You'd think that we'd simply want to peg what things really are, and not be biased against simple facts. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, some people do, some care only to have a set of beliefs about the world which make them happy enough to get through the day. I can get on with either type. What happens in ethics though is we get a third type, the ones that want a stick to beat everyone else with. That's what the objectivists are looking for, and that I don't get on with at all.

Well, Im not sure why you are talking about “everything independently of mentality”, I may have missed parts(s) of the conversation I so rudely interjected myself into.
Anyway, you see an error or have disagreement...im just wondering why this particular error is strange to you? Why is it more weird than other errors you might take issue with?
Cuz its so obvious to you I take it? Its weird becuase its so simple to understand why its erroneous?

It is completely clear that Hume's is a theory built on certain presuppositions and a model. That is, given the model, then if this, then that. — tim wood

All the good ones do that, to be sure, and we shouldn’t chastise them for wishing the integrity of their respective philosophies be maintained. Both Hume and Kant reminded the reader to stay within the theory in order to get the most out of it, and if the reader was sufficiently qualified to rebuke it....have at it.

Both even when so far as to say the only way to rebuke either theory was to change the definitions or rearrange the system itself. Egos at work, both of ‘em.

Anyway, you see an error or have disagreement...im just wondering why this particular error is strange to you? — DingoJones

I think the bemusement stems from the fact that human emotional responses are dismissed so casually ("mere preferences"), in the context of morality, when emotional dispositions must surely be central to any test of 'well being' (or whatever you think is the purpose of morality).

Why on earth would we have no complaint? I think I speak for all the relativists who've posted here in saying that we do not want to be murdered. The Lord wants to murder us, we do not want to be murdered. What is there not to get about that? — Isaac

But that's not reasonable. Of course you don't want to be murdered, but who besides you cares, or should care? Why should they care? You have your desires; the lord of the castle his. It's all about desires. if you're in the castle, your bad luck. You got nothing else, if you're a relativist. Am I wrong?

Are you voluntarily trying to come across as stupid?

It would be possible to have a good discussion about this sort of stuff where the discussion isn't solely fueled by straw men and playing stupid. — Terrapin Station

Then it should be easy as pie for you to present something - better not call it reason - that might forestall your fate at the hands of the lord in the castle. My point is that you-all relativists are, as the expression goes, hoist by your own petard.

Is that about right?
— tim wood

You really should read the responses from the relativists on this thread (ROTT). If you did, you wouldn't ask such absurd questions. — ChrisH

Where have I gone wrong? The ROTT consistently deny the efficacy of reason. It's all relative; reason is the slave of passion. Well, if you deny reason in favour of relativity and passion, then what else do you have but relativity and passion?

I guess I just dont see it. Its exactly what you would expect from someone who thinks morality is somehow objective, just as you would expect someone who views morality as about feelings about things to NOT have this bias against mental phenomenon.

It is completely clear that Hume's is a theory built on certain presuppositions and a model. That is, given the model, then if this, then that.
— tim wood

All the good ones do that, to be sure, and we shouldn’t chastise them for wishing the integrity of their respective philosophies be maintained. Both Hume and Kant reminded the reader to stay within the theory in order to get the most out of it, and if the reader was sufficiently qualified to rebuke it....have at it.

Both even when so far as to say the only way to rebuke either theory was to change the definitions or rearrange the system itself. Egos at work, both of ‘em. — Mww

Exactly, exactly, exactly! In The Compleat Gentleman for Wannabees, under the section concerning understanding, rule 9 states that when confronted with the thinking of a first-rate mind, any difficulty in comprehending, understanding, or applying that thought must be attributed to the reader and not the thinker himself. Corollary to that is the rule that if you believe you understand that thought, what it's for, what it's about, etc., and have not worked at it, then it's very likely you do not understand it.

Above I challenged S. on his understanding of Hume's "reason is the slave of passion." I should like to qualify that. In no way do I suppose that Hume did not himself know what he was doing, or did not understand what he was writing or for what purpose he was writing it. The failure of understanding Hume is mine; Hume is to be presumed to have understood Hume. But S has made clear he does understand Hume, and in understanding Hume, Hume's reasons and purposes - Hume's why. I think S. must understand it - at least the phrase that he's oft quoted: "reason is the slave of passion" - because he's used it like a club, an argumentum ad baculum. I simply invite S. to make his understanding, and thereby Hume, clear.

I suspect Hume had his own reasons and that his argument is sound within the horizon of its own reasons, which is not to say his argument is sound outside its bound. I wait to see if in fact S.'s understanding and usage is indeed out of bounds. As such, any premise that seems mis-applied is open to challenge and requires support from within the arena that S. is applying it to.

More power to him if he can do it!

Of course you don't want to be murdered, but who besides you cares, — tim wood

Well, I expect my wife cares (sometimes). I don't understand why you're asking these weird questions. Of course other people care if I'm murdered.

Why should they care? — tim wood

There is no reason why they should care, not one that I can make any sense of. I don't get why you think that means no one will. We do not only do that which we are compelled by reason to do.

if you're in the castle, your bad luck. You got nothing else, if you're a relativist. Am I wrong? — tim wood

No, I've got nothing. You reckon you've got a better chance? You seriously think you've got a chance reciting Kant to a murderous aristocrat?

No, I've got nothing. You reckon you've got a better chance? You seriously think you've got a chance reciting Kant to a murderous aristocrat? — Isaac

C'mon, the argument here is whether reason is worth the candle, or if in fact it's all "passion." Of course your wife would care (one hopes). Nor do I think Kant would deflect a murderous lord. But why do you say murderous? Isn't that a judgment a relativist shouldn't be making? And I didn't say he was murderous, only that he wanted to murder the relativists he'd gathered up. Maybe he just wants to see a demonstration that he should not murder you, in which case Kant would suffice - but according to one of you, Kant is just a joke.

The point here is either murder is wrong in some sense, or it's not. You-all relativists apparently would choke before you might acknowledge it wrong, just plain wrong. Well, my absurd thought experiment is intended to put the question in blunt terms. Such is the occasional value of absurdity, that it can facilitate a blunt if unrealistic question.

You-all relativists apparently would choke before you might acknowledge it wrong, just plain wrong. — tim wood

I think, whether or not the are conscious of it or not, the rope the relativists can not let go off, is a question of source. Like you, I tried to show on some moral questions there would be a near universal view. The only relativinist answer to this is an amazing coincidence, or pointing to some incredibly rare outlier and say, " see he doesn't think so, so it is relative". All other answers require a source outside the individual, a source for a common belief or thought. That is a hard rope to let go of for some.

I think, whether or not the are conscious of it or not, the rope the relativists can not let go off, is a question of source. — Rank Amateur

Would you accept the addition that they fail to acknowledge that once reason has been applied, then the product of that reason is a product of reason, not and no longer a mere "passion."

Does passion have anything to do with it? Sure, why not - it depends on a pretty thorough explication of "passion" though.

Maybe passion like milk, eggs, flour, sugar, yeast (and some other yummy ingredients). Correctly mixed and baked and iced and you have cake. From the ingredients, but no longer just the ingredients.

it depends on a pretty thorough explication of "passion" though. — tim wood

Good point, and in keeping with

any difficulty in comprehending, understanding, or applying that thought must be attributed to the reader — tim wood

....it may do well to understand just what a passion, Hume style, really is:
“As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary. (...) Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.”

While Hume relates passions to emotions, as we would do, he does not relate emotions to feelings as we would do. Hume calls them all perceptions of the mind, but modern thinkers do not attribute perception to anything but the senses. Kant removes emotions, or feelings in general, in his moral theory in order to get rid of passions and make room for practical reason alone, because (he says) no feeling allow us to arrive at a cognition, which any moral judgement must do.

hen it should be easy as pie for you to present something - — tim wood

We're explained to you many times that the fact that moral stances are preference-based doesn't imply that one doesn't have preferences--that's pretty obvious, isn't it? They wouldn't be preferences otherwise.

If you're strictly focusing on "reasons that might persuade someone else," how in the world are you arriving at a notion that just in case something is an extramental fact and can be supported with non-personal reason(s), then other people have to be persuaded by it? You could only think something like that if you've been living in a bubble all your life.

Like you, I tried to show on some moral questions there would be a near universal view. The only relativinist answer to this is an amazing coincidence — Rank Amateur

I actually explained this to you a couple times already. It's no more a coincidence than the fact that we all have noses above our mouths. We don't have to say that noses above our mouths are NOT something that our bodies do, do we?

It's like we have to keep repeating the same kindergartenish explanations over and over in response to the same "Let's play stupid" straw men.

Philosophy can't be just about pretending to be learning disabled.

We're explained to you many times that the fact that moral stances are preference-based doesn't imply that one doesn't have preferences--that's pretty obvious, isn't it? They wouldn't be preferences otherwise.

If you're strictly focusing on "reasons that might persuade someone else," how in the world are you arriving at a notion that just in case something is an extramental fact and can be supported with non-personal reason(s), then other people have to be persuaded by it? You could only think something like that if you've been living in a bubble all your life. — Terrapin Station

Gosh, I never thought of that! Imagine that: there are preferences, and, what they are, are preferences. I'm glad to have that information! Move on.

No I am not focusing on persuasion. That you fall back to persuasion from the question of reason strongly suggests that you're innocent of any understanding of the differences between persuasion and reason. Or - wait a minute, are the the fellow who argues that 2+2=4 is a matter of opinion? I certainly do not want to waste time with you if you are.

No, persuasion is altogether different, and it's proper range is matters of opinion, hopefull informed by reason, and feeling, that can be substantively argued. Shall we attack at dawn? Shall we build ships or a wall? are examples of ancient arguments that were the properly resolved through argument and persuasion - the only way they could be resolved. To see how this all worked, and works, see Aristotle's, Rhetoric.

But you seem to confuse the contingent, that can be either this way or that way, with the apodeictic, that is universally and necessarily so: two very different animals. To say that some moral propositions are apodeictic is not to say that the opposite is impossible of thought or action, but it is to say that the truth they express is certain. Not equivocal, Not a matter of mere opinion. Not a product of passion.

I observe that the relativist argument throughout this thread has been a mix of invective, condescension, deflection, denial, insult, and at the best claims without evidence. It's time for you to do better - or quit the field.

as crazy as this possibility is, I might disagree with the nose analogy, even crazier, you could be wrong. It is possible. It does seem a tad ironic that the group who argue relative and subjective in regard to morality, act as if this particular view of morality is objectively true.

Would you accept the addition that they fail to acknowledge that once reason has been applied, then the product of that reason is a product of reason, not and no longer a mere "passion."

Does passion have anything to do with it? Sure, why not - it depends on a pretty thorough explication of "passion" though.

Maybe passion like milk, eggs, flour, sugar, yeast (and some other yummy ingredients). Correctly mixed and baked and iced and you have cake. From the ingredients, but no longer just the ingredients. — tim wood

I think our passions (what we desire), impacts our thoughts, and ordering and evaluating our thoughts against our passions, and our values, and against the things we hold as true impact our reason, and our reason impacts what we desire, and so on and so on. And I can think of no way you could isolate any part of that system as being before the other. It all seems so interdependent to me.

But again, happy to call it human nature, or evolution, or what ever you like. It is as near a fact as I can think of, that on more then a handful of moral choices, nearly every human conscience on the planet would evaluate it the same. That is difficult to reconcile without allowing for some degree of objective morality on some issues.

Exactly.

I'm always amazed by the sheer amount of - apparently - unrecognized double standards underwriting your rhetorical drivel. A well-considered measure of rhetorical power is and always will be accompanied by an argument with the strongest possible justificatory ground. You wield the rhetoric. The argument remains unseen.

Being a parrot doesn't count as good philosophy.

I cannot help your lack of understanding. If you have an argument of your own, I'll be glad to put it to the same tests that I use for determining the value of my own. If not, I doubt you'll receive much more of my attention. Some folk here know what I'm talking about. It's a reading comprehension thing, you might not understand.

Morality is codified rules of behaviour. Code is language.
— creativesoul

(1) that would amount to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc.,

(2) it either ignores or gets wrong what meaning is/how meaning works,

and

(3) it ignores that someone feeling one way or the other about interpersonal behavior--assessments of permissibility, etc. is a unique phenomenon, contra for example behaving in a way that doesn't upset the apple cart in relation to other persons' behavior precipitated by their feelings about interpersonal behavior. In other words, there's an important difference between Joe feeling that it's wrong for him as a 40 year-old to have sex with eager 13 year-olds and Joe behaving in accordance with the prohibition of such sex because of the social repercussions of it should he engage in that activity and be found out. — Terrapin Station

Non-sequiturs won't do here.

There's an argument. You are objecting to the primary premiss. The primary premiss is both true and verifiable. I'll have nothing more to do with this conversation unless your tack takes a 180.

The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. — Mww

The above is clearly false. It stands in direct conflict with everyday observable events. It may well be consistent, coherent, and/or otherwise lacking self-contradiction. It may well be a valid conclusion. It is false nonetheless. False conclusions cannot be arrived at by logical means/valid argument. Hume's argument is valid(I'm granting that without prejudice). Therefore, at least one of the premisses is false.

The argument supporting the objection is as follows: The rules of morality are written in and/or reported upon and/or taken account of with common language. All of them. There is no better place to 'look' for empirical evidence to be used to help us consider Hume's position on morality. The rules of morality are the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. The rules of morality have evolved over time. Written history will attest to this. This evolution is the result of people changing their minds about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Slavery. Reason changed minds all over the world. Thankfully.

The above conclusion is false.

Nice post. There's a number of different facets of understanding to be discussed. I have my own copy of the Enquiry. May be worth a reading group thread. Let some flies out of the bottle.

Moral agency is existentially dependent upon thinking about the rules of behaviour. The rules of behaviour are statements of thought/belief. Moral agency is what's happening when one is carefully considering what sorts of behaviours are good and what sorts of behaviours are not; what one ought do, and what one ought not, etc.

All observable and thus undeniable moral agency includes a creature which adopts, and thus must begin working from, it's initial worldview. The adoption of world-views replete with moral thought/belief is existentially dependent upon common language replete with codes of conduct.

To say that some moral propositions are apodeictic is not to say that the opposite is impossible of thought or action, but it is to say that the truth they express is certain. Not equivocal, Not a matter of mere opinion. Not a product of passion. — tim wood

Yes, we know what apodeictic means. What we're missing is your argument for why moral position are such truths. You just keep re-stating your belief that they are with increasing incredulity. I'll start you off. Murder is universally and objectively wrong because...

It is as near a fact as I can think of, that on more then a handful of moral choices, nearly every human conscience on the planet would evaluate it the same. That is difficult to reconcile without allowing for some degree of objective morality on some issues. — Rank Amateur

Why? You've repeated this argument several times without answering the key question about it. If the vast majority of people evaluate the earth to be flat, or the vast majority of people evaluate black people to be of lesser worth than white people (both of which have definitely been the case in some closed communities), then do we have to accept those evaluations as objective truths. If not why is the majority opinion on murder different. All you've given me so far is that murder is a matter conscience (I think the worth of black people is a matter of conscience too, but we'll deal with that later). What you've not provided is your reason why being a matter of conscience suddenly make the majority belief into objective fact. If I argued that all 'purple apples could fly' and you retorted that apples can't fly, it would not be a suitable counter argument to simply point out that purple apples are different because they're purple. You'd expect an argument as to why being purple caused this difference.

So why does the fact that moral rules occur in the conscience mean that, unlike all other beliefs, what the majority think makes a belief into objective fact?

I cannot help your lack of understanding...Some folk here know what I'm talking about. It's a reading comprehension thing, you might not understand. — creativesoul

If the best you can manage is just to say that every counter-argument to your Delphic declarations is either a red-herring, a non-sequitur or the result of a failure in understanding then you might as well not bother writing anything. This is a philosophy discussion forum, not a podium from which to pronounce to your followers. Pathetic.

If the best you can manage is just to say that every counter-argument to your Delphic declarations is either a red-herring, a non-sequitur or the result of a failure in understanding then you might as well not bother writing anything. This is a philosophy discussion forum, not a podium from which to pronounce to your followers. Pathetic. — Isaac

Philosophy discussions include calling out fallacious reasoning when and where it happens. It is happening here and now. The best I can do is call it out. An astute reader will notice the sheer lack of valid rebuttal coming from folks like you.

Do you have a valid counterargument? Do you have a valid argument? We all know you are rhetorically talented. Rhetoric alone doesn't cut it. Shut up and learn.

Again, exactly.

Philosophy discussions include calling out fallacious reasoning when and where it happens. — creativesoul

So. I'm arguing with your approach of presuming that because you think it is fallacious, it is therefore fallacious and no further argument is required. Its unpleasantly arrogant.

The best I can do is call it out. — creativesoul

No, you can provide reasoning as to why you think it is fallacious. Do you really think that responding to an entire post with "Non-sequiturs won't do here" followed by a bare assertion that what you said is true, is a quality philosophical argument?

An astute reader will notice the sheer lack of valid rebuttal coming from folks like you. — creativesoul

Really? Is that the best you can do? No actual argument just "anyone clever enough would agree with me".

Do you have a valid counterargument? Do you have a valid argument? — creativesoul

Yes and yes. Both have been presented. The fact that you do not agree with them does not make them invalid.

Shut up and learn. — creativesoul

Arrogant and rude, who the hell do you think you are that you can tell others to shut up and learn as if we were your students? I thought this thread had become unpleasantly ad hominem on a number of occasions before but it has managed to at least return to the actual arguments. If all you want to do is declare your edicts and tell your interlocutors to "shut up and learn" then you have no place on a philosophy forum.