For me, in the ethical context, to be right simply means being effective in promoting what nearly all of us want; to live in harmony, and being wrong simply means being defective in promoting it. — Janus

So this, for example, is a semantic disagreement between us which I don't think you've properly dealt with. You're not interested in any problems I see with it, just because you can maintain internal consistency, which almost anyone can do without great difficulty? How hard can it be not to contradict yourself? Internal consistency ain't the be-all and end-all.

My objection wouldn't merely be that I go by a different semantics. It would be criticism along the lines that mine makes more sense or is less problematic. If yours cannot account for a number of situations about what is right or wrong supported by strong intuitive appeal or experience or common usage of moral language, then that is evidence against your semantics. Are you not interested in that?

I suspect that you're defining these terms how you want them to be defined, so that they fit your preexisting moral principles. I am not doing that. I am thinking about how it is used, how people reach moral judgements, what they mean. Mine is more of a disinterested approach to ascertain the truth, not to make the truth fit my agenda like you seem to be doing.

If the person making the promise does not think doing so confers a duty to keep their word, then either they are ignorant of what a promise means, or it is an insincere speech act. — creativesoul

Or they don't agree with you about what a promise means. Your arrogance is restraining your philosophical investigations. If you continue to simply presume that however things seem to you to be, that must be how they are, you're never going to reach any more interesting conclusion than that you were right all along. In which case there's very little point posting here.

I'm simply pointing out what making a promise means, and then further pointing out how just simply understanding the language use causes expectation that is only taken into proper account with an ought. — creativesoul

No, you are not 'pointing' either of these things out, like a tour guide might 'point out' the incontrovertible existence of the Eiffel Tower. You are asserting these things, and in philosophical discussion it is reasonable to expect assertions to be accompanied by justification, otherwise, what's the point of asserting them to a discussion forum?

When you ae ready to discuss your reasons for believing these things to be the case, then we will have something to talk about.

I see a different problem there. It's not so much that he hasn't provided support, although you're right about that. There's very clearly a pattern with him in that regard. That's why we call him the Oracle.

The problem I see is one of logical irrelevance. He wants to refute Hume, but he is missing the target. Even if we were to grant his point, it misses Hume's point. It actually just tries to unphilosophically reinforce the pre-Hume sort of thinking.

The biggest problem I see with the crudest form of moral relativism ( morality relative to individual preference only) is that it is really a symptom of our modern, self-centred, exploitative culture. Is it really sensible to think that everyone should be ruled by their passions? — Janus

There's nothing modern at all about it. Morality relative to individual preferences is what morality IS, ontologically, and it's what it always has been--errant, confused, mistaken beliefs that it's something else aside. "Shoulds" are just as well individual preferences (re "should be ruled by their passions.") The fact that morality is individual preferences in no way implies what morality should be. It's just a fact about what it is.

but what of those whose moral feelings are underdeveloped, atrophied or whose feelings are just not moral at all? — Janus

All of that is only relative to someone else's opinions, opinions that hinge on their preferences contra someone else's.

So, the descriptive gives a phenomenological account of how people's moral beliefs and dispositions are mediated by the community — Janus

That would have to hinge on claims that things like meaning as well as preferences can literally, wholesale be given to someone from something outside of themselves.

Those claims would require support.

According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,[1] there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics)

What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology)

How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology) — Wikipedia

What makes them all "moral"?(the kind of semantics, ontology, epistemology, thought, belief, judgment, etc.)

Hume has been refuted. It had nothing to do with promises. Your belief is not necessary.

You also conflate belief and truth, but I do not expect you to see it. Keep on riding shotgun with one who does not care about truth. Confirmation bias feels good.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation — creativesoul

A promise, in and of itself, or any affirmative token with a moral interest, regardless of it’s object, implies something a whole lot more fundamental than mere intentionality. Without these fundamentals, the object might as well not even be included in the predicate of a promise proposition.
—————————

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. — creativesoul

Certainly. Statements, at least explications about promise, should include those aforementioned fundamentals. Any decent meta-ethicist is already well aware of them.
————————-

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done. — creativesoul

Agreed. Still, a promise is a synthetic proposition, and all synthetic propositions have a necessary connection between its subject and its object.

I am not arguing that one ought keep their promise. — creativesoul

Maybe not within the context of promise, but you’d argue that one ought to kee a promise if the context was about “ought”. I mean, one ought to keep his promise is a valid argument to make, right?

ou know...the human complement system: Yes, no; left, right; front, back; up,down.....mores, taboos.
But you think of a taboo more as a negative more? That’s fine. I can do that, if it ever comes up again. — Mww

I just saw this reply of yours...somehow slipped through the cracks...

Could it reasonably be said that taboos (proscriptions) are generally stronger than mores (prescriptions)? I don't know. It seems that every proscription could be reframed as a prescription in any case.

So you use enculturation that way, from a child-rearing perspective. I was attributing more to it than that, looks like. It relates because I treat morality from the perspective of a fully developed rational system. As such, I don’t think morality is given to me by parents or society or environment. I figure if I’m responsible for my actions, I get to say what they’re going to be. — Mww

Yes, I agree that your moral responsibility entails your saying what your actions are to be. There could be no morality without that, just enforced law.

I am a relativist in the common sense only insofar as my moral interests are certainly not going to be identical to everybody else’s, I’m a subjectivist simply by nature, and I’m a deontologist because the idea of moral law appeals to me. — Mww

I am also a relativist in that sense, because it seems obvious that no two people's moral intersts are ever going to be identical. I lean towards deontologism and virtue ethics and away from consequentialism, at least in so far as it consists in any form of hedonic calculus. I also favor an approach which might be called 'intentionalism'; the idea that one's intentions as sincerely enacted determine whether actions are good or bad; or in other words if my intention is to act in the interests of others rather than self-interestedly then my acts will be morally good. This also seems in some ways to be close to virtue ethics, in others close to deontology, and in yet others close to consequentialism. There are bound to be overlaps, and it seems "isms" are not as hermetically sealed from one another as might generally be thought.

The C.I. is the formula for a moral law, it says act strictly in accordance with a principle and whatever that principle is, which I am free to choose, treat it as if it were a law on which everybody else acted the same way. Although this is not a realistic “ought”, it is a very substantial guide to private conduct, to being morally disposed. And that’s all it was ever supposed to be. Murder is a moral interest of mine, because from it I can hold with a principle (murder is contrary to the purpose of life), therefore I ought to act (never commit murder) as if it is indeed a fact murder is contrary to the purpose of life.

I think I would rather say that murder is contrary to the universal desire for life, rather than that it is contrary to the "purpose" of life, though. I wonder what difference that makes...

It just occurred to me that, in a way, the C.I. is a reformulation of the Golden Rule.

All my above is in relation to your assertion here. I voted it true, because I agree with that assertion in itself. I bring it up to exemplify the difference between your “morality is relative” with respect to the good of a community, and my “the relativism of morality” which I assert has nothing to do with community.

Is there any common ground? — Mww

Could you explain some more how you see the difference between ""morality is relative" with respect to the good of a community" and ""the relativism of morality" which has nothing to do with community"? If I clearly understand the distinction then I may be able to say whether I think there is any common ground.

Imagine that a guy owes some very unsavory characters a large amount of cash that he does not have. He cannot pay. He knows that these are dangerous people:Eyewitness style. Further envision a promise being made to the guy from the unsavory ones to harm the guys family if the guy didn't pay up.

If the guy doesn't pay, then his family ought be dead. I'm not condoning the act. I'm saying that knowing the meaning of a sincerely made promise creates expectation.

I am not saying that all promises ought be kept. — creativesoul

I think I would call that a threat rather than a promise. To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon, and it also must be something that will be of benefit to the other, such that if you don't hold to it the other will be let down, and feel deceived or betrayed.

So, I would say that, in principle at least, promises should be kept and threats should not be carried out, which would mean that they are kind of opposites. Perhaps threats could be classed as "negative" promises.

It just occurred to me that, in a way, the C.I. is a reformulation of the Golden Rule. — Janus

That has been the case since its inception, and the literature is abundant both pro and con. Skipping all the theoretics, the bottom line is.....the second formulation of the C.I. we all know and love in effect says never treat another rational agent as a means to your own ends, whereas the G.R. explicitly requires a rational agent to do just that. In addition, by that same requirement, the other person is relieved of both his freely autonomous will, and his duty.

On the other hand, there’s nothing untoward in treating someone a certain way for no other reason than it would be good for you to be treated that way. Problem is of course, this system only works with non-deviant rationalities. I mean, you wouldn’t gain much if you went around robbing people because you want them to rob you.

But no, the C.I. prime doesn’t relate to the G.R. It doesn’t obligate anyone to treat you any way at all. It only obligates individual agents to act as if everyone else was obligated the same way.
————————-

Could you explain some more how you see the difference between ""morality is relative" with respect to the good of a community" and ""the relativism of morality" which has nothing to do with community"? — Janus

Nahhh........I lost my chain of thought on that. Reading back through all your stuff, I couldn’t pick it back up.

Imagine that a guy owes some very unsavory characters a large amount of cash that he does not have. He cannot pay. He knows that these are dangerous people:Eyewitness style. Further envision a promise being made to the guy from the unsavory ones to harm the guys family if the guy didn't pay up.

If the guy doesn't pay, then his family ought be dead. I'm not condoning the act. I'm saying that knowing the meaning of a sincerely made promise creates expectation.

I am not saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

I think I would call that a threat rather than a promise — Janus

Granted.

To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus

As is a threat.

...and it also must be something that will be of benefit to the other, such that if you don't hold to it the other will be let down, and feel deceived or betrayed.

So, I would say that, in principle at least, promises should be kept and threats should not be carried out, which would mean that they are kind of opposites. Perhaps threats could be classed as "negative" promises. — Janus

I'm having significant difficulty here...

Hot and not. True and false. Open and closed. Meaningful and meaningless. Caring and not caring. Speaking honestly and speaking dishonestly. Deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought/belief and not. These are the sort of things that it makes sense to me to call "opposites".

None can be a kind of the other.

A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.

All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.

The problem I see is one of logical irrelevance. He wants to refute Hume, but he is missing the target. Even if we were to grant his point, it misses Hume's point. It actually just tries to unphilosophically reinforce the pre-Hume sort of thinking. — S

This is interesting, but I'm not seeing the link yet. Could you lay it out a bit more.

Hume has been refuted. — creativesoul

Really. What is the point in you posting if all you're going to do is just tell us what is and is not the case? I honestly want to know what you post here for.

My understanding of Hume was that he was talking about reason in a strict sense, not just what seems to make sense on the surface. If we go by the latter, then it doesn't seem to be a problem to say something like, "If you promised to do it, then you ought to do so". But anyone who knows anything about logic knows that it doesn't work quite like that. What can seem reasonable to a layperson can be otherwise in logic. And this is just one example of that. When he brought up this point a couple of months ago, I told him that he would need an additional premise, but has he adapted his argument? No. He rarely if ever adapts, he merely repeats. It would become a valid argument if we included the premise that you should always keep your promises, but I don't think that that's true without exception, and if there's a single exception, then the premise is false, which would make the argument unsound.

Hume has been refuted. — creativesoul

Even if he has, he hasn't been refuted by you. That would be a delusion.

You also conflate belief and truth, but I do not expect you to see it. Keep on riding shotgun with one who does not care about truth. Confirmation bias feels good. — creativesoul

I know you would rather attack a straw man. That is perfectly clear.

it would become a valid argument if we included the premise that you should always keep your promises, but I don't think that that's true without exception, and if there's a single exception, then the premise is false, which would make the argument unsound. — S

Agreed. I was going to make the same point myself, but was more annoyed by his style than by the substance of his argument at the time, so didn't tackle the glaring error in it. I don't think anyone sane would agree that if someone promised to eat a meal, but subsequently found out the meal was poisoned, that somehow they still ought to eat the meal. I think tacit within every promise is "all things being equal, and unforeseen changes of circumstances aside...".

To me, it's like there's a load of small print attached to each word, we all know it's there, we're none of us exactly sure what the other person's small print is, but we fully expect there to be some.

The idea that a promise leads to an ought on the basis of its meaning is a classic example of philosophy constructing castles in the air by attempting to make logical deductions from words. It's a bit like trying to deduce the structure of a bridge from the facade alone, there's a lot more going on underneath that needs to be factored in if one is going to attempt something like that.

Though why they would bother when we all know already what a 'promise' means from years of experience using the word, is beyond me.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation
— creativesoul

A promise, in and of itself, or any affirmative token with a moral interest, regardless of it’s object, implies something a whole lot more fundamental than mere intentionality. Without these fundamentals, the object might as well not even be included in the predicate of a promise proposition. — Mww

I'm not even sure what the notion/idea of "a promise's object" is picking out and/or referring to. I know what a promise is. I know what an object is. I do not know how an object can belong to a promise.

Promises include/contain predicates. If there is an object in the predicate of a promise it is but one part of the whole promise. Roses and family are objects mentioned in the predicate of the promises under current consideration.

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise.
— creativesoul

Certainly. Statements, at least explications about promise, should include those aforementioned fundamentals. Any decent meta-ethicist is already well aware of them.

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

Agreed.

Good.

I know you would rather attack a straw man. That is perfectly clear... — S

The irony is thick when the above comes from one that mischaracterizes an argument about how an utterance of ought can be derived as an argument of/for moral approval despite the author's obvious rejection of exactly that.

:yikes:

It is a semantically blind reader who mistranslates claims like "I am not, will not, and cannot argue that one ought keep one's promises" as "if you promised to do it, then you ought to do so"... and then goes on and on and on and on and on... all about the imaginary opponent.

Live by the sword...

Hume has been refuted.
— creativesoul

Really. What is the point in you posting if all you're going to do is just tell us what is and is not the case? — Isaac

What do you care for? You do not have use for truth, or what's true, or what can be true, or how true things become so...

What do you care for? You do not have use for truth, or what's true, or what can be true, or how true things become so... — creativesoul

I'm not seeing the link. Why would my attitude to 'truth' have anything to do with wanting to hear about people's motives?

I think you have no idea what you're talking about.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday. — creativesoul

No it doesn't. You're wrong. Accept it and move on.

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency. — creativesoul

Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

What does existential dependency mean to you?
———————-

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept. — creativesoul

Under the assumption that all promises have moral implications, can you agree with thinking that all promises ought to be kept? Or, upon the making of a promise, the ought to keep belongs to it necessarily? I wouldn’t even make a promise, given a certain set of conditions, unless I knew beforehand I would keep it, within that same set of conditions. My contention would be, the fact I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made, is insufficient to relieve me of my moral obligation otherwise.

Wait....maybe you mean a promise made by some other person that would not be in your best interest ought not be kept. Even so, you’d still be forced to admit his obligation to keep it despite your being ill-disposed because of his moral integrity. Seems odd, although nonetheless morally worthy, to credit his moral worthiness in keeping a promise at the same time he ends you.

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.
— creativesoul

Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

What does existential dependency mean to you? — Mww

Existential dependency is a relationship between different things. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something exists in it's entirety prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That's a rough basis/outline of the paradigm. The simplicity is remarkable. The scope of rightful application... quite broad.

In the context of this conversation...

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. A difference that can only be discovered by understanding existential dependency. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The former existed in it's entirety prior to the latter.

Voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match one's words is what one does when making a promise. That is determined wholly by a community of language speakers who understand the crucial importance of the role that trust and truth play in interdependence. The preceding two statements report upon and/or take account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to my account of it. It is about promise making. It is a report about what has happened, what is happening, and barring an extinction event of humankind, will continue happening.

Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened.

It's not about approval/disapproval of how the world was promised to be changed, or what was promised to be done. Rather, saying that one ought keep their promise is about the reliability, dependability, and/or trustworthiness of the speaker. Such character traits are crucial for the survival and over-all well-being of interdependent groups.

A complete lack of trust is unsustainable.

Here's a question oft asked but never exactly answered (I looked), evaded or avoided on every occasion. It's a question as to a fact, and as such warrants no argument at all.

So-called relativists on this thread severally agree that murder is bad. The question goes to the reason for that judgment. I understand from the repeated expressions of those, here, that the reason each thinks murder is bad is based on personal preference. (Why or how they severally arrive at that is an interesting question, but I am not here asking that question.) And in particular they all deny, with differing vehemence though the same substance, that there is any more to the assessment of murder as bad, or wrong, than personal preference, and in at least one quote, that it is nonsensical to think that there is.

So the question: is this a fair summary of the relativists' view on this thread?

Yes or no should suffice, and is really all that's asked. If anyone wishes to be insulting, the best they could do is reproduce the exact answer to the exact question, thus showing I missed it, which is possible. But lets see what we get.

Yes (for my views, at least. I can't speak authoritatively for anyone else. Also, technically the "yes" is assuming that we're talking about a foundational moral stance, but let's keep it simple for now.)

Thank you! That's just the clarity I was seeking. .

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

Under the assumption that all promises have moral implications, can you agree with thinking that all promises ought to be kept? — Mww

No. All promises do have moral implications according to my position, but as I've noted and asked of several different participants, even going to the extent of asking an 'at large' question...

What counts as being moral in kind???

Earlier you elaborated upon what counts as a moral kind of interest, as compared/contrasted to other kinds. I was left with no greater understanding than before I asked the question. Here's the answer again...

An interest which is the object of desire is an interest of empirical reason and is subjectively pathological; an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality and is purely subjectively practical. It is here that it becomes clear objective examples, re: external to the moral agent, of moral conditions are not sufficient for moral judgements.

In the former it is the object itself that is good because it satisfies a desire, in the latter it is the willful determination of a volition in order to attain to an object that is good because it satisfies a moral disposition.

If an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality, and being an interest of morality is what counts as being moral, then moral agents are agents of morality, conditions of morality are moral conditions, and judgments of morality are moral judgments. Applying this to what counts as 'moral' implications, we would be saying that implications of morality are moral implications. The obvious next question would be what is morality?

If an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality, and being an object of the will is what counts as being moral, then moral agents are objects of will, moral conditions are objects of will, and moral judgments are objects of will. Applying this to what counts as 'moral' implications, we would be saying that moral implications are objects of will. What is will?

I do not actually think/believe that either one of the above elaborations align with your position, but the answer you offered was not not at all helpful. Could you set it all out in as clear and simple terms as the position you argue for/from will allow?

What counts as being moral in kind, such that all things satisfying the criterion are sensibly and rightfully called "moral" things?