He was never concerned with the nature of reality outside of its reflection in the human mind. I wonder what he would write now 100 years later. — TheArchitectOfTheGods
It's not a question of denying a n empirical account of matter and energy, but of showing what underlies the conditions of possibility of models based on objective causality. Heidegger didn't say that matter doesn't 'exist', he says it is the product of a derivative thinking.How would a universe without matter ‘look’ like? — TheArchitectOfTheGods
I think you may have misunderstood the intention of my question, I should have written:It's not a question of denying an empirical account of matter and energy, but of showing what underlies the conditions of possibility of models based on objective causality. — Joshs
Well, he wrote, and that was a literal quote, that the stone does not exist, it is just there (vorhanden). That is what he wrote. And that doesn't make much sense to me, and I hope also not to most others.Heidegger didn't say that matter doesn't 'exist', he says it is the product of a derivative thinking. — Joshs
Well, he wrote, and that was a literal quote, that the stone does not exist, it is just there (vorhanden). That is what he wrote. And that doesn't make much sense to me, and I hope also not to most others. — TheArchitectOfTheGods
If we had a better understanding, we would be close to knowing what this that energy everything consists of is, we knew what the universe is. That is what keeps human philosophy going. Einstein said something indefinitely more meaningful with five symbols than Heidegger did with with all his jumbled grasping at linguistic straws. For scientific and philosophical purposes, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the existence of a stone and existence of a human mind. — TheArchitectOfTheGods
There is no such thing as a specific object like a stone outside of an account of a stone — Joshs
Knowledge is not representation but transformative interaction — Joshs
Heideggers untenable, anthropocentric notion of ‚existence‘:
„Existence is the name for […] human ‚Dasein‘. A cat does not exist, but lives, a stone does not exist and does not live, but ‚is there‘ GA 26,159“. This is not from ‚Being and Time‘ but from a lecture given in 1928. — TheArchitectOfTheGods
Stone is being too. It is being/entity within-the-world (innerweltliches Seiende). — waarala
So therefore this was a reality outside the human mind, which was very real to the pre-human lifeforms that inhabited it. — TheArchitectOfTheGods
Or it can simply remain a innerwordly being? Something not used or observed. — waarala
What is the practical significance of making a claim that rocks existed before there were humans to name them? The question is what we are doing when we name a rock, when we construct a theory about what a rock is. — Joshs
Before there is made a distinction between the tool-being and object-being, there is the absolutely fundamental and primary structure of Care, which is equiprimordial with temporality, Understanding and Befindlichkeit. One never experiences one of these structures without the other . They all imply each other. Heedfully circumspect Handiness, deriving from Care , is the condition of possibility of having a world, and thus of the experience of innerworldly beings. The reason Heidegger puts nature and reality in scare quotes is because such notions are present to hand concepts derived from handiness.he is not reasoning against the possibility of the innerworldly being as such, before there is made a distinction between the tool-being and object-being. — waarala
The same can be said of the natural landscape: mountains etc. i.e "Nature" has here its worldliness not in the practical or theoretical world. — waarala
.historically or traditionally inherited "cultural "objects simply are there and are part of some cultural-historical landscape. — waarala
Something can be practically relevant in a negative sense: "I can't do anything with that". I encounter something here as not to be assimilated to this practical nexus. A being shows itself there as useless *. It is there as something not to be mastered in the practical world. It stands there as an innerworldly being without practical-technical significance. It persists (at least for the time being) "open" as "something" (without any determinations or involvements). In practical understanding it can remain or can be sustained as something yet to be mastered and used (in some other situation in the future). — waarala
No, it stands there conspicuously in its significance for me in relation to my context of activity as something not useful. Handiness isn't the same thing as 'practical' if by practical you mean the narrow sense of the tools I am using right now. Handiness, relevance, Care, heedful circumspection are about a relational totality of meaningfulness in a situation in which I am involved in my world. Things that break, that I cant use in a specific practical context, things that are missing , these are all part of the totality or meaningful relevance of that context, and thus all belong to handiness.It stands there as an innerworldly being without practical-technical significance. — waarala
There has been encountered something that can't be handled practically inside the current relevance-relations — waarala
I think you are intermingling too much the (practical) concern (Besorgen) with the more "general", that is, more original care (Sorge). There can be concern only because there is care but it is not necessary that care will "realize" itself primarily as concern (Besorgen). Dasein's being is Sorge, not Besorgen. Also, I think there can be Care ("basic interest") which cares that something is not done or used! There can be Care that is concerned to keep something not to be encountered as a tool or device (Zeug) (Could this be possible??). — waarala
.where everything has a very specific significance as they are constituting some Work (Werk) to be accomplished. This actually resembles something thoroughly rational and calculated! Everything has its pre-determined place in the teleological system — waarala
It's important to understand first of all that primordial Care for Heidegger, as well as taking care and concern, have nothing to do with ontical sentiments like having a good feeling about someone. One could despise someone and that would still represent for Heidegger a relation of Care and concern for. These terms for Heidegger, like primordial attunement, understanding and temporality, tel us that, as Dasein , each of us are always already in the world of involvement with others. There is no isolated subjectivity for Heidegger that then encounters others. It also seems that you are understanding handiness and 'taking care' in terms of a narrow thinking about praxis, tools , accomplishment and work. — Joshs
Heidegger explains rationality and object are based in propositional subject-predicate statements "Like interpretation in general, the statement necessarily has its existential foundations in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. But how does the statement become a derivative mode of interpretation? What has been modified in it?" Heidegger says predication points something out in a way that we sheerly look at it. By transforming the circumspective 'something "as" something' into 'this subject "as" this object', the 'as' is forced back to the uniform level of what is merely objectively present. It "dwindles to the structure of just letting what is objectively present be seen by way of determination."When we just stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more." Heidegger recognizes the theoretical as an impoverished, 'cut-off' modification of understanding. Ontologically, it originates from and never departs from heedful circumspective relationality. — Joshs
Care (Sorge) could be a reflective dimension "over" the more practical concern (Besorgen). The practical Besorgen is doing concretely this and that in order to attain concretely this and that. Care "thinks" this "in order to" in terms of more far-reaching meaning. — waarala
Yes, I think Heidegger's distinguishing between an authentic and an inauthentic mode of Dasein made it necessary for him to identify an inauthentic modification of Care, which led him to Besorgen.
The authentic and the authentic have a peculiar relationship. On the one hand, one might be tempted to see the former as 'better', more true, than the latter given the way Heidegger talks about the inauthentic in terms of average everydayness and the normativity of das man. But he reminds us throughout the book that this is not his intention: "The inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a "lesser" being or a "lower" degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Da-sein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure." "Not-being-its-self functions as a positive possibility of beings which are absorbed in a world, essentially taking care of that world. Thus neither must the entanglement of Da-sein be interpreted as a "fall" from a purer and higher "primordial condition." Heidegger also cautions that the authentic is not more 'general' that the inauthentic in the sense of an overview. "Da-sein can fall prey only because it is concerned with understanding, attuned being-in-the-world. On the other hand, authentic existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness." — Joshs
What I am confused about is whether, in raising this question, Heidegger is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality, or rather (merely) with the reality of the human experience/condition. That is to say, is Heidegger concerned with what reality is like, in the sense that a physicist can be said to be, or is he concerned with what it is like to be a human being, more in the sense that an existentialist can be said to be? — philosophy
"The theory of relativity in physics does not deal with what time is but deals only with how time, in the sense of a now-sequence, can be measured. [It asks] whether there is an absolute measurement of time, or whether all measurement is necessarily relative, that is, conditioned."
Heidegger is completely wrong abut relativity in general, and space time in particular. Spacetime is a physical reality that is distorted by gravity. This is evident on earth, where two atomic clocks run differently, where one is at sea level, and the other is in plane flying 30,000 feet above. This is called 'time dilation' - and it's a scientifically proven phenomenon. — karl stone
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