The point though, is that Wittgenstein is making no such distinction between types of explanation at 87. Luke is making this distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we have these two fundamentally different ways of using language, the one assumes an ideal, and proceeds in that way, in logic and explanation, and the other, common usage, assumes no such ideal, and does not proceed according to theoretical rules of essentialism, but by practise, then doesn't an accurate description of language require considering both of these branches of language use? — Metaphysician Undercover
It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were aiming at a particular state, a state of complete exactness, and as if this were the real goal of our investigation. [§91]
For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the nature of language — its function, its structure — yet this is not what that question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth.
‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience. [§92]
94. ‘Remarkable things, propositions!’ Here we already have the sublimation of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional sign and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublimate, the sign itself. — For our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved.
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.) [§96]
97. Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus. — Its essence, logic, presents an order: namely, the a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty may attach to it. —– It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language.
101. We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.
102. The strict and clear rules for the logical construction of a proposition appear to us as something in the background — hidden in the medium of understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium), for I do understand the sign, I mean something by it.
103. The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. — How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.
107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming vacuous. — We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! — PI
So I disagree that we have "two fundamentally different ways of using language". We have a view of language derived from looking at its use, and a game of finding ideal meanings that, like Antigonish, does not mesh with the world. — Banno
Not really, because the (non-common) "usage" which assumes an ideal is only found in philosophy. — Luke
Keep in mind that it is the assumption (of an ideal) - the thinking - that is misguided. — Luke
As I explained in the post, if it is all just one way of using language, that way assumes ideals. — Metaphysician Undercover
69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine
that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and
similar things are called 'games' ". And do we know any more about
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what
a game is?—But this is not. ignorance. We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took
the definition: i pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one
pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't
an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.—
Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — PI
The question would be whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
You keep coming back to §98. But it is only a small part. Read §99, which has one of his alternate voices; he sets up the case you are arguing! The in §100, rejects it. — Banno
The ideal we are now discussing is an assumption which can result from the sublime nature of logic. — Luke
132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.
Serving the purpose is the real ideal, as expressed at 88. — Metaphysician Undercover
The ‘ideal’, misconstrued, is evident in the preconception of the strict rules of the logical structure of propositions, in the idea that the sense of every sentence must be absolutely determinate, in the thought that every proposition must have the form ‘Such-and-such is thus-and-so’, in the supposition that the real name must be simple, in the conception of the sentences and words of ordinary language as merely crude surface manifestations of the real propositions and names hidden in the medium of the understanding. Caught thus in the web of illusion, the conception seems irresistible. — Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations : Part II: Exegesis §§1–184, Volume 1
However, he does not reject "ideal" as a totally useless word which people are going around using when it really has no use. He calls it a misunderstanding of "the ideal". He still allows that "ideal" has a role in language. — Metaphysician Undercover
He is not referring to "the ideal" at §88; he is referring to ideal exactness. Furthermore, he is criticising, not defining, the unspecified notion of ideal exactness. He says "we don't know what we are to make of this idea". He goes on to talk about other kinds of ideals (other than ideal exactness) from section §89 onwards. — Luke
These are not all about 'serving a purpose' or 'achieving a goal'. — Luke
Whether you call it "ideal exactness", or "the ideal exactness" is not relevant, we are talking about the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if we look back and apply the term in retrospect, at 87, the final explanation, the one which requires no further explanation to avoid misunderstanding would be the ideal explanation. At 85, the sign-post which leaves no room for doubt would be the ideal sign-post. — Metaphysician Undercover
He is criticising this notion of "ideal", as if it is misguided, and we ought not use it... — Metaphysician Undercover
at this stage I'm sick of you holding the thread up. There's a whole book here. Move on. — Banno
If you need this space just to repeat yourselves ad nauseum, then I'll stop attempting to move the thread on to the more interesting parts of the book. — Banno
I made a distinction between "ideal exactness" and "the ideal", and referenced other types of ideal than ideal exactness. — Luke
This has already been addressed: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." You have in your mind some ideal explanation that accounts for every imaginable doubt, but this is not Wittgenstein's idea. Then you accuse him of being inconsistent based on your own ideal. — Luke
Where do you get the idea that Wittgenstein is trying to reject any form of language use? As I stressed earlier, it is about particular assumptions, presumptions, preconceptions, misconceptions, or misguided ways of thinking. Wittgenstein diagnoses particular forms of wayward thought in philosophy, including those listed by Baker and Hacker: — Luke
Nowhere does Wittgenstein advocate that we ought not to use the word "ideal", or any other word. Wittgenstein is trying to dispel particular philosophical dead ends of thinking. — Luke
at this stage I'm sick of you holding the thread up. There's a whole book here. Move on. — Banno
How is ideal exactness any different from any other ideal, qua 'ideal"? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is actually very simple and straight forward, so I can't understand why you don't see it. In philosophy, if we diagnose a particular form of thought as "wayward", we are rejecting the way that the philosopher is using language. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem, in this particular instance, as I described in my last post, is that the role of "ideal" is the very opposite of the dead end. — Metaphysician Undercover
Accepting that there is an ideal, which has not yet been obtained, is what leaves us open to continually bettering ourselves. If, instead of "ideal" we accept "fulfils its purpose", as our goal, then we have no inspiration to find a better or more efficient way to do what we are doing. Therefore, rejecting "the ideal", in favour of "fulfils its purpose" is really what is the dead end, because the end, or goal, is already reached when the purpose is fulfilled, and there is nothing further, no ideal, to strive for. — Metaphysician Undercover
This book is, in my opinion, the single most important philosophical text ever written — Isaac
The issue is that Wittgenstein is discussing other particular types of ideal that you are failing to acknowledge. — Luke
It is very simple. Wittgenstein is attempting to dispel misconceptions; he is not attempting to dictate any changes to the use of the word "ideal". — Luke
The problem is that you make sweeping abstract generalisations about the word "ideal", without regard for how Wittgenstein is using this term or to what he is referring. — Luke
Wittgenstein offers no positive determination or definition of "the ideal" (especially outside of any particular language game), yet you are hellbent on trying to find one. — Luke
If he talks about ideal this, or ideal that, ideal exactness, ideal languages, or ideal logic, "ideal" is the adjective. These are not different types of ideals. They are different types of things described by the same adjective, "ideal", and therefore we ought not assume that "ideal" refers to a different type of ideal in each case. — Metaphysician Undercover
Read 100 -110 and tell me how many times he mentions "the ideal". — Metaphysician Undercover
Can you offer an explanation for why he drives a wedge between "ideal" and "perfect"? — Metaphysician Undercover
Could you expand upon this (or anyone else who happens to agree)? I'm genuinely curious. I have no philisophical knowledge of Witty at all. — emancipate
Wittgenstein references "the ideal" in regard to the ideal language, the ideal sentence, the ideal exactness, the ideal (purity of) logic, the ideal game, the ideal application of the word "game", and the ideal order between sentences, words and signs. — Luke
The non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical is found where he says that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence" (§98). Here, the "order" of the vague sentence is already "perfect" as it is. This is contrasted (in the same section) with the ideal meaning of "perfect" where he says: "we are not striving after an ideal, as if...a perfect language still had to be constructed by us." — Luke
This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc. — Luke
How is it possible that there is a perfection which is not ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover
So "ideal' has a meaning here other than as a perfection which we strive after. — Metaphysician Undercover
The result is that "ideal" means something other than a perfection which we strive after — Metaphysician Undercover
He is distinctly saying that the work of philosophy is to describe the use of language, not to criticize it. To criticize it is to pass judgement, and this implies that one ought, or ought not use language in a particular way. Where does Wittgenstein show any principles to give this criticism any repute? Such hypocritical criticism is nothing more than a potential for ridicule. — Metaphysician Undercover
. In essence it digs what's left of philosophy out of the massive pit it had burrowed itself into and gives it a purpose in an age where 'reckoning' how the world is from an armchair no longer passes muster. — Isaac
You have it backwards. It is the ideal which we are not striving after at 98. — Luke
This makes no sense. You state that W distinctly says that the work of philosophy is not to criticise the use of language, but you then appear to imply that W criticises language use. Where does he do so? Your abstract bombast is tiring. — Luke
It is you who has stated that W was being critical of others' use of "ideal" (aims of traditional philosophy). So there is no need for me to point you to where he criticizes the language use of others, you must already know, because you are the one whose made that assertion.This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc. — Luke
On a personal note, I will be undergoing extensive medical treatment for a few months so I possibly might not be around for a while. — Luke
a chair/seat is that which we use primarily for sitting on, — I like sushi
I am suggesting that the “meaning” is the “use”. — I like sushi
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