That is completely counterintuitive; why would you say it?

That was my friend, sorry about that. They didn't realize the word was being used in the likeness of a group sence.

Even if the misinterpretation of the word kind was present in my friends comment; how was it counterintuitive

It would be counterintuitive to say that to act morally could be to act unkindly or that to act unkindly could be to act morally. To say that just would be a "misinterpretation" of the word 'kind' and/or the word 'moral'.

Also, why is your friend posting in your name?

tim wood- Forgive me for being blunt, but I feel like you are trying to defend anyone who does or believes anything at all, as potentially thinking that it is "morally right" to do that thing or to have that belief. I feel like you are saying that anything that anyone says or does is simply what they believe or how they feel, which is essentially downplaying the severity of certain actions or beliefs that may or may not be a result of what a person has been conditioned to believe, or what they actually feel is "morally right." Granted I am NOT saying that some people may not do or believe things that actually are a result of what they feel is morally right, but I feel like on some level this is being used as an excuse to explain why some or all people believe what they do or do what they do, when this is in fact not the case for everyone. Believe it or not, there ARE people out there who do bad things despite feeling that it is morally wrong to do these things, and so it is not fair accurate to assume that everyone's actions have been based on their morals, because that simply isn't the case.

Relevant because???
— creativesoul

Because it's the sense of opinion that's appropriate for the discussion. It's the sense pertinent to the subject matter, to the phenomena in question. — Terrapin Station

Some opinion can be true/false though. That's the way it is. If moral opinion can be true/false then it is most certainly relevant.

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.
— creativesoul

Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station

So...

All opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions(of the kind we call "moral").

Can moral opinions be true/false?

So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.
— creativesoul

I did say I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made. Otherwise, yes, to be morally worthy one ought to act in accord with his moral obligation, in this case do what he promised. Won’t be long before he becomes quite careful in what he promises. — Mww

Ah. For whatever reason, I interpreted the opposite... perhaps it is because what follows below seems to contradict what's directly above...

I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.
— creativesoul

Then he has no business making one. Remember, you said....voluntarily obligates himself. A guy promising to commit murder, again, as you say, hasn’t actually done it, so he is just speaking threateningly. — Mww

If the discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made relieves one of the moral obligation to make the world match one's words, then that is an example of an extenuating circumstance.

It is most certainly the case that promise making always includes a voluntarily entered into obligation to make the world match one's words. There are any number of different unforeseen scenarios, situations, and or otherwise possible circumstances that may arise and warrant careful reconsideration of whether or not it is best to keep a promise previously made.

I understand the foundational need for being able to take another on and/or at their word. The keeping of promises builds confidence in such. All promises are overt expressions of what one intends to do. Promises to cause injury notwithstanding.

The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm...

Not all promise making is good.

To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus

As is a threat.
— creativesoul

No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise. — Janus

Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood.

In the last statement... I think you meant to write "That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does not embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise."

When one speaks sincerely about the way things are, they believe things are that way. When one promises, they believe that they will keep it. If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.

A speaker who does not intend to make the world match their words is dishonest, insincere, and/or lying. The promise is a deliberate misrepresentation of the speaker's own thought/belief about what has not happened(the changes promised).

A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.

All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it! — Janus

People in this world actually promise to cause injury and then deliver on that promise. This happens everyday across the globe regardless of individual particulars. Denying that they are making a promise is the result of the speaker not having the same notion of what counts as promise making as you do.

Ask them if they are making a promise. They'll say yes, assuming they've no reason to lie about it. The distinguishing aspect of promise making as compared to merely saying what one intends to do, is that the promise is a sort of unwritten spoken additional guarantee. This holds good regardless of what changes are promised to be made.

I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions? — Janus

This presupposes that the meaning inherent to promise making is somehow existentially dependent upon the listener's wants/wishes/desires. No one wants to be threatened with bodily injury. It is promised nonetheless.

Not all promises are good.

What moral distinctions are being blurred?

So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. — Janus

Promises to cause harm are made and kept everyday.

Not all promises are good.

The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust. — Janus

Mutual trust is imperative. Mutual understanding is as well. One can trust that another means what they say even if and when it involves a promise to cause injury. Not all promises are made with good intention.

If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false. — creativesoul

Promises are not true or false in an empirical propositional sense of course. but what may appear to be a promise that is insincerely made is not a true promise, or in other words it is not truly a promise.

The rest of what you say consists in disagreeing with me about what should be termed 'promise'. My position is that a promise should benefit the one to whom it is made, and consists in entering into a mutual pact of trust that the benefit will be afforded by the promiser. Threats, which usually take no account of the moral entitlements of the one threatened, are not like that, so why bother insisting that they should be termed 'promises' rather than merely 'threats'? Both promises and threats are better thought of as subsets of assurances; they are different kinds of assurances. A threat may be insincere and still be a threat; whereas what might appear as a promise cannot be insincere and still be a promise.

For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat.

On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now?

Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening.

As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I.

Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not.

To put the distinction another way, threats, regardless of whether they are sincere or not ,can never be considered to be morally good, whereas promises may be considered to be morally good if they are sincere; that is, if they actually are promises. In any case, if you remain unconvinced I'm quite content to agree to disagree on this, I have no intention of arguing further about it, that's for sure.

I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...
— creativesoul

From deontological metaphysics, the key is understanding there is a freely determinant will that both prescribes a law and subjects itself to it. For that to have any sustainable power, a moral agent must hold with respect for law in itself. Otherwise, morality can never be grounded in that which is universal and necessary, which are the criteria of law, and our private conduct would know no ground. Duty is the consciousness of respect for law, and consciousness of the will that determines it. Obligation is acknowledgement of duty in the form of judgement, when it comes to acting in conformity to an imperative. — Mww

I have serious very well grounded objections to the notion of freely determinant will(free will). I'll leave those aside and address what I see to be unacceptable consequences following from the above account...

One who has not yet begun to doubt and/or otherwise think about their original worldview cannot have consciousness of their own respect for law, and/or the will that determines it. If obligation is acknowledgement of the consciousness of respect for law and the will that determines it, then one who has not thought about their own worldview could not possibly have any of these a priori necessary elements.

So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.

I do not think it serves us well to simply chalk this difference up to what we (arbitrarily?)think counts as being a promise. I'm simply pointing out that that is not up to our definitions if what we're describing already exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. What a promise means is determined by the correlations drawn between the speech act and imagined future events stoked by the making of that promise. What counts as a promise is not determined by us. Our definitions can be wrong and/or inadequate for taking proper account of what actually happens.

I think I understand your concerns about the logically possible consequences of what I'm presenting here. I want to try to ease those, for I do not find that such problems are inevitable.

By my lights we agree upon much more than we disagree.

"Insincerity" does not equate to "false".

Agree?

One can say "Joe killed Jane" and believe otherwise, even if Joe killed Jane. "Joe killed Jane" is both insincere and true.

As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I. — Janus

I would not assent to such an account. We agree here.

For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat. — Janus

The listener believed you... clearly. You were paid off as a means to avoid danger. That is a large part of the efficacy aspect. The promissory intent is openly guaranteed. It has been emphasized.

The efficacy of the threat includes the listener's belief about that threat. Your intentions(to enrich yourself by means of physical intimidation/threat to injure) effected/affected the listener. Surely we all know this to be true.

On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now? — Janus

Sincerity does not equate to truth. Sincere statements can be false. Promises are not the sort of things that can be true/false.

Your intentions are not irrelevant to how well threats work. All it takes to work is the listener believe that the world will be made to match the words. You intend to make them believe that. That is entirely relevant to how well the threat works.

You're conflating sincerity with truth and insincerity with falsehood.

Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not. — Janus

Not all promises are good. Not all threats are bad.

Doesn't that wrap it up in the simplest, but more than adequate, terms?

Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? — Janus

Why the scare quotes? Those emotions clearly fit the moral category, unlike others. Each has an explanation relating to moral judgement, such as that you feel guilty when you judge you've done something wrong, and that you have feelings of disapproval when you judge someone else has done something wrong. You don't get that with shyness or embarrassment, for example.

And moral judgement is founded in moral emotions because they are essential and they make moral judgement what it is. Under current technology, a robot couldn't make moral judgements, because we don't have technology advanced enough to replicate emotions. If we built it such that it would respond in a certain way, such as to say, "No, murder is wrong", when asked to murder someone, then the robot wouldn't be making any moral judgements, in spite of appearances.

You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here. — Janus

Are you deliberately not taking into account my response, or are you making this error accidentally? I'm not going to answer your loaded question in the way that you want me to. They're not "more than" personal preference because it's inappropriate to call them that to begin with.

The personal part is inappropriate, because one definition of that is, "belonging to or affecting a particular person rather than anyone else", and the preference part is inappropriate because one definition of that is, "a greater liking for one alternative over another or others",
("her preference for white wine"). Those are the first definitions that came up on a Google search. We don't tend to say, "My personal preference is not to murder children, because I like children when they're going about their lives, not petrified that I'm attempting to murder them or lying on the ground in a lifeless bloody heap". That's not the best way to word it, as "personal preference" and "like" don't quite do it justice. It sounds like an understatement, too trivial and inappropriate.

So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation. — creativesoul

What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent.

The ongoing is a perfect example why moral philosophy and psychology and anthropology are and should be separate disciplines.

As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I. — Janus

You do see, don’t you, that in making that threat you’ve already violated two of the three forms of the C.I., which makes you morally unworthy. You’re acting as if it was universally lawful to coerce a pay-off, cause pain or both, and, you’re using a fellow human as means to your own ends. If you make the threat but don’t follow up on it because you chickened out, which implicates you in a false truth, you’ve still acted as if causing fear of injury in a fellow human is universally lawful. Not to mention, the guy you threatened fears his possible injury will prevent him from doing his job and thereby supporting his family, so he might lose his house, his ol’ lady dumps him for not providing her standard of living, kids don’t text him anymore but still want their birthday money......so he beats the snot outta you first.

Fine community member you’d make. (Grin)

The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm... — creativesoul

Nowhere is it said human nature is subsumed necessarily under moral agency, such that a moral agent is prohibited from operating under the rationale of a momentary greater good. While he is freely autonomous in his determinations towards his morality, he is nonetheless just as freely autonomous in substituting a lesser version of it.
———————-

Not all promise making is good. — creativesoul

This is just an instance of moral relativism. Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.

Some opinion can be true/false though. — creativesoul

<sigh> as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion. One sense is how a person feels about something. Whether they like or dislike the thing in question, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. That sense can only be true or false re whether the person is honestly reporting how they feel, and insofar as the sentences are framed more or less as "I feel . . . ," "I think . . . ," "In my opinion . . .," which they often are not. (For example, people often say "Beethoven is the greatest composer," rather than "I feel that Beethoven is the greatest composer." The former can't be true or false.)

The second sense of "opinion" refers to a person's view on a factual matter, where there's often an emphasis on the views of persons with some expertise in the area in question, and on matters that are still up in the air if not outright controversial epistemically. So, for example, we might query a cosmologist's opinion on dark matter--query exactly what the cosmologist believes dark matter to be. This is not querying how the cosmologist feels about dark matter, whether they like or dislike it, etc., which is unlike the other sense of "opinion." And unlike "Beethoven is the greatest composer," something like "Dark matter is simply an issue of having an incorrect model of physics, so that our gravitational formula are wrong at least in particular circumstances" can be true or false without needing to add "In my opinion" to it.

There are different senses of the word "opinion." Only one sense can be true or false when stated without an "In my opinion" (or equivalent) clause. You should have at least learned this in school as a little kid--by second or third grade, say.

Can moral opinions be true/false? — creativesoul

No.

<sigh> as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion. — Terrapin Station

Indeed. This goes back to my earlier remarks that this is not by any means a discussion of equals. I know that that might sound arrogant, but it's true.

tim wood- Forgive me for being blunt, — Maureen

You didn't refer back to something I wrote, but I think I know. And I think you've got me crossed-up with terrapin and S. They believe, and have made plain in this thread, that all moral judgments are strictly, merely, relative, matters of personal preference.

And I think you've got me crossed-up with terrapin and S. They believe, and have made plain in this thread, that all moral judgments are strictly, merely, relative, matters of personal preference. — tim wood

Can you pay closer attention, please? That's not asking for much, and it is a fair request. It is tiring correcting you all the time repeatedly. Try harder.

It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing.
— Mww

About this no argument from me! — Janus

Me neither. But further to that point, the imperative to act as though such-and-such is a universal law can be ineffectual and redundant. I go direct to my conscience, so for me, Kant's categorical imperative is a useless waste of space.

That's the way it is. — creativesoul

That sums up your "argument", I think. You could have saved yourself a lot of time and effort if you had simply said that from the beginning and left it at that.

So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
— creativesoul

What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent. — Mww

I asked what counts as being "moral" in kind. Moral agents are a kind of agent. You answered by offering a criterion. The satisfaction of that criterion requires thinking about one's own thought/belief(original worldview).

I meant what I wrote.

I'm fairly certain that you're using more than one sense/definition of the term "moral" in the same argument.

Maybe if you spent less time and effort on "correcting" and more on being correct, or at least clear, I wouldn't be revisiting this. Terrapin has been clear. I attempted to ask a simple question; he got it and answered, which I appreciate. From him, clarity and communication. From you, same old same old. Failure to answer and engage; indeed you seem to be careful not to. But much admonishment, mock, and all the time hand-waving to the effect that whatever is asked of you has always already been answered. In my post above I wrote, "Let's see what we get." And from you I got what I expected, which is nothing enlightening, really nothing at all. Thank you, then, for your nothing.

Ok. The derogatory remarks are rather unbecoming. I'm wanting to confirm and/or ensure that I have your position correct.

So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.

Do I have this much right?

Yes, that's right.

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?

Maybe if you spent less time and effort on "correcting" and more on being correct, or at least clear, I wouldn't be revisiting this. Terrapin has been clear. I attempted to ask a simple question; he got it and answered, which I appreciate. From him, clarity and communication. From you, same old same old. Failure to answer and engage; indeed you seem to be careful not to. But much admonishment, mock, and all the time hand-waving to the effect that whatever is asked of you has always already been answered. In my post above I wrote, "Let's see what we get." And from you I got what I expected, which is nothing enlightening, really nothing at all. Thank you, then, for your nothing. — tim wood

So you don't recall what I've said on "mere", even though it was one of the first things I said to you almost 70 pages ago, and I've repeated it innumerable times since, and elsewhere? You are oblivious to my comments on "personal preference", even though they're right under your nose? And, as usual, this is all my fault.

I see how it is.