I'm not disagreeing that the ability to organize sensations isn't less inherent in the nature of the mind than the sensations themselves. Without either there would be no mind. It would be like saying you could boil water without any water.I'm not 'conflating' anything. Without the ability to organise sensations, then what kind of ideas could you form of anything? It's not simply a question of 'recieving sensations' and 'learning by experience' - the mind has innate abilities and capacities of many kinds, which constitute ideas. Now, whether that means that we're born with ideas, is another question, but what I am arguing is that we are not born 'tabula rasa', as Locke says, and we don't accumulate knowledge solely through experience or sensory impressions. — Wayfarer
Learn how to throw a rock well, and precisely. That takes some pretty hardcore math skillz. — Wozret
No. That's not all my post says. Defining these terms would certainly be a starting point and would build a good foundation for what we are talking about. If you have better definitions then by all means, provide them instead of just putting words in my mouth.Basically your post says 'hey, all we need to do is define 'ideas' and 'knowledge'! - and then you proceed to do that, as if you can compose a forum post, and basically wrap up the entire curriculum of philosophy. They're deep issues - Plato's dialogue on the nature of knowledge presents various definitions but ultimately leaves it an open question. — Wayfarer
In any case, however, these hinge beliefs seem to work pretty well. Hinge beliefs, or beliefs in general, that are horribly off-base would probably not be very conducive to survival and would thus be selected against. — darthbarracuda
Insofar as language is learned and all ideas are expressed in learned languages it makes it seem as though all ideas are acquired by experience. I seem to remember that Kant made a distinction (and I think he was following Leibniz' own explicit statements in this) between ideas that are merely acquired by experience but cannot be confirmed or dis-confirmed by particular experiences and yet are self-evident by virtue of the general logic of experience itself, and ideas (in the form of beliefs and judgements) which may be confirmed or dis-confirmed by particular experiences.
I take this to mean that some ideas are intuitively self-evident to us and so are not dependent on language per se, although they do require a language for their formulation. It is language which allows us to make explicit what would otherwise be merely implicit and would be reflected only in our behavior and dispositions. — John
It is not on this basis a concept but rather our ability to perceive, and we cannot perceive without this ability. It is not conceptual in that sense, it is necessarily a part of the hardware we born with. — Cavacava
Do you believe in such a thing as an innate idea? Or are ideas always built up from experience? — Mongrel
How do we know that these other ideas are "unconscious"? Our brains are modular and we could have several different parts forming different concepts with different data.Consciousness is always of something. It isn't clear that all thought and ideation are necessarily conscious. I think nativism is counting on the existence of unconscious ideas. If such a thing exists, how does that work? — Mongrel
How do we know that these other ideas are "unconscious"? Our brains are modular and we could have several different parts forming different concepts with different data. — Harry Hindu
Then you're not familiar with modern theories in neuro science and psychology.I'm not familiar with modularity in brains. — Mongrel
Exactly - just as the number and kinds of sensory devices you have reduce the number of possible outcomes in your mind and create an innate tendency to think in sensory impressions (symbols). Do the symbols lean us toward the truth? Darwin says we an rely on that because of natural selection also fine-tuning the mind to interpret these symbols in ways that allow the organism to survive and procreate in a dynamic environment.We can tell that math isn't straightforwardly innate because there wouldn't be any such thing as a math class if that was true. That's one prong of Locke's attack. The other prong is to say that if Leibniz (and others) are saying that humans have a potential to acquire knowledge, then the thesis is trivially true.
Leibniz says it's something else. He uses the tabula rasa image, but says we should imagine it as marble with streaks running through it. Any statue can be cut from plain marble, but the streaky kind will reduce the number of possible outcomes... in like manner, the mind has an innate tendency to think along certain lines.
But do the streaks lean us toward the truth? Descartes says we can rely on that because of God's benevolence. For Leibniz, it's more that the human mind is a reflection of the divine mind. — Mongrel
If your only argument is that my explanation is to simple then I take that as a compliment. — Harry Hindu
OK then, I meant 'simplistic'. — Wayfarer
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