Yes, colour is something we experience. It doesn’t exist apart from a mind’s experience of it.

Yes, colour is something we experience. — AJJ

Didn't we just go back and forth for a ridiculous length of time with me explaining that the experience of a color is not the same thing as the color?

And you wouldn’t answer in what sense you thought light refraction was the same as colour. It’s colour only in virtue of the fact that, when looked at, it will be experienced as colour. It is not in itself colour, because it is only particles. It is only when looked at that they generate colour, in the mind.

And you wouldn’t answer in what sense you thought light refraction was the same as colour. — AJJ

With respect to this, I said this and you ignored it, which is why it went no further. You can't ignore it, then: "The question makes no sense. Are you thinking that the only senses there are of anything are experienced senses? "

Maybe you can answer that now?

Yes. That is the definition of a sense.

Yes. That is the definition of a sense. — AJJ

Where in the world are you getting that idea from?

Our sense of sight is our visual experience of things. Our sense of smell is our olfactory experience of things. Our sense of hearing is our auditory experience of things, and so on.

So when you ask "And you wouldn’t answer in what sense you thought light refraction was the same as colour," you're asking me to say, "sight," "smell," "hearing," "touch" or "taste"? You're not asking about definitions/connotations?

There “sense” = manner. In what manner - or in what way - do you think light refraction is the same as colour? I’m saying it’s only in virtue of the fact that when looked at it will be experienced as such.

do you think light refraction is the same as colour? — AJJ

Light refraction is something we're naming "color." I'm not saying that it's the same as the experience of color. I'm saying exactly the opposite of that, which is important for the confusion you're expressing above, where you're expecting the experience to be the same as the color in some way.

If light refraction is different from the experience of colour, what makes a brain phenomenon the same as an experience of colour?

If light refraction is different from the experience of colour, what makes a brain phenomenon the same as an experience of colour? — AJJ

I don't know how that question makes sense to you, really. In the first case we're naming two separate things ontologically. In the second case, we're naming two identical things ontologically. I'm not sure how else to answer that. It's kind of like trying to answer, "If planets are not identical to stars, what makes the morning star identical to the evening star." How do we answer that? What makes the morning star identical to the evening star is that it turns out that both terms actually have the same thing as a referent (namely Venus). But that's just another way of saying that they're identical, no?

I’m asking you to demonstrate why you think brain phenomena and experiences are identical, not simply to insist that they are.

Then just ask that. Asking "what makes x and y identical" seems like you're asking for some sort of explanation of how it would work ontologically that some x and y could be identical.

All the evidence we have shows that mentality is simply brain phenomena. I can't list it all, of course, but it includes things like:

https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-movies/
https://www.headway.org.uk/media/3999/psychological-effects-of-brain-injury-e-booklet.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29223975
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/01/070131135536.htm
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5649212/

I’ve been posing the problem of qualia to your position. The observation that redness is a quality that exists in the mind but not in the material world; that brain states do not exhibit redness, and that therefore the mind, which does exhibit redness to the person whose mind it is, must be different from the brain, and different from brain states. Brain states is a paraphrase of brain phenomena. This is one of the principle arguments against materialist theories of mind.

The observation that redness is a quality that exists in the mind but not in the material world; that brain states do not exhibit redness, and that therefore the mind, which does exhibit redness to the person whose mind it is, must be different from the brain, and different from brain states. Brain states is a paraphrase of brain phenomena. This is one of the principle arguments against materialist theories of mind. — AJJ

Once again, this is a simple confusion. "Redness" (or the property of being red) is NOT IDENTICAL to the experience of red(ness). So it's quite silly to expect the experience of red(ness) to BE red(ness). It's not. It's the EXPERIENCE of redness. It's not itself red(ness).

You're confusing the experience of something with the thing that's experienced.

You’re failing to understand that something does not appear red unless it is looked at.

Of course it doesn't "appear red," if we're using "appear" to refer to experience of it, unless it's looked at.

That doesn't mean that it's not red if it's not looked at. It just doesn't "appear red." Because that phrase refers to experience per se.

The point being, it’s only in the mind that anything ever appears red. A brain phenomenon does not in itself appear red, but generates redness in the mind. Therefore they can’t be identical. Simply insisting that they are identical is no good, you have to get around this problem.

The point being, it’s only in the mind that anything ever appears red — AJJ

Experience is mental, yes. What the experience is of isn't mental. The experience of x isn't going to be identical to x. Obviously, right?

Thus forwarding an argument where we act as if it's problematic that the experience of x isn't itself x is stupid.

Mind isn't identical to brain simply because we're insisting it. It's because all of the evidence points to it. Just ignoring the evidence and going back to a more or less retard-level argument doesn't help.

If it’s a “retard-level” argument you should be embarrassed you don’t understand it. Being unaware of a major argument against your position and insisting that it’s proven by all “the evidence”, ignoring the basic logical problem with the whole concept, is no good.

Holy shit, you are not making a major argument against ANY position! You are baffled, and should pay attention to what you are being told so you can learn where you are making semantic and philosophical mistakes. Good god man!
The lack of understanding is entirely your own, and Terrapin has laid it out very plainly. I do not know whats blocking your ability to comprehend the very very simple distinctions and results of those distinctions to the subject matter but its aggravating me and Im not even the conversation! If you are trolling, then hats off, you are showing true mastery!

Perhaps restate the argument I’ve been making, to see if you understand it.

Terrapin has simply been insisting without argument that the experience of colour and colour are distinct, and insisting without argument that brain phenomena and experience are the same thing. I’ve been giving reasons why that doesn’t make sense, which have been ignored.

By the way, even if the argument you're endorsing didn't rest on a completely inane confusion between x and the experience of x (a confusion where one is supposing that the experience of x should literally possess the properties of x for some unfathomably ridiculous reason), as an argument against materialism, it's even more inane, as it suggests the following:

An experience of x literally possesses the properties of x. And since physical things other than x don't literally have the properties of x (for example, brains aren't fire trucks), then the experience of x must be nonphysical, because . . . well, nonphysical things that aren't x literally have the properties of x (the nonphysical experience of a fire truck is a fire truck) based on . . . Well, who knows, as there's zero evidence of nonphysical things even, and the very idea of them is incoherent, but we're making this nonsensical shit up, akin to making up "God did it" to explain something we otherwise can't explain or that we're confused about, even though what we're making up not only doesn't explain anything any better, it introduces this additional incoherent garbage. Q.E.D. Bow and exit stage left while thinking oneself to be extraordinarily clever.

Terrapin has simply been insisting without argument that the experience of colour and colour are distinct, — AJJ

You already agreed with that. The only difference is that you're not agreeing to name a particular thing "color" that I'm naming "color" rather than the experience of color. That naming doesn't matter. It's still x versus the experience of x (with the latter bestowed with a unique name), which you agree are different.

Why then are our brain states identical to our experiences? As opposed to it being the case that we experience our brain states?

Why then are our brain states identical to our experiences? — AJJ

Earlier when you asked this--well, or something very similar to it--you claimed that you were asking for supporting evidence of it . . . at which point you proceeded to ignore that track once some evidence was given. Are you asking for evidence here, or are you now asking why some x and y would be identical? (Where presumably "because they're the same thing" should be the sort of thing that would count as an answer, but where that should also be obvious to anyone who understands the term "identical," so we have to wonder just what sort of response you'd be looking for.)

I’m looking for a response that doesn’t simply insist without argument your position to be the case.

I’m aware that when we experience something, something happens in the brain. What makes you think what is happening in the brain is identical to the experience, as opposed to the experience being of what is happening in the brain? You should give a logical reason why it is more plausible to believe the former.

What makes you think what is happening in the brain is identical to the experience, — AJJ

For one, the fact that all of the evidence that we have points to this.

I asked for a response without a simple insistence that what you believe is true. Give examples of this evidence. Refer to it, show why it shows your position to be the more plausible. Don’t simply post links, I’m not here to argue against links, but against other people, on this, a philosophy forum, populated by people interested in arguing about philosophy, and not only stating what they believe over and over without support.