I find the terms moral objectivism and moral subjectivism to be nonsense...unless you can define them for my edification. I would be eternally grateful.

Or maybe a wikilink

It's a minefield. Needs to be kept simple and we need to take small steps. — Banno

No way, let's blow up the MF and see what's leftover.

I think applying them to moral statements - looking for objective morality - is a misuse. Not because there are no objective moral facts, but because morality is not the sort of thing that can be objective.

But that does not imply that it is not something about which we can agree.

That's the error made by folk who think that being objective means being in agreement.

It's a minefield. Needs to be kept simple and we need to take small steps. — Banno

I agree that morality is not the sort of thing that can be objective. Those who think that it is objective are moral objectivists, and I am not a moral objectivist.

Again, you want me to justify my preference for vanilla ice? No? Then why do I need to justify my preference for not committing murder? — Banno

So this is just another semantic disagreement, it seems. I would say that our judgement that murder is wrong is justified by my standard.

And again, it was the meta-ethics that I was saying would need to be justified, not the ethics. It is about the statement, and in what sense it is true, not whether murder is wrong. Some people on this forum seem to muddle up meta-ethics and ethics.

I agree that morality is not the sort of thing that can be objective. Those who think that it is objective are moral objectivists, and I am not a moral objectivist. — S

What about the judeo-Christian ethic that pervades the western world, that seems like an objective morality to me.

What about the judeo-Christian ethic that pervades the western world, that seems like an objective morality to me. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, I'm not so naive.

I find the terms moral objectivism and moral subjectivism to be nonsense...unless you can define them for my edification. I would be eternally grateful. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nah, you can you google it or pick up how they should be used by paying attention to people like me.

Or you can simply dismiss them as nonsense, but you'd be wrong.

Well, I'm not so naive — S

.


Then its possible you don't mind the murder and rape of babies, but for the dominant majority of people living in the western world, they would object simply because they have inherited the judeo-Christian ethic, wittingly or not...Very objective

Then its possible you don't mind the murder and rape of babies, but for the dominant majority of people living in the western world, they would object simply because they have inherited the judeo-Christian ethic, wittingly or not. — Merkwurdichliebe

It's possible that you're an abnormally intelligent octopus hidden away in a secret lab somewhere in Switzerland, but you're not.

It would be silly to believe that, and it would be silly to believe that I don't mind the murder and rape of babies.

Let's not be silly.

Also, the justice system is has scientific precision in determining the morality of a society. That's pretty objective

Also, the justice system has scientific precision in determining the morality of a society. That's pretty objective. — Merkwurdichliebe

Bare assertions about something controversial in philosophy is not an example of doing philosophy well. If you want to argue for moral objectivism, do so properly and in a discussion with that as the topic. I only brought it up here as an example relevant to the topic of the subjective-objective distinction.

...

There is no requirement on this forum to do philosophy well. And how can you do philosophy well without taking the proper digressions.

There is no requirement on this forum to do philosophy well. — Merkwurdichliebe

True, but it should be encouraged.

And how can you do philosophy well without taking the proper digressions. — Merkwurdichliebe

We already have a topic and should stick to it. We have the ability to create separate discussions for a reason. Digressions are never really "proper". They're usually a sign of a lack of focus.

I agree

So back to the topic at hand.

Let's recapitulate, what have we figured out so far..


ABSOLUTELY NOTHING

An excerpt from a Web definition of 'objective'.

1. (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
"historians try to be objective and impartial"
synonyms: impartial, unbiased, unprejudiced, non-partisan, disinterested, non-discriminatory, neutral, uninvolved, even-handed, equitable, fair, fair-minded, just, open-minded, dispassionate, detached, impersonal, unemotional, clinical
"an interviewer must try to be objective"
antonyms: biased, partial, prejudiced
not dependent on the mind for existence; actual.

"a matter of objective fact"
synonyms: factual, actual, real, empirical, verifiable, existing, manifest
"the world of objective knowledge"

Bolds added. ;-)

Certain statements are labeled subjective because they set out an individuals taste or feelings. In contrast, other statements are called objective, as they do not set out an individual's taste, feelings or opinions.

So that I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste.

That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth.

That's an end to it; don't allow the notions of subjectivity and objectivity to take on any more significance.

in particular, don't pretend that there are either only subjective facts, or that there are only objective facts. — Banno

I think a better way of framing this is in terms of subjective and inter-subjective. "That this text is written in English" is an inter-subjective fact, because it can be inter-subjectively confirmed. The only difference between an inter-subjective fact and a purported fact that has not been inter-subjectively confirmed,and which we might want to call 'objective', is that it is yet to be confirmed. But it ought to be, at least in principle, capable of being inter-subjectively confirmed.

You might want to say that there could be purported facts which are thought to have been inter-subjectively confirmed and yet not facts at all (although I can't think of any likely candidates), and that is true in principle since we are not infallible, but it is nonetheless the case that such a purported fact turning out not to be a fact must be on account of a further inter-subjective confirmation. What could it mean to say that what we think of as a fact might not be a fact at all, even though its non-facthood could never be confirmed?

I think this is a classic example of a philosophical problem which dissolves when one looks closely at the language. — Isaac

I don't think this is true.

If one say "anchovies are disgusting" I don't think they are making a claim about anchovies at all, they're making a claim about their state of mind, it just sounds like they're making a claim about anchovies — Isaac

The language is quite clearly the language of objectivity - the intention may not be to make an objective claim, but the language construction is identical to an objective claim.

So "anchovies are disgusting" is just as much an objective claim as "anchovies are fish" because "anchovies are disgusting" means "I don't like anchovies". — Isaac

Of course, if you take it for granted that it is intended that all such apparently objective claims are qualified by the assumed but unspoken "In my view/opinion" then the problem dissolves. But this is quite an assumption and clearly not warranted in all cases when it comes to moral claims.

it seems to me that it's reasonable to describe ostensibly objective claims for which it is believed there is no external (extramental) objective referent as "subjectively true". This has the benefit of reflecting how the term is commonly used.

it seems to me that it's reasonable to describe ostensibly objective claims for which it is believed there is no external (extramental) objective referent as "subjectively true". This has the benefit of reflecting how the term is commonly used. — ChrisH

What would be the subjective truth expressed in the above example "anchovies are disgusting"? Something like 'I find anchovies disgusting'? If so, I would agree that it counts as a subjective truth (when it is true) since it cannot be an inter-subjective truth, because there is no way to inter-subjectively confirm that I don't like anchovies.

What do you think pointing that out achieves? It is objective in the sense that it isn't an opinion, and it is subjective in the sense that the meaning depends on common usage by subjects. — S

Basically, you answered your own question. I felt that the distinction as Banno originally described it was too mutually exclusive when, as you point out, the meaning of a word is objective fact (by virtue of not being anyone's opinion) and subjective by virtue of being entirely mental. Noting determined that 'cat' should mean what it does other than people's opinion that it does. Once determined, however, it is an extramental fact that this is the case.

And you mentioned truth as collective belief. Truth is not collective belief. Collective belief is just collective belief. — S

Truth can instrumentally be collective belief. Personally I don't need any more than that. It is true that bishops move diagonally in chess is entirely a description of the collective belief of chess players.

So, Isaac, I take your point, and contend that while there are cases where our belief brings social institutions into being, those are not the cases to which I was referring. — Banno

Fair enough. To answer your first question, the part I took issue with specifically was "being true does not imply being believed". Obviously, as we have just discussed, this is not universally applicable. In some cases being true absolutely requires that it is believed.

Both funny and salient. — S

I'm glad someone understood the relevance (or maybe everyone did, but thought it unworthy of response)

What would be the subjective truth expressed in the above example "anchovies are disgusting"? Something like 'I find anchovies disgusting'? — Janus

Yes. It's subjectively true for anyone who does find anchovies disgusting.

The language is quite clearly the language of objectivity - the intention may not be to make an objective claim, but the language construction is identical to an objective claim. — ChrisH

Yes, that's the point. Why get tangled in what the language is constructed like? This is classic Wittgenstein, we are impressed by the shape of the grammar, as if it's shape meant something, yet we all know what it means.

Of course, if you take it for granted that it is intended that all such apparently objective claims are qualified by the assumed but unspoken "In my view/opinion" then the problem dissolves. But this is quite an assumption — ChrisH

Not really, it's exactly the sort of presumption required to communicate. If we took every utterance to mean literally what was said without contextual knowledge communication would grind to a halt.

and clearly not warranted in all cases when it comes to moral claims. — ChrisH

I agree with you here, but only insofar as it is not the same presumption.

it seems to me that it's reasonable to describe ostensibly objective claims for which it is believed there is no external (extramental) objective referent as "subjectively true". — ChrisH

But the belief that there is no external referent is in the mind of the speaker, and the description "subjective truth" is applied by a third party. Do you not see the difficulty in having a necessary property of some class being the contents of someone else's mind?

"I prefer...", if stated sincerely, is objectively true - its truth is not dependent on anyone's opinion.
— ChrisH

Isn't it dependent on the opinion of the speaker? — Banno

No it's a statement of fact. I suppose you could argue that all statements of fact are "dependent on the opinion of the speaker". I'm not sure how useful that would be.

I think a better way of framing this is in terms of subjective and inter-subjective. — Janus

It isn't.

"That this text is written in English" is an inter-subjective fact, because it can be inter-subjectively confirmed. — Janus

It doesn't need to be.

A fact is a fact, regardless of confirmation. Confirmation is completely irrelevant.

Suppose I think that one ought keep holy the Sabbath ( I don't).

If Fred comes along and says that we should open up shops on the Sabbath, I might simply say that he is wrong. That does not make my beliefs about the Sabbath any less subjective.

That is, keeping the Sabbath Holy, while not objective, can still determine my attitude towards Fred.

Yeah, that's not as clear as I would like it to be. We are in a culture that has valued objective truths because it seems easier to reach agreement on them. This has led to a devaluation of subjective truths.

Yet it is our attitude towards things that is most important. — Banno

This is very salient, I think, but perhaps I could add this to my list of problems which dissolve if we don't get too tangled in the form of an expression, but focus only on what it does.

One might say "it is immoral to work on the sabbath" and we could easily tie ourselves in knots over the fact that this had the grammatical structure of a truth apt proposition. But it doesn't do what a truth apt proposition does. What saying "it is immoral to work on the sabbath" does, is either to frighten, ostracised or subject the person to whom it is said. Or (in a nicer sense) it publicly declares an intention, in Anscombe's sense, to make the world that way.

The structure of the statement does not in itself carry any philosophical significance.

Truth can instrumentally be collective belief. Personally I don't need any more than that. It is true that bishops move diagonally in chess is entirely a description of the collective belief of chess players. — Isaac

I find that weird, because that isn't truth, that's just treating as truth something which is not truth. It's a bit like treating a phone as a thing which goes "ring ring", instead of a device for calling people. You and Janus are wrong to think of belief in this way. There can be a truth which is not a collective belief nor intersubjectively confirmed, and that it could be intersubjectively confirmed is irrelevant, because it is already a fact by virtue of the way the world is. A genius could discover a truth unknown by the rest of the world.