Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account? — creativesoul

How can there not be? Existence belongs to the existing thing. Being taken account of, that account is the account of an other. The other is not the thing, thereby different. What am I missing?

Quine argues - quite impressively actually - on empirical grounds. His work is theory laden, and I find much agreement between some things he holds and my own position. However, I am very confident that I do not grasp much of what Quine argues. The formal aspects require formal understanding, and in that I am surely lacking.

Well, let's just go with your position.

Proposition 1) there is no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account.

Proposition 2) there is a difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account.

I hold with 2). Another difference is that one is passive, the other active.

You?

I hold that there is most certainly a difference between being taken account of and existing prior to being taken account of. I would take it even further than that...

However, what I'm hoping to see here is someone who can set out Quine's line of reasoning that supports his mantra.

My recollection of the saying is different: 'To be is to be the value of a bound variable'. What the bolded word adds is that the variable is quantified, either by 'there exists' or 'for all'. So it is not necessary to refer to the object individually. One need only assert its existence by an existential quantifier (as we do for dinosaurs that occurred long before any human could observe them, or stars that are too far away for anybody to observe), or comment on its attributes by a universal quantifier.

With that correction, the objection - so far as I understand it - seems to disappear.

Does the difference between what counts as being a variable and what counts as being a bound variable bear upon whether or not existence is equivalent to being taken account of?

As I understand it, Quine wants to reject certain conceptual schemes(linguistic frameworks), namely those which posit the existence(the reality) of abstract objects, or how certain schemes posit such things... at least.

If it is true that some things exist prior to our account of them, then it cannot be true that to be(if that is synonymous with "to exist") is to be the value of a variable, regardless of existential quantification...

If being the value of a bound variable is equivalent to being (adequately?)taken account of, then I've no objection, but being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery.

being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery — creativesoul

Beware the use of 'clearly'. Things are rarely if ever as clear as one first thinks. The truth of the proposition in question is far from clear to me.

'Taking account of' is a woolly term, which can mean whatever one wants it to mean. Was the Higgs Boson not taken account of before they finally detected (discovered) one, decades after it was predicted?

I just remembered, or at least I think I remember, that I owe you an apology. There is no excuse, no justification, for my attitude displayed towards you as a person in a recent thread. I think that it was the Kripke reading group thread. No matter which thread... I am regretful for not handling that situation with the respect that was/is due. That said...

The Higgs particle was posited as a result of necessity stemming from taking account of things other than the Higgs. In other words, regarding the Higgs field and boson, it's discovery was a consequence of other accounts(the standard model). Post hoc. The Higgs field/particle was posited as a means to account for (missing)mass that the standard model couldn't account for without positing the Higgs field/boson.

With that in mind...

The Higgs particle was taken account of(conceived) prior to it's physical detection - assuming, of course, that it was actually detected. That is still contentious for some it seems. Nevertheless, I'll grant that it was, for it will allow our discourse to continue unabated.

I've no problem at all with being able to discover some things before they are detected/verified. Some things are discovered by taking account of other things.

I just remembered, or at least I think I remember, that I owe you an apology. — creativesoul

Thanks. No worries at all. That thread was a minefield!

That is still contentious for some it seems. — creativesoul

I was not aware of that. Is that scientific contention, involving criticism of whether the experiment was definitive, or is it philosophical, along the lines of what constitutes an 'observation'.

I wonder whether Quine would say that the Higgs Boson is the value of a bound variable.

The CERN website offers brief mention in simple easy to understand terms...

I think that he wouldn't equate an object with being the value of a bound variable. That's more about being an object within an account, is it not... for Quine? More about the use of "existence" or "exists"... Yes?

That thread was a minefield! — andrewk

It was a difficult yet ultimately rewarding thread. *Grows emotional.*

'to be is to be the value of a variable,' yet that which possesses the potential to contain a limited value within itself, has being, for that which possesses an essence, i.e. the potential to contain value, cannot not have being. that is to say that being isn't predicated of empty variables, but predicated of variables which correspond to unique essences.

I've been wondering what you think about this...

He's right, isn't he? Although that is only on of many senses of "to be".

Well. In one sense, certainly. As I said to andrewk earlier...

If being the value of a bound variable is equivalent to being (adequately?)taken account of, then I've no objection, but being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery.

I wonder why there was all that universe just hanging around waiting to exist for billions of years.

And as he replied, "Being taken account of" is wooly.

The "bound" is often left out, but it makes all the difference. Without it, it sounds like Quine is equating being to being spoken of, as @fdrake. With it, it's a mere tautology.

So it's more about accounting practices than existence?

With that correction, the objection - so far as I understand it - seems to disappear. — andrewk

Could one of you help me to understand how?

It depends on what the objection is. Without the crucial 'bound' qualifier, one might object that Quine's statement means we cannot say that any dinosaur existed other than one we can refer to individually, for instance because we are looking at the fossil of its skeleton. That would be a strange position because although we are confident that millions of dinosaurs inhabited the Earth, we can only recognise the existence of a few hundred of them. Hence, the misreported Quine definition becomes a partial dinosaur denial.

What the 'bound' qualifier does is allow us to refer to all dinosaurs (eg 'all dinosaurs had hearts'), and also to particular dinosaurs whose identity we do not know (eg 'the tallest dinosaur that ever lived'). Those dinosaurs meet Quine's criterion for existence. We can thus see that Quine was not a dinosaur-denier to even the slightest degree..

It depends on what the objection is. — andrewk

I'll put it as succinctly as possible.

To be the value of any variable, bound or otherwise, is to be taken account of within some framework of logical notation.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Surely there is.

The common language account existed in it's entirety prior to the translation into logical notation.

That's the objection.

It's not so much refuting and/or attempting to refute Quine. It's more like tempering...

Without the crucial 'bound' qualifier, one might object that Quine's statement means we cannot say that any dinosaur existed other than one we can refer to individually, for instance because we are looking at the fossil of its skeleton. That would be a strange position because although we are confident that millions of dinosaurs inhabited the Earth, we can only recognise the existence of a few hundred of them. Hence, the misreported Quine definition becomes a partial dinosaur denial.

What the 'bound' qualifier does is allow us to refer to all dinosaurs (eg 'all dinosaurs had hearts'), and also to particular dinosaurs whose identity we do not know (eg 'the tallest dinosaur that ever lived'). Those dinosaurs meet Quine's criterion for existence. We can thus see that Quine was not a dinosaur-denier to even the slightest degree.. — andrewk

I was thinking more along the lines of Quine's statement means that to be is to be taken account of. My reasoning is above. Are there hints of Wittgenstein driving Quine? The whole we cannot get beneath language notion?

I don't like the 'is' either. I think it's misleading. It should be "if an object is bound in a formula on some domain of discourse then we are committed to that entity's existence'. It's less about ontology/metaphysics in the continental sense of studying how or why things are the way they are and just about what there 'is' in the first place.

Edit: to see how little this helps you decide, consider the difference between "The present king of France is bald" now (with the implicit domain of currently living people) and in 1774 (when the domain includes a king of France). In the first case it's false because there is no present king of France, in the second case it depends on whether he has hair or not. This maxim just spits out whatever you've put into the domain already.

The Quine aphorism was forwarded under the umbrella of Russell's theory of descriptions. As such it's tackling philosophy of language issues.

To be the value of any variable, bound or otherwise, is to be taken account of within some framework of logical notation.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account? — creativesoul

There is no difference that can be identified in language, because by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them.

The best one can do is feel - if one so wishes - that there is more to this than taking account of things, but you cannot articulate that feeling in any known language, or in any language I can imagine.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?
— creativesoul
There is no difference that can be identified in language, because by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them. — andrewk

My objection is not about that. I agree, without prejudice, that by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them. That's not in contention.

The best one can do is feel - if one so wishes - that there is more to this than taking account of things, but you cannot articulate that feeling in any known language, or in any language I can imagine.

Common language is more than adequate.

In order to take account of something, that something must exist. Common language expressions exist prior to being translated into logical notation. Being the value of a bond variable is to be put in terms of logical notation. So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.

So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'. — creativesoul

I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing.

Limiting the interpretation to formal logical expressions would make the statement nonsensical. It would mean that Quine did not recognise the statement "Look, there's a wombat!" as taking account of existence.

I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" — creativesoul

I think you might be right about that. An appealing (to me) interpretation is that he's just pointing out the futility of ontology. I would expect devoted ontologists to disagree. Fortunately, philosophy is a broad church, and can accommodate us all.

So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.
— creativesoul
I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing — andrewk

That would be a very queer move for someone to make. Each and every day people say meaningful things in common language that are not amenable to logical translation. There are thought/belief governed by common language that cannot be aptly put into terms of being the value of a bound variable.

The semantics of common language is directly at odds with many a philosophical notion. "An abstract object of thought" is one such notion. Quine aimed at abstract objects of thought. "Existence" is held by some to be such an object. Quine had the right target. He did not have the right ammunition.

Limiting the interpretation to formal logical expressions would make the statement nonsensical. It would mean that 'Quine did not recognise the statement "Look, there's a wombat!" as taking account of existence. — andrewk

Or a red herring?

I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing — andrewk

So he's including all the ones that can be and/or have been already translated into logical notation?

Nah. That can't be what you mean here.

He's including natural language expressions that already have been translated into logical notation and natural language expressions that have semantic dopplegangers?