Being is change, yes, but change understood via a certain structurality. Being is change that anticipates. And it anticipates via the directing impetus of its past.

Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges.
Temporality is 'simultaneously' of 3 ecstacies. The past as 'having been', the presencing, and
future. Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself,
that is, is futural in its being in general."
"Only because Da-sein in general IS as I AM-having-been, can it come futurally toward itself in
such a way that it comes-back." Thus, "Having been arises from the future".
Being is structurally articulated within itself as the 3 ecstacies. Being is ahead of itself as itself, as
the 'not yet', it projects, anticipates, as fore-having, fore-structuring. It is transcendence. It is also,
as attunement, thrownness, Being as 'being affected by'. "What is projected , fore-given, has the
character of possibility." "World gives itself to Dasein in each case as the respective whole of its
"for the sake of itself," i.e., for the sake of a being that is equi-originarily being alongside . . .
what is present at hand, being with . . . the Dasein of others, and being toward . . . itself(notice
that this is not a progress. It is the hermeneutic circle)"

What are traditionally divided up into sensation, perception, cognition, affect, and language are
united for Heidegger as temporality. Understanding is the cognate aspect, attunement-care the
motivational-affective aspect, discourse the linguistic-communicative aspect.

Well, this is a fundamental assumption.

Being is and isn't change. One would more often arrive at the conclusion that being would have to be change, simply because pure stasis is incomprehensible by thought. Thought itself is an act and an act is motion and motion is change.

All that be, be; and 'being' being an act of sorts, infers motion, which infers change.
Yet, when one ponders change - one may come to understand that constant change is lack of change; as it is simple repetition.

Consider an object, that moves with equal force in all directions; it goes nowhere. It is acting, yet not acting. Such is the case with being.

The relation of being is change, and perhaps the object which Heidegger takes as being, is simply the being - relative to himself; the being of things.
Perhaps not.

'being' being an act of sorts, infers motion, which infers change. — Shamshir

You're basing your understanding of change on motion. But where do we get our idea of motion from? There is a long history in the West, starting with the Greeks, and culminating in Galileo, Descartes and Newton, that frames causation and change in terms of the properties and behavior of objects. But there are specific presuppositions arising out of this history that make possible the concept of an object. One must dig beneath such presuppositions to come up with a more primordial notion of change than that of motion as change of location of an object. This is what Heidegger attempts to do.
Think of it this way. What happens when we question the sense of meaning of something like motion(or any other concept)? You might argue that questioning semantics has to do with subjective meaning and has nothing to do with the objective determination of change as motion. But Heidegger believes that there is no meaning outside of subjective determination. The notion of change that is connected with Being has to do with the way that objective and subjective co-determinatively transform each other in order for us to create meaning, whether in science or any other mode of thinking.

Time, change. Change is difference. I am not exactly sure what more there is to say about that. Heidegger did certainly investigate certain aspects of experience and come up with a lexicon to approach them - in regards to time - that some have found useful.

For me his work is a strange admixture of psychological self-perception, linguistic gymnastics and task that goes nowhere (yet gives a strange sense of benefit by doing so that is not easy to ignore or dismiss completely).

I’m tempted to revisit B&T to add what I can regarding Temporality. Maybe next week fi I grab some time between others reading :)

What happens when we question the sense of meaning of something? Nothing.
Let me put it this way: One has a view, and when one questions, one shifts his gaze - yet his view remains in part and never whole. Maybe one looks elsewhere, maybe one tilts one's head or looks upside down; who knows?
So, I would say, when one questions anything - one merely shifts his gaze.

This aside, pardon me, for I will reiterate.
Change is an act. And an act is motion. So change is evidently motion.
But change is born of relation; and relation requires things.
When one should attempt to envision the whole, it is relative to nothing - hence it does not change, yet it be. So being is not evidently change.
You, well as I, should be able to partly understand this by our own static self-awareness; each remains oneself, unchanging - lest one should relate to something.
And so we, being parts of the whole, will always be in relation to other parts - hence changing in our being. And so our being, but not being itself, may be viewed as change; yet partly so.

As to the creation of things, whether meaning or invention - I find that man does not create, but merely finds. To reiterate once more: One shifts one's gaze from where it isn't to where it is; from lack thereof to the object.

Which philosophers would you say support your view?

You're basing your understanding of change on motion. But where do we get our idea of motion from? — Joshs

Existence without motion is unthinkable and motion is unthinkable sub specie aeterni. Leaving out motion is not exactly the cleverest of moves, and introducing it into logic as transition, and with it time and space, is only a new confusion. But in so far as all thought is eternal, the difficulty is one for the one who exists. Existence, like motion, is a very difficult matter to deal with. If I think it, I do away with it, and then do not think it. — Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, p258

I have no names to give you. I have come to this understanding through observation; and the observation of my observation has concluded the aforementioned.

Perhaps someone, somewhere has thought and/or maybe written something on this. Who knows?

ACH-HEM...

Existence without motion is unthinkable — Kierkegaard

Dammit Mr.Kirk! Never been near a Black Hole with Mr.Spock?

What is more it appears I can think of numbers yet they don’t have motion. I can also think of motion, yet motion doesn’t have motion. Is this no more than a misapplication/misapprehension of worded terms?

You'd be surprised at how varied the philosophical understanding of concepts like change, time and difference has been . Take the idea of motion.

"Aristotle called it 4opa. This means that a body is transported from one place to another, to its place. Galileo abandoned notions of above and below, right and left. Physical space is homogeneous. No
point is more distinctive than any other. Only this conception of space makes it possible to determine locomotion. Space must be homogeneous because the laws of motion must be the same everywhere.
Only then can every process be calculated and measured.
Nature is viewed in a very specific way to satisfy the condition of measurability. Beings acquire the character of being mere objects and of being objectified. No such "objectivity" can be found in Greek
thought. Being "an object" only makes its appearance in modern natural science. The human being then becomes a "subject" in the sense of Descartes. Without all these presuppositions, the expression
"objective" is meaningless." Heidegger, Zollicon Seminar

Sounds like Heidegger agreed with Kierkegaard.

You only regard it as such because you are reflecting, and not considering the dialectal framework which was adopted by those who were accused of being existentialists.

Dammit Mr.Kirk! Never been near a Black Hole with Mr.Spock? — I like sushi

Btw, its captain, or Jim

You may be the only one in the known universe who has thought these thoughts. But don't despair. Others will follow.

Thought itself is motion. Thought without motion, would be unaware - and whilst maybe not impossible, irrelevant.
Thinking about something, you inadvertently move the subject of thought along with the thought - like how the river moves the fallen leaves.

Btw, its captain, or Jim — Merkwurdichliebe

Or James T.

Thought is the dialectical negative. It freezes motion in it's abstraction, but does not stop motion in existence.

Glad I'm not the only nerd here.

You may be the only one in the known universe who has thought these thoughts. But don't despair. Others will follow. — Joshs

If what I say is true, it is true.
If what I say isn't true, I will learn the truth.

What is there to despair over?

Thought is the dialectical negative. It freezes motion in it's a straction, but does not stop motion in existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

Understandably, one would compare thought to the paused frame of a movie; yet it is aptly more than that. It is, for lack of a better analogy, walking on a treadmill. There appears no motion, yet there is motion.

You only regard it as such because you are reflecting, and not considering the dialectal framework which was adopted by those who were accused of being existentialists.

And you only regard my regarding as such (whatever “such” you so choose to frame as apparent) due to not considering the dialectical framework adopted by specified ‘they’; whom were apparently accused of being ‘existentialists’ (lord forbid!)

Sorry, sarcasm overdrive! Haha!

Seriously, what do you seem to think I’ve done? What am I ‘reflecting’ on, but not ‘considering’? What precisely is the difference you’re implying between ‘reflecting’ and ‘considering’? Is it simply that you see me staring at my own beautiful reflection rather than asking others about what they see, or that I’m ignoring the mirror entranced, as I am, by my own image (and who can blame be! Such a sight to behold ... oops! Too much coffee today methinks!)

Anyway, just cracked open B&T and I have an hour for lunch ...

Seriously, what do you seem to think I’ve done? What am I ‘reflecting’ on, but not ‘considering’? What precisely is the difference you’re implying between ‘reflecting’ and ‘considering’? Is it simply that you see me staring at my own beautiful reflection rather than asking others about what they see, or that I’m ignoring the mirror entranced, as I am, by my own image (and who can blame be! Such a sight to behold ... oops! Too much coffee today methinks!)

Anyway, just cracked open B&T and I have an hour for lunch ... — I like sushi

I'm about to crash, so allow me tomorrow to adequately respond. However, I get your attitude, as I to have come across some on TPF who make a career of being difficult. I am not one of them, I assure you. Till tomorrow. You too Shamshir

(I think that) Being is for H. actuality in different possible "historical" situations and contexts. It is what is actual, real or "there" (present) in different situations. However, actual and real not conceived as reference-object for some statements. "Mere" significance is "real" when it has meaning. Its being-meaningful "verifies" it in itself. Significance is verified when it "functions" with other significances "seemingly without a problem" ("evidently").

For example, table is encountered primarily as a significance (as what it means "here and now"). It is not primarily a (verifying) reference-object for a statement like "table is a rectangular, horizontal surface on vertical supports". Things out there are not primarily "empirical reality" or evidence for theoretical statements, they are significances met in understanding living among those things. I think this is what it means when H. says that Dasein/existence is "in the truth".

Husserl made a distinction between meaning/significance (Bedeutung) and reference-object (Gegendstand). Heidegger doesn't seem to make this distinction. Hereby distinction between intending (Meinen) and evident fulfilment (Erfüllung) is abandoned as well? That is, at least Husserl's conception of truth is modified. This could mean that existence is living in a "pragmatic" (non-theoretical) conception of truth. It is living in "mere" intending and is not explicitly concerned with the question about significance being really fulfilled.



I think that the problem of temporality relates to the way how existence moves or proceeds among these significances. Significances are not intended as reference-objects when existence is relating "ecstatically" or originally (prior any "theoretical" acts) toward them. That is, significances are intended as significances and their "true" fulfilment is constantly transcending. For the most part, when living our "inauthentic" existence, we are among reference-objects in objective time with regard to some theory. We are concerned with that these objects correspond to some theory or to some general frame of reference (through which they are defined or constituted as what they supposedly "in reality" are) so that we can proceed from one reference object to an another in a systematic manner.

You'd be surprised at how varied the philosophical understanding of concepts like change, time and difference has been . Take the idea of motion. — Josh

And maybe you’d be surprised how this:

Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. Temporality is 'simultaneously' of 3 ecstacies. The past as 'having been', the presencing, and future. Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." "Only because Da-sein in general IS as I AM-having-been, can it come futurally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back." Thus, "Having been arises from the future".
Being is structurally articulated within itself as the 3 ecstacies. Being is ahead of itself as itself, as the 'not yet', it projects, anticipates, as fore-having, fore-structuring. It is transcendence. It is also, as attunement, thrownness, Being as 'being affected by'. "What is projected , fore-given, has thecharacter of possibility." "World gives itself to Dasein in each case as the respective whole of its"for the sake of itself," i.e., for the sake of a being that is equi-originarily being alongside . . .what is present at hand, being with . . . the Dasein of others, and being toward . . . itself(noticethat this is not a progress. It is the hermeneutic circle)" — Josh

Is a reiteration of what Husserl said. Or maybe not? Maybe I assume your surprise where there is none? I at least assume you understand what I am talking about.

The meaning of “Being” for Heidegger is the meaning of the word “Being” within language suspended in separation from, shall we call it ‘primary conscious being’(?) as opposed to how we explicate said conscious experience verbally - how it is communicated. That is not to say consciousness is separate from language because we’ve coined the “phraseology” (the immediate non-verbal experience, the ‘phraseology’ of experience prior to worded ‘language’; language in how Wittgenstein frames it not as some pure subjective consciousness of patterns of sensation by which we come to navigate through the world - a point of reference would be to feral children and something I like call ”kinaesthetic language” which is ‘held’ in a purely subjective manner and complimented by “symbolic language”).

Heidegger is ONLY concerned with “verbal language” and takes this to be all there is or can be simply because it is immediately communicable between subjects. He completely misses the original intent of “Phenomenology” as a science of consciousness and perverts/warps by focus on a singular aspect of consciousness as being the ONLY point of conscious being - that is through the mens of “language” (in Wittgenstein’s sense of “symbolic/spoken/signed language” not “kinaesthetic language”).

This doesn’t undermine Heidegger’s attempts only shows them to be “apart”, rather than “a part,” of the ‘science of consciousness’ - Phenomenology as an approach. Phenomenological Hermeneutics is a fair enough title. It is only part of the picture though.

Change is change. Physically speaking the phenomenon is further framed by the concept “Entropy” - a term we know nothing much about. We can at least say from there that “time” is a measure of entropy and that “change” is the natural human experience of this phenomenon. ‘Being’ is just a ‘pointing-out’ of delineations adumbrated through sensory perceptions build upon by protention, retention and immediate (or as Heidegger reiterated it above in the more obtuse manner outlined by Josh and the “3 ecstacies”.) The term “I” is much like “Being” in that without spoken language there is no “I” or “Being,” they are merely adumbrations of adumbrations held in a strong apodictic sense by being attended to AS words; maybe we could call these “words” the symbolic manifestation of “Intentionality” ... yet to suggest they ARE intentionality is as ridiculous as saying the nose on my face possesses “one-ness” and my eyes “two-ness” separate from other representations of “one” and “two”.

It helps too not to ignore what Heidegger sets out early in B&T. That is the differentiation of “ontic” and “ontology,” by which he further distances the concept of ‘Dasein’ from common parse and sets up his own little language game (which some find useful obviously). Within the game he manages to give the impression of ‘Dasein’ meaning something and through numerous twists and turns seems to have convinced others it has inherent meaning whilst seemingly unable to convince himself (?). Its use is its failure.

Here you go [pdf]

Advise anyone interested in Heidegger to read it, it was very good and well written.

Here you go [pdf] — StreetlightX

Which begins, "The premise is that Heidegger remained a phenomenologist from beginning to end and that phenomenology is exclusively about meaningand its source. The essay presents Heidegger’s interpretation of the being(Sein) of things as their meaningful presence(Anwesen) and his tracing of such meaningful presence back to its source in the clearing, which is thrown-open or appropriated ex-sistence (dasereignete/geworfene Da-sein)."

Which means that right off the bat, I think, "Yikes--so the whole 'project' seems to be based on a complete misunderstanding of what meaning is."