How can I distinguish that from living purely in a present where I simply know what to do at each (the only) moment? Put another way, perhaps protention only gains plausibility as a retrojection of disappointment and tripping and so on.

Also, note the oddity that if protention is literally perceptive, this means that the future is in some sense 'there' to be seen

!
But the way you're using 'perceptive' here is precisely Derrida's point when he says, apropos of Husserl characterizing retention as 'perceptive' immediately after saying it isn't: ""We can therefore suspect that if Husserl nevertheless calls [retention] perception, it is because he is holding on to the radical discontinuity as passing between retention and reproduction, between perception and imagination etc. and not between perception and retention. (bottom of page 55)

The way you're using 'perceptive,' above, can not possibly mean the same thing as the the 'perceptive' elements of protention/retention.

Which, incidentally, may explain your skepticism of the whole Husserlian analysis.

I'm not sure what you're getting at.

Why does Derrida first talk about protention alongside retention, then silently drop only to retention, apparently without comment or reason? I suggest it is because protention is less comprehensible.

I don't understand what you mean. The perception does not 'turn into' representation at its far end. Representation is going to be things like secondary memory and fantasy, which are not a function of this shading off, but have to be introduced by separate noetic acts (primary memory does not 'become' secondary memory at its far end, and fantasy has to be deliberately introduced by new acts of imagination). — The Great Whatever

Sorry, I mean to refer to the 'structure of representation' qua the possibility of repetition. Hence the losing remarks of the chapter: "Without reducing the abyss that can in fact separate retention from re-presentation .... we must be able to say a priori that their common root, the possibility of re-petition in its most general form .... is a possibility that not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now, but also must constitute it by means of the very movement of the différance that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now."

As for Hagglund, you miss the point. Hagglund doesn't simply express incredulity, but notes the instances according to which, "whenever Husserl sets out to describe the pretemporal level, he will inevitably have recourse to a temporal vocabulary that questions the presupposed presence."

The point of demonstrating that the indication/expression distinction cannot hold is to then show how the failure of that distinction compromises the rest of Husserl's project. But if the rest of Husserl's project is precisely what you need to collapse that distinction.... — csalisbury

Yeah, this is a very contentious point of Derrida's philosophy as a whole. He always avows his commitment to the metaphysical tradition, claiming never to be able to quite 'exit' it. There are really two ways to take this. On the one hand, you get an incredibly hostile and foreful reading like the one Nick Land offers, where he accuses Derrida of more or less being a supreme apologist of metaphysical thought:

"Deconstruction is the systematic closure of the negative within its logico-structural sense. All uses, references, connotations of the negative are referred back to a bilateral opposition as if to an inescapable destination, so that every ‘de-’, ‘un-’, ‘dis-’, or ‘and-’ is speculatively imprisoned within the mirror space of the concept. ... Such logicization of the negative leads to Derrida ‘thinking’ loss as irreducible suspension, delay, or differance, in which decision is paralysed between the postponement of an identity and its replacement. Suspension does not resolve itself into annihilation, but only into a trace or remnant that has always been distanced from plenitude (rather than deriving from it), so that differance is only loss in the (non)sense of irreparable expenditure insofar as this can be described as the insistence of an unapproachable possibility, which is to say, under the aegis of a fundamental domestication.

...[In Derrida], the ‘text of Western metaphysics’ finds itself subject to a general ‘destruction’, ‘deconstruction’, or restorative critique, which—amongst other things—fabricates ‘it’ into a totality, rescues it from its own decrepit self-legitimations, generalizes its effects across other texts, reinforces its institutional reproduction, solidifies its monopolistic relation to truth, confirms all but the most preposterous narratives of its teleological dignity, nourishes its hierophantic power of intimidation, smothers its real enemies beneath a blizzard of pseudo-irritations (its ‘unsaid’ or ‘margins’), keeps its political prisoners locked up, repeats its lobotomizing stylistic traits and sociological complacency, and, in the end, begins to mutter once more about an unnamable God. Deconstruction is like capital; managed and reluctant change." (Land, The Thirst for Annihilation)

On the other hand, champions of Derrida will say that Derrida allows for the de-sedimentation and destablization of fixed identities and differences, allowing for ethical openings etc, etc. There's an element of truth in both I think, although I am more sympathetic than not.

As for Hagglund, you miss the point. Hagglund doesn't simply express incredulity, — StreetlightX

I think I gave the piece you quoted a pretty fair reading and looked it over a few times. I don't find anything in it but incredulity. It may be that you're more sympathetic to the position, which causes you to infer more argumentation into it than I can see. He seems simply to be denying what Husserl asserts, that the division in the temporal structure is not itself temporal, but just insisting it must be isn't all that interesting. If there's something else in there you'd like to draw my attention to, feel free.

And maybe Husserl thought we lacked names, but so what – that doesn't mean we can't see what he's talking about (naming isn't existence), and as I said, my guess is the names are satiation and apprehension, in the ethical sense. In fact my suspicion is there's not really any such thing as protention of retention, just backformation of these ethical tangles. But then, I guess I don't think there's really anything, along the same lines. *shrug*

How can I distinguish that from living purely in a present where I simply know what to do at each (the only) moment? Put another way, perhaps protention only gains plausibility as a retrojection of disappointment and tripping and so on.

Well first, the very idea of doing something in a single moment already strikes me as viewing things through an artificial lens. Any action I can think of requires some duration for its execution. But even if protentional life could only be distinguished from pure-moment-life through some kind of disappointment or tripping - does it matter? We've all tripped and been disappointed, so it's there for us to see - and to see as having been there all along. There are many things we've only been able to learn about through stumbling onto something unexpected which throws what came before into a new light (science progresses this way no?) Perhaps there's even an anstoss-y element to the whole thing: that very disappointment is the condition of our introduction into time.

I'm not sure what you're getting at.

I take that quote to be saying that Derrida considers Husserl's characterization of protention/retention as perceptive as primarily a reaction against Bretano, to say that there is a kind of memory and anticipation that is quite different then recollection and reflective expectation. But if we keep the idea of perception as involving something being 'there' we lose sight of retention/protention altogether. Thus there's some equivocation with 'perception' in Husserl's account.

To go back to music. Much of the emotion and tension comes from a movement away from, then back to the tonic. We feel this tension listening to music. But obviously the tonic is not 'there' in the sense that we can 'hear' it. We've retained it - that's precisely what explains our emotional reaction to the note we hear now.- but it's not 'present'

I actually sympathize with that Land quote a whole bunch (tho Land himself scares me a lot. He was too smart for his own good and went too deep down a drug/deleuze hole, to emerge bitter and honestly kinda evil. I tried reading his book on Bataille and it was painful, by turns deeply irritating and alarming - Nick Land may be the single best example I know of that kind of bloated self-hating narcissism which usually produces abusive drunks, but may sometimes, in strange conditions, if the subject is smart enough, produce authentically vile academics)

Anyway - while I sympathize with that quote, that's not quite what I meant. I'm talking about V & P's argument specifically. Derrida clearly means to collapse the indication/expression distinction in order to put into question all of Husserl's work. But if you use Husserl's work to collapse the distinction ..... then you've created a weird loop where you're trying to undermine the thing you rely on to produce that undermining, which therefore can't be undermined, lest it no longer serve as a way to undermine itself - this isn't even circularity, I don't know what you would call it.

a simpler way to put that last point: If Husserl himself, in later works, undermines that distinction and admits it, then its pointless to try to undermine it again through intricate analysis of a brief section of an early work - especially if the crux of your argument winds up just being Husserl's argument anyway. I find the Hagglund stuff interesting but it feels like it goes beyond what Derrida's doing here. Tho i haven't read the last two chapters

I can offer something here maybe. Husserl when talking about protention and retention is doing so by use of epoche. We also look at time in the same way although we are blind to this. We bracket out time and replace it with spatial markers. Time "moves", "forward" is future and "backwards" is past. In reference to protention and retention Husserl is highlighting our natural in the world inclination to package time (more deeply instilled by empirical sciences and acts of measuring). This is why we see temrs such as "static flow" used by Husserl.

All we have to see in what Husserl means is that the past is experienced as an experience now and that thoughts of the future are experienced now. In this way we reduce the objective naturalism of time to a purely subjective "non-position". We are not time travellers or beings that experience time. We are time thinkers able to reframe and shift experience in such a way as to "see" time. We can also be space thinkers ... however we shift experience we do so through use of epoche, by bracketing out and statically flowing between horizons (even though there is no literal "between").

The whole mess above points directly to what someone mentioned a few posts back. There are no words here to explicate. Words are not all we have to work with, just the only medium through which we can express and exchange ideas.

Maybe the above is useless to you. I do not have a copy of Derrida so just trying to show my understanding of Husserl.

Things get left behind in some sense, but I am unsure I can see the future rather than walking a razor's edge of future-oriented present competence. The more I think about it, the more I seem to live in an endless moment, more than the stretch that Husserl's extended present implies. The easiest example should be a melody, I guess (though even this is misleading because it's not as if anything is happening in a melody that isn't always supposed to be happening), especially a melody that one is familiar with. But here I feel like there are all sorts of little non-passive future intrusions of what's to come as well

Have you tried meditation? I have found it most beneficial in developing the finer mental faculties for the contemplation of such ideas regarding the self.

Some more guess work.

My thoughts on that are that is that it's justified only insofar that we "open up" the sign. I get the distinct sense that Derrida is not trying to disprove Husserl, as much as inhabit his thoughts out of a kind of respect. Otherwise, wouldn't he just make a straightforward argument? Derrida seems more than capable on that point.

Though, since it's being mentioned, it could just be sympathies playing in Derrida's favor in my part. I don't mind the conclusion -- I tend to fall on the non-Cartesian side of things in my thinking.

But if the latter Husserl trips across indication in the now, by way of the interplay between the present and the absent found in what is all equally now (which is probably the closest to a succinct first reading I can muster at this point. I plan I re-reading the chapter on Thursday to see if I can suss anything else out of it), then the deconstruction is only against metaphysics -- the expression/indication distinction -- and not against phenomenology and Husserl. This "opens" the sign in the sense that the sign is not a modification of presence, but rather allows the "solitary life of the soul" to operate.

Which would mean that it has a kind of existence (existance?) -- it is the concept of the origin, and the sort of ideal meaning, and the notions of language, rather than all the conclusions of Husserl that are threatened.

Though, if that be the case, it is also hard to reconcile statements that Derrida makes like "the project is threatened" -- I suppose it depends on what the project was. If it was to secure a kind of point-like individual separate from the world then that would be the case -- the Cartesian core of a self as a metaphysical entity. But the Cartesian project wasn't predicated on those sorts of conclusions, and I don't know if I'd say anything I've read of Husserl's is actually threatened by this attempt to "drain the presence" out of the text. (of course, I am only passingly familiar with Husserl too -- what say you @The Great Whatever?)

But if you use Husserl's work to collapse the distinction ..... then you've created a weird loop where you're trying to undermine the thing you rely on to produce that undermining, which therefore can't be undermined, lest it no longer serve as a way to undermine itself - this isn't even circularity, I don't know what you would call it. — csalisbury

I think you'd call it deconstruction :D Anyway, perhaps the trouble is that Derrida doesn't 'simply' collapse the distinction. Part of what's at stake is the refusal of a simple either/or: either pure presence of a single term or sheer distinction between two, which will amount to the same thing for Derrida. Rather Derrida wants what he calls differance (or 'trace') to inhabit the space in-between both, a kind of both/and operation uses the tension between expression and indication, presence and non-presence, as a kind of springborad or propellant which cannot be stilled by settling upon one term or the other.

Speaking broadly, this has to do with Derrida's unwavering commitment to the transcendental, and his refusal to simply cede transcendental thinking to the empirical. Peter Dews brings this out very nicely in his essay on Derrida, where he notes that Derrida consistently defends Husserl against those who would, in fact, simply collapse the transcendental into the empirical: "Derrida vigorously denies that the 'methodological fecundity' of the concepts of structure and genesis in the natural and human sciences would entitle us to dispense with the question of the foundations of objectivity posed by Husserl. He staunchly defends the priority of phenomenological over empirical enquiry, arguing that, 'The most naive employment of the notion of genesis, and above all the notion of structure, presupposes at least a rigorous delimitation of prior regions, and this elucidation of the meaning of each regional structure can only be based on a phenomenological critique. The latter is always first by right...'.

A similar attitude is expressed in Derrida's article of 1963 on Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics', where he argues, against Levi-Strauss, that the 'connaturality of discourse and violence' is not to be empirically demonstrated, that 'here historical or ethnosociological information can only confirm or support, by way of example, the eidetic-transcendental evidence'. Furthermore, this parrying of what is seen as a self-contradictory relativism is also central to Derrida's review of Madness and Civilization, and hence to the highly symptomatic contrast between Foucauldian and Derridean modes of analysis. For what Derrida objects to in Foucault is the attempt to define the meaning of the Cartesian cogito in terms of a determinate historical structure, the failure to grasp that the cogito has a transcendental status, as the 'zero point where determinate meaning and non-meaning join in their common origin'" (Dews, Logics of Disintegration)

So I think @Moliere is exactly right to say that Derrida isn't out to 'disprove' Husserl so much as to 'inhabit' his thought. Even in the first chapter Derrida will speak of how "the whole analysis will move forward therefore in this hiatus between fact and right, existence and essence, reality and the intentional function"; and further of "this hiatus, which defines the very space of phenomenology....". It is in this 'hiatus' which Derrida will seek to remain in, without identifying with either term on either side of it.

--

Re: Land, I think that's the general consensus. I've only read the Bataille book as well (it's where the quote comes from, and in truth, it's perhaps the only passage in the whole book that I recall well), and like you said, there's a hyper-intelligence tinged with madness that both terrifying and spectacular at the same time. I only ever see his name now mentioned as one of the pre-cursors to the 'alt-right' movement, which both surprises me and doesn't, but I haven't really followed up on that. Curiously, I noticed he was running an online seminar with the Sydney School of Continental Philosophy just a few months ago, so it seems at least that he hasn't entirely abandoned institutional philosophy.

Well first, the very idea of doing something in a single moment already strikes me as viewing things through an artificial lens. Any action I can think of requires some duration for its execution. — csalisbury

But it seems to me the stretching things into a length is what's artificial. In other words you have to see the timeline as implicitly linear already to make sense of retention, in terms of the duration of an act, in terms of extension. The notion of an extended present still only fundamentally seems to make sense if you believe time is a series of now-points – adding modifications of it doesn't really change the picture. And if it's demanded of us to explain what we call time or temporality as such without resorting to 'temporal' (read: 'linear,' 'pseudo-spatial') terminology, okay, we use ethical terminology instead. 'Duration' means endurance:

late 14c., "to undergo or suffer" (especially without breaking); also "to continue in existence," from Old French endurer (12c.) "make hard, harden; bear, tolerate; keep up, maintain," from Latin indurare "make hard," in Late Latin "harden (the heart) against," from in- (see in- (2)) + durare "to harden," from durus "hard," from PIE *dru-ro-, from root *deru- "be firm, solid, steadfast"

I take that quote to be saying that Derrida considers Husserl's characterization of protention/retention as perceptive as primarily a reaction against Bretano, to say that there is a kind of memory and anticipation that is quite different then recollection and reflective expectation. But if we keep the idea of perception as involving something being 'there' we lose sight of retention/protention altogether. Thus there's some equivocation with 'perception' in Husserl's account. — csalisbury

I don't think so, unless you assume to begin with that all that can be 'there' must be temporally present. (and so Derrida's favorite pun, present-present, which while evocative is not an argument). Much of what seems to be going on here looks to me like this incredulity in the face of what Husserl actually says.

Insofar as Derrida's conclusions are in conflict with the principle of principles, yes it would threaten the project. But again this would turn on refusing to believe that perception could be of what is past, the grounds of which I don't understand.

The principle of principles is: all perception is a legitimizing source of cognition.

I don't think so, unless you assume to begin with that all that can be 'there' must be temporally present. (and so Derrida's favorite pun, present-present, which while evocative is not an argument). Much of what seems to be going on here looks to me like this incredulity in the face of what Husserl actually says.

But take that music example. If we're listening to a piece that began with the tonic, and has moved on to the dominant - in what sense is the tonic 'there'? Certainly it's not there as a note we're presently hearing. But do we still 'hear' it as past? I don't think we do. What we hear is the dominant as colored by the tonic, whose sounding we've retained. So if it's 'there,' the tonic, it's there in a very strange way. But you seem to be using 'there' in a typical, (tho, yes, non-temporal) way as in this quote, from above:

Also, note the oddity that if protention is literally perceptive, this means that the future is in some sense 'there' to be seen. A disruption would have to be literally a kind of illusion, rather than a mistaken doxastic attitude, however momentary.

Are you suggesting that for protention to be a real thing, we'd have to literally see into the future as through a crystal ball or sci-fi wormhole? If that's what you mean, that seems like a deep misunderstanding, but I may not be following your point.

I like the idea of Derrida 'inhabiting' Husserl, and I also read V&P that way at the beginning (I called it the 'sussing out of the text's immanent logic'.) But from the beginning, he's signaled that the telos of this inhabiting is the undermining of Husserl's larger project. (You could make a fine distinction and say that Derrida's not actively undermining anything, the text undermines itself. I've heard that distinction made, but it's a specious one I think. To point out inconsistencies and untenable distinctions is to undermine. Another term for this sort of thing would be, simply, arguing. )

I suspect more and more that this 'inhabiting' and all the close reading - they're stylistic gestures carried out for the sake of demonstrating virtuosity. @@StreetlightX has brought in a ton of outside quotes which are very interesting and thought-provoking, but which, by and large, have nothing to do with the argument of the book. They illuminate Derrida's motives, methods, and conclusions, but don't, in my opinion, help explain the path of the book itself. They tell us how to think and talk like a Derridean, but little insight on how to follow this particular Derridean exercise.

Which would mean that it has a kind of existence (existance?) -- it is the concept of the origin, and the sort of ideal meaning, and the notions of language, rather than all the conclusions of Husserl that are threatened. — Moliere

I think, though, that he's trying not to say that the sign, as opposed to presence, is the concept of the origin, but that the sign undermines the concept of originality altogether (while it's also what makes the notion of 'origin' possible.) To put it cutely: origin and non-origin would be co-original. Hence the significance of the 'trace'.

By the by, has anyone else dabbled in Kabbalah? I'm getting some heavy ein-sof vibes from the discussion in the later chapters. (the "trace" is also very similar to the 'reshimu'

" Ein-Sof must be constantly redefined, as by its very nature, it is in a constant process of self-creation and redefinition. This self-creation is actually embodied and perfected in the creativity of humanity, who through practical, ethical, intellectual and spiritual activities, strives to redeem and perfect a chaotic, contradictory and imperfect world.

The Kabbalists used a variety of negative epistemological terms to make reference to the hidden God; "the concealment of secrecy", "the concealed light", "that which thought cannot contain" etc. (Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah, p. 88) each of which signifies that this God is somehow beyond human knowledge and comprehension. However, there are other terms, e.g., "Root of all roots", "Indifferent Unity", "Great Reality," (Scholem. Major Trends, p. 12) "Creator," "Cause of Causes" and "Prime Mover" (as well as the term, Ein-Sof, "without end") which signify that God is the origin of the world, the reality of the world, or the totality of all things. Yet in spite of the positive connotations, even those Kabbalists who utilized such terms held that they referred to a God who is completely unknowable and concealed." - from newkabblah.com, which who knows how authoritative it is, but that quote seems entirely in keeping with what you'll read about the ein sof just about anywhere else.

But take that music example. If we're listening to a piece that began with the tonic, and has moved on to the dominant - in what sense is the tonic 'there'? Certainly it's not there as a note we're presently hearing. But do we still 'hear' it as past? I don't think we do. What we hear is the dominant as colored by the tonic, whose sounding we've retained. So if it's 'there,' the tonic, it's there in a very strange way. But you seem to be using 'there' in a typical, (tho, yes, non-temporal) way as in this quote, from above: — csalisbury

How does retaining the sound of a past tonic describe the hearing any more than the present perception of a tonic-colored dominant? If I satiate my taste buds with sweetness, so that what I taste next isn't as vivacious insofar as how sweet it is, am I not just tasting less sweetness, and even though this is conditioned by a prior tasting of sweetness, is there any way in which I am 'retaining' a past sweet experience (which must mean, I suppose, that I am in some way 'still' tasting it, although with some past-modification?)

Are you suggesting that for protention to be a real thing, we'd have to literally see into the future as through a crystal ball or sci-fi wormhole? If that's what you mean, that seems like a deep misunderstanding, but I may not be following your point. — csalisbury

It would not be a very good crystal ball – maybe on the order of milliseconds, and unable to move where one looks, but yes. That is, being surprised or interrupted would have meant, on your account, that in the same way we missee an object, we can missee the future – look at it, but apprehend its properties wrong. It seems more natural to describe the future as something that can't be perceived, not something that we sometimes misperceive.

How does retaining the sound of a past tonic describe the hearing any more than the present perception of a tonic-colored dominant?

It's hard to answer this because I don't see the difference between the two alternatives. A note is not dominant in-and-of-itself, but only by relation to the tonic. The idea of tonic-colored dominant which doesn't rely on a recently heard tonic is a contradiction in terms.

It would not be a very good crystal ball – maybe on the order of milliseconds, and unable to move where one looks, but yes. That is, being surprised or interrupted would have meant, on your account, that in the same way we missee an object, we can missee the future – look at it, but apprehend its properties wrong. It seems more natural to describe the future as something that can't be perceived, not something that we sometimes misperceive.

I think this is a wrong way to look at protention though. It's not that we see or missee a future that is there - it's that we're incessantly projecting into the future. I don't think there's anything mystical about this.

It could be considered, that what we have here is two distinct conceptions of "the present", playing against each other. First we have the punctual "now", which is the tradition in measurement. The now is a point which divides one period of time from another, the past time from the future time. Through extrapolation this becomes "the moment" which divides any period of time. Husserl does not seem to accept this punctual now, at p52-53, the division of the continuum of time is disallowed, though it is allowed to have a source-point. The second conception of the present is the continuity, the living present. This is the conception which Husserl favours.

We can class the punctual now as ideal, it is an ideal division, a point between one part of time and another. As such, it cannot act as the real present which we experience, which is a kind of continuous separation between past and future, the punctual now is an ideal separation. Under this conception, the dividing point, the now, does nothing more than divide two parcels of "time", any two. That one is past, and one is future, making a particular moment the present now, rather than any random moment, is accidental. Notice the end of the chapter where Derrida talks about the fissure caused by "what has been called time".

So Husserl focuses on the real present, in which the distinction between past and future is of the essence. So we have the concepts relating to memory and anticipation. This is the living present. The punctuality of the present is not proper to this concept, as it is the property of the other concept, the one which inserts the point to divide and measure parcels of time, the ideal now. What is proper to the concept of present, in the sense of the living present, is continuity. There is a division between past and future, which we call the present, and we live, perceive, and think, within this "present". Husserl describes our modes of activity within this present What we can say about this division between past and future is that it is continuous.

As Derrida indicates, Husserl does not embrace the first concept of the present, which employs a punctual now. However, he provides a quote at p53, referring to "the actually present now", as something punctual. Derrida seems to seize upon this, to produce a concept of the now as "pure actuality", p58. It should be noted that this is still referred to by Derrida as an ideality, though it is called "the form (Form) of presence itself".

"Without reducing the abyss that can in fact separate retention from re-presentation .... we must be able to say a priori that their common root, the possibility of re-petition in its most general form .... is a possibility that not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now, but also must constitute it by means of the very movement of the différance that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now." — StreetlightX

This is that pure actuality which Derrida refers to. The problem with this is twofold. First, as I indicated already, if the now is a pure actuality, it is impossible that a possibility inhabits it, or is inserted into it because this would contradict "pure actuality".

The second problem which comes to my mind, is that the present, according to the second conception, described above is a continuity. To maintain consistency with classical principles, Aristotelian metaphysics, the continuity must be of the nature of potential, rather than actual. This is the position which Aristotle gives to matter, as the continuity of existence despite changing forms, such that prime matter would be pure potential.

So if we posit the real present as pure potentiality, rather than pure actuality, we maintain consistency with the concept of continuity, in Aristotelian metaphysics. Further, we can resolve the first problem, by allowing that the possibility of repetition, being a potential itself, partakes in the pure potentiality of the present.

Does anyone involved in this reading see any reason why Derrida should designate the now as a pure actuality rather than a pure potentiality? What are the reasons for this move?

MU, I wouldn't associate the sign with protention as you have. The possibility of repetition generally, or expectation generally, is something far and above protention, which is something a little closer to home: the kind of primary expectation that comes in sort of 'seeing the future' when you watch movement, with things that are about to happen seemingly 'getting ready to happen' right before your eyes. — The Great Whatever

Perhaps, but notice that Derrida wants to downplay the difference between primary and secondary anticipation as well as the difference primary and secondary memory. It seems that these distinctions are only made to facilitate the concept of a continuous present. Primary anticipation, and primary memory blend together, perhaps even within the originary act of perception, and this provides for the continuity of the present. Secondary memory and anticipation are well separated. But if anticipation perceives one side of the present, the future, while memory perceives the other, past, then this is the important difference, and we don't need to focus on the difference between primary and secondary.

In this case, we need to be able to interpret "the possibility" of repetition. As a possibility, it must be classed as an anticipation, as it refers to the future. The sign, as possibility of repetition, is an apprehension of repetition occurring in the future. But as representation, the sign is something completely different. Sure, it can be both a representation, and the possibility of repetition, but one refers to its position in memory, the other to it's position in anticipation.

I think this is a wrong way to look at protention though. It's not that we see or missee a future that is there - it's that we're incessantly projecting into the future. I don't think there's anything mystical about this. — csalisbury

If we're not seeing the future, then protention is not, contrary to Husserl's claims, preception. We can of course project into the future without seeing it in any sense. This is ordinarily how we think about these things, and is not what Husserl is claiming, so far as I see it.

To make clear just how weird this is, say you're listening to a piece of music you've never heard before. You have certain expectations, perhaps, based on genre stereotypes and certain biologically or culturally ingrained notions of how music ought to proceed, involving tonality and resolution, rhythm, and so on. Let's say that you're broadly correct about which direction the piece will go: it doesn't pull a fast one on you so hard that you think 'what the hell just happened?' What is the best way to describe this situation? Did you perceive the piece as it approached, in the way you might see a truck approaching? That is, is it in virtue of the perceptible qualities of the piece that you understood what course it would take? It seems not – for you would have the same expectations regardless of whether the piece actually went that way, making the qualities of the piece itself irrelevant to your expectations and protentions. But if protention is a matter of perception, it must have been in virtue of perceiving the piece that this was possible.

It's hard to answer this because I don't see the difference between the two alternatives. A note is not dominant in-and-of-itself, but only by relation to the tonic. The idea of tonic-colored dominant which doesn't rely on a recently heard tonic is a contradiction in terms. — csalisbury

Must I retain a tonic in order to perceive the dominant as tonic-flavored? Is it so implausible, for example, that I might be stimulated to hear a tonic-flavored dominant out of the blue, without actually having perceived a tonic beforehand? In such a way that I could not phenomenologically distinguish between these? If so, it seems implausible to say that I experience the dominant in relation to the tonic in virtue of literally retaining the tonic in perception, rather than there just being facts about my present perception that are influenced by immediately preceding perceptions.

If we're not seeing the future, then protention is not, contrary to Husserl's claims, preception. We can of course project into the future without seeing it in any sense. This is ordinarily how we think about these things, and is not what Husserl is claiming, so far as I see it.

To make clear just how weird this is, say you're listening to a piece of music you've never heard before. You have certain expectations, perhaps, based on genre stereotypes and certain biologically or culturally ingrained notions of how music ought to proceed, involving tonality and resolution, rhythm, and so on. Let's say that you're broadly correct about which direction the piece will go: it doesn't pull a fast one on you so hard that you think 'what the hell just happened?' What is the best way to describe this situation? Did you perceive the piece as it approached, in the way you might see a truck approaching? That is, is it in virtue of the perceptible qualities of the piece that you understood what course it would take? It seems not – for you would have the same expectations regardless of whether the piece actually went that way, making the qualities of the piece itself irrelevant to your expectations and protentions. But if protention is a matter of perception, it must have been in virtue of perceiving the piece that this was possible.

This makes the case excellently that Husserl cannot really mean 'perception' in the traditional sense, but that he simply is using the term to differentiate his understanding from Brentanos, as Derrida suggests. If we think Husserl means 'perception' in the traditional sense, we have to literally understand him as saying we can see into the future, which is absurd for the reasons you've adduced.

I think the case is more plausible for retention. And that is what Derrida specifically criticizes (again, without comment on why protention ought to be ignored), so I don't know if beating up on protention specifically will help that much. However I agree that there is something weird about this, I would just diagnose it differently from Derrida: Husserl meant what he said, but his linearizing of time was still partly naturalistic, and the 'names' he was looking for had to do with ethical qualities his philosophy wasn't attuned to.

Back to retention then:

Is it so implausible, for example, that I might be stimulated to hear a tonic-flavored dominant out of the blue, without actually having perceived a tonic beforehand? In such a way that I could not phenomenologically distinguish between these?

It seems implausible to me. It's easy to imagine hearing a note out of the blue, but, again, a dominant is relational. There is no more a dominant without a tonic then there is an uncle without a niece or nephew. To hear a dominant is to hear the tension between itself and the tonic. So, even if we didn't actually perceive a tonic before, we'd have to hear to the dominant as if we had - and how would one characterize this as if?

If so, it seems implausible to say that I experience the dominant in relation to the tonic in virtue of literally retaining the tonic in perception, rather than there just being facts about my present perception that are influenced by immediately preceding perceptions.

Can you expand what you mean by the preceding perception 'influencing' one's present perception and how you see that as different than retention?

I think the case is more plausible for retention. — The Great Whatever

It can be argued, that whatever is perceived, sensed, is necessarily in the past, by the time the perception of it has occurred. So there is a clear relationship between perception and retention. However, the degree to which anticipation affects perception is not so clear. We could analyze the way that we focus our attention. With all of the things going on around us, we tend to focus our attention on particular things which we are interested in. This is the way that anticipation is related to perception, such that we actually perceive and retain, those aspects of the reality around us, which anticipation has guided us to observe, by focusing our attention on these things.

It seems implausible to me. It's easy to imagine hearing a note out of the blue, but, again, a dominant is relational. There is no more a dominant without a tonic then there is an uncle without a niece or nephew. To hear a dominant is to hear the tension between itself and the tonic. So, even if we didn't actually perceive a tonic before, we'd have to hear to the dominant as if we had - and how would one characterize this as if? — csalisbury

I guess it depend son what you think of Omphalos hypotheses. Put it this way – if I'm familiar with a piece, and I hear a note or chord from the middle, might my previous conditioning not influence me to hear the pitch as influence by something prior, even though I cannot be retaining the prior pitch because ex hypothesi I have not actually heard it (this time)? I know if my case there are songs that have such deep resonances with me that hearing jus a moment from them allows me to hear them in the context of what came before, but I cannot be retaining this, since I haven't heard anything to be retained.

It seems important, though, that in these examples, you are already familiar with the piece. Again the as if is interesting here.

But my familiarity can't have a bearing on retention. Unless I've horribly misunderstood, retention cannot extend years, or even hours, into 'the past.' We would either have a secondary memory here (recollection), or more plausibly, a sort of experiential conditioning (sedimentation, maybe) that itself could possibly be accomplished without having to have any perceptual retention attached to it.

So yes, I agree with what you've said, and these cases are interesting snd complicate any account of time --but Husserl uses music and past notes to illustrate what he means by retention and so to understand him we must look at what its like to listen to a piece of music and how the past notes work on the present ones-and I think past notes clearly operate in the way I've outlined.

The crux is this: can you be introduced to a piece of music midstream and have it seem from your perspective that you had been listening all along? If so, then retention loses some of its plausibility, since just like with the future it seems this experiential conditioning from past to present doesn't rely on retaining the notes in perception, since ex hypothesi you did not perceive the other past notes (but the effect was the same). In other words, we don't know whether the past notes are important for the reason Husserl says, or if just because independently they condition your resent perception in certain ways, regardless of our account of perception.

It may be that Husserl's notion of retention is really supposed to be razor's-edge, just a very bare retentional shade that defines any perception no matter how transient (and so in a weird way, perception never 'starts').