and the relevant question is 'on what basis could one think that some interpersonal behaviors are "more significant than etiquette"?' — Janus
he dishonestly uses any strategy to avoid admitting that his position is inconsistent, — Janus
An example is that Terrapin will counter any argument that appeals to the prevalence of shared values on the most central moral issues (murder, rape, torture, theft and so on) with the objection that the almost universally cross-culturally prevalent attitudes that condemn those is merely a matter of those attitudes being more "popular", which basically gives them no more inter-subjective weight than personal culinary preferences. — Janus
And yet when I say that from the perspective of someone who is morally neutral, who is amoral, assuming moral relativism, all moral stances are equal, and that there is thus no inter-subjective rational warrant to prefer one stance over the other, he claims that no one is in fact morally neutral and that this is demonstrated by statistics involving studying "hundreds, even thousands" of people. — Janus
Even if it were accepted that those statistics are accurate and that they reflect what is the case with billions of people, his own position should dismiss it on the basis that it is an appeal to populism. — Janus
Because there is no objective (on his view of objectivity) reason why people should not be morally neutral, — Janus
life and death is profoundly important to almost all of us, and that is the "objective" element of commonality — Janus
Maybe you personally put a lot more weight on something because it's more prevalent, and you're not claiming that the prevalence has anything to do with it being correct, so that it's just a pledge to conformity, essentially, and that's fine. — Terrapin Station
But you can’t bite the apple and tell someone it tastes both good and bad at the same time. In order to communicate your view of the taste of the apple you have to use adjectives with some degree of objective meaning. — Rank Amateur
If you murder someone because that action is the lesser of two evils how is that relevant to the point that an act is moral if its intent is to do the least harm possible to social harmony? — Janus
what you say here only seems to support what I have been arguing, against the notion that morality is merely a matter of personal preference. — Janus
I'm not saying that we may always access the evidence required for strong induction (or are always capable of interpreting it), I'm saying that in some situations we can do so sufficiently, especially with regard to negative moral claims. — VagabondSpectre
Any disagreements with the above? — VagabondSpectre
not all vaccines are inherently profit driven, — VagabondSpectre
Many scientists and researchers in medical fields genuinely are trying to create things to improve life rather than improve corporate profits. Sometimes corporations, even for greedy reasons, do good things. The list of essential vaccines that have saved millions of lives since their inception are among them. — VagabondSpectre
Aren't you on some level treating people like children in doing so?
I'm with you about the existential and psychological need for happiness, but what if someone is unhappy because they cannot get their own (ridiculous) way? (Or maybe more to the point, what happens when they're unhappy precisely because they've gotten their own way?). Our expectations do not always conform to reality, and in so far as we can inform our expectations (and hence the way we feel about the related action) with reason and evidence, we can tend toward more accurate and consistent feelings about actions. — VagabondSpectre
Good faith means that when you point out inconsistencies or inadequacies in the other's position they provide a cogent argument to show that it is not in fact an inconsistency, or if they can't, then admit that iit is an inconsistency. — Janus
As I read this thread (and others) Terrapin never does that, but introduces any red herring he can find, or pretends not to comprehend what is being said, that is he dishonestly uses any strategy to avoid admitting that his position is inconsistent, mistaken or explanatorily inadequate. — Janus
That which is subject to individual particulars is little to nothing more than an unhelpful distraction during moral discourse. That which is true of everyone lends itself to being a rock-solid dependable foundation. — creativesoul
, is one. May we agree reason is the other? Reason the human constituency first, reason the human natural activity second.Morality. (The human constituency) All humans follow one (the human activity) — creativesoul
, and that's precisely why it is obvious that, contra your one-dimensional view, 'life and death' moral dispositions are not anything like mere personal preferences. — Janus
And you will never admit you are inconsistent — Janus
Why are human emotional responses so frequently characterised as mere preferences? Why can't they be, in the context of morality, profound and heartfelt passionate dispositions? — ChrisH
Morality. All humans follow one after (mostly)adopting their first world-view via language acquisition. — creativesoul
You have your tag-line, "reason the slave of the passions." Beyond that, not so much. Why don't you put your sling-shot away and take a little time and make all this clear, including what your tag-line means.
In my view, reason is the slave of reason, nothing else, and not a slave either, but a partner. — tim wood
The general theme of your series of comments seems to focus on the pre-rational or early rational chronology of moral agency. If such chronology is more reactive to outside influence from which experiences are attained, yet moral philosophy in and of itself is predicated on active determinations, which presupposes fully developed rational capacity with its set of experiences already attained, then it is reasonable to suppose the former is merely forms of consequential inclination, rather than a true system of morality, which is just as reasonably supposed to incorporate a form of antecedent obligation that a psychologically incomplete rationality cannot abide. — Mww
Moral agency requires thinking about thought/belief. — creativesoul
Reason can change one's passions. Therefore, it is not a slave to one's passions. — creativesoul
I'm after what grounds all morality in order to compare it with conventional moral discourse. — creativesoul
Moral agency requires thinking about thought/belief. — creativesoul
A language-less creature cannot do this. — creativesoul
I'm after what grounds all morality in order to compare it with conventional moral discourse. — creativesoul
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