But then I am forced to consider why evolution would develop such a redundant mechanism as emotion to begin with. — Merkwurdichliebe

It's pretty shocking to call emotion redundant.

From a reductionist position (which science is generally inclined toward) it is perfectly non-shocking to view emotions as redundant if we’re looking at events as part of causal chain without applying emotional weight to them - again the mainstay of the scientific endeavor; to distance the gathering of data from emotional interpretations).

From a reductionist position (which science is generally inclined toward) it is perfectly non-shocking to view emotions as redundant if we’re looking at events as part of causal chain without applying emotional weight to them - again the mainstay of the scientific endeavor; to distance the gathering of data from emotional interpretations). — I like sushi

That's very different to how I interpreted the statement. To state that emotions are redundant is to suggest that they have no function, serve no purpose, are of no use or benefit. And this was in the context of evolution. That seems obviously wrong on scientific grounds. Think fight or flight, social hierarchies, building relationships, dominance, courtship, survival, and so on.

Sometimes I wonder whether people here are reading the same thing that I'm reading. Here is what I was responding to:

"But then I am forced to consider why evolution would develop such a redundant mechanism as emotion to begin with".

That is a shocking thing to say.

Let's just look at some information on the amygdala, which is part of the limbic system in our brain:

Amygdala

The amygdalas are two almond-shaped masses of neurons on either side of the thalamus at the lower end of the hippocampus. When it is stimulated electrically, animals respond with aggression. And if the amygdala is removed, animals get very tame and no longer respond to things that would have caused rage before. But there is more to it than just anger: When removed, animals also become indifferent to stimuli that would have otherwise have caused fear and even sexual responses.

What can I say ... I decide on charity of interpretation here and there. In the sense I mentioned it is a justifiable claim to say that emotions serve no functionality anymore than it would be to say that consciousness serves no purpose - you’ll find that a number of neuroscientists have quite different ideas regarding the mechanisms of brain functions. Koch and others would likely side with idea that emotions are merely something akin to steam from the engine as with the same view of consciousness. Also, that Aussie dude (philosopher of mind geezer), Chalmers? Chambers? set up such musings in the zombie problem. Dennett put forward Mary in her room too in regards to the phenomenon of sense experiences. Gazzaniga would say dogs don’t have a theory of mind either.

I don’t believe emotions are “redundant” yet I wouldn’t go so far as to say they are certainly “functional,” as in anything more than an effect rather than affect.

When you think about it the “shocking” part is to suggest ‘evolution’ has some developmental idea, and the scary thing in disregarding this is to assume the “shit happens” idea thus presenting us with little more than a sequence of causal events of no consequence from one to the other - hence the profound modern “attraction” of a more nihilistic and anarchic approach to the experience of being; a fatalism that stalls meaning.

if we’re looking at events as part of causal chain without applying emotional weight to them - again the mainstay of the scientific endeavor; to distance the gathering of data from emotional interpretations). — I like sushi

If part of the phenomena we're looking at is emotional, then we shouldn't dispense with the emotional aspects, or we're not really doing science at all. Science's aim is to look at what is and to account for it, develop theories about it, etc.

The data is data. How we feel about us irrelevant. That’s all I was saying. The aim of the scientist is to approach the data free of emotional bias.

I was being charitable to whathisname and then merely stated that experts in this field have different approaches that would, to some degree, back up the proposition that emotions are “redundant” if viewed through an emotional lens - this is the modern problem of psychology and something Husserl was primarily concerned with regarding the idea of developing a subjective science in order to deal with such problems. A “science of consciousness,” not to undermine the objective value of science though.

From a reductionist position (which science is generally inclined toward) it is perfectly non-shocking to view emotions as redundant if we’re looking at events as part of causal chain without applying emotional weight to them - again the mainstay of the scientific endeavor; to distance the gathering of data from emotional interpretations). — I like sushi

Emotions are for regulating energy expenditure appropriately to circumstances and are not all all redundant. They would be redundant if we didn’t have biological bodies, or maybe just our specific biology, to support our brains. How’s that for nonemotional reductionism.

it's only biology that makes judgments, or that formulates and applies concepts. — Terrapin Station

It cannot do this without some variety of order, similar to the way a computer is nonfunctional without software.

If the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other were asked, it would be insufficient to identify the hardware alone. For one thing, it couldn’t account for the variety of protocols that various computer networks may use.

The data is data. How we feel about us irrelevant. That’s all I was saying. The aim of the scientist is to approach the data free of emotional bias. — I like sushi

Science provides only analytical data. The interpretation of what that data means is not science, it is speculation. Speculation is necessary for forming new hypotheses and theories that further scientific investigation, but it cannot be consider a scientific fact until it is sufficiently tested, in which case, it is no longer speculation.

Because scientific analysis requires empirical verification, it becomes necessary to reduce its subject matter to that which is objectively quantifiable, and ignore anything that is not. This makes the sphere of metaphysical subjectivity (consciousness, intellect, emotion) inaccessible. Either that, or else the entire category of subjectivity has to be redefined into terms of objectivity. So it is correct to say emotion is redundant insofar as it pertains to scientific facts.

Yet, just because subjectivity can be considered scientifically irrelevent, does not mean it has no importance elsewhere. I might argue that emotional existence is of supreme importance for the individual subject who directly experiences it, even more important than any degree of knowledge he can obtain through scientific investigation.

I had no intentions of shocking, but I'm glad I did.

It has to be if we're trying to say that since A causes or is a cause of B, then A is the source of B. "The source of" is another way of saying "Where it comes from" or "Where it originates", "Where it arises from" or "What is B properties of." If A causes/is a cause of B, but A isn't identical to B, then we don't actually have B yet when we have A, so naming A doesn't tell us where/what/how B happens to be. This is actually because something else has to be necessary for B--some other substance, and/or process and/or context, etc. If that weren't the case, then A would be identical to B. — Terrapin Station

I cant say that makes much sense to me.
I know you do not like breaking down posts line by line, me neither though it seems it would be appropriate here, so maybe we can just do one thing at a time. So, this:
The chemicals on the end of the match (and their relevant processes of course, I don’t see the necessity in worrying about the specifics here) causes the flame. You disagree with this because there must be a connection of some kind between the flame and the match head, and there isnt otherwise we wouldnt differentiate between the match and the flame in the first place. Is that right?

If the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other were asked, it would be insufficient to identify the hardware alone — praxis

Brains aren't dead, static things. They undergo processes. The processes that amount to moral judgments/preferences occur in brains, and only in brains. Conflating influences, preconditions, etc. with what they're influences on or preconditions of is simply--and rather ridiculously--sloppy.

The chemicals on the end of the match (and their relevant processes of course, I don’t see the necessity in worrying about the specifics here) causes the flame. You disagree with this because there must be a connection of some kind between the flame and the match head, — DingoJones

No, I disagree because the processes aren't optional. You do need to worry about including everything. Philosophy doesn't work well half-assed. We need to be precise, complete (at least sufficiently), etc.

In addition, as I said, causes can't be identical to what they cause unless you want to say that something can cause itself. Normally we say that there are causes and effects, and the two aren't identical, as that wouldn't make much sense re making a between between causes and effects.

The processes that amount to moral judgments/preferences occur in brains, and only in brains. — Terrapin Station

The processes of ethical judgement do indeed occur in the mind, but the source of morals cannot be adequately explained if we ignore the context (influences, preconditions, etc.) in which ethical judgments are formed. If we exclude the context in which moral judgements are formed, they cannot be explained as anything but caprice - qua. more of an aesthetic assessment.

You're not going to ignore that other stuff if you're explaining them, sure, but we shouldn't move on to explaining them if we can't even identify what they are/where they occur. Explaining them more broadly is a more advanced topic that we shouldn't move on to until we've mastered the basics. And no matter what we do, they're fundamentally "caprice."

explaining them more broadly is a more advanced topic that we shouldn't move on to until we've mastered the basics, and no matter what we do, — Terrapin Station

That is a matter of opinion whether or not knowledge proceeds from the universal to the particular, or the reverse. I would surmise it is a combination of both, and it would be an error to be committed to proceeding only one way.

and no matter what we do, they're fundamentally "caprice." — Terrapin Station

If true, then there is no room for individual responsibility in regards to the ethical.

It's about social interaction, and social interaction influences it, but the social realm can't literally have moral stances, because we can't have moral stances in lieu of meaning, in lieu of behavioral preferences, etc. And those things only obtain as mental phenomena. There is no social mind — Terrapin Station

What do you mean by this? As far as I can see ALL moral issues are about how individuals should treat other individuals; this to me clearly suggests ethics concerns how one must live among others - a social/communal context.

So, if you found yourself in that scenario, you wouldn't try to resolve one of the most famous moral dilemmas of all time: whether to be, or not to be? — S

This isn't a moral dilemma exactly. It's an existential question based on weighing the happiness/pain in one's life. How this question concerns you isn't about morality. However, if the answer to the question makes you decide on how to treat other people it becomes a moral issue.

If nothing else, we inherit a specific, historically embedded morality from the society into which we are born, we which must take into account.

No, I disagree because the processes aren't optional. You do need to worry about including everything. Philosophy doesn't work well half-assed. We need to be precise, complete (at least sufficiently), etc. — Terrapin Station

It isnt really relevant, the chemicals on the end of a matchstick, the chemical process, whatever details you want to include. Doesnt matter, I just mean the cause, whatever you want that to entail. It illustrates the way I think about it regardless.
Sufficiently complete as you say.

In addition, as I said, causes can't be identical to what they cause unless you want to say that something can cause itself. Normally we say that there are causes and effects, and the two aren't identical, as that wouldn't make much sense re making a between between causes and effects — Terrapin Station

Ya, I agree that the two are not identical. That makes no sense to me either. What I do not understand is why you think a cause must be identical to what it causes. Your explanation seems circular and I do not see an answer to my questions in it.

So far...we agree?

If the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other were asked, it would be insufficient to identify the hardware alone
— praxis

Brains aren't dead, static things. They undergo processes. The processes that amount to moral judgments/preferences occur in brains, and only in brains. Conflating influences, preconditions, etc. with what they're influences on or preconditions of is simply--and rather ridiculously--sloppy. — Terrapin Station

Both brains and computers process information. The processes that amount to computer networks of cooperative interaction occurs in computers, and only in computers.

Computers are certainly not as dynamic as brains but they’re not static, at least in the sense that they do the same basic thing that brains do, which is take in data and process it for some purpose.

If you were asked what the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other is, would you identify the hardware alone?

we shouldn't move on to explaining them if we can't even identify what they are/where they occur. — Terrapin Station

Because an inadequate identification would result in an inadequate explanation.

And we can't find an adequate identification, because that would require an adequate explanation of what what and where they are.

Because an inadequate identification would result in an inadequate explanation. — praxis

You aren't able to correctly/adequately identify moral stances, moral judgments, etc. if you're placing them outside of minds.

If you were asked what the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other is, would you identify the hardware alone? — praxis

I don't think that's really what you want to ask me, because "interact cooperatively" is irrelevant to whether we're talking about hardware alone.

I'll explain why: in my view, the hardware/software distinction is only a conceptual abstraction. It's not real/it doesn't correlate to any objective distinction that holds water. The world is comprised of material in dynamic relations. There isn't anything that's not material and there's no material not in dynamic relations with other material. So everything is both "stuff" and processes. Software is material in dynamic relations, and so is hardware. It's the same thing. Hardware and software are just different ways of looking at the same thing, different abstractions that we make.

Focusing on "interacting cooperatively" is wanting to ask me whether we can talk about just one computer, basically. The hardware/software distinction, with respect to what I think that is ontologicaly, is irrelevant to that. Obviously we can't talk about just one computer when we talk about them interacting cooperatively, because we've stipulated in our ask that we're not talking about just one computer.

When we talk about moral whatever, qua moral(ity), though, we're not stipulating something that's interactive, and in fact, the moral part, qua what it is to be moral, is not interactive, even though it's about interacting. Here another rudimentary mistake is being made: conflating something with what it's about. It's basically the use/mention conflation. Use and mention are not the same thing.

What I do not understand is why you think a cause must be identical to what it causes. — DingoJones

I don't. What I kept pointing out was that they're not identical, so we can't conflate the two. That was the whole point. If we're going to talk about morality then, talking about something that causes it isn't sufficient, because the cause isn't identical. I think what came across as confusing is that I said, "If you want to consider cause x to be identical to phenomenon y that we're talking about, then you need to do so and so."

Another confusion here might be over the word "source." "Source" isn't "cause." "Source" is where something starts, as itself. For example, the source of a river isn't what causes a river. It's where the river starts, as the river in question.

If we wanted to just ask, "List some contributing causes to morality" we probably should have asked that. And if people want to focus on that, then we should probably be explicit that that's what we're doing.

Here are some contributing causes to morality in that sense:

The big bang
The formation of the Earth
The presence of water on the Earth

Etc. (and there are important illustrative reasons why I'm listing such things as causes, including that we're not at all tackling the issue of just how temporally or logically contiguous any proposed cause is)

What do you mean by this? As far as I can see ALL moral issues are about how individuals should treat other individuals; this to me clearly suggests ethics concerns how one must live among others - a social/communal context. — TheMadFool

I'm talking about what morality is ontologically. Where it occurs, what it's a property of, etc.

"All moral issues are about . . . " isn't focused on that.

The distinction is similar to the use/mention distinction.

If true, then there is no room for individual responsibility in regards to the ethical. — Merkwurdichliebe

How does that follow in your view?

That is a matter of opinion whether or not knowledge proceeds from the universal to the particular, or the reverse. I would surmise it is a combination of both, and it would be an error to be committed to proceeding only one way. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm not talking about universal versus particular.

I'm talking about not being able to get on a bandstand and play "Giant Steps" when one doesn't even know what a G major chord is. You need to know the basics before you tackle something advanced that incorporates the basics.

Another way to put it--you're not going to build a house if you can't even hammer a nail.