Since you keep mentioning rules/codes, and especially since you're mentioning written rules here, can I ask just where these rules/codes are recorded? — Terrapin Station

They are recorded wherever paper meets pen during the recording...

Kant is working from two notions, one of which is pure reason in comparison/contrast to the other which is emotion.

The two are inseparable.

Pure reason consists of thinking about one's own thought/belief. All thinking about thought/belief is existentially dependent upon something to be thinking about. Thought/belief exists prior to thinking about thought/belief.

Pure reason is existentially dependent upon a much more rudimentary kind of thought/belief. Pre-reflective, one might say. The kind of thought/belief that is later named, isolated, and thus further considered must exist prior to it's being reported upon. All examples of doing this show it's being done with written language replete with names for mental ongoings.

That which is being reported upon exists in it's entirety prior to our report. Prelinguistic thought/belief exist in their entirety prior to being reported upon.

All thought/belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between things. The first place we look and see this would be language use itself. Our reports, all of them, consist entirely of predication. All predication is correlation.

Is mental correlation adequate? Is it both, necessary and sufficient, such that all predication counts as being thought/belief? I can't imagine a good argument against it. Without a creature capable of drawing mental correlations between different things, there could be no such thing as predication of any kind. So, predication is itself existentially dependent upon mental correlations.

Can mental correlations between different things exist prior to predication?

Of course!

What would those things be? What things would become a part of the creature's mental correlations? In this early stage, of course, the creature has no language. So the pre-linguistic mental correlations could not include linguistic tokens, characters, signs, marks, and/or symbols.

Physiological sensory perception doesn't need turned on. That happens autonomously. Fear doesn't need turned on. That happens autonomously. Contentment need not be turned on. That is the simplest of mind states along with it's counterpart... discontentment.

Hunger pangs and the visceral satisfaction thereof...

...and the things connected to these.

The sheer quantity of possible combinations is more than adequate to account for all the different kinds of thought/belief. The complexity of thought/belief is established and/or determined solely by virtue of complexity of the correlations. The kind is reflected by it's content.

Kant named some kinds that would be possible if things were not the way they are. If the emotional aspect of all mental correlation were non-existent... things would be a different way. As it stands however, emotion and thinking about thought/belief are inseparable, despite lots of folk thinking/believing otherwise.

I did not misquote you, because I was not quoting you at all. Here is what I wrote: — tim wood

But why did you write that then? Why write a different thing that has nothing to do with the post you're responding to?

Yes, that just means ability. Had it been in my mind to reference a permission, I'd have written "may." — tim wood

Well then the answer to your question is obviously yes. Unless you are suggesting that the laws of physics intervene in order to make Kant right (and God knows at this stage I wouldn't put it passed you), then it is obviously reasonable to say "a) you don't want to be murdered, but b) you can yourself murder as you desire,". How could it possibly not be? The first is a statement about your preferences and the second is a statement about the lack of physical limitations on some action you may take.

And you apparently didn't see the "If." Ifs make a difference. Nor the "reasonable." — tim wood

No, I saw both. I've just dealt with the reasonable, I don't understand why you think 'if' makes my response less comprehensible.

I am sure you understand this. Why do you write as if you do not? I do not question what you can desire. I question whether you can reason. — tim wood

No, I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. You've yet to explain how one can derive an action from reason alone. Absent any desire, the application of reason has nothing to work with. What 'reason' is there to do anything without the desire to do it?

Me as a transcendental Kantian on the one hand and you as a...what, virtue ethicist?....on the other. You tell me, keeping in mind this is a thread on morality. — Mww

Yes, by and large a virtue ethicist. I think that large decisions such as those made by governments and corporations, should probably be made on utilitarian grounds, but at a personal level, I trust my instincts most. I'm also an ethical naturalist in that I believe the source of moral thought is biology.

They are recorded wherever paper meets pen during the recording... — creativesoul

Sure. Such as?

Thanks. Read most of the ten pages.

I’m comfortable allowing rigid designator to stand as a distinctive representation of a concept. A stop sign can be a rigid designator. I don’t intend anyone should also agree with and use my terminology, but he should understand without complication what I mean when I use it.

Nothing too deep or troubling about that, I wouldn’t think.

If one gets thought/belief wrong, then one gets something or other wrong in their report/account — creativesoul

My report of Kant's shortcomings are existentially dependent upon Kant's words. — creativesoul

So.....Kant, because your report informs me that his “linguistic framework is utterly incapable of taking proper account of the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief”, must have something or other wrong in his reporting, in some or all of his various essays, manuscripts, theoretical speculations, etc.

If that is the shortcoming you’re reporting on, this incapable accounting, what makes your thought/belief not wrong? Is it even possible to show his linguistic framework and the intrinsic incapacity attributed to it, to someone else?

You’re either really super smart or just plain bad at writing. I don’t understand a third to half of what you say in any given post.

I don't understand a lot of the content of Mww's posts, either, but so far I'm just attributing it to very different paradigms than my own that I figure would be impossible to sort out in this context.

Glad to hear I’m not the only one.

I’m comfortable allowing rigid designator to stand as a distinctive representation of a concept. A stop sign can be a rigid designator. — Mww

I just can't make any sense out of saying/supposing that anything would be rigid. To me that is not at all how reference, meaning, etc. work, and it's very obvious that it's not how they work.

And if it's otherwise just supposed to be saying something about identity, then it's a very convoluted, confused, misleading way to say something so simple that it's not worth saying.

Any and all evidence to the contrary of one's belief system becomes such as a result of it's being used as such. Prior to the use, what becomes evidence is not yet... evidence. — creativesoul

I’ve lost interest in this. The reductionism necessary to validate my argument is so far down in the weeds it couldn’t possibly pass the wtf test.

Necessary to validate? Or necessary to invalidate? This is another example of me not understanding you.

The reductionism necessary to validate my argument is so far down in the weeds it couldn’t possibly pass the wtf test. — Mww

Ah, I get you. You really are too smart for us. Try talking to us as if you were explaining something to children.

Although most geniuses are shit at teaching.

“...The capacity of experiencing Pleasure or Pain on the occasion of a mental representation, is called ‘Feeling,’ because Pleasure and Pain contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even Sensations, considered apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the modifications of the Subject, as, for instance, in reference to Red, Sweet, and such like, are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to Objects, whereas Pleasure or Pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet, express absolutely nothing that is in the Object, but merely a relation to the Subject. And for the reason just stated, Pleasure and Pain considered in themselves cannot be more precisely defined. All that can be further done with regard to them is merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain relations, in order to make the knowledge of them available practically...”

Available practically. The practical and the pure are very different. Pure reason has nothing to do with emotion, for emotion, reducible to none other than feelings of pain and pleasure, can provide us with no knowledgeable object, but merely a subjective condition. The separation of emotion from pure reason is very clear.
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Is mental correlation adequate? Is it both, necessary and sufficient, such that all predication counts as being thought/belief? I can't imagine a good argument against it. — creativesoul

Such that predication counts as thought belief? It does not follow necessarily from mental correlation being both necessary and sufficient, that such counts as thought/belief. Mental correlation *IS* predication itself, and could count as pure reason with as much validity as counting as thought/belief.
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Physiological sensory perception doesn't need turned on. That happens autonomously. — creativesoul

Physiological sensory apparatus doesn’t need turned on; it is available for perceiving autonomously, all else being given. Sensory perception requires an affectation, therefore is not autonomous.

Contentment need not be turned on. That is the simplest of mind states along with it's counterpart... discontentment. — creativesoul

Contentment = pleasure; discontentment = pain. Absolute most basic human emotional states, granted. Innumerable objects responsible for one or the other of these emotional states, sure. Do we need to reason between the state and the object that informs it? No, we don’t. After the fact, we may reason as to the effect (sorrow) with respect to its cause (forgot my anniversary). Be that as it may, for an emotion to manifest as either pain or pleasure requires an object to turn it on. It is required the wavefunction collapse to a probability density of 1, in order to recognize a certainty.
(Sorry.......that just popped in out of nowhere. Disregard)
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emotion and thinking about thought/belief are inseparable, despite lots of folk thinking/believing otherwise. — creativesoul

Theoretically, right?

Very good responses to creativesoul. I understood all of it. Thanks for dumbing it down for me.

“...The capacity of experiencing Pleasure or Pain on the occasion of a mental representation, is called ‘Feeling,’ because Pleasure and Pain contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even Sensations, considered apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the modifications of the Subject, as, for instance, in reference to Red, Sweet, and such like, are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to Objects, whereas Pleasure or Pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet, express absolutely nothing that is in the Object, but merely a relation to the Subject. And for the reason just stated, Pleasure and Pain considered in themselves cannot be more precisely defined. All that can be further done with regard to them is merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain relations, in order to make the knowledge of them available practically...” — Mww

What is this from?

It is required the wavefunction collapse to a probability density of 1, in order to recognize a certainty.
(Sorry.......that just popped in out of nowhere. Disregard) — Mww

:lol: smartass

https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kant-the-philosophy-of-law

It’s long and drawn out, but the part you’re asking about is at the beginning.

Hmmm.......with only those two choices, guess which I’d pick. (Grin)

The smart vs bad at writing? I now realize you are super smart. I’m just not accustomed to your way of speaking.

Are you a physicist or do you just have an interest in physics?

I just can't make any sense out of saying/supposing that anything would be rigid — Terrapin Station

If you stopped at the stop sign, the rigidity of the designator is validated. If you didn’t, the designator is no less rigid, but you disregarded it for whatever reason. All the designator needs, is for what it represents to be understood, not necessarily agreed with.

If you stopped at the stop sign, the rigidity of the designator is validated. If you didn’t, the designator is no less rigid, but you disregarded it for whatever reason. All the designator needs, is for what it represents to be understood, not necessarily agreed with. — Mww

Very good explanation, teacher. :smile:

Nope, just an interest, from Maxwell to Hawking, mostly. The really old and the really new, not so much.

Do you have a professional background in philosophy?

attributing it to very different paradigms — Terrapin Station

There’s a lot of them, that’s for sure. Pick one, run with it.

Nope. Lots of books, lots of RAM.

Thanks for dumbing it down for me. — Noah Te Stroete

I didn’t dumb it down, which means you’re just as smart in understanding it as I am in writing it.