That's strange I would think that "ripeness" is a judgement made by human beings, and not a property at all. When the banana is ripe for me, it is overripe for my son. Ripeness is not a property at all, it's a judgement, just like good and bad are not properties of moral and immoral acts, they are judgements of such acts. Come to think of it, redness, big, small, hard and soft, and everything that we call "properties" are just judgements made by human beings. When we say that such and such has X property, we are just making a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
If being able to be measured, and having spatial relations with other things is having a "location in space", then the imaginary pattern has no location in space. — Metaphysician Undercover
Studies in physics demonstrate that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign spatial locations to parts (particles) within objects. So I think that my position is much more realistic than yours. — Metaphysician Undercover
The threads are physical things which we can sense, and spatial and temporal relations are not sensible so they are non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, what are you saying - that there are no such things as properties - only judgments? Judgments about what? — Harry Hindu
What is ripe for you isn't overripe for your son. It is still in a state of ripeness that either you or your son prefer. It isn't that it is over ripe for your son, it is the same ripeness as it is for you, it's just that he prefer's his under ripe, whereas you prefer yours ripe. You aren't determining the ripeness of fruit. It is your judgment, or preference, of the current state of ripeness. Your judgment has to be about something, and it is about the current state of the fruit. You are committing a category error in projecting "good" or "bad" onto the fruit, when the fruit is only ripe, over ripe, or under ripe, not good or bad. Good and bad are properties of judgments. — Harry Hindu
Your syllogism is correct, but I don't agree with (nor can see any reason for) the premise. Why would our ability to measure something have anything to do with its having a location in space? Surely all our ability to measure something tells us is our current state of technology, not anything ontological?
If you mean our ability to measure something in theory, then you're just begging the question by asserting that the pattern in the mind cannot be measured. That is the very issue at hand. — Isaac
It is difficult to determine the spatial location of quantum particles, but as soon as they become physical objects their spatial location is not at all difficult to determine. — Isaac
Not that "physical" is defined by "what we can sense," but you can't sense that something is, say, a meter to the left of something else? How do you figure out that something is a meter to the left of something else if you don't sense that? — Terrapin Station
If you mean, do I think there is in principle an explanation for scientific laws, the answer is: I don't think there is — Wayfarer
To say that the pattern has a spatial location inside a brain is really nonsense because the neurosurgeon will find neurons, synapses, and things like that, but not the pattern which is being imagined. — Metaphysician Undercover
So you believe that there is a time when a quantum particle is not a physical object? I suppose therefore, that at this time it is non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
It seems like you accept dualism in the principles of physics, but not in ontology of the human being. Isn't this the type of nonsense which the op refers to? Dualism in physics is conventional, but the physicalist doesn't allow dualism in ontology. What's with that? — Metaphysician Undercover
No I can't sense that one thing is a metre to the left of another, that must be measured or in some other way judged. Senses don't make judgements, minds do. — Metaphysician Undercover
How are you determining that the "neurons, synapses, and things like that" are not the pattern? Again, you're begging the question. You're assuming 'the pattern' is some existant thing (such that you can say that a collection of neurons aren't it) in a discussion about whether a pattern is an existant thing. — Isaac
No. Not a physical object, and not physical at all are two different things. Energy is physical, but it is not a physical object. — Isaac
Yes, that's pretty much true in essence. I don't think physicists would use the term' dualism', but it certainly seems as though some very 'spooky' stuff is going on at the quantum scale. But it's not 'nonsense' at all to dismiss it at the human level. There is sound empirical and mathematical evidence for the 'spooky stuff' going on at the quantum level. There is none whatsoever for it going on at the human level. We do not require a 'realm of thought' to create useful models of the world (yet), so why invent one? — Isaac
Can you sense the measurement? — Terrapin Station
It is a comparison between the thing measured and the devise, or standard used for measuring. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that raises the question of what demarcates physics from metaphysics. Is it a difference in kind or a difference in focus? As I see it, philosophy goes meta by focusing natural investigation onto itself. That is, it is the investigation of investigation. — Andrew M
As I said before, if the pattern which we are talking about is not an existent thing, then what are we talking about, — Metaphysician Undercover
We agreed that there is one pattern on the shirt, and one pattern in the imagination, — Metaphysician Undercover
Energy is not a physical object, it is an attribute, a property of moving objects, the capacity to do work. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you truly believe that there is no quantum activity in the human nervous system? — Metaphysician Undercover
How are you determining that the "neurons, synapses, and things like that" are not the pattern? Again, you're begging the question. You're assuming 'the pattern' is some existant thing (such that you can say that a collection of neurons aren't it) in a discussion about whether a pattern is an existant thing. — Isaac
No. Not a physical object, and not physical at all are two different things. Energy is physical, but it is not a physical object. I'm not in any way an expert in physics, so my terminology might be all wrong, apologies if it is, but the difference I'm trying to capture is only that between energy and matter, which I understand are somehow convertible from/to one another. — Isaac
you don't sense what the tape measure reads at the other rock, etc. Is that right? — Terrapin Station
Not sure I did, but I may have been careless with my language I suppose. I don't agree that there "is" a pattern on the shirt and one in the imagination (where 'is' is being used to convey existence). I think we can talk about the pattern of the shirt, and we can talk about the pattern of the imagination, but neither exist outside of what they both physically are (shirt and brain). — Isaac
No, and I'm not sure where you might have got that impression from. My understanding of the physics is that the theories at a quantum scale do not apply to objects at a non-quantum level (which neurons certainly would be), that the uncertainties resolve as soon as physical mass is obtained. We might have the particle which mysteriously changes properties depending on whether it is observed, but we do not have any objects which behave this way. — Isaac
I read the tape with my mind, not with my eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to have agreed that we can talk about patterns without any judgement about whether or not these patterns exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
So why do you want to make assertions about where they physically are? — Metaphysician Undercover
Woah, cool. You're a psychic! — Isaac
I don't. I suppose I would be asserting where the origin of the pattern I'm talking about (which, as above, does not 'exist') physically is. Like a painting of a unicorn. I might say "the unicorn in that painting has black fur, that's unusual for a unicorn, and it looks like it's angry about something". Of course, the unicorn in question does not exist, neither do any of the unicorns I'm comparing it to in establishing it uniqueness, but that doesn't mean it's not relevant where the origin of my abstraction is located. Its about a presumption of shared experience. I see a shirt reflecting partly black, partly white light. I abstract from those light signals a pattern, as set of instructions (black....move an inch...white). I point out the origin of that abstraction, and even talk colloquially about its "being on the shirt" because I presume your mind is sufficiently like mine that you will form a similar abstraction. — Isaac
So, the laws of physics are observed and measured (meaning not measuring some imaginary event!) and mathematical abstractions are then created - thought up - in order to make useful and applicable predictions about how experienced phenomena relate - or don’t relate! — I like sushi
I already explained how saying something has a specific property does not mean that the thing has that property. Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. Like I said, redness carries information about all three causes, not just the apple. Just as a doctor can test your sensory system by making you look at letters, the letters are the constant, but our sensory systems could be different and create different visual effects in our minds. We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision?We make judgements about anything. Do you recognize the difference between the thing and what is attributed to the thing (a property)? Or, the difference between the subject and the predicate? To say that something has a specific property does not mean that the thing actually has that property, the statement is a reflection of a judgement. It means that the thing has been judged to have that property. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. Sure, humans create arbitrary categories to make sense of the world. These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. If I was referring to the apple when using the word, "ripe", and you were referring to your judgment, then we would both be talking past each other. When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table?That's nonsense. If it isn't a judgement which determines whether the fruit is ripe or not then how is the ripeness determined? Do you not see that there needs to be criteria as to what constitutes "ripe" and, that there needs to be a comparison of the fruit in relation to this criteria, in order for the fruit to be determined as ripe or not? If this comparison is not a judgement, then what is it?
This is the case when any properties are attributed to anything, it is a matter of judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
Physicalism is the idea that nothing exists except for concrete objects in the material world. But physics is the study of the mathematic principles which determine the behavior of these material objects. And these abstract principles (e.g. F=G(m1m2)/r^2) surely don't exist in the material world. You can't locate them under a microscope. So acknowledging that the laws of physics exist seems to contradict the theory of physicalism. Thoughts? — Dusty of Sky
Physicalism is the idea that nothing exists except for concrete objects in the material world. — Dusty of Sky
That's right, the tape measure doesn't read, I read the tape measure, and reading is a mental activity. I read the tape with my mind, not with my eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Physics is derived from the Greek 'study of nature', conventionally distinguished from metaphysics. So I would say, different in kind. Post Galilean science concentrates on what is quantifiable, first and foremost. The primary or measurable qualities or attributes of any subject are just those factors which can be precisely described in such terms. So the natural sciences likewise are conceived in mainly quantitative terms which is why physics is the paradigmatic science of modernity. But as the OP points out, in fact the ontological status equations, algorithms, and mathematical theorems, are themselves not something which can be located in the physical domain. So, yes, agree with you that metaphysics is in some fundamental way thinking about the nature of knowledge itself, about what it means to know. That is mostly shoved aside or ignored or taken for granted in a lot of analytical philosophy. — Wayfarer
Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. — Harry Hindu
We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. — Harry Hindu
If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision? — Harry Hindu
I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. — Harry Hindu
These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. — Harry Hindu
When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table? — Harry Hindu
You’re being absurd if that’s what you think I meant. The relation is observed and measured. Thus ‘laws’ are established and further refined.
I wasn’t saying anything outrageous. The OP is ridiculous. — I like sushi
Do you sense the tape measure? — Terrapin Station
Sure, I see something which I call a tape measure, but even in calling it a tape measure, I am making a mental judgement. I think the point is that there is no sensing without mental activity. So I think it would be incorrect to say I see this, or I see that, as an act of sensation alone, without an accompanying act of mind. Mind is required for seeing, and I believe, any type of sensing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense?The doctor makes a judgement comparing what you claim to see, with a standard, the norm. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you sense the marking on the tape measure? — Terrapin Station
Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense? — Harry Hindu
You have to realize that judgments are about things, and it is what those judgments are about that matter. Sure, it could be that judgments is all you can do and make of the world, but the aboutness of those judgments creates a relationship that we usually refer to as "accuracy", so judgments themselves have a property of accuracy where they are more or less representative of what they are about. — Harry Hindu
Instead of "judgment", I think I prefer "interpretation". Our senses don't lie, but we can lie to ourselves by interpreting sensory data incorrectly. In interpreting sensory data, we are attempting to determine what they are about. What they're cause is. If they have no cause, then solipsism would be the case, which is what it seems that you are ultimately arguing for. — Harry Hindu
How else can you explain similar judgments by similar minds? Think about it. If we are all separate minds without a shared world (if that makes any sense) then how is it that we came to similar judgments about our separate sensory data - like that there is an "external" world and that there are other minds, and that you are similar enough to be part of a group of similar entities called "human beings"? How is it that "norms" can even be established and referred to? How is it that language could evolve at all? There must be more to the world than just our judgments - or its solipsism, and I assure you that if solipsism is the case, then I'm the solipsist and you are just a judgment in my mind that only exists when I read your words. — Harry Hindu
How about sensing the tape measure stretched between the two rocks? — Terrapin Station
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