Naming and Necessity is an extended argument against the theory that a name refers in virtue of an associated description.
I think the argument is successful
He is explicit that although he presents a causal chain as an alternative, this theory is of secondary import to the rejection fo the description theory.
I don't see a problem ins simply accepting that names refer, without further explanation. It's just what we do with names. Their use. — Banno
This, I think, goes some way towards assailing ↪fdrake's worries about the Clark-Superman example. Indeed, to some people the different names may carry different information and thus suggest different courses of action (though not to everyone, obviously: if Lois already knows that Clark is Superman, in most contexts it would be indifferent for Batman to tell her that Clark is looking for her or that Superman is looking for her). But this is not a semantic property of the name, so it doesn't tell against Kripke's points. Note that this is also not a "quietist" stance: there may well be a valuable theory to be developed about how semantics interact with cognitive psychology, or even a more general science of information. It just won't be a theory about semantics. — Nagase
You also asked about semantic content. As I said, the semantic content of an expression is its contributions to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it appears. My contention is that the semantic content of a name just is the referent of the name, since that is what contributes to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it appears. — Nagase
I'm not entirely sure what you are calling "behavioral regimes", but I think it's entirely clear that they are contingently associated to the referent. Clark Kent needed not be a journalist. Consider: DC had a nice line of comics that mimicked Marvel's "What if..." series. In one of those, the rocket containing baby Kal-El did not land in Kansas, but rather near Gotham. So Kal-El was adopted by Thomas and Martha Wayne, instead of Jonathan and Martha Kent. There, he was called "Bruce Wayne" (though, obviously, he wasn't Bruce Wayne, since Bruce Wayne didn't exist in that world, as Thomas and Martha Wayne didn't have a biological child there) and never became a journalist. Still, he was Clark Kent, which is why we can truthfully say (or rather, would truthfully say if those were real people and not fictional characters) "Clark Kent might have been a millionaire in Gotham and never have become a journalist".
after the initial dubbing by an individual, other people intend to use the name to refer to whatever was dubbed by that individual. It is this intention to refer to the same thing that ensures that reference is transmitted — Nagase
What matters is that I intended to use the name to refer to the person referred by whoever it was I picked the name from. — Nagase
Similarly, this also answers the problem raised by ↪Janus
, that a speaker may use descriptive information in tracking down the reference of a name. Indeed, that may very well be the case (and Kripke does address this in his book), but it is totally irrelevant to the semantics of the name. Notice also that in many cases the speaker may not have any descriptive information that allows this tracking: for instance, consider myself. I am shamefully ignorant of Gell Mann. The only thing I know about him is that he is an excellent physicist. But this is not enough for me to distinguish him from, say, Einstein. Yet I still may have true beliefs about Gell Mann (e.g. that he is an excellent physicist), and may refer to him in conversations, for instance by requesting more information about him. But this reference cannot be done via descriptive means, since the only descriptive information I have of Gell Mann is that he is an excellent physicist, and if this was the information used by me to refer to him, I could be referring to Einstein, and not Gell Mann, when I say that "Gell Mann is an excelent physicist". In fact, notice that I may not even have any descriptive information about a person, only non-descriptive information (say, of the perceptual kind) and still be able to refer to a person. So reference cannot be tied to descriptive information (and this even in cases in which the reference was first established by description). — Nagase
Contrary to Russell, I think we succeed in thinking about things in the world not only through the mental residue of that which we ourselves experience, but also vicariously, through the symbolic resources that come to us through our language. (...) I may apprehend you by (more or less) direct perception. I may apprehend you by memory of (more or less) direct perception. And finally, I may apprehend you through a sign that has been created to signify you. — David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, p. 604
The notion that a referent can be carried by a name from early past to present suggests that the language itself carries meanings, and thus that we can acquire meanings through the instrument of language. This frees us from the constraints of subjectivist semantics and provides the opportunity for an instrumental use of language to broaden the horizons of thought itself. — David Kaplan, ibid., p. 603
This?I don't agree the argument is successful for the reasons i already gave. — Janus
if memory serves Kripke speaks as though reference is completely independent of description. But, if the referrers along that historical chain of reference do not personally know the person they are referring to, then the only way they could have known who it is they intended to refer to is via description, or so it seems to me. — Janus
You haven't attempted to address the problem I highlighted: that anyone who is not visually acquainted, either in person or via image or film, with the referent, will necessarily rely on description to ascertain who is being referred to. — Janus
And finally, I may apprehend you through a sign that has been created to signify you. — David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, p. 604
Kripke clearly shows that reference can occur in the absence of definite descriptions. — Banno
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