we are impressed by the shape of the grammar, as if it's shape meant something, yet we all know what it means. — Isaac

But language construction does mean something.

When some people say X is immoral they really don't mean that they personally feel that X is immoral.

Similarly some people apparently believe some works of art really are beautiful (i.e. they don't believe beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder).

The problem here is if you assume all such claims have an implied "In my opinion" attached to them then all such claims become objectively true. I think this would be confusing particularly in the case of moral claims.

But the belief that there is no external referent is in the mind of the speaker, — Isaac

All beliefs are in the mind. Whether or not an external referent exists is objectively true or false. So. no, I don't see any difficulty.

I'm glad someone understood the relevance (or maybe everyone did, but thought it unworthy of response) — Isaac

It could be that they got it, but just decided not to reply. Although I think that some people around here just aren't intelligent enough to distinguish between funny comments with a serious philosophical point, and a simple joke with no serious philosophical point.

Fine then give me an example of an unconfirmed fact and I will believe that you are not speaking through your arse.

There can be a truth which is not a collective belief nor intersubjectively confirmed, and that it could be intersubjectively confirmed is irrelevant, because it is already a fact by virtue of the way the world is. A genius could discover a truth unknown by the rest of the world. — S

I don't disagree with that at all. I'm not saying that truth is intersubjectively confirmed, only that it becomes difficult to talk about truth, in the way we use it without including, in that definition, some things which are intersubjectively confirmed. I'm working from the use of the word out, rather than from the utility in.

So there is a true fact related to the chemical composition of jupiter. This fact is true no matter what anyone thinks about it.

But there also seems to be a true fact related to the meaning (or in this case proper referent) for the word 'cat'. Unlike the last fact, however, the truth of this one is entirely dependent on what people think. If, one day, language evolved such that 'cat' no longer referred to the feline species, then it would no longer be true.

Maybe you're old enough to remember Michael Jackson's 'Bad' album. Although probably not so sudden in 'the hood', here in the leafy suburbs of England, literally overnight the statement "'bad' does not mean something to be admired" stopped being true and became false.

Im just trying to find some language to express that function.

Fine then give me an example of an unconfirmed fact and I will believe that you are not speaking through your arse. — Janus

You must have arse for brains, since that is not necessary. A hypothetical unconfirmed fact is sufficient, and I already gave an example of that. That's an example of something that would be a fact by virtue of the way the world is, not by virtue of your irrelevant and wrongheaded definition of what a fact is. I can easily provide innumerable examples of that.

A hypothetical fact is not a fact any more than a hypothetical thing is a thing. Try again.

A hypothetical fact is not a fact any more than a hypothetical thing is a thing. Try again. — Janus

Yes, a hypothetical fact is not a fact. And missing the point is missing the point. Try again.

But language construction does mean something. — ChrisH

What does it mean then?

When some people say X is immoral they really don't mean that they personally feel that X is immoral.

Similarly some people apparently believe some works of art really are beautiful (i.e. they don't believe beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder).

The problem here is if you assume all such claims have an implied "In my opinion" attached to them then all such claims become objectively true. I think this would be confusing particularly in the case of moral claims. — ChrisH

More confusing than assuming they don't? If some claims do have an implied "in my opinion" why would you treat them all as if they didn't and call them subjective truths. Surely all we've established is that at least some claims of the form "anchovies are disgusting" are not, nor were ever supposed to be, anything other than an objective claim about my state of mind. The sort of thing I would fully expect an fMri scan to confirm. No different to "the grass is green" which I fully expect a spectrometer to confirm. Why is the subject matter of these claims entitling them to a unique class. We don't group all claims about the weather together in one class. Why would we group all claims about mental states into a unique class?

All moral claims that are not relativist already must contain within them a hidden premise in order to overcome Moore's open question, or the is/ought problem. So treating any of them as simple fact claims is definitely wrong. No one is ever claiming "murder is wrong" without also claiming a meta-ethical commitment which then renders the claim as objective as "the grass is green", in meaning.

So, a relativist "murder is wrong" means murder feels wrong to me, an objective report of their mental state which they might reasonably expect to be verified by fMri (should it ever one day be capable)

A divine command theorist "murder is wrong" means there exists a god whose command constitutes wrongness and his command is not to murder. Again, thru fully expect, in the afterlife, to have this verified.

And so on with all moral claims.

So I'm still not seeing why we need a special category of truth for any of this.

So what was the point? I'm not going to do your work for you.

So I'm still not seeing why we need a special category of truth for any of this. — Isaac

I'm not suggesting we do. But it remains the case that the term "subjectively true" is in common use.

I'm just trying to make sense of what might commonly be meant by the term.

I'm just trying to make sense of what might commonly be meant by the term. — ChrisH

I see. I misunderstood your approach as claiming there to be some metaphysical, or ontological significance to the term. If you're just trying to make sense of common use, then yes, I think it is most commonly used to mean 'true, but contingent on a mental state'. But I'm not sure myself how commonly it is used outside of philosophy, which is why I think primarily it is term invented to describe a pseudo-problem arising only from taking normal sentences out of context.

But I'm not sure myself how commonly it is used outside of philosophy, — Isaac

In my experience it's quite common ("subjective" not necessarily "subjectively true").

In my experience it's quite common ("subjective" not necessarily "subjectively true"). — ChrisH

Yes, I most commonly come across that as a pejorative response to a claim which is intended to carry some weight. "Shakespeare is a brilliant writer" might be rejoined with "that's just subjective". To say that it is subjective truth, I think is to either mistake the intention (which was maybe just to say "a lot of people think..."), or to give credit to what is actually a cheap trick to lend authority to a claim. If they actually do mean "Shakespeare is a brilliant writer" without any caveats, then they are just plain wrong, not subjectively right.

The existence of Jupiter does not depend on you or me or anyone else or anyone at all, nor on what we think or perceive or judge and so on. It is objective. — S

But what makes you think that, what makes you arrive at that objective 'fact' or 'truth'?

People have reported seeing some specific shape through their telescope, that they call Jupiter. Maybe yourself have seen that shape through a telescope, and called it Jupiter. People are able to predict where they have to point their telescope to see that shape. People have sent a spacecraft towards that shape and have seen on their screens a specific shape, that they deem to be the shape they call Jupiter shown in greater details.

You say that the existence of Jupiter does not depend on anyone because anyone is seemingly able to see that shape through a telescope as long as some conditions are met (it is night, Jupiter is not below the horizon, the telescope is powerful enough). What you deem to be the proof of the objective existence of Jupiter is that on many occasions people have reported seeing that shape, and that on many occasions people have been able to predict where they have to point their telescope to see that shape. But what this shows precisely is that your proof of the objective existence of Jupiter hinges on the reports of people, it does depend on what people see, or more precisely on what people report they see.

You don't have a proof that Jupiter exists when no one is looking at it. You don't have a proof that suddenly tomorrow people will not stop seeing that shape. What if when they point their telescope tomorrow the shape has disappeared, for no explainable reason, and no one ever sees it again. How would you react then? All that would be left is reports of people who said they saw that shape and now they don't see it anymore.

And at that point you would say that Jupiter has no objective existence any more, it did, but not any more. Would you realize then that you said Jupiter had an objective existence only because many people reported seeing it, and that Jupiter stops having an objective existence when people stop reporting seeing it? Do you then see that what you call the objective existence of Jupiter does depend on people perceiving it?

Or maybe you would say that Jupiter existed objectively, but then an unknown phenomenon that has an objective existence made Jupiter disappear. But then how would you prove that this unknown phenomenon has an objective existence, if the only evidence you ever find is that people simply stopped seeing Jupiter? There again, the 'objective existence" of this unknown phenomenon would hinge solely on the reports of people, on the reports that they perceived Jupiter and they don't anymore.

You may believe that such a thing cannot happen, that something that you deem to have an objective existence cannot possibly disappear without there being any hint of what made it disappear. But what proof do you have that this cannot happen, other than a belief?

Maybe you would then say that Jupiter was a shared hallucination, that it didn't really exist objectively, but then the consequence is that there was no way to make a difference between an objective existence and a shared hallucination.

. If they actually do mean "Shakespeare is a brilliant writer" without any caveats, then they are just plain wrong, not subjectively right. — Isaac

I've always taken the "it's subjective" response as just another way of saying they're plain wrong if they think there's an objective fact of the matter.

In what way does "The cat is on the mat" set out the speaker's feeling or taste? — Banno

But do you realize that subjectivity includes perception itself and not just feeling or taste? A simple example is that there are people who are visually blind, they perceive things very differently. Among people who are not visually blind, we do not agree on everything, some people see a thing as green while others call it blue, some see a thing as orange while others call it yellow. Various people see various shapes when looking at a cloud.

Now, "I believe that the cat is on the mat" sets out an opinion, and hence is subjective. But "The cat is on the mat" and "I believe that the cat is on the mat" express quite distinct things. — Banno

In what way are the two different? To me there's only a difference in the strength of the belief, "I believe that the cat is on the mat" expresses that I may be mistaken, while "The cat is on the mat" expresses that I'm certain I'm not mistaken.

I think that there is some philosophical over-thinking in your approach. I do not think that we would only call a fact objective if people agree about it. I can see no reason why there can't be something that is true, and yet believed false by most folk. I's not hard to think of historical examples. — Banno

But the fundamental problem is how do you determine that something is true? You refer to historical examples, but all they show is that there are things that used to be believed false that are now believed true, that doesn't show in any way that some time in the future they won't possibly be believed false again. Truth appears as shared beliefs of an era.

Today many people laugh when they are told the Sun revolves around the Earth. To them it's obvious that the Earth revolves around the Sun, it's the 'truth'. But how did they arrive at that truth? Often it's simply what they were taught in school, what they read in books, they didn't check the reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the Earth revolves around the Sun, they don't know the assumptions at the basis of the reasoning, but still to them it's obviously true that the Earth revolves around the Sun. Just like for many it used to be obviously true that the Sun revolves around the Earth.

Truth appears as something obvious. Much like beliefs. When we believe it it's obviously true. When we believe the contrary it becomes obviously false. As if there was no fundamental difference between truth and belief. Beliefs change, and with it what we consider to be truth. Sometimes people have conflicting beliefs, sometimes a minority has beliefs that they see as truth, against the majority. Then if the minority manages to convince the majority to change their beliefs, these new beliefs are then seen as truth by the majority. Then we say that the minority was right and the majority was wrong, but the only thing that happened is that the majority adopted the beliefs of the minority, they changed their beliefs and with it changed what they see as obvious.

So what was the point? I'm not going to do your work for you. — Janus

What part of what I originally said don't you understand? I don't have any "work" to do, because I don't need to provide an actual example. A hypothetical example is sufficient. For example, if there's a particular galaxy in a particular location in space that no one is currently aware of, then that would be an example of a fact that is not intersubjectively confirmed. Facts don't need to be intersubjectively confirmed to be facts.

The form of any proposition is either sound or symbols, neither of which has any meaning in itself. Any meaning a proposition has is assigned. No assignment, no assigner, no meaning.

No one has yet defined "meaning." Maybe for the sake of argument we should. — tim wood

I have defined meaning as the relationship between cause and effect. What words mean, are what the author intended, and author's are influenced by the language they learn and their skill with using that language.

Every causal relationship has meaning. We don't assign meaning, we discover it.

Now, "I believe that the cat is on the mat" sets out an opinion, and hence is subjective. But "The cat is on the mat" and "I believe that the cat is on the mat" express quite distinct things. — Banno

Not that distinct. One is about the cat, and the other is about your belief. Both are objective aspects of the world that we can talk about. Is it true that you have beliefs? Is it true that a cat is on the mat? Are both of these things true independent of how people feel about them?

I think that there is some philosophical over-thinking in your approach. I do not think that we would only call a fact objective if people agree about it. I can see no reason why there can't be something that is true, and yet believed false by most folk. I's not hard to think of historical examples. — Banno

Sure, this would be pleading to the authority and isn't what I mean when I say that objectivity is something everyone believes. What I mean is that everyone CAN believe it if stripped of all subjectivity (like emotional attachments to beliefs), and given the same evidence (just the facts, ma'am). This is what the prosecution and defense do in a courtroom in trying to sway the jury to see their side of things. What does the evidence support? What is the logical conclusion given the evidence?

When we think we are being objective but find out we were wrong, the reasons we find that we were wrong was because we were being more subjective and less objective. We were missing information, lied to, or committed a logical fallacy, like pleading to authority.

It's an objective truth in the relevant sense. — S

What's the relevant sense? "A truth about an objective state of affairs"? If that's what we're saying it's fine, but we need to be careful with how we're talking, because usually <adjective><noun> implies that the adjective is a property of the noun. For example "cotton shirt"--that implies that the shirt has the property of being made out of cotton. So we shouldn't be surprised when someone reads "objective truth" so that we're claiming that truth can have the property of being objective. But truth can't have that property. However, if "objective truth" is a loose way of saying "A truth about an objective state of affairs" that's fine . . . it's just a bit sloppy linguistically for doing philosophy.

No, because that's just what meaning, generally speaking, is. — S

That's just another way of trying to sneak an argumentum ad populum in the back door. Argumentum ad populums are fallacious. Things that most people say or do are only relevant to the question of "What do most people say or do?" There's no other implication to it.

While it is true that some philosophers use these meanings, I think it causes more fog than clarity. — Banno

What would be an example or two of that (of it "causing more fog than clarity") in your view?

So, if meaning is not objective, it is subjective, a question of taste or opinion. — Banno

If this is the sort of fog you're referring to, it's simply a matter of you not being able to read what I'm writing with a definition that I just made explicit and that you even commented on. That's not something problematic with the definition. The problem is the inability to remember and apply the definition in context. I'm not saying anything like "meaning is just a question of taste or opinion."

Moreover, if meaning is a metal phenomena, then it happens in each mind, independently; and you and I can never talk about the very same thing. — Banno

We can never have the very same meaning. That's the case even if meaning is objective, insofar as our individual relationships (perception if it's objective, cognition, use, etc.), our individual interactions with it would go. This doesn't imply that we can't talk about the same thing. Our pointing is not identical to what we're pointing to. Meaning would be our pointing--our individual fingers. And indeed, you and I can not have the same fingers. But what we're pointing to can be the same thing.

That strikes me as wrong. Meaning is shared. Indeed, I think it better not to talk about meaning at all, but instead to look at what is being done with the sharing of words. Sentences (propositions, for Terrapin) are not mere mental phenomena. — Banno

"Meaning is shared" is what is wrong. No mental phenomena are literally shared in any sense. We share words in the "show and tell sense," yes. We don't share words in the "My word is literally, logically identical to your word" sense--which is a matter of what side we take in the nominalism vs. "realism" (realism on universals/types in other words) debate. I'm a nominalist. Maybe you're a realist (on universals) . . . and that would be a worthwhile thing for us to talk about in a different thread, rather than us starting so many threads where we wind up talking about the same handful of things over and over.

Sentences, as text strings, ordered sound waves, etc. are not mental phenomena. Propositions, which are NOT identical to sentences, are mental phenomena, because propositions are the meanings of the sentences that can be true or false. (Propositions are not the meanings of other sorts of sentences.)

There are good reasons in analytic philosophy for all of these distinctions (sentences vs statements vs propositions, etc.) Simply not wanting to learn them doesn't help you understand any of this stuff.

I'm lost here because I am not sure what "the relation in question" is. — Banno

Aside from the fact that I've explained my truth theory a bunch of times in different threads here, the post you're responding to explains that it's "a judgment about that meaning [of a proposition] and its relationship to something else." The something else, as I've explained many times, depends on the truth theory the individual in question adheres to (at least on the occasion in question). It can be correspondence to some state of affairs, coherence with some set of propositions, etc.

My suspicion is that for you truth and belief are pretty much the same, and hence, since opinion is subjective and belief is opinion, that truth is opinion and hence truth is subjective...

But I might be wrong. — Banno

How about reading the posts that you're responding to? That gives you the answer instead of having to make stuff up. If you don't understand what I write, I'd be happy to explain it to you if you'd a bit more humbly/respectfully inquire about it rather than wanting to argue with it and "win" despite it being obvious that you're not absorbing what I'm writing.

If you came across a group of folk who used "cat" to only refer to what most of us call "dogs," — Banno

Why a group, though? Wouldn't an individual be sufficient?

What's the relevant sense? — Terrapin Station

Banno's sense, otherwise you're just talking past him. And he could have hardly made it any clearer. He said: "That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth".

That's just another way of trying to sneak an argumentum ad populum in the back door. Argumentum ad populums are fallacious. Things that most people say or do are only relevant to the question of "What do most people say or do?" There's no other implication to it. — Terrapin Station

You don't properly understand what is and what is not an argumentum ad populum fallacy, so I dismiss what you say.

I felt like writing something similar, but I didn't care enough to make the effort. I would think something so obvious would be recognized by anyone with 2 shits for brains, but go figure.

Anyway, excellent point.

You don't properly understand what is and what is not an argumentum ad populum fallacy — S

What is the "proper" understanding?

Banno's sense, otherwise you're just talking past him.  — S

Banno, what is the sense you are getting at?

the nominalism vs. "realism" (realism on universals/types in other words) debate. I'm a nominalist. Maybe you're a realist (on universals) . . . and that would be a worthwhile thing for us to talk about in a different thread — Terrapin Station

Good idea.

it may seem obvious to you that there are unconfirmed hypothetical facts, and there indeed may be, but as I said earlier they will only become actual facts when confirmed. The idea of a fact which could never be confirmed in principle is incoherent. So, facts and confirmation are inextricably tied.