The are two distinct ways of understanding timelessness and immortality. One is to identify timelessness as infinitely extended duration, which many point out is unthinkable or a contradiction. The other is to identity timelessness with tenselessness, designating propositions for which the assignment of a temporal index or duration is nonsensical.

For example, every perceivable event (or even every conceivable event) might be regarded as necessarily having finite duration in being otherwise unperceivable or unthinkable; yet at the same time it might be conceded that the abstract types associated with such events are nevertheless tenseless.

For example, it make sense, at least to my mind, to insist that the actual Elvis Presley, in the sense of a particular rock-star who grew fat bingeing on burgers while living in Graceland, was mortal. Yet the concept of Elvis Presley must be tenseless, for otherwise how can I currently make sense of the claim that "Elvis no longer exists"?

An informal way of expressing this is to say that the King can never die... Perhaps a better way of expressing this is to say that one's private imagination only acquires tense indirectly through it's practical application in the world, via calibrating it's imagery to the world's public convention of temporal semantics.

But I would argue that it does not matter how much time you allow; if the objects do not have temporal starts, they do not exist. To see what I mean, try imagining a brick without any identifiable spacial start point. It would not exist. Works exactly the same for time as it does for space. As I've pointed out before (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5242/infinite-being), infinite existence is impossible for beings so it should be impossible for anything else also. — Devans99

when you break it down though we're getting this as the logical argument:

1) infinite time with no starting point
2) cannot get to now without a starting point
3) therefore 1) is false

Not really getting any substance there except a bias against the idea of an infinite regress being the fact. There's no contradiction with infinite falling dominoes if we grant the premise of infinite dominoes, infinite time, and no prime mover. Without the contradiction it's not a false statement.

You are saying you can't perform mathematical operations on infinity? IE it's not a number. — Devans99

Not in conventional real number math. It's meant to be a description saying that no upper bound exists. Asking what 1 + "no upper bound exists" makes about as much sense as asking 1 + rainbow.

The point is that the rationals are larger than the naturals. For every natural, there is an infinity of rationals. That's a simple proof that bijection gives the wrong answers. — Devans99

That's 2 different definitions of equals you're using. Because whole numbers are a subset of rational numbers then there's more rational numbers than whole numbers.

|natural numbers| = |rational numbers| means they have the same cardinality but that's as far as it goes.

Definition 1: |A| = |B|

Two sets A and B have the same cardinality if there exists a bijection from A to B, that is, a function from A to B that is both injective and surjective. Such sets are said to be equipotent, equipollent, or equinumerous. This relationship can also be denoted A ≈ B or A ~ B.

For example, the set E = {0, 2, 4, 6, ...} of non-negative even numbers has the same cardinality as the set N = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} of natural numbers, since the function f(n) = 2n is a bijection from N to E.

Outside of sets I wouldn't use equals in that manner to make predictions about the world.

Since you seem so sure of your position, though, I'd like to ask you if you see any significant implications of it on the "human condition." If you are correct, as you seem certain you are...are there significant other truths that derive from it? — Frank Apisa

I would not say I'm 100% sure of my position but there seems to be more evidence in favour of eternalism.

Impacts on the human condition depend what type of eternalism. If time is circular for example, that would mean we experience the same lives over and over again. Not as far fetched as all that; the Big Crunch would fit very nicely with the Big Bang. And there is no place in spacetime apart from the Big Crunch to get enough energy/matter for the Big Bang.

I would not say I'm 100% sure of my position but there seems to be more evidence in favour of eternalism. — Devans99

I think the very notion of eternalism is completely incoherent, so I wouldn't say that. :yum:

Presentism is incoherent too though.

No, it isn't, because as I've explained to you time and again, stuff either exists always or there was a start to it, and there's no way around that, despite both being counterintuitive.

That's not the problem with eternalism. The problem with eternalism is that it's incoherent with respect to what time is ontologically, and it doesn't get rid of what time is ontologically a la presentism anyway--it merely pushes the same exact thing to phenomenal experience, while unjustifiably positing additional nonsense--ontological notions that are incoherent in general, time-oriented or not--that presentism doesn't invoke.

No, it isn't — Terrapin Station

Yes it is. It leads to an infinite regress which is impossible, so it's incoherent. At least Eternalism is logically possible.

No, it isn't, because as I've explained to you time and again, stuff either exists always or there was a start to it, and there's no way around that, despite both being counterintuitive. — Terrapin Station

- 'stuff either exists always' is impossible as I've proofed over and over. To exist you must first start existing.
- 'or there was a start to it' which leads to a start of time. Which rules out presentism.

Yes it is. It leads to an infinite regress which is impossible, so it's incoherent. At least Eternalism is logically possible. — Devans99

as I've explained to you time and again, stuff either exists always or there was a start to it, and there's no way around that, despite both being counterintuitive.

To exist you must first start existing. — Devans99

Not if something always existed.

It's like you don't even understand how English works. Stop repeating the same nonsense over and over after we correct it

or there was a start to it' which leads to a start of time. Which rules out presentism. — Devans99

No it doesn't, because presentism doesn't posit that time didn't start. Again, this has been pointed out to you again and again.

To exist you must first start existing. — Devans99

That seems to lead to "NOTHING EXISTS."

Or...to "There was one thing that existed always and did not have to first 'start existing'...and that 'one thing' gave a start to everything else that exists."

Is that where you are heading with, "To exist you must first start existing?"

And if it is not too much trouble, I would love to read the P1 and P2 that brings you to the C of "Therefore, to exist you must first start existing."

Just want to analyze it.

The only way for something to 'exist always' is for it to exist timelessly; otherwise you have an infinite regress which is impossible.

And if it is not too much trouble, I would love to read the P1 and P2 that brings you to the C of "Therefore, to exist you must first start existing." — Frank Apisa

Points 1-6 in the OP here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5302/an-argument-for-eternalism/p1

otherwise you have an infinite regress which is impossible. — Devans99

It's not impossible, it's just counterintuitive.

One common way to use the term "impossible" is to refer to something that would amount to a logical contradiction--an instance of P & ~P. I presume you're not using the term that way, though. What sense are you using instead?

One common way to use the term "impossible" is to refer to something that would amount to a logical contradiction--an instance of P & ~P. I presume you're not using the term that way, though. What sense are you using instead? — Terrapin Station

I'm using it in the way of meaning a logical contradiction. To quote the op:

1. The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number*.

*(Infinity is a concept not a number, proof: Infinity, if a number, would be a number X which is greater than all other numbers. But X+1>X). — Devans99

So here we have something that is a number but greater than any number. Thats clearly a logical contradiction.

Did you get what I've been saying though?

1. The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number*.

*(Infinity is a concept not a number, proof: Infinity, if a number, would be a number X which is greater than all other numbers. But X+1>X).

When you say "The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number". I would accept that as true when describing the event as having no upper bound but does not mean the number of events equals a number called infinity. That's why point 1 is not a contradiction.

It would be like me proving infinite integers smaller than 0 don't exist this way:
1) The total number of integers smaller than 0 is greater than any number.
2) Which is a contradiction; can't be a number greater than any number*.

*(Infinity is a concept not a number, proof: Infinity, if a number, would be a number X which is greater than all other numbers. But X+1>X)

But the events have happened, they are in the past. And I know whatever finite number I pick, it is smaller than the number of events. The only conclusion is that the number of events is greater than any number.

It would be like me proving infinite integers smaller than 0 don't exist this way:
1) The total number of integers smaller than 0 is greater than any number.
2) Which is a contradiction; can't be a number greater than any number*. — coolguy8472

I take your point, but [1] above is still valid. And it leads to [2]. And infinity is not a number so [2] is still a correct conclusion.

IE There is no number that describes the size of the set of negative integers. I know mathematicians have made up a number for size of the natural numbers but that definition leads to ∞+1=∞ and the same craziness with the other arithmetic operators.

I think actually I have made an error with my proof that an infinite regress is impossible - sorry. Amended version below:

1. The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number.
3. But can be a number greater than every other number
4. But there is no greatest number (If X is greatest, what about X+1)
5. So is not a number (from 3 and 4)
6. Contradicts [1] which says it is a number

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number. — Devans99

The error there would be that you're calling it a number in the first instance-- "The number of events."

The only way for something to 'exist always' is for it to exist timelessly; otherwise you have an infinite regress which is impossible.

And if it is not too much trouble, I would love to read the P1 and P2 that brings you to the C of "Therefore, to exist you must first start existing." — Frank Apisa


Points 1-6 in the OP here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5302/an-argument-for-eternalism/p1 — Devans99

CoolGuy and Terrapin seem to have a handle on the possible math inconsistencies of your assertions here; I suck at math...so I'll leave that element to them.

I would ask (again) about the impact on humanity of you being correct in your assertions.. If, in fact, "presentism is impossible"...what would be (consequentially), Devans?

Would there be cosmological consequences?

Ethical consequences?

An existential one...particularly of the kind Thomas Aquinas explored?

The error there would be that you're calling it a number in the first instance-- "The number of events." — Terrapin Station

For any infinite regress, you can number off the events sequentially so there is no error.



I think a main consequence is that there is a timeless, prime mover who created time and the universe.

↪Frank Apisa


I think a main consequence is that there is a timeless, prime mover who created time and the universe.
an hour ago
Reply
Options — Devans99

Okay. Thanks, Devans. I suspected that was where this was heading.

The desire to arrive at the position of a need for a "prime mover"...is so compelling that almost anything can be imagined to be "logical" by someone with such a desire...and "the desire" is so pervasive that it is an exercise engaged in over the years by multitudes. .

Aquinas, a truly gifted thinker, thought his "five proofs" were logical.

They were not.

I think Aquinas might have been more logical if he were not so motivated to arrive at the need for a prime mover.

Not sure if that desire is the case with you, Devans, but if so, the same thoughts hold.

For any infinite regress, you can number off the events sequentially so there is no error. — Devans99

Yes there is an error:

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number. — Devans99

Suggests that you do not understand the concept of infinity. Infinity is not a number.

I did not set out to prove the prime mover; I set out just by observing that presentism leads to an impossible infinite regress. So I just set out in unbiased sort of way using logic and arrived quite naturally at eternalism as a way out of that infinite regress. It leads to a timeless prime mover who is therefore beyond cause and effect and therefore does not in itself need to be caused. Its the only logical way out of the infinite regress at the start of time.

As far as Aquinas goes, his argument from design is still applicable today. The argument from first cause is still applicable if you believe in cause and effect. It is reenforced if you make God timeless and thus beyond cause and effect.

Suggests that you do not understand the concept of infinity. Infinity is not a number. — Terrapin Station

You are agreeing with me. Infinity is not a number so it cannot stand in for 'number of events' because that expression requires a numeric value.

You are agreeing with me. — Devans99

No, I'm not. Your argument is based on conceiving of an infinite regress as a number. Infinity is not a number. Hence your argument is flawed from the start. There's no logical contradiction if infinity is not a number.

What is wrong with that? For example, an infinite number of particle collisions, extending into the past, can be represented by the numeric sequence:

-∞, ..., -3, -2, -1

Any time ordered set of events can be arranged linearly like this.

↪Frank Apisa
I did not set out to prove the prime mover; I set out just by observing that presentism leads to an impossible infinite regress. So I just set out in unbiased sort of way using logic and arrived quite naturally at eternalism as a way out of that infinite regress. It leads to a timeless prime mover who is therefore beyond cause and effect and therefore does not in itself need to be caused. Its the only logical way out of the infinite regress at the start of time.

As far as Aquinas goes, his argument from design is still applicable today. The argument from first cause is still applicable if you believe in cause and effect. It is reenforced if you make God timeless and thus beyond cause and effect. — Devans99

Thank you for your response, Devans.

Except for people who are convinced that a god (a god they already have in mind) exists...none of what Aquinas wrote in his "proofs" have applicability or relevance today...because they are, for the most part, devoid of logic.

My guess is that if you were able to question Aquinas, he would aver that he was not out to prove the existence of his god...but that he was following a logical progression to where he ended up...which just happens to be that his god exists...and exists of necessity.

That is the way with people already convinced of the existence of Aquinas' god.

The premises which get you to where it appears you wanted to go...seem contrived.

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number — Devans99

"The number of events in an infinite regress" -- there is no number of events in an infinite regress. Infinity is not a number.

"It's greater than any number" -- yes, but it's not itself a number. Again, infinity is not a number.

"Which is a contradiction--can't be a number and greater than any number" --a number can't be greater than any number, but infinity is not a number.

That's the error there.

.because they are, for the most part, devoid of logic. — Frank Apisa

The argument of the first cause follows just from cause and effect. I fail to see what is illogical about it.

The argument from design holds today; there are about 20 physical constants which appear to have been fine-tuned to life supporting ranges.

If you agree infinity is not a number then you must also agree that properties of reality of a numeric nature (such as age of the universe) cannot take infinity as their value.

If you agree infinity is not a number then you must also agree that properties of reality of a numeric nature (such as age of the universe) cannot take infinity as their value. — Devans99

If the universe if infinitely old, then the age of the universe is not numeric, by definition.