In the case at hand, the phenomena only occur as thought. That only applies to all phenomena if we restrict our context to thinking about things. — Terrapin Station
I don’t agree with direct apprehension of external phenomena. — Noah Te Stroete
(neither)idealism or representationalism are at all empirically supportable. — Terrapin Station
“...The capacity of experiencing Pleasure or Pain on the occasion of a mental representation, is called ‘Feeling,’ because Pleasure and Pain contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even Sensations, considered apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the modifications of the Subject, as, for instance, in reference to Red, Sweet, and such like, are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to Objects, whereas Pleasure or Pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet, express absolutely nothing that is in the Object, but merely a relation to the Subject. And for the reason just stated, Pleasure and Pain considered in themselves cannot be more precisely defined. All that can be further done with regard to them is merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain relations, in order to make the knowledge of them available practically...”
Available practically. The practical and the pure are very different. Pure reason has nothing to do with emotion, for emotion, reducible to none other than feelings of pain and pleasure, can provide us with no knowledgeable object, but merely a subjective condition. The separation of emotion from pure reason is very clear. — Mww
Is mental correlation adequate? Is it both, necessary and sufficient, such that all predication counts as being thought/belief? I can't imagine a good argument against it.
— creativesoul
Such that predication counts as thought belief? It does not follow necessarily from mental correlation being both necessary and sufficient, that such counts as thought/belief. Mental correlation *IS* predication itself, and could count as pure reason with as much validity as counting as thought/belief. — Mww
They can’t be, they are purely speculative. Nothing about either of those is subject to the scientific method. But they can still be logical. — Mww
I don't do ontology by speculation or purely by logic. — Terrapin Station
Cool. You can do ontology without using language? — creativesoul
Physiological sensory perception doesn't need turned on. That happens autonomously.
— creativesoul
Physiological sensory apparatus doesn’t need turned on; it is available for perceiving autonomously, all else being given. Sensory perception requires an affectation, therefore is not autonomous. — Mww
Contentment need not be turned on. That is the simplest of mind states along with it's counterpart... discontentment.
— creativesoul
Contentment = pleasure; discontentment = pain. — Mww
Add in the conditions of the day, his empiricist bent, gives us what we see as simple-minded thinking. Still, it only took 50 years for his moral theory to be shown incomplete and thus sufficiently refuted. — Mww
I think his biggest detriment to moral philosophy was....plain and simple....he worked backwards, insofar as he tried to synthesize modern empirical thought to ancient virtue ethics. Which just doesn’t work. You can’t get Greek virtue utilitarianism to inform British Enlightenment sentimentalist plurality. — Mww
Kinda funny, if you ask me. People are so much more apt to think themselves as sentimental entities, than to think themselves rational entities. — Mww
He was still quite wrong. — creativesoul
It does not follow from the fact that emotion - alone - cannot furnish us with knowledge about objects that pure reason does not include and/or consist of emotion - at least in part. — creativesoul
Consider this for a moment. (...) If thinking about thought/belief does not include thinking about the emotional aspects, then such considerations are not taking proper account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to the account. — creativesoul
I don't do ontology by speculation or purely by logic. — Terrapin Station
Kant, an the other hand, granting Humian cause and effect in the physical world as given, thus recognizing the need for consistency of the principle with respect to the authority of the will in a possible metaphysical context wherein your “universal fact of human responsibility” is an effect and presupposes a necessary cause. But he was still at the mercy of infinite regress, for to suppose freedom as a cause necessitates it be at the same time an effect. What Hume didn’t consider is this:
“....I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which rational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. The former is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the speculative proof should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which presses on the theory. We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., as endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom...”
In short, Hume couldn’t prove a cause, Kant showed no proof was necessary. We couldn’t tell the difference between a rational being with freedom theoretically proven as cause for the authority of the will, from a rational being with merely the presupposed idea of freedom as the means for the authority of the will. — Mww
A theory predicated on logic, internally consistent, and non-contradictory....can be wrong? — Mww
They can’t be, they are purely speculative. Nothing about either of those is subject to the scientific method. But they can still be logical. — Mww
A theory predicated on logic, internally consistent, and non-contradictory....can be wrong? — Mww
If ontology isn’t presupposed or irrelevant, I don’t care what it is. — Mww
So “morality” must always refer to acceptable/unacceptable behavior is a necessary truth. — Noah Te Stroete
They can’t be, they are purely speculative. Nothing about either of those is subject to the scientific method. But they can still be logical.
The question 'But do we REALLY have free will?' is at best unanswerable, and at worst inapt and even incoherent. The idea that it is a coherent question seems to be a chimera created, again, by outmoded and unfortunate atomistic, mechanistic thinking. — Janus
It is well accepted in philosophy of science that theories cannot be verified to be right or wrong. A theory is provisionally accepted as long as it seems to be, regarding what is observed, the most explanatory one available and as long as any predicted conditions and events that it entails are consistently observed to obtain. — Janus
A theory predicated on logic, internally consistent, and non-contradictory....can be wrong?
— Mww
Of course it can be. Coherency is insufficient for truth. — creativesoul
If ontology isn’t presupposed or irrelevant, I don’t care what it is.
— Mww
Haha (or were you not joking?) — Terrapin Station
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