This is high order sophistry! One is never required to prove a negative. It is the plaintiff that must prove his case, something which you have singularly failed to do in my opinion. The defendant is not required to prove anything. — Barry Etheridge

Quite the contrary. If there is any doubt in our mind that an organism is capable of suffering, then it is the skeptic that must provide evidence that they cannot feel suffering.

It is an inescapable truth that human rights (if such a concept has any meaning anyway) are the distillation of ethical arguments by humans, about humans, and for humans. There is no rational or logical argument by which the qualifier 'human' may be erased. They do not, by definition, apply to any species other than humans. For any other species to have these rights they must not simply resemble humans they must be humans or identical to humans. — Barry Etheridge

So you're appealing to the historic application of rights to argue that we ought not to apply these rights to other creatures.

"Human", in the case, can be replaced with "sentient". Indeed that's what our arrogance had us believe was the case: that humans were the only sentients on earth. But we know better now. Not giving animals rights is akin to not giving blacks rights because they're "sub-human".

If part of the reason that we treat people better than we treat animals is that people are human then it's not inconsistent or irrational to treat people better than we treat animals. — Michael

But there needs to be a justification for why humans are special.

Perhaps we're special because we can vote or do philosophy. In which case, yes, we shouldn't give voting rights to animals because they can't vote! Yet they can suffer (as can we). They fulfill some standard necessary for a right to be applied.

What reasons do you have for believing that all things (and only those things?) which can suffer deserve equal ethical consideration? You keep asserting it and demanding that others prove you wrong, but that's shifting the burden of proof. — Michael

Well, because I think all value comes down to a balance of pain and pleasure.

But anyway this misses the point. I'm not arguing that only things that can suffer are worthy of consideration (although I do agree with this), I'm arguing that things that can suffer are worthy of consideration (among other possible things), and that animals can suffer. No matter what else you believe, I take it as a common value that if you can suffer, you are ethically relevant.

It's not my job to argue against your claim. It's your job to defend your claim. — Michael

I have, by appealing to our sense of equality. I have offered a reductionist approach to this issue: there is no good reason to not apply equality to animals.

Or to put it another way, you can't go from "all humans ought be treated equally" to "all things which can suffer ought be treated equally". And there's nothing arbitrary, irrational, or inconsistent about the former. — Michael

But I can, because I have argued that humans ought to be treated equally not because they are humans, but because they can suffer. I have pointed out how any other justification is inherently tribalism.

You know what. I really don't care any more. You carry on spouting you're error strewn nonsense and I'll get back to my bacon sandwich with a clear conscience. My involvement in this thread is finito.

Umm...ok?

If part of the reason that we treat people better than we treat animals is that people are human then it's not inconsistent or irrational to treat people better than we treat animals. — Michael

What those that criticise speciesism would say about this is that the question is why does people being human cause us to treat them better than other animals? I believe the reason is simply tribalism - because humans are our group and cows are not. If defenders of speciesism would just agree to that then there would be no incoherence in their position.

Cognitive dissonance arises when people do not want to admit that, so they try to come up with all sorts of contorted arguments as to why there are good ethical reasons to treat humans better, that have nothing to do with kinship. Peter Singer has done a marvellous job of pulling these arguments apart and showing their inconsistencies. Even Bernard Williams, who disagreed with most of what Singer wrote, said that he favoured people over other animals because they were like him and he thought that was just fine.

We've seen several threads on here trying to argue that humans are somehow 'special', and not just by virtue of kinship. I didn't see a single good argument in any of those threads.

It's like Jim Jeffries' marvellous rant against gun culture. If pro-gun people would just be honest and say the reason they don't want guns controlled is 'I like guns! F*** Off!' then we could respect them for their logical coherence. But instead they come up with ridiculous arguments about 'protection' and 'safety', which have no logical coherence at all.

There's nothing logically incoherent in somebody saying 'I like bacon! F*** off!', or 'I'm kinder to humans than other animals because I'm more closely related to them'. IMHO neither is an attractive argument, since the latter can be used just as well to justify racial discrimination. But they have a certain integrity.

What those that criticise speciesism would say about this is that the question is why does people being human cause us to treat them better than other animals? I believe the reason is simply tribalism - because humans are our group and cows are not. — andrewk

It is hardly so arbitrary. Humans treat each other well in the hope and expectation they will get the same treatment in return. That is basic rational behaviour.

Pet owners and farmers do the same thing with their animals because in reciprocal fashion they get personal goods like pets that comfort and protect them, or farm animals that are easier to handle and more productive.

So it is about the group dynamic - the give and take of mutual interests. But to simply give rights without reasons is arbitrary and irrational, unless you can argue for some further transcendent principle at work.

So it is about the group dynamic - the give and take of mutual interests. But to simply give rights without reasons is arbitrary and irrational, unless you can argue for some further transcendent principle at work. — apokrisis

You're conflating hypothetical imperatives with categorical imperatives. You use "rational" (i.e. self-interest) as the motivating reason to adopt a moral scheme. This is all fair and good, if you're a moral egoist or an anti-realist non-cognitivist who rejects categorical imperatives. But then just come out and say so, and admit that the categorical imperative is really just self-interest.

Yet I think it is clear that morality, as it is being discussed here, is about the categorical imperatives. We are talking about morality as if there is some non-selfish reason to follow these rules. We are talking about a morality that clearly goes beyond self-centered behavior. Which is why I have relied upon appeals to the more "transcendent" moral principles, like equality, to defend my claim.

The fact that animals cannot really "give back" to you is seen as evidence by yourself that they are not worthy of ethical consideration, as helping them would be irrational (against our own interests). Yet I hope that you agree that this strikes a chord in some sense - that despite being "irrational" (altruistic), we still feel compelled to act this way.

Indeed, it is inherent to hypothetical imperatives that they seem to not settle the open-ended question.

So what I am advocating here then is an abandonment of conventional, historical morality. So humans tended to other humans who were part of their small clan in the past...so what? So humans have historically abused and instrumentalized animals in the past...so what? So humans have systematically discriminated against each other based on race, sex, or any other means...so what? Should we continue to espouse tribalistic behavior? Should we continue to abuse animals? Should we continue to discriminate against members of our own species simply because they have different shades of skin or different genitals? Are we not better than that? Can we not move on from these beastly behaviors? Can we not recognize that there is a difference between rationality and ethicality? Can we not recognize that, if we existed in a different world, we might not have to espouse these ancient, oppressive traditions?

By calling these traditions "oppressive", "tribalistic", "totalitarian", "unequal", etc., I am identifying an actual quality of these traditions. They really are oppressive, tribalistic, totalitarian, and unequal, whether you like to admit it or not. And my hope is that, once you admit this fact, your sense of morality will fire up and you will reject these prior traditions in virtue of the fact that they are oppressive, tribalistic, totalitarian, and unequal.

You could accuse me of putting everyone on a guilt-trip; yet this guilt is precisely why I think we ought to abandon these traditions. After all, I am only pointing out facts. Whether or not we are able to act ethically is entirely irrelevant to the discussion.

It is hardly so arbitrary. Humans treat each other well in the hope and expectation they will get the same treatment in return. That is basic rational behaviour.

That is beside the point. The discussion was about ethical justifications for treating humans better than animals. Those reasons have nothing to do with ethics. They are simple transactional considerations.

You're conflating hypothetical imperatives with categorical imperatives. — darthbarracuda

No I'm not. I'm taking the view that talk about categorical imperatives is transcendent bunk. As a Pragmatist, I can only support reasoned approaches to morality - ones that are natural. And I've said that all along, so I hardly have to come out of the closet about it.

Yet I think it is clear that morality, as it is being discussed here, is about the categorical imperatives. — darthbarracuda

That's your claim. I've repeatedly asked you to justify it.

You don't make an appeal to god, or maths, or anything. So what justifies your transcendental ontology apart from a dualistic, reality-denying, approach to "sentience"?

You say that '"equality" is your transcendent principle, and yet you reject any reasonable approaches to measuring that equality. If anyone points out that humans and animals are not equal in terms of any sensible definition of sentience, you simply claim not to believe the science which tells us that as a measureable fact. Your position is defended by sticking your fingers in your ears and refusing to talk about equality realistically.

The fact that animals cannot really "give back" to you is seen as evidence by yourself that they are not worthy of ethical consideration, as helping them would be irrational (against our own interests). — darthbarracuda

As usual, you distort what people argue.

I said in practice we do care about animals to the degree they "give back to us". And this is natural as morality is all about the practical business of organising social relations. We are social creatures and ethical frameworks exist to optimise that. As social creatures, we now have extended that to the realm of domesticated animals. We treat domestic animals differently from wild animals or good reason. We do things like pay their vet bills because we accept their welfare as our responsibility.

Are we not better than that? Can we not move on from these beastly behaviors? Can we not recognize that there is a difference between rationality and ethicality? Can we not recognize that, if we existed in a different world, we might not have to espouse these ancient, oppressive traditions? — darthbarracuda

Not only can we do these things, but we do do these things. However the best argument is going to be that it is rational self-interest to do so.

By calling these traditions "oppressive", "tribalistic", "totalitarian", "unequal", etc., I am identifying an actual quality of these traditions. — darthbarracuda

Or rather you are trying to win an argument by using emotionally loaded terms. I prefer reason and evidence myself.

You could accuse me of putting everyone on a guilt-trip; yet this guilt is precisely why I think we ought to abandon these traditions. After all, I am only pointing out facts. Whether or not we are able to act ethically is entirely irrelevant to the discussion. — darthbarracuda

This gets very weird. You want to cause us the suffering that is to feel guilt even if there is then nothing we could do to assuage that guilt you have created?

Is that ethical in your book?

That is beside the point. The discussion was about ethical justifications for treating humans better than animals. Those reasons have nothing to do with ethics. They are simple transactional considerations. — andrewk

Sorry, I can't make any sense of what you want to say here.

No I'm not. I'm taking the view that talk about categorical imperatives is transcendent bunk. As a Pragmatist, I can only support reasoned approaches to morality - ones that are natural. And I've said that all along, so I hardly have to come out of the closet about it. — apokrisis

I said in practice we do care about animals to the degree they "give back to us". And this is natural as morality is all about the practical business of organising social relations. We are social creatures and ethical frameworks exist to optimise that. As social creatures, we now have extended that to the realm of domesticated animals. We treat domestic animals differently from wild animals or good reason. We do things like pay their vet bills because we accept their welfare as our responsibility. — apokrisis

Right, so you are under the framework that what has been done, and what we currently do, is what we ought to continue to do because it's natural and rational, or in our own self-interest.

In other words, comfort is evidence of moral value. If we aren't comfortable with the prospect of giving up our dominion over animals, then by golly it's not important.

Not only can we do these things, but we do do these things. However the best argument is going to be that it is rational self-interest to do so. — apokrisis

Yet this is false because we hold many moral beliefs that are not in our best-interest. Perhaps we hold that lying is wrong, even if we could get away with it. It may be in our best-interests to lie, but perhaps we just don't think it's right to lie. Or perhaps we realize how our money would be better spent on aiding those in need, instead of buying that new video game that we want.

Or rather you are trying to win an argument by using emotionally loaded terms. I prefer reason and evidence myself. — apokrisis

As if ethics is entirely disconnected from emotion. Because self-interest isn't emotional at its core...?

This gets very weird. You want to cause us the suffering that is to feel guilt even if there is then nothing we could do to assuage that guilt you have created?

Is that ethical in your book? — apokrisis

Well, yes, it is appropriate, since your guilt is insignificant compared to the suffering of wild animals, which we do indeed have an ability to minimize. It's not that I want you to feel guilt, I want to you act more ethically. It does no good by proclaiming something moral or immoral if everyone is coming from different metaethical perspectives. So I resort to appealing to universal ethical concepts and asking people to consider why they constrain these concepts to a select few.

I really don't have much use for moral condemnation. I'm interested in presenting an ethical position that I feel should be pursued, by presenting facts and allowing others to come to the same conclusion that I have. This takes the form of an if-then counterfactual. If you abide by equality, then you ought to treat animals with respect (unless you have a good reason, i.e. a constraint, not to).

In your case, this reason seems to be rational self-interest. Yet this does not satisfy the open ended question very well, and especially conflicts with our intuitions that maybe we should focus on the welfare of people instead of merely seeing them as a means to an end for our own purposes. Because that is what rational self-interest egoism entails: that we care for others so long as we ourselves benefit from this. And I cannot be the only one who finds this to be troubling.

So I will say something along the lines of: if you care about suffering, then you will do something about it. This, I take it, is a fact - if you care about something, then you will do something relevant to it. If you don't want to do something about suffering, then you must not care about suffering. And I'll let you figure the rest out for yourself, and come to terms with this. If you don't care about suffering, then so be it. Likewise, if you don't care about equality, then so be it. Just don't pretend you do.

Right, so you are under the framework that what has been done, and what we currently do, is what we ought to continue to do because it's natural and rational, or in our own self-interest.

In other words, comfort is evidence of moral value. If we aren't comfortable with the prospect of giving up our dominion over animals, then by golly it's not important. — darthbarracuda

You just won't deal with my actual arguments, will you?

What we did in the past was often based on flimsy reasoning. Morality was something God told you about. I say that examine some of that closely - in the light of a modern scientific understanding of the principles of natural systems - and you can see why some of those traditional habits were functional, even if they couldn't account for themselves in naturalistic terms.

Today of course we can develop morality based on a proper understanding of natural systems. Which is where we can start to criticise much of how modern society might be organised from a credible basis.

That means I have no patience for your fact-lite PC guilt-tripping. If you want to make credible arguments, establish a proper basis for them.

Yet this is false because we hold many moral beliefs that are not in our best-interest. — darthbarracuda

The argument is that morality reflects the communal best interest.

As if ethics is entirely disconnected from emotion. Because self-interest isn't emotional at its core...? — darthbarracuda

Again, the argument is that morality reflects the communal best interest.

So the bleeding point of it is to transcend your personal feelings about what ought to the case because the very idea of suffering causes you unendurable suffering.

It's not that I want you to feel guilt, I want to you act more ethically. — darthbarracuda

Then give me appropriate reasons.

Personally I find cats delightful and dogs repulsive. Emotionally, the idea of vivisectionists experimenting on kittens is appalling, but beagles don't move me the same way.

And yet I myself say it would be ridiculous to support one rule for kittens, another for beagles, in this regard.

The ability to make this kind of distinction between my emotional preferences and rationally held communal beliefs seems basic to any worthwhile morality.

In your case, this reason seems to be rational self-interest. Yet this does not satisfy the open ended question very well, and especially conflicts with our intuitions that maybe we should focus on the welfare of people instead of merely seeing them as a means to an end for our own purposes. Because that is what rational self-interest egoism entails: that we care for others so long as we ourselves benefit from this. — darthbarracuda

I'll say it again. The systems view is explicit that society is a balance between competitive and co-operative imperatives. We need both to make society work. So there is self-interest in getting my own selfish way, alongside the self-interest in my community flourishing.

Trade-offs are already at the heart of morality. Which is why your black and white thinking seems so hopelessly romantic and out of date.

Today of course we can develop morality based on a proper understanding of natural systems. — Apokrisis

I can't see how that can be anything other than a utilitarian ethos - 'greatest good for the greatest number'. Nor can I see any 'intrinsic good' in naturalism, that compares to (for example) the higher truths in Buddhism, towards which ethical actions are directed.

Today of course we can develop morality based on a proper understanding of natural systems. Which is where we can start to criticise much of how modern society might be organised from a credible basis.

That means I have no patience for your fact-lite PC guilt-tripping. If you want to make credible arguments, establish a proper basis for them. — apokrisis

Yes, but you still have to argue for what the standard should be that we should attempt to strive for.

The argument is that morality reflects the communal best interest. — apokrisis

Yes, but why should we consider communal best interest to be more important than a global community's best interest?

So the bleeding point of it is to transcend your personal feelings about what ought to the case because the very idea of suffering causes you unendurable suffering. — apokrisis

No, it's because no triumph or something silly like that can phenomenally compare to suffering as it is experienced in sentient organisms.

Personally I find cats delightful and dogs repulsive. Emotionally, the idea of vivisectionists experimenting on kittens is appalling, but beagles don't move me the same way. — apokrisis

This is not my argument. My argument is not that we must personally love animals. My argument is that we must treat animals with respect because they deserve it. I've said this many times before, we don't actually have to be animal lovers to recognize this.

Ethics is not about being comfortable or justifying our inherent animalistic dispositions.

I'll say it again. The systems view is explicit that society is a balance between competitive and co-operative imperatives. We need both to make society work. So there is self-interest in getting my own selfish way, alongside the self-interest in my community flourishing. — apokrisis

Oh, certainly we have to have these in place for a certain kind of society to work. But why should this constrain the possibilities?

We obviously have different views as to what constitutes the "good". I am willing to accept this, so long as you are willing to accept that the flourishing of society is not on my list of priorities for reasons I have already stated.

I can't see how that can be anything other than a utilitarian ethos - 'greatest good for the greatest number'. Nor can I see any 'intrinsic good' in naturalism, that compares to (for example) the higher truths in Buddhism, towards which ethical actions are directed. — Wayfarer

And?

My position is that tradititional wisdoms endured precisely because they were utilitarian in this regard. They might invent gods or categorical imperatives of various kind, but this was just post-hoc rationalisation.

Yes, but why should we consider communal best interest to be more important than a global community's best interest? — darthbarracuda

I made that proximity argument at the beginning of this thread.

No, it's because no triumph or something silly like that can phenomenally compare to suffering as it is experienced in sentient organisms. — darthbarracuda

Stuck. Record.

My argument is that we must treat animals with respect because they deserve it. — darthbarracuda

Why do they deserve it? I give the natural reasons. You talk about your emotions.

Oh, certainly we have to have these in place for a certain kind of society to work. But why should this constrain the possibilities? — darthbarracuda

Systems have a logic based on constraints and the freedoms they shape (which are the freedoms needed to energetically reconstruct that prevailing state of constraint).

So the reasons why society has to be that way - global cooperation and local competition - is that it is what works. Marxism, anarchy, flower power, dictatorships, communes - there are plenty of examples of alternatives that didn't work because they did not strike the right balance.

that's the assumption that any naturalistic account will provide, but it is reductionist. 'Everything in service of survival' is what it amounts to.

Why do they deserve it? I give the natural reasons. You talk about your emotions. — apokrisis

No, you also give emotional arguments because you have placed value upon the "natural" state, thus making it susceptible to moral discussion. Nothing discovered under the microscope is inherently moral or valuable - in the absence of any transcendental Good, value comes from the person.

These natural reasons are valuable because you think they are valuable because you have placed value on whatever it is that these reasons uphold.

Systems have a logic based on constraints and the freedoms they shape (which are the freedoms needed to energetically reconstruct that prevailing state of constraint).

So the reasons why society has to be that way - global cooperation and local competition - is that it is what works. Marxism, anarchy, flower power, dictatorships, communes - there are plenty of examples of alternatives that didn't work because they did not strike the right balance. — apokrisis

Right...so because it works, therefore it's moral?

You have jumped the is-ought gap here by implicitly assuming a standard that these reasons uphold. A standard that does not ring true to me at all as being obviously moral.

that's the assumption that any naturalistic account will provide, but it is reductionist. 'Everything in service of survival' is what it amounts to. — Wayfarer

But your claim that it reduces to "survival" is taking a "survival of the fittest" rhetoric overly seriously.

Ecologists and other systems thinkers talk about resilience, richness, flourishing, and even ascendancy, for a reason.

Remember that German natural philosophy (as a precursor to a modern ecological view) was seen as an idealist exercise. And holism and systems science have been more than sympathetic to eastern religion - indeed they fueled transhumanism and other new age cults.

So you are trying to peg me as a scientistic Darwinist. But that's not what I've argued. I began by talking about flourishing rather than surviving for good reason.

No, you also give emotional arguments because you have placed value upon the "natural" state, — darthbarracuda

This is getting very silly.

You have jumped the is-ought gap here by implicitly assuming a standard that these reasons uphold. — darthbarracuda

The is-ought fallacy is your hang-up, not mine.

My argument is that morality is simply an encoding of the organisation by which a social system can persist. And to pretend it is anything more high-falutin' than that is a damaging romantic delusion.

This is getting very silly. — apokrisis

Please respond with an argument and not just a handwave. I have clearly shown to you how your emphasis on "natural-ness" is derived from a prior appropriation of value to a certain standard.

My argument is that morality is simply an encoding of the organisation by which a social system can persist. And to pretend it is anything more high-falutin' than that is a damaging romantic delusion. — apokrisis

You are merely asserting that the anthropological history of morality defines what morality currently is or could be in the future, thus limiting its prospects.

Hence why I am repeatedly said before that your position is inherently affirmative - affirmative of society, affirmative of progress, affirmative of life. While I am coming from a non-affirmative, perhaps negative, perspective, in which morality is not a tool to be used to enhance our ability to survive but rather a truly reflective enterprise meant to overthrow past assumptions based upon a critical analysis of the world we live in.

Please respond with an argument — darthbarracuda

Respond to the argument already made. Don't be a dick.

You are merely asserting that the anthropological history of morality defines what morality currently is or could be in the future, thus limiting its prospects. — darthbarracuda

Or rather I show why its future prospects would be self-limited for the same reasons.

As usual, you just ignore any actual argument I make. For instance, I've said often enough that living within the solar flux vs living off a fossil fuel explosion has produced a historical disjunction in terms of "morality". So the critical question becomes, well, do we like what that results in?

Hence why I am repeatedly said before that your position is inherently affirmative - affirmative of society, affirmative of progress, affirmative of life. — darthbarracuda

I talk about how things actually are. You talk about what you wish them to be.

But that's not what I've argued. I began by talking about flourishing rather than surviving for good reason. — Apokrisis

Sorry I didn't intend to do that. I'm trying to make a more general point about naturalistic ethics. Think about this point. What is the origin of the idea that all humans are of equal worth, that the life of the poor and disabled, is of equal worth to the life of the healthy and productive? Historically that idea originated in the Christian ethos. It might seem natural to us now, but it could be questioned from a utilitarian viewpoint. Furthermore there have been cultures where such an idea does not seem at all natural.

So, what if we're in a situation where resources are seriously scarce - which collectively, I think our culture is going to inevitably face - do we let some people perish, so that others might flourish?

Now I'm not proposing any answer to that question. Nor am I suggesting that making such a drastic decision is an entailment of a naturalist ethos. All I am saying is that the rationale for treating all lives as equal, is not obvious from a utilitarian or naturalist point of view. A utilitarian might convincingly argue that the healthy will benefit a lot more, if freed from the drain of supporting the elderly or disabled. Of course we see that, rightly, as an abhorrent argument. But that is really for reasons of conscience.

And speaking of 'species-ism', surely the fact that we can make such choices is one of the ways in which we differ from other species.

I talk about how things actually are. You talk about what you wish them to be. — apokrisis

Probably because we are able to conceive of realities that are not.

Looks like we're even then!

Looks like we're even then! — andrewk

Not really as what you wrote was self-contradicting and so made no sense to me.

You said: "The discussion was about ethical justifications for treating humans better than animals." And then "Those reasons have nothing to do with ethics."

So I'm baffled what you might mean.

Your comment: "They are simple transactional considerations," did not help explain.

Probably because we are able to conceive of realities that are not. — darthbarracuda

We can easily conceive of things that don't work. I mentioned marxism and flower power as examples. So that doesn't help your case.

So, what if we're in a situation where resources are seriously scarce - which collectively, I think our culture is going to inevitably face - do we let some people perish, so that others might flourish? — Wayfarer

I doubt that "we" would get the choice. And we know the answer. If things get tight, fairness doesn't have a hope.

So the best ethical response is to act in ways that reduce the chance of things getting tight. Then also to start building up resilience in our local communities.

A utilitarian might convincingly argue that the healthy will benefit a lot more, if freed from the drain of supporting the elderly or disabled. Of course we see that, rightly, as an abhorrent argument. But that is really for reasons of conscience. — Wayfarer

But is it abhorrent or is that just the way you currently look at things from a fairly privileged position?

I don't think moral philosophy has any value if it simply takes whatever current PC view of life happens to prevail and then tries to project that on "everyone" at "all times" as the categorial norm. If your morality has no reasoned justification - its simply an endorsement of what one feels - then why even bother with philosophical discussion at all. It is merely propaganda.

We can easily conceive of things that don't work. I mentioned marxism and flower power as examples. So that doesn't help your case. — apokrisis

Just because they don't work doesn't mean they aren't candidates for morality. They don't work, not because they aren't good, but because there's something limiting its instantiation.

Why can't the good be unattainable? Why must we be able to attain the good? Why must the good be constrained to be compatible with our own limitations?

So once again your pragmatism, although being useful for practical, applied ethics, is getting in the way when we talk about theoretical normative ethics. There is no need for the good to correspond to our abilities, because we are able to conceive of scenarios in which there is nothing stopping the instantiation of the good.

Whereas you start out with the assumption that a prosperous civilization is good, I go deeper and ask whether or not a prosperous civilization even is good, and if so, when. Thus your ethics is second-order and assumptively affirmative whereas my ethics is first-order in that it questions the ethics of existence (as it is currently practiced) itself.