In Chapter I of the Science of Logic, Hegel defines being to mean 'pure indeterminateness and emptiness', from which he concludes that being is nothing. Hegel then defines nothing as 'absence of all determination.' Since both being and nothing are absence of determination, Hegel concludes that 'being and nothing are the same'. But Hegel then writes:

'But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming...'

In other words, becoming is the union of being and nothing. Two questions.

(1) How can Hegel claim that being and nothing are and are not the same? This is a contradiction.

(2) How can being vanish into nothing and nothing vanish into being? This violates Parmenides' argument in On Nature, according to which being cannot come from nothing, and vice versa.