Two ways to use "morality". Both refer to codes of conduct. — creativesoul
it would simply be a case of me not agreeing — Terrapin Station
As to the right/wrong of it, it is, most simply, answered by the thing itself. That is, not as a matter of preference, desire, or inclination, nor even on mere abstract reasoning. It rests on the thing itself, properly understood. — tim wood
Hume's mistake is conflating simple, rudimentary, and/or basic thought/belief with the linguistically informed/ladened
— creativesoul
Might this hold some relevance to your thought/belief characterization? I’m still working on it, how I might find something comparable in my own mind. (I still need to separate them; it’s my cognitive bias at work....sorry) — Mww
“....Certain statements have strong existential implications; we might say that they are 'ontologically loaded." There is a tendency to equate the making of these statements with the making of an ontological commitment. But to do so would be a mistake, one that has prompted Quine to devise a formula to help keep our tendency in check. Quine draws a distinction between linguistic facts and ontological attitudes. The fact is, as Russell and Quine have pointed out, that statements can be meaningful without referring to anything. A person can play with linguistic objects to his or her heart's content without embracing any ontology that might be said to be "included" or "inherent" in the objects. We can tell stories about Pegasus without committing ourselves to its existence. Of course, with certain linguistic entities, the ontological implication can be strong, and the game can be dangerous. These days, we have quite happily accepted the Russell-Quine doctrine, and do not see ontological commitments in statements employing certain linguistic entities. We now accept that we only commit ourselves when we specifically give the variable a value....”
(A. T. Nuyen, 1985)
Which apparently you reserve unconditioned license to do. Or since everything is relative, agreement cannot have anything to do with things, because that would allow for something to be the case — tim wood
For Terrapin, Nothing is Wrong. — tim wood
Morality is obviously an inter-subjective phenomenon, — Janus
In case you forgot, I am fine with inter-subjectivity. — S
If you are the kind of moral relativist who claims that moral truths are relative only to individuals' preferences, then you are not "fine with inter-subjectivity", despite the fact that you might lack the subtly to realize that. — Janus
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