We have no idea of what exists that we still have not detected. — Frank Apisa

https://www.space.com/26078-how-many-stars-are-there.html

So there are 1*10^24 stars in the observable universe. God could be anywhere amongst them. So we can't use 'we can't find God' to categorically disprove the existence of God.

Devans99
1.2k

We have no idea of what exists that we still have not detected. — Frank Apisa


https://www.space.com/26078-how-many-stars-are-there.html

So there are 1*10^24 stars in the observable universe. God could be anywhere amongst them. So we can't use 'we can't find God' to categorically disprove the existence of God. — Devans99

Using "we can't find any gods" as proof that gods do not exist...

...is totally illogical.

Agreed. It works the other way around too. The universe is so big, God would never be able to find us.

So you're not proposing something undetectable in principle? Just something we haven't detected yet?

Terrapin Station
8.3k
↪Frank Apisa


So you're not proposing something undetectable in principle? Just something we haven't detected yet? — Terrapin Station

I honestly do not know what you mean by your question, Terrapin.

Here is my position stated for (I think) the third time:

It is absurd to suppose that because humans cannot detect "X"...that "X" does not exist.

It is absurd to suppose that everything that exists...can be detected by humans.

I am not being intentionally obtuse. I just do not know what you means by "something undetectable in principle."

So there's a distinction to be had here:

(1) X is undetectable in principle. In other words, no matter what we ever do, no matter what we ever know, we will never be able to detect x, because there's something about x that makes it inherently outside the realm of any possible interactive experience, even indirectly.

(2) We haven't detected x yet, maybe because we simply haven't yet looked in the right place, or in the right way yet, or maybe there's something we're yet to discover, but that we eventually will discover, that will enable us to detect x.

Terrapin Station
8.3k
↪Frank Apisa


So there's a distinction to be had here:

(1) X is undetectable in principle. In other words, no matter what we ever do, no matter what we ever know, we will never be able to detect x, because there's something about x that makes it inherently outside the realm of any possible interactive experience, even indirectly.

(2) We haven't detected x yet, maybe because we simply haven't yet looked in the right place, or in the right way yet, or maybe there's something we're yet to discover, but that we eventually will discover, that will enable us to detect x. — Terrapin Station

Okay...

...YES.

To both.

It certainly is POSSIBLE that there is an "X" that is undetectable in principle. In other words, no matter what we ever do, no matter what we ever know, we will never be able to detect x, because there's something about x that makes it inherently outside the realm of any possible interactive experience, even indirectly. Humanity (human beings) may cease to exist without ever having detected some "X."

AND...it certainly is POSSIBLE that there is an "X" we humans haven't detected x yet, maybe because we simply haven't yet looked in the right place, or in the right way yet, or maybe there's something we're yet to discover, but that we eventually will MAY discover, that will enable us to detect x.

It certainly is POSSIBLE that there is an "X" that is undetectable in principle. — Frank Apisa

Sure, it's possible that there's an x undetectable in principle, and it's possible that there is no x undetectable in principle. Which one do we go with and why?

Terrapin Station
8.3k

It certainly is POSSIBLE that there is an "X" that is undetectable in principle. — Frank Apisa


Sure, it's possible that there's an x undetectable in principle, and it's possible that there is no x undetectable in principle. Which one do we go with and why? — Terrapin Station

if you want to guess...guess.

If you are asking me to guess...I will flip Mr. Coin. But to what avail?

They are not mutually exclusive...you realize?

They are not mutually exclusive...you realize? — Frank Apisa

Sure they are. It's a simple contradiction. If there's an x that's undetectable in principle, then it can not be the case that there is no x that's undetectable in principle. Again, both are possible.

You suggested that there's an x that's undetectable in principle. You didn't suggest that there's no x that's undetectable in principle. Why? Did you flip a coin?

Terrapin Station
8.3k

They are not mutually exclusive...you realize? — Frank Apisa


Sure they are. — Terrapin Station

Are you saying one is impossible?

Which one is that?

These are possibilities we are talking about. No "possibility" of this sort is mutually exclusive.

If it is possible that X...that presupposes the possibility of not-X. If not, it is a certainty, not a possibility. That is intrinsic to possibility propositions. We are talking about the possibility...not the reality.

It's a simple contradiction. If there's an x that's undetectable in principle, then it can not be the case that there is no x that's undetectable in principle. Again, both are possible. — Terrapin

If one...then not the other. That is the reality.

But we are talking about the POSSIBILITY...not the reality.

Anyway...this is a side-track...uninteresting and immaterial.

You suggested that there's an x that's undetectable in principle. — Terrapin

I did no such thing. I suggested the POSSIBILITY.

You didn't suggest that there's no x that's undetectable in principle. — Terrapin

The POSSIBILITY, Terrapin. THE POSSIBILITY.

Why? Did you flip a coin?

For that?

No reason to flip a coin on that. That is a given.

Unless a thing is established as impossible...it is possible.

Both those things are possible.

Anyway...what is the point of all this?

Are you saying one is impossible? — Frank Apisa

Both are epistemically possible, but if one is ontologically actual, the other is ontologically impossible by virtue of being a contradiction of the other. One has to be ontologically actual.

Terrapin Station
8.3k

Are you saying one is impossible? — Frank Apisa


Both are epistemically possible, but if one is ontologically actual, the other is ontologically impossible by virtue of being a contradiction of the other. One has to be ontologically actual. — Terrapin Station

The possibilities of both exist, Terrapin.

The POSSIBILITY of one...does not negate the POSSIBILITY of the other. In fact, the POSSIBILITY of one just about demands the POSSIBILITY of the other.

It does not follow from the claim that we cannot or have not determined whether gods exist that we should take seriously the possibility that they do exist. Not ruling something out does not mean we should rule it in. There are various reasons why one might want to rule it in, but if I do not find any of those reasons compelling then I have no reason why I should rule it in.

My position is epistemologically agnostic, but with regard to belief I "pistemically" atheist or "apistemic", that is, without belief in gods. I could be wrong, but I do not believe in gods and nothing I do is predicated on their possible existence.

Fooloso4
344
It does not follow from the claim that we cannot or have not determined whether gods exist that we should take seriously the possibility that they do exist. Not ruling something out does not mean we should rule it in. There are various reasons why one might want to rule it in, but if I do not find any of those reasons compelling then I have no reason why I should rule it in.

My position is epistemologically agnostic, but with regard to belief I "pistemically" atheist or "apistemic", that is, without belief in gods. I could be wrong, but I do not believe in gods and nothing I do is predicated on their possible existence. — Fooloso4

There is a difference between "nothing I do is predicated on their possible existence"...and "they do not exist."

You may feel it reasonable to "not take seriously the possibility that they do exist"...BUT the unavoidable fact is that it IS possible that gods exist.

THAT is not even in dispute...and there is no getting around that.

There is a difference between "nothing I do is predicated on their possible existence"...and "they do not exist." — Frank Apisa

Right, that is my point. I make no claims of knowledge, but still hold beliefs on the matter.

You may feel it reasonable to "not take seriously the possibility that they do exist"...BUT the unavoidable fact is that it IS possible that gods exist. — Frank Apisa

The trap one falls into is thinking that it follows from the claim that something is possible, which is to say, not impossible, that this possibility has any bearing on what one does or believes. It is possible that there is a monster under my bed that has the ability to disappear whenever I look for it. It IS possible that it exists, BUT what follows from this?

Fooloso4
345

There is a difference between "nothing I do is predicated on their possible existence"...and "they do not exist." — Frank Apisa


Right, that is my point. I make no claims of knowledge, but still hold beliefs on the matter. — Fooloso4

Which is to say that you make a blind guess one way or the other.

My guess is that your guess is that no gods exist.

You may feel it reasonable to "not take seriously the possibility that they do exist"...BUT the unavoidable fact is that it IS possible that gods exist. — Frank Apisa


The trap one falls into is thinking that it follows from the claim that something is possible, which is to say, not impossible, that this possibility has any bearing on what one does or believes. — F

I certainly do not fall into that.

I am saying IT IS POSSIBLE gods exist...just as it is POSSIBLE that no gods do.

The notion that one it is more likely one way or the other...IS ALSO JUST BLIND GUESSWORK.

It is possible that there is a monster under my bed that has the ability to disappear whenever I look for it. It IS possible that it exists, BUT what follows from this?

Beats me.

But if there are gods...what makes you suppose this places an obligation on you.

Where does that come from?

The possibilities of both exist, Terrapin. — Frank Apisa

Yeah, that's what I said. "Both are epistemically possible."

But only one can be actualized, because they're logically contradictory.

Terrapin Station
8.3k

The possibilities of both exist, Terrapin. — Frank Apisa


Yeah, that's what I said. "Both are epistemically possible."

But only one can be actualized, because they're logically contradictory. — Terrapin Station

At no point had I spoken of the REALITY.

I was talking about the possibilities.

In any case...are you going to give us some idea of what this is all about. What point you are trying to make...and how it impacts on why most people are unwilling to just say "I do not know?"

Which is to say that you make a blind guess one way or the other. — Frank Apisa

I do not make a blind guess unless I take seriously the possibility of the existence of gods. And unless I find some persuasive reason to take seriously the possibility of their existence, I find no reason to rule them in, and so, do not blindly guess about their existence any more than I make a blind guess about the existence of the monster, or any of the countless things I might imagine are possible without any reason to think that they might be actual.

But if there are gods...what makes you suppose this places an obligation on you. — Frank Apisa

Well, it is also possible that the gods do place obligations on us.

The question I am getting at is about the significance of such possibilities. In what way does it matter that it is possible that gods exist? If I take seriously the possibility that there is a monster under the bed I might be fearful. I might not want to get in the bed or out of the bed. But if it does not change anything I do or fear then what difference does it make? If a child is fearful, what do we take seriously, the possibility of the monster or the reality of the fear? Do we act to eliminate the threat of the monster or alleviate the fear?

Sure we're getting there. So the question again is why you were going with "There are some things that are in principle not detectable" over the other possibility. We straightened out that they're both epistemic possibilities. Why are you going with one epistemic possibility over the other?

Fooloso4
348

Which is to say that you make a blind guess one way or the other. — Frank Apisa


I do not make a blind guess unless I take seriously the possibility of the existence of gods. And unless I find some persuasive reason to take seriously the possibility of their existence, I find no reason to rule them in, and so, do not blindly guess about their existence any more than I make a blind guess about the existence of the monster, or any of the countless things I might imagine are possible without any reason to think that they might be actual. — Fooloso4

Well...allow me to help you with that.

I absolutely guarantee that there is the possibility of the existence of gods.

That is 100%. Cannot get any better than that.

You concede there is the possibility of no gods...and with that, you must concede the possibility of gods.

But if there are gods...what makes you suppose this places an obligation on you. — Frank Apisa

Well, it is also possible that the gods do place obligations on us. — F

Yup...possible both ways.

The question I am getting at is about the significance of such possibilities. In what way does it matter that it is possible that gods exist? If I take seriously the possibility that there is a monster under the bed I might be fearful. I might not want to get in the bed or out of the bed. But if it does not change anything I do or fear then what difference does it make? If a child is fearful, what do we take seriously, the possibility of the monster or the reality of the fear? Do we act to eliminate the threat of the monster or alleviate the fear?

If you are telling me there are no gods...or that it is more likely that there are no gods, Fooloso...

...you ARE making a blind guess.

Terrapin Station
8.3k
↪Frank Apisa


Sure we're getting there. So the question again is why you were going with "There are some things that are in principle not detectable" over the other possibility. — Terrapin Station

I didn't.

We straightened out that they're both epistemic possibilities. Why are you going with one epistemic possibility over the other?

It isn't.

So...what is this all about?

Are you stalling for some reason?

I didn't. — Frank Apisa

Then why did you bring it up when I was talking about evidence?

Then why did you bring it up when I was talking about evidence? — Terrapin Station

His point was that it's possible that a god exists, and that, given that we can conceive of an undetectable god, we don't know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist.

Your point about evidence doesn't work as an attempted refutation of his point.

What was the point in you making that point about evidence? That is only of logical relevance to a specified god, and he didn't specify. You did. But why?

His point was that it's possible that a god exists, and that, given that we can conceive of an undetectable god, we don't know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist. — S

We can say that it's possible that a god exists and is undetectable. It's also possible that no god exists and that any existent god would be detectable. Possibility isn't enough then, is it?

We can say that it's possible that a god exists and is undetectable. It's also possible that no god exists and that any existent god would be detectable. Possibility isn't enough then, is it? — Terrapin Station

Logical possibility is sufficient to justify the stance that we don't know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist. That was his point. To argue against that, you'd have to argue that it is logically impossible for there to be an undetectable god. But that argument won't work because it is logically possible for there to be an undetectable god.

Logical possibility is sufficient to justify the stance that we don't know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist. — S

Then logical possibility is sufficient to justify the stance that we do know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist.

In other words, logical possibility would have to be sufficient to justify contradictory claims.

Then logical possibility is sufficient to justify the stance that we do know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist. — Terrapin Station

No it isn't, and saying that makes no sense. If you cannot logically rule out the possibility of the actual existence of god, unspecified, then you aren't justified in claiming that you know that god, unspecified, doesn't exist.

In other words, logical possibility would have to be sufficient to justify contradictory claims. — Terrapin Station

What?