I understand relativism as the referral of all judgments back to a set of criteria, the relativity arising in that your set of criteria differs from my set. But is that the limit?

Demonstrate why it's not.

Apparently the relativist stops there and allows as how it's a matter of preference, opinion, and therefore we on one side have no grounds beyond our personal views to condemn the other side.

Please demonstrate anytime in history where any one group of people have made a collective decision that appeals to any type of provable objective code.

If you can't, then how can you manage to type out paragraph after paragraph pertaining to, effectively, nothing? It's very straightforward. Any extended dialogue develops in the nuances of believing in an objective reality. If you can't first perceive and demonstrate that objective reality then stop waffling.

First of all, I've explained why I think that Kant's categorical imperative is a joke directly in reply to you at least a couple of times now. Your forgetfulness or dishonesty in this regard is not excused. I don't know why some people here seem to think that this sort of denial is acceptable as a response. It isn't. Rank Amateur is by far the worst for doing this, as he does it with such frequency that it beggars belief.

Secondly, I read as far as your straw man that I cannot find anything at all wrong with the actions of the infamous mass murdering humans (I strongly believe that it is counterproductive to dehumanise them by calling them monsters. That they were human is extremely important to explicitly acknowledge) of the 20th century, and I decided not to read any further as result.

Hear, hear! Less waffle, more demonstration.

Dude, your analysis is praiseworthy and spot on. But is it really worth your time and effort? We're at 47 pages. When is enough enough?

I like your “notion of truth”, but doesn’t analytic philosophy demand more than a notion?

I’ll go first: truth is the non-contradiction of a conception with its object. — Mww

The best definition of truth that one hundred years of analytical philosophy was able to produce would seem to be Tarski's deflationary T-sentence: “'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white”.

It reminds me of Aristotle's: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” Apparently not much progress with a definition! But we do have a notion of truth which is in accordance with those two formulations, I would say.

And I think your formulation exemplifies the same basic logic of correspondence.

Expressed in the terms of your formulation, for me the object of moral thinking is harmonious community. So, to say that murder is good is a contradiction with its object, because, as Kant pointed out, murder cannot be a general moral good if the object of any moral good is social harmony. "Murder is good" thus cannot be true.

The objection that some have raised that murder might be good for say a serial killer is inapt, because the question is whether murder can be a general good, and not merely whether it could be a good for a few psychopaths.

Ah, new terms to add to the catalogue of evidence in support of my charge against Tim: "Trumpian", "disgusting", "sickening", and "toxic". They are accompanied by "mere", "destructive", "childish", and others. Related is the guilt by association fallacy with Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and others, although that's actually a 3-in-1, as it's also a straw man and an implied ad hominem: a straw man, because unlike them, we judge their actions to be wrong, yet Tim deliberately says otherwise; and an ad hominem because the suggestion is that you shouldn't even consider what a moral relativist says, because he is like Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and others. The general category for these sort of fallacies is an appeal to emotion.

But you appear to either refuse to, or cannot, generalize that view even so far as to say that their actions, among the most horrendous in recorded history, are simply wrong simpliciter. — tim wood

Because I don't want to claim that the world is some way that it isn't ontologically. The idea of something being morally wrong simpliciter is false in terms of what the world is like ontologically. I see our job as philosophers as being to analyze, observe, report what the world is factually like. It's the same thing that scientists should be doing. We're just using a different methodology.

If they're not wrong, then nothing is wrong. — tim wood

They're wrong subjectively, when we make the subjective judgment in question. They're not wrong objectively.

I do not mean to disqualify your view that it's wrong. But your expressed view is a misstatement. — tim wood

Nope. I'm reporting what the world is factually like.

What, then, is the natural, or default, state? Nothing is wrong? Nothing is right? — tim wood

Things are morally wrong or right from subjective perspectives. Subjectivity is the correct realm for moral judgments. We need to talk about them in the context of the correct domain. Not a domain that makes no sense for them, because it's not what the world is like.

I understand relativism as the referral of all judgments back to a set of criteria, the relativity arising in that your set of criteria differs from my set. — tim wood

I'm not saying anything like this. I'm saying that moral judgments are something that individuals do, and that's all they are--something that individuals do. That's the correct domain for them. Every individual could do some moral judgment identically (ignoring nominalism for a moment). We could all have the same criteria. Nonetheless, it's still just something that we do as individuals. We can't get correct or incorrect a "non-personal moral judgment" because there is no such thing.

Apparently the relativist stops there and allows as how it's a matter of preference, opinion, and therefore we on one side have no grounds beyond our personal views to condemn the other side. — tim wood

Again, and again, and again, and again . . . we've tried to correct this misunderstanding of yours. NO ONE IS SAYING WHAT YOU JUST SAID ABOVE. No one. The correct domain for moral judgments is what we think as individuals. What we think as individuals in this case, for most of us, happens to be that we condemn people who murder. We don't say this because the universe outside of people says that there's a problem with murder. We, as individual people operating in the world, thinking about it, etc. feel that there's a problem with murder. Hence we condemn it.

For anyone with the stomach for it:

First of all, I've explained why I think that Kant's categorical imperative is a joke directly in reply to you at least a couple of times now. Your forgetfulness or dishonesty in this regard is not excused. — S

Below are all of S.'s replies and posts to me in this thread even remotely connected with Kant. You will search in vain for any argument or explanation. Claims, yes. Sarcasm, invective, and insult, yes, Hand-waving, deflection, misdirection, yes, A seeming deliberate ignoring of anything of substance, or any direct challenge or invitation to clarity, yes. All manner of things except anything of substance. And yet he calls me dishonest - or forgetful. This is your method of argument, S. Nor is it restricted to me. In going through your comments it appears to be your modus operandi. This is not reasoned debate to the end of learning; it's just a street-fight. You have demonstrated your ignorance of any better way. From now on you're not S., but mere-s. Kant is not a joke, you are, but not a funny one. You're not worth arguing with, because you don't know how.

-----

No, it's Tim's, for one. That's where this stems from, as far as I can tell. See his comment on the previous page. He strongly suggested that the acts of Stalin and others like him were wrong in themselves, and that this is not nonsense. He has thus far failed to explain this. I rightly reject it as nonsense. Where do you stand on this?

What's the point of a few Kantian's agreeing amongst themselves? That's not much of a debate, is it? I'm still waiting for the impossible, namely for someone to make sense of the nonsense of murder being wrong in itself.

It would be interesting, to say the least, to see you attempt to argue that I cannot condone murder without implicitly condoning my own murder, given that that is simply illogical, given that obviously I would just implicitly make an exception of myself. I predict that your argument would beg the question and contain at least one false premise.
If it goes something like this:
If the categorical imperative...
Then it will instantly fail for begging the question, because we most certainly are not all Kantians, and we most certainly do not all accept the categorical imperative, and Kant is most certainly not God, and his writings on the subject are most certainly not Biblical.

With my meta-ethical position, I can still say that murder is wrong, and that it's true that murder is wrong, and make sense. That is an advantage over your meta-ethical position, which can do the first two, but is committed to nonsense, so although you can say it is true, if it amounts to nonsense, it can't be. Moral absolutism is simply nonsense, it seems. How would you even attempt to explain it? Bearing in mind that dogmatic assertion is not explanation. You wouldn't, for example, accept someone dogmatically asserting that God exists, would you? You'd demand an explanation in support of the assertion, or else rightly dismiss it.

But Tim, please try to understand you have a giant burden that we simply don't have, and a giant burden that you've utterly failed to even come close to meeting. Dogmatism simply does not cut the mustard. Participants in this discussion do not have a burden to support what is obvious and agreed upon by both sides. So we do not have a burden to support that we feel strongly against murder, judge it to be wrong, and so on. It is your additional claims which require support, and after 43 pages, you still haven't provided any logical support. Going back through this discussion, one will find fallacy after fallacy from your side. It is frankly an embarrassment.

You are having the same problem that Rank Amateur is having as a result of additional unwarranted assumptions which can be cut out with Ockham's razor. If we were to go through the motions in detail, we'd see much in common between us, such as we both feel strongly against murder, we both judge murder to be wrong, we both don't want to be murdered, we'd both complain for these reasons, and so on. The big difference is your additional unwarranted assumption which stands out like a sore thumb, and which I have the good judgement to reject.
You also have persistent problematic misunderstandings about the logical consequences of moral relativism which seem practically irresolvable for you, in spite of valiant efforts. I mean, look, we've reached forty pages now, and you seem none the wiser. As I've said before, and of others, the real problem here seems psychological. You have a psychological problem with moral relativism, such that you simply must defeat it, no matter what.
You can lead a horse to water...

Yes, but obviously I have already considered and assessed the argument for why reason is a slave to the passions and judged it to be successful enough, hence my mentioning of the oft-quoted line to begin with. You have yet to put forward a superior alternative in my assessment. You have yet to put forward a greater reason for concluding the contrary, namely that reason is not a slave to the passions, whether semantic or otherwise.
And I steadfastly refuse to address what the Kantian in the background has said if he hasn't the decency to even speak to me. He who has the nerve to suggest that I lack philosophical maturity. I think they call that projection.

I didn't say that Kant is a joke, I said that his categorical imperative is a joke, because it is.
And yes, obviously murder is wrong in some sense, and that sense is the sense of wrong that is explained by moral relativism, not the sense of wrong which moral absolutism fails to properly explain and thus resorts to dogmatism and bad logic. Bad logic like your fallacious appeal to absurdity: "But murder is (absolutely) wrong! Superficially, and by my narrow judgement, the contrary seems absurd. Therefore the contrary is false". That seems to be your implicit logic.

It is first and foremost a matter of moral feelings. If most people felt differently about it, then they would reason differently about it. Perhaps now you can see why reason is the slave of the passions. But I doubt it. You seem to have made your mind up to argue against it no matter what. For you, reason simply must play a much more vital role, or else all is lost! Really, this has more to do with psychology than philosophy. You're actually not being reasonable at all, except perhaps in a more superficial sense. Underneath the visard, you're being emotional and alarmist. That has been quite clear from the start, actually. Clear to me at least. The first step for yourself and others who match your psychological profile is to come to the realisation that all will not be lost.

The reason I said that the categorical imperative is a joke earlier on in the discussion is because it is merely a conditional about universalism. "Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that"-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way, and your reply of "Well, you should do!" has no force.
I think that Kant's predecessor in Hume was a far greater moral philosopher.
[In sum, reason can and does give us absolutes. At the same time reason makes rigorous demands in the expression of those absolutes. Thus, "You shall not kill," correctly seems problematic as over and against the more precise, "You shall not murder."
— tim wood]
Well no, in sum it does no such thing. But you're free to deceive yourself otherwise.
[I sum, I hold the argument against the possibility of moral absolutes as an argument against reason in favour of psychology. Psychology has its uses, but it's not reason nor a substitute for it.
— tim wood]
Reason is the slave of the passions.

I think that you, Tim, and Vagabond Spectre have been suggesting ad hominems throughout this discussion, but sometimes in a subtle way so that it has a better chance of going undetected. Some of the key fallacious suggestions from you three have been that us moral relativists are trivialising important matters, condoning things like murder or female genital mutilation, treating different moral judgements as not different but equal, being destructive, and thinking like an adolescent. Therefore, we're wrong, even though these suggestions are a steaming pile of bullshit and are nothing more than fallacy-laden propaganda.

[You completely miss the boomerang effect of this, don't you. And it's not trivial. Indeed it's a linchpin of your argument. Like this:
1) If nothing is absolutely right or wrong, then no moral proposition is absolutely right, or wrong.
2) Nothing is absolutely right or wrong.
3) No moral proposition is absolutely right, or wrong.
But 2) is just an unsupported claim. The syllogism is valid, just not true. But why would you care, after all, nothing is absolutely true or false? You can have what you want. Btw, does everyone benefit from this argument of yours? Or does it only work for you?
— tim wood]
This is easily resolved in favour of the sceptic of moral absolutism, rather than the proponent of moral absolutism. One could just retract the stronger claim that nothing is absolutely right or wrong, and instead just point out that there seems to be no credible evidence or reasonable argument in favour of moral absolutism, only dogmatism and bad logic.
You would be just as guilty as he is with your own bare assertion that his argument is unsound because the second premise is not true. You haven't shown that it is not true, and you also just keep assuming absolutism, which renders your criticism trivial and ineffective.

[You both miss. I am not arguing that murder is absolutely wrong; I am assuming it. You both are free to take any stance you like. The substance is, that if you do not agree with me (more exactly with the view expressed - I take no credit for it), then in essence you're saying that at the least some murder is not absolutely wrong. If that's your position, that some murder is all right, then please say what kind of murder or what circumstance of murder that might be.
And note that "self-defense" or any similar equivocation misses because it is not to the point. Killing is not murder, and the question is to murder. Your problem, given your stance (as I understand your stance) is since morality is relative, then there is no maintainable absolute or universal moral stricture against murder. And if not, then some is ok. Question to you both: is it?
— tim wood]
That is a terrible argument which confuses normative ethics and meta-ethics. This error has been pointed out multiple times, and yet you still make it.
You're asking me normative ethical questions about murder, so obviously I'm going to answer from my perspective, and I've already told you that I feel just as strongly about murder as you do. Nope, no murder is okay or alright. That is obviously my moral judgement, as you're asking me, and not someone else. It is relative and subjective. Not absolute, not objective.
If you ask a murderer, you might get a different answer. And moral relativism just words that as saying that murder is okay for him.
And yes, morality is not absolute. Murder is wrong, just not absolutely wrong in a meta-ethical sense. Before asking me a silly question about murder, remind yourself that I feel just as strongly about it as you do. But I am capable of distinguishing between normative ethics and meta-ethics.

[Murder. Murder is simple. I say that murder is absolutely wrong. Maybe in some cases understandable, but wrong. Now you explain how murder is not an absolute wrong. If you cannot then your relativism is a dead letter.
— tim wood]
That's clearly an argument from ignorance, which is a fallacy.
And I feel just as strongly about murder as you do, so don't even try to suggest otherwise. But that still doesn't make it a moral absolute in a meta-ethical sense. On the contrary, it suggests moral relativism.

What's the tl;dr version?

Sometimes it seems like we should rename this place the logorrhea forum.

Far too much waffle. I'm not willing to put in the time and effort required to analyse all of that.

I understand relativism as the referral of all judgments back to a set of criteria, the relativity arising in that your set of criteria differs from my set. But is that the limit? - timw

Demonstrate why it's not.

Apparently the relativist stops there and allows as how it's a matter of preference, opinion, and therefore we on one side have no grounds beyond our personal views to condemn the other side. - timw — Edward

Please demonstrate anytime in history where any one group of people have made a collective decision that appeals to any type of provable objective code. — Edward

Because sets of criteria can be thought of as being in layers. From a surface you dig down a little, but you can dig more, and more. The goal is to reach a limit. To my way of thinking that limit is reached when parties either reach complete agreement (perhaps not on exactly the original question, but on a more fundamental principle that will inform the original question), or, when parties establish they are in irreconcilable disagreement, perhaps because they have reached a complete contradiction in their respective positions.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident...". If you're not American and do not know this reference, google the American declaration of independence." That is a time in history when one group made a collective decision that appeals to any type of provable objective code. It is my guess that most constitutions for government make such appeals. Certainly with respect to many civil movements in history, groups of people have made collective decisions that appeal to objective codes.

I vote that analyses such as these be archived for the purpose of being a valuable lesson in how not to argue against moral relativism, or even, really, how not to argue in general.

OK, I guess. I’m not happy with tautological truths myself, but ehhhh.....I’ll never be famous.

Agreed on harmonious community, if one thinks of morality as an act, or a set of actions.

What's the tl;dr version? — Terrapin Station

That whatever mere-s knows, he does a bloody bad and self-destructive job of presenting it. To the point, imho, of being toxic to argue with.

Poisoning the well. You're just pissed off because I'm like a gadfly with attitude. I am "toxic" like Socrates was "toxic" to the Athenians. But Socrates wasn't as wry or caustic as me. So I guess I'm "doubly toxic".

They didn't think it was wrong, therefore it isn't wrong.
— tim wood

No. This has been repeatedly explained to you and your refusal to acknowledge this is nothing but bad faith. — Isaac

How? I acknowledge you-all think - feel - are informed by your passions - that the bad guys did bad stuff. But here's the difference: for you-all, it's "bad-in-my-opinion, but not only does that not make it bad, it makes it impossible for it to be bad, except in my opinion," & etc. (And please justify the "repeatedly."

Whereas I just denominate it it bad, as I find reason dictates. My passions can add to my discernment, beyond that just lend volume. If yours are constitutive of reason, please advise me as to how.

Poisoning the well. You're just pissed off because I'm like a gadfly with attitude. — S

Indeed you are. Perhaps it's time for you to take a more mature and better informed approach to argument. You may care to weigh how you've damaged yourself in my regard. You're not obliged to care, but you might find it useful to consider it. See if you can transform mere-s back to S. I'll read and reply as appropriate, but I will no longer be drawn.

I'm far too principled to cave in to such petty judgements, which is what you really want from me. But I do at least consider them, because I'm philosophical like that.

I gotta say, being an unabashed transcendentalist, if ANYBODY had said he’d said anything about Kant in general and the CI in particular, I would have known about it. I would have researched the crap out of it just to see where it was right or wrong. Like you, I went back through the entire thread, and found not a gawddamn thing about anybody telling you anything about the CI, joke or otherwise.

So I’m with you, for whatever that’s worth. I wouldn’t have gone through the same trouble as you, just to find out the same thing and come to the same conclusion. There’s dishonesty in the building, dishonorable and disrespectful, herein never to be taken seriously.

Apparently the relativist stops there and allows as how it's a matter of preference, opinion, and therefore we on one side have no grounds beyond our personal views to condemn the other side.
— tim wood

Again, and again, and again, and again . . . we've tried to correct this misunderstanding of yours. NO ONE IS SAYING WHAT YOU JUST SAID ABOVE. No one. The correct domain for moral judgments is what we think as individuals. What we think as individuals in this case, for most of us, happens to be that we condemn people who murder. We don't say this because the universe outside of people says that there's a problem with murder. We, as individual people operating in the world, thinking about it, etc. feel that there's a problem with murder. Hence we condemn it. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I believe I've got this exactly, and have had it exactly.

"The correct domain for moral judgments is what we think as individuals." Which is exactly what I think you think, and how you think, and that is consistent with your views expressed above. I just am persuaded you're upside-down wrong-headed, with reason to think so.

He who hasn't the courtesy to speak to me directly is both blind and judgemental. He obviously didn't look hard enough, as the following proves:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/265816

It wasn't hard to find at all. I used the advanced search function and found it with ease in a matter of minutes. Yes, I know, he now has egg all over his face, and I can't think of anyone more deserving.

He owes me an apology, but this has gone so far that I think that I would throw it right back in his face, even if he did offer me an apology.

Yes, mere-s. Kant's a joke because "it is merely a conditional about universalism. 'Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that'-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way,..."

You don't therefore he's a useless hack and a joke. Perhaps a statement about you, but not an argument, nor, really, a statement about Kant.

I do not question that you adhere to your own conception of what a relativist is. I simply do not see reason in it.

Well yes, that's actually the point, at least in part: I find the categorical imperative to be a joke, and I have my reasons. It is a joke to me, but in a wider sense also. (Believe it or not, I am quite aware that not everything is all about me). Of course, I acknowledge that others judge it to be of far greater significance. It is of greater significance to them. What I said is not merely about mere, foolish, toxic, destructive, me. Such criticisms about Kant's categorical imperative, which are also necessarily about what I think, whether that's implicit or explicit, happen to resonate with others also. Kant is only human after all, he is not God. God is dead, and Kant is human, all too human. His writings are largely a symptom of the moral prejudice of a philosopher, and that is largely true of many of those philosophers who came before him.

And yes, you don't see reason in meta-ethical moral relativism. You don't see reason in it largely because you still don't even understand it, 47 pages later, in spite of reasonable efforts. And you don't even understand that you don't even understand it. You persist in attacking your own misunderstanding, and you seemingly have no qualms in resorting to unreasonable and underhanded tactics in pursuit your narrow-minded goal to "defeat" meta-ethical moral relativism, or amoralism, or moral nihilism, or chaos, or doom, or destruction, or Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Trump, disgusting, evil, toxic monster! (They're all one and the same to you, right?).

you don't see reason in meta-ethical moral relativism. — S

Show it me, then. And cut with the nonsense about prior efforts; you're sounding shrill. And maybe you can show me what is relative about reason. As to Kant, you're now an admitted coat-tail rider, adopting stances you cannot hold for the twin reasons that you don't understand them, and they don't support your conclusions - quite aside from your failure to evidence any understand of Kant at all.

It's time for you to grow up and move beyond the ranting, posturing, and preening you do. A person who really knew his material would for a number of reason be glad to present to a willing-to-listen auditor - more than once if necessary. The value lies in sharing knowledge, not in a cheat-win in a street-fight excuse for an argument. You act as if winning were what is at stake, here. Take it from me, the rewards here have nothing to do with winning. Winning here, in fact, is losing. We're all - well most of us here - are ignorant. Winning on your terms means only that you learned nothing, and taught nothing.

After 47 pages, I think I've shown that I have the patience of a saint, but even saints have their limits. Members like Isaac and Terrapin Station clearly know what they're talking about and are more than capable of setting you straight, but you should try much harder if you genuinely want to gain an understanding of moral relativism. As for me, I've grown sick and tired, as it has been dealt with ad nauseam.

And as for Kant and his categorical imperative, you haven't said anything at all which would give me reason to withdraw or rethink my criticism. Merely saying that I don't understand him and suchlike is not a valid response, and don't even think about giving me a "You too!" style response, because I have put great effort into explaining moral relativism to the likes of you and Rank Amateur, even though it has been a thankless task, yet you've shown very little improvement, if any. We're still having to correct the same basic misunderstandings 47 pages later.

Empty posturing. You can start by properly addressing what I actually said of the categorical imperative. — S

This is what you wrote:

"it is merely a conditional about universalism. 'Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that'-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way,..."

You 'simply" don't agree with it. There are many things on earth a person can disagree with. But it's considered good form to understand before you disagree, at least with some things, and Kant is among the things to be understood before disagreeing with him. Bad form to disagree without understanding because usually - always, really - such disagreement just identifies you as a fool.

Here, this, from Stanford.edu:
" Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason reveals the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he also argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle), and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect."

Kant had what are called "hypothetical imperatives" in his sights. These are just "imperatives" of the sort, If you want X, then you must do Y. The problem is the "want." Kant's view is that if you're subject to desire, then you're not free. We're all subject to at least some desire some of the time, so none of us is, or has, a completely autonomous will. But we can work toward doing our best to realize one when and if we can. Skipping out and calling Kant's reasoning here "a joke," is just a profession of a profound ignorance. .

Be a slave if that's what you want. In a way you're lucky; most slaves don't get to choose, and if they did they wouldn't choose to be slaves.

First of all, although I am far from an expert, I do have some background knowledge here, as a matter of fact. I know that yourself and others might want to make out like I'm a know-nothing on Kant, but that simply isn't true.

Secondly, I don't think that quoting from the SEP, or worse, directly from Kant, is the best way to get his point across. I think, generally, the best way to get a point across is to be clear and to simplify and avoid jargon where possible.

What I find annoying about Kant, and this is especially true of Kant, is the amount of jargon he coined, which needs to be translated in order to be understood. I already knew about "hypothetical imperatives". I wasn't too clear on "practical reason". One online source states that he defined it as the capacity of rational agents to act according to principles (i.e. the conception of laws). And this stuff about "rational agency" and "autonomous will" and the like is similarly obscure unless you are already fluent in Kantanese, which I'm not. I'm not fluent in Hegelese or Heideggerese either, although Kant isn't half as bad as those two. And it annoys me that that's even a problem in the first place, because I doubt the supposed necessity of it.

But anyway, yes, of course I disagree with Kant's categorical imperative. That much is surely obvious. Though, evidently, I haven't just dismissed it as a joke, in spite of doing so initially, and justifiably in response to your bare assertion which it was replying to, in accordance with Hitchen's razor. I've submitted criticism, and I stand by that criticism.

Bringing up hypothetical imperatives seems to miss the point of my criticism. Kant might well have had them in his sights, but so what? They make way more sense, and are way more relatable than his categorical imperative. I am criticising his categorical imperative. I am asserting that he largely failed, because the categorical imperative is largely alien and useless and ineffectual. I know enough about logic to recognise a logical conditional when I see one, and that is how it is commonly argued. I'm just skipping ahead to that key bit. One can ask, "Why should I act only according to that maxim whereby I can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law?". And that's when the conditional kicks in. "Well, if you were to...". But I don't. And my morality is just fine, thanks. I know that intuitively. The categorical imperative is redundant and artificial. I am not subservient to any supposed universal moral laws. That is not my measure of right and wrong. My own conscience is sufficient for the job. How can that objection be overcome? I don't think that it can. That's what I meant when I said that it has no force over myself and others. It cannot override my moral foundation in moral feelings. It is just a curious little thought experiment, but it isn't at all practical or realistic. What's practical and realistic is simply appealing to your conscience without any need for Kant's abstract and rationalist way of thinking.

You’re right, it’s not impossible, if something new is available. — Mww

New thought/belief.

New thought/belief about the societal/familial rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

All new moral thought/belief that knowingly and deliberately goes against the societal grain begins by questioning the truth, veracity, and/or dependability of the morality that one already has.

The ability to do that takes something else. Something aside from the rules we first learn to live by.

In Sapientia's candidate, we could very well have all this and more. So, yeah...

It is possible for one to learn to how to disagree with the morality adopted within his/her/their original worldview.

It takes something else. It takes thinking about one's own thought/belief(worldview) in terms of the re-evaluation of behaviour and/or the historic 'moral concepts' such as good/evil, good/bad, praiseworthy/blameworthy, etc.

Thinking in such terms requires being able to use such terms in some acceptable form or other.