I don't know, what if I said I predicted you were going to make a post defending nothingness instead of experience?What if I said I predicted this idea was going to be brought forward? — schopenhauer1
I would like to know where this "mission" comes from? — schopenhauer1
Given that actualizing nothingness is a metaphysical impossibility, I’d say that the quote-unquote mission is there because there is no other way—metaphysical or otherwise—of alleviating existential suffering at large than via increased understanding. — javra
I’m thinking at the margins, not the whole pie. It’s the decision of the individual. For example, one persons meat eating dies or negate another’s veganism. — schopenhauer1
As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species. — javra
Just add in “mystical unquantifiable mix of the two” of you want. I’ll allow it. — schopenhauer1
I’m at the level of individual actor decisions to not bring another existence into the world, not existence of sentient beings as a whole. — schopenhauer1
(I also have an idea similar to Javra's maybe, that people aren't brought from nothing into the world, its more like a redistribution of consciousness, so antibatalism wouldn't work anyway, but I can't really argue that. ) — csalisbury
I'm in good company then. :grin: I often enough feel the same way, but haven't been able to find a stringent argument for it. — javra
Heidegger, Nietzsche and various post structuralist thinkers point to the approach to nothingness within the history of Western metaphysics as being dominated by presence, truth , immediacy and plenitude. In order to maintain this privileging , whatever threatens this dominance in the from of negation, nihilism and nothingness ,must be treated as accidental and secondary. As an example, negation is only a means to a positive end for Hegelian dialectics. Post-structuralism instead identifies the nothing as a positive meaning co-defining particular contexts of experience. They wouldn't say that achieving nothingness is impossible, rather that we do it all the time, as we transition between regions of meaning. The point is that invoking nothingness, in the traditional sense, as an alternative to being is unknowingly embracing a certain kind of being. It's not that we can't get what we want when we desire the nothing, but that longing for the nihil is just as much an active engagement with meaningfulness as desiring anything else, because the nothing always manifests itself as a certain kind of substantive within meaningful contexts.Without the just stipulated premise being evidenced false, the longing for nothingness holds the exact same properties as the longing to arrive at the planet’s horizon. It can’t be done. Not that it’s inconceivable; it is—as evidenced by our ability to understand the concepts. It’s just that it’s metaphysically impossible and, hence, a complete falsehood. — javra
It's not that we can't get what we want when we desire the nothing, but that longing for the nihil is just as much an active engagement with meaningfulness as desiring anything else, because the nothing always manifests itself as a certain kind of substantive within meaningful contexts. — Joshs
So thinking is an error of abstraction. — javra
Consider that a person yearning to reach the horizon will also live a meaningful life in so yearning—this while reaching the horizon is a physical impossibility. Hence, just because a concept is meaningful does not then imply that its referent is real or, hence, obtainable. — javra
There are alternative ways of thinking about being. Instead of the easily conceived dyadic categories of being and nonbeing one could, for example, present the two extremes of a complete chaos of being and a complete order of being — javra
So thinking is an error of abstraction. — javra
Isn't it the reverse, abstraction is an error of thinking, or are you regarding thinking as an abstraction in this case? — Merkwurdichliebe
I just think it relevent to point out that the dialect of order/chaos is qualitatively and categorically different than the dialectic of being/nonbeing. — Merkwurdichliebe
Or was your reply one of dry funniness? — javra
There is no sufficient reason known to mankind as to why there is existence rather than nothingness. Given this, then neither can there be any presently known sufficient reason for why there someday will be nothingness rather than some form of existence. Reasoning not composed of valid reasons is commonly considered irrational. Again, the reality of nothingness is conceivable but, I so far think, cannot be established. This despite many treating it as an established metaphysical fact. — javra
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