truths. But these are really not our problems at all, because you merely assume cognitivism and assume absolutism without warrant. So they're actually your problems.

There are two people, like yourself believe moral judgments are mostly subjective
One says, to me, my moral relative thought is murder is wrong.
The other says, my moral relative thought is murder is fine.

Both tell each other they disagree with the other one.

If you believe there is a possible truth about the moral nature of murder they both
Can not be right. — Rank Amateur

No, the logical fallacy you're committing there is one that has been pointed out before multiple times, and it is that of begging the question. It is begging the question because when you say that both can't be right, what you really mean is that both can't be right in accordance with moral absolutism. But the error in that should be obvious, because a moral relativist obviously doesn't accept moral absolutism.

Alternatively, you're just plain wrong, because in accordance with moral relativism, both can be right. To understand that, you would need to learn about moral relativism and learn about the law of noncontradiction. If you have a proper understanding of both, then you will know that they're compatible, and that there is no contradiction, no violation of that fundamental law of logic.

And if you believe in mostly subjectivity, there is no standard to judge
If wrong. — Rank Amateur

This has been shown to be a non sequitur. There is a standard, and it is subjective. The logical error you are making is once again that of begging the question, because by "standard" you really mean objective standard. You must realise that standards are not necessarily objective, and that it is fallacious to just assume an objective standard in this context.

If it is not right or wrong, it is just different. Like the choice of vanilla or chocolate. — Rank Amateur

It is right or wrong, so the antecedent is false and the consequent is irrelevant. You would be once again begging the question by saying that there is no right and wrong because of how you interpret right and wrong. Moral absolutists do not have copyright privilege to moral terminology. I must have seen that error a hundred times or more.

And the comparison to foodstuffs has already been exposed as misleading, so you should stop doing that unless you actually want to look like a sophist. There is a right and wrong - no one here is denying that. Do not confuse moral relativism for moral nihilism. They are two distinct positions. And nor has anyone denied that moral preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it is of greater significance than preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it about foodstuffs, i.e. "mere" preference.

I have no issue with the moral relativist as long as they acknowledge they lose the right to judge the moral judgments of others. — Rank Amateur

No, you need to understand and acknowledge your errors, including non sequiturs like the above. But I am not a wizard, I can't magically make you understand. I am just in effect your tutor in logic without pay.

you are incapable of dialogue, because you exercise no effort in understanding the other opinion.

You are incapable of dialogue, because you exercise no effort in understanding the other opinion. — Rank Amateur

No, you are projecting. But take a break, and when you're capable of being reasonable enough to overcome your psychological issues, I suggest you slowly go back over my reply instead of being a knee-jerk reacting bad pupil.

By the way, anyone merely making the point that some moral statements are true should recognise that this point will be completely irrelevant to most of us here. I only know of one person in this discussion who would deny that. He is an emotivist. I am not, and neither is Isaac, and obviously neither is anyone on the moral realist side. We're all cognitivists, and we all believe that there are some true moral statements, with the exception of one person.

So please bear that in mind when making lengthy self-congratulatory posts, under the illusion that you're getting somewhere and building a good case against the opposition. Unless the opposition is Terrapin and no one else, you're not getting anywhere.

True, there is no truth value in opinion. Nevertheless, maybe it’s no more a problem than disconnecting moral dilemma from aesthetics. Choice of ice cream may be a practical preference grounded in opinion, and hardly compares to taking a life, whereas morality is a fundamental condition of being human, so shouldn’t be grounded by something so arbitrary as practical preference. Easier to see if one considers the differences in the consequences of choice of aesthetics as opposed to the consequences of choice of poor moral imperatives.

You’re struggling with it because you can’t see how arbitrarily taking a life could possibly be good, or that even assigning a truth value to a moral proposition which says taking a life could possibly be good. The best way to get over that struggle is to become the object of some other moral agent believing it is true that taking a life is good. Being that object doesn’t help you understand how someone could believe it, but you certainly will be forced to know they do.

I don’t struggle with it because I have determined it couldn’t possibly be good in fact and the proposition that contains it is morally bankrupt. It is my own morality with which I concern myself, and from there, I don’t care how someone can come to believe something I find abhorrent. You, on the other hand, are on your own. This is subjective relativism writ large and how it works is entirely metaphysical. How it originates in the beginning, and how it manifests in the end, is something else indeed, for these are both empirically conditioned. Morality itself is in the middle.

“......Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition....”
They seem so, but can be reconciled a priori by means of pure reason. It is these reconciliations from which distinct forms of morality arise, and makes objective morality as a doctrine, impossible.

Notice also, the things we agree on are not the root of the moral debate, but rather it is the things we disagree on. If the former is significantly greater than the latter, we have an ethical community. Where the latter does come to the fore, we have administrative justice to handle the disagreement. Morality, again, in the middle, describes how the differences obtain.

Ok, if you do not believe there are any truth statements we can make about the rightness or wrongness of murder, we just disagree.

Then whatever my personal judgment on the topic is, you can disagree with, but have to accept as just as morally valid as yours — Rank Amateur

There is no such thing as morally valid. There is nothing to judge. Are you seriously suggesting that you weighed the pros and cons of murder before deciding it was morally wrong? For me it's just obviously wrong.

Valid is a judgement of logic. It expresses that that the proposition has not transgressed any of the rules of logic. If you agree with those rules the judgment is important. If you don't agree with those rules it is unimportant. Most people agree with the rules of basic logic (though there is disagreement around the periphery).

If there are similar rules of morality, then propositions about whether certain actions meet those rules or not will have a truth value (of sorts). It will be true that the proposed action is outside of those rules. But this will only be of interest to those who agree with those rules. Unlike logic though, there is not such widespread agreement on the details of those rules.

No! The whole point of philosophy is to get right what it means for us to be us, and to be in the world as us as we are and can be. — tim wood

That's not part of what the world is like?

That's not part of what the world is like? — Terrapin Station

Great point.

If I have that right, than what makes any thoughts about a moral stance any more than a preference by the thinker of one over another stance — Rank Amateur

Nothing. I've said over and over that moral stances are simply preferences, utterances of approval and disapproval (about a particular subject matter, not just any preferences, of course).

as long as they acknowledge this entails allowing the different moral views of others without any value judgments. — Rank Amateur

What entails that? Or it's entailed by virtue of what?

You can have subjective but then all you can have is different not better not worse. — Rank Amateur

Better and worse are subjective judgments. So why can't you have that?

I think that you, Tim, and Vagabond Spectre have been suggesting ad hominems.... Some of the key fallacious suggestions from you three have been that us moral relativists are trivialising important matters, — S

This is easily resolved in favour of the sceptic of moral absolutism, rather than the proponent of moral absolutism. One could just retract the stronger claim that nothing is absolutely right or wrong, and instead just point out that there seems to be no credible evidence or reasonable argument in favour of moral absolutism, only dogmatism and bad logic. — S

Moreover, whether or not everyone benefits from his argument is irrelevant. Why do you keep confronting people like myself and Terrapin Station with irrelevancies, as though they are not irrelevancies? Are you so eager to attack our position that you're not thinking things through properly? It has seemed that way from the very beginning. You seem to have few qualms about throwing the logic rulebook out of the window if it seems to you that by doing so you'll gain the upper hand over your moral relativist opponents. — S

Because, from my point of view, morality is inherent in man. — Brett

It is a real shame that Tim's reply completely ignores your explanation and jumps straight into a question about your answer full of his own implicit misguided assumptions. What he's really asking is, "Do you really believe that, given all of my misguided assumptions, and completely disregarding the explanation you've put time and effort into producing?". Isn't philosophy supposed to encourage critical thinking and open-mindedness? — S

One of the ways I understand reason is that by which both you and I can be compelled to assent to something as a matter of free will, because reason shows that the thing assented to just is so. And reason for itself only seems to require the possibility of meaning. "Possibility" because clearly there are expressions that are meaningless; i.e., it is not the case that everything is meaningless, or meaningful.

I'm pretty sure this mutual/collective assent can only occur in reason, on the sorts of things that reason addresses. We all standing on the same mountaintop admiring the same sunset nevertheless all experience a different sunset. If we agree - presumably we do; it's a beautiful sunset - it is in the nature of agreement on a class of abstract generalities. But agreement it is, though the underlying experience differs.

2+2=4 is the poster-child expression of an example of reasoning we can all be compelled to assent to as a matter of reason. Maybe not all of us, but certainly those of us who reason.

The question arises if there is any moral/ethical proposition we who reason can be compelled to assent to according to the standards of reason, as just above. But we might first ask if any such proposition is, can be, reasonable. The latter is answered by observing that the proposition in question is meaningful (assuming that it is), and not meaningless. Perhaps second, if in respect of its own subject matter, it is a categorical proposition, or can be rendered as one.

It does not take long to recognize that propositions founded in a psychology, whether of being in general or an individual, are generally insufficiently meaningful to reason with, except with substantial and material qualifications, constraints, limitations. But insofar as propositions of and about morality are deemed to come out of a psychology, then I am compelled to agree with S, that all morality is relative.

But does all morality find its ground in morality? Morality as psychology? Or morality as reason? Clearly the expression of much morality is in such terms as to make it seem psychological. "Should" is a convenient and easy enough argument, and easy enough to swallow, if it must be swallowed. It seems to me, though, that it all originates in reason. Not temporally; not first reason then practice. People do not usually work that way. But as a matter of logically priority. Experience, then reflection on that experience to unearth basic principles, reasons. Thus, to Brett, (human) morality comes into being in man, but is grounded in reason.

How reason? Kant mapped this territory. If I suppose murder at all right, then implicitly I consent to murder. Ultimately as a matter of reason to my own murder. If I qualify that to exclude my own murder, then presumably everyone can make the same exception. In addition there are notions of stealing, and of taking life, equally non-reasonable. And so the argument spins. Is Kant water-tight on this all the way out to the edges and corners? This amounts to the question of whether anything underpins reason. Kant indeed has values. But I think his effort of tailoring the fit of values and reason is more than adequate.

In sum, reason can and does give us absolutes. At the same time reason makes rigorous demands in the expression of those absolutes. Thus, "You shall not kill," correctly seems problematic as over and against the more precise, "You shall not murder."

I sum, I hold the argument against the possibility of moral absolutes as an argument against reason in favour of psychology. Psychology has its uses, but it's not reason nor a substitute for it.

All that really amounts to is saying that the people who don't agree with you are unreasonable. Not much of an argument.

How reason? Kant mapped this territory. If I suppose murder at all right, then implicitly I consent to murder. Ultimately as a matter of reason to my own murder. If I qualify that to exclude my own murder, then presumably everyone can make the same exception. In addition there are notions of stealing, and of taking life, equally non-reasonable. And so the argument spins. Is Kant water-tight on this all the way out to the edges and corners? This amounts to the question of whether anything underpins reason. Kant indeed has values. But I think his effort of tailoring the fit of values and reason is more than adequate. — tim wood

The reason I said that the categorical imperative is a joke earlier on in the discussion is because it is merely a conditional about universalism. "Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that"-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way, and your reply of "Well, you should do!" has no force.

I think that Kant's predecessor in Hume was a far greater moral philosopher.

In sum, reason can and does give us absolutes. At the same time reason makes rigorous demands in the expression of those absolutes. Thus, "You shall not kill," correctly seems problematic as over and against the more precise, "You shall not murder." — tim wood

Well no, in sum it does no such thing. But you're free to deceive yourself otherwise.

I sum, I hold the argument against the possibility of moral absolutes as an argument against reason in favour of psychology. Psychology has its uses, but it's not reason nor a substitute for it. — tim wood

Reason is the slave of the passions.

For you we'll go very simple. Do you hold that 2+2=4 is absolutely true as a matter of reason? Or true only as a matter of opinion, of psychology, and thus true for some folks and not true for others?

Do you hold that 2+2=4 is absolutely true as a matter of reason? — tim wood

No.

I've posted this a couple times in the last month or so, and I'm pretty sure I directed you to it already:

Mathematics is an abstracted way of thinking about relations, with some basis in external-world relations as we observe and think about them (which doesn't imply that any mathematics is identical to external-world relations, of course), but the bulk of it is extrapolated from that, creating a sort of construction/game upon that in an erector-set manner.

Because of that, there's no reason to say that any mathematical statement is universal.

As it is, no mathematical statement is universally constructed by humans, but we have very stringent socialization procedures in place to enforce conformity to the norms.

Congratulations, yours is the start of another thread, this time in math.

For you we'll go very simple. Do you hold that 2+2=4 is absolutely true as a matter of reason? Or true only as a matter of opinion, of psychology, and thus true for some folks and not true for others? — tim wood

What if I do? You can't just pull a switcheroo and conclude that it must be so with morality also. Ethics and maths are two very different things.

Good luck trying to get through to him. I really mean that. I want him to understand. But we have reached the point of him getting stuck on reoccurring problems. I think that the biggest problem is that he can't see things from within moral relativism or emotivism, or he refuses to do so. His moral absolutist spectacles seem glued on tight.

And note that earlier on he mentioned the possibility of an explanation of morality involving God. I know that he believes in God, and the kind of people who believe in God are known to be dogmatic and rigidly committed to a set of beliefs. Maybe he is fixated on the idea that he simply must reject moral relativism. Moral relativism is bad! Destructive even! It is no different to moral nihilism or amoralism! Everything would be equally acceptable! (Even though it wouldn't be, that's just a really bad misunderstanding). :scream:

But does all morality find its ground in morality? Morality as psychology? Or morality as reason? Clearly the expression of much morality is in such terms as to make it seem psychological. "Should" is a convenient and easy enough argument, and easy enough to swallow, if it must be swallowed. It seems to me, though, that it all originates in reason. Not temporally; not first reason then practice. People do not usually work that way. But as a matter of logically priority. Experience, then reflection on that experience to unearth basic principles, reasons. Thus, to Brett, (human) morality comes into being in man, but is grounded in reason. — tim wood

Maybe a way to approach the matter is to look at the limits of psychology in a different context than the contrast of reason against the background of experience.

For example, Kierkegaard outlined the limits of psychology as the insufficiency of explanation in relation to the need to decide. If the parameters of some situation can be completely explained as an event, no decisions are needed. The diremption between the absolute and the relative concerns the use of language, as such, and framing it in those terms does not make the observation a new psychology.

I find Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics interesting in this regard because he points to a gap between expressions of "absolute" experiences and the other kind without explaining it. Or at least it can be said that language does not explain language.

I wanna play!!!!

Yes, I hold 2 + 2 = 4 is absolutely true. As a matter of reason. No, not as a matter of opinion, psychology, and whether others hold with it is up to them.

Now what?

I wanna play!!!!

Yes, I hold 2 + 2 = 4 is absolutely true. As a matter of reason. No, not as a matter of opinion, psychology, and whether others hold with it is up to them.

Now what? — Mww

Now we wait for the inevitable switcheroo, even though it won't work because ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things.

I'm always one step ahead. I don't think that that's always appreciated. I think it wound Rank Amateur up. It's not my fault some people are predictable. :lol:

"Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldnt surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed.