The nature of pleasure

Inyenzi

There is an everyday view of suffering and pleasure that sees suffering as being positively negative, and pleasure as being positively good. The hedonic value of an experience is seen as lying somewhere on a spectrum that has suffering (and its degrees) on one side of hedonic neutral, and pleasure (and its degrees) on the other.

But are pleasurable experiences truly good in the way suffering is positively bad? Is the hedonic spectrum truly double ended?

I tend to see the picture as far more bleak, siding with the views of various Buddhists, Arthur Schopenhauer, Hegesias, etc. In that suffering is what is positively bad, whereas pleasure exists only as a reduction or cessation of some suffering, pain, lack, dissatisfaction or another. Suffering are sensations that are unwanted - they are afflictions. The hedonic value of pleasure is nothing over and above the removal of these afflictions. There is nothing extra.

Lets take hunger and the pleasure of eating as an example. We have a metabolism. We require energy, vitamins, minerals, elements, hydration. Bodies lacking in these forms of nutrition hurt. In the short term, we start feeling fatigued and sluggish, irritable, our stomach hurts and rumbles, our productivity reduces. We are afflicted by sensations that are unwanted. If we continue to not eat, these sensations, and the degree to which they hurt, only increase exponentially, until within a few months our bodies, racked with vitamin, mineral, and caloric defeciencies will excruciatingly and slowly cannabilize itself to death. Without eating, all of us will be dead by this agonizing process within 1-3 months. It's quite sobering how close all humanity is to starvation, and how real and genuine our need to eat is. Driven by these painful sensations that arise when we lack calories and nutrition, we seek out and ingest food, which temporarily reduces or negates these sensations. By consequence we maintain biological homeostasis, and the process repeats. Eating today, so that we may feel hunger again tomorrow.

But where in this process is the positive hedonic good, the actual pleasure of eating. The true good, over and above the reduction in bad? It is nowhere to be found. If eating is genuinely pleasurable, why do we eat only until satiation (note - I see obese people as not being able to reach satiation, rather than eating out of the positive hedonic value of eating)? Some might say the positive hedonic value of eating comes from the actual taste sensations felt on ones tongue. Firstly, if that were true then why are we put off by the idea of having a constant taste sensation in ones mouth (of say, strawberries)? What do we actually mean when we say something tastes good? That it is agreeable? That we desire more? That it is conducive to being ingested? That I experience some sort of momentary loss of self within the sensation in the same way say one is absorbed into a film? If the genuine hedonic value of eating lies in taste sensations, then why do I swallow?

Can we not analyze all things we call the good in life in the same way? As not being genuinely good in themselves but rather as some combination of a reduction or cessation in suffering/dissatisfaction/lack, a drive satisfied, or an experience of selflessness where ones subject-object relation to the world dissolves within the experience (eg, loss of self within the orgasm sensation). After all, we call a film 'good' based on the degree that one was immersed and absorbed within it, forgetting oneself. Likewise with music, sex, conversation. Put simply (in terms of the hedonic value of our lives) there is only suffering and its negation, in some form or another.

Do you agree with this (admittedly) bleak view? Why/why not?

*Note I am not arguing that life has no value whatsoever

Pattern-chaser

Can we not analyze all things we call the good in life in the same way? As not being genuinely good in themselves but rather as some combination of a reduction or cessation in suffering/dissatisfaction/lack...

Do you agree with this (admittedly) bleak view? Why/why not? — Inyenzi

No, I don't. Your treatment seems to isolate pleasure and suffering, to see them as two things, separate and distinct. My view is to see them as a pair, like yin and yang are a pair. They describe the extremes of one spectrum. So an experience of this type, that you judge to be positive, you describe as "pleasure". And for the experiences you judge negatively, you call them "suffering". But that doesn't make them different. They are still the same thing, but some are viewed more positively than others.

Just my two pennyworth.... :up:

Shawn

I tend to see the picture as far more bleak, siding with the views of various Buddhists, Arthur Schopenhauer, Hegesias, etc. In that suffering is what is positively bad, whereas pleasure exists only as a reduction or cessation of some suffering, pain, lack, dissatisfaction or another. Suffering are sensations that are unwanted - they are afflictions. The hedonic value of pleasure is nothing over and above the removal of these afflictions. There is nothing extra. — Inyenzi

So, if I recall correctly Schopenhauer never advocated masking suffering with pleasure. He was for the idea of reducing suffering, not increasing pleasure. Not sure if this is pertinent, just wanted to point that out.

It's quite sobering how close all humanity is to starvation, and how real and genuine our need to eat is. Driven by these painful sensations that arise when we lack calories and nutrition, we seek out and ingest food, which temporarily reduces or negates these sensations. By consequence we maintain biological homeostasis, and the process repeats. Eating today, so that we may feel hunger again tomorrow. — Inyenzi

Not really. Food is remarkably cheap. The starvation crisis in Africa isn't as dire as it was many years ago.

Do you agree with this (admittedly) bleak view? Why/why not? — Inyenzi

So, you bring up the concept of homeostasis, yet then present the picture of there being an almost endless desire to experience what is known as pleasure. Homeostasis is self-regulation, so there's no need to insist that pleasure will endlessly be pursued. Think about tolerance, as an example. Or satiety.

Shamshir

What do we actually mean when we say something tastes good? That it is agreeable? That we desire more? — Inyenzi

That it fits.

When the shoe fits, it is comfortable.
When it does not, it pinches or flies off.

ernestm

I applaud the OP for some very good thought.

Maybe you find it interesting to consider Locke's view on hunger, thirst, and other bodily desires. He observes, if we did not have such desires, we would be unmoving, like rocks and stones. So God, in His infinite wisdom, created us with desires that are never fully satisfied. Even when satiated, the desires return. That creates a restlessness of the Will, which in its movement, creates good and evil.

However, Locke continues, pleasure is an impermanent reward for the satiation of desires. True happiness arises from acting for the greater good.

So really the opposite of suffering would be happiness, not pleasure. And suffering arises from people not acting from the greater good. The opposite of pleasure is not suffering, but pain.

It's a good empirical model, even if you don't agree with the premises.

TheMadFool

↪Inyenzi

I heard this somewhere I can't remember:

1. Pleasure is a drug
2. Medicine is bitter

What do you make of that?

Inyenzi

So, if I recall correctly Schopenhauer never advocated masking suffering with pleasure. He was for the idea of reducing suffering, not increasing pleasure. Not sure if this is pertinent, just wanted to point that out. — Wallows

Yep, so what I am referring to Schophenauer's views along these lines:

Happiness is of a negative rather than positive nature, and for this reason cannot give lasting satisfaction and gratification, but rather only ever a release from a pain or lack, which must be followed either by a new pain or by languor, empty yearning and boredom. — Schophenaur

I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in its character. Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his position by using a palpable and paltry sophism. It is the good which is negative; in other words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought to an end. — Schophenaur

Shawn

↪Inyenzi

Yeah, pretty much everything you said is in those two quotes. Ta-da!

Inyenzi

However, Locke continues, pleasure is an impermanent reward for the satiation of desires. True happiness arises from acting for the greater good. — ernestm

1. Pleasure is a drug
2. Medicine is bitter

What do you make of that? — TheMadFool

I agree with these themes. Due to pleasure only existing in relation some suffering or desire being negated, it cannot given as that which gives life its value or meaning. If one agrees with the outline of pleasure in the this thread, and also takes a hedonic view on the good in life, then the conclusion would be reached that the highest good belongs to the dead (which is essentially the view of the Buddhists).

Inyenzi

Yeah, pretty much everything you said is in those two quotes. Ta-da! — Wallows

So the purpose of this thread is to try and get a discussion started on whether this view on pleasure (found also in the thought of the Buddhists, Arthur Schophenauer, Locke, Hegesias, etc) is correct. And in a wider sense, how we should respond if so. If the good of our existence is not found in chasing pleasure, satisfying desires, fulfilling our needs, then where is it found? How should we then choose to find value in our lives?

I could have started this thread with a series of quotations from various authours outlining the general idea, but this being a philosophy discussion forum, chose to use my own words.

Possibility

So the purpose of this thread is to try and get a discussion started on whether this view on pleasure (found also in the thought of the Buddhists, Arthur Schophenauer, Locke, Hegesias, etc) is correct. And in a wider sense, how we should respond if so. If the good of our existence is not found in chasing pleasure, satisfying desires, fulfilling our needs, then where is it found? How should we then choose to find value in our lives? — Inyenzi

Perhaps the good of our existence is found in chasing awareness and interconnectedness, and in fulfilling the overall potential of the universe. We should then choose to find value in the way our lives intertwine with everything else, and how our own potential is broadened in the awareness and fulfilment of a universal potentiality: the capacity to develop, achieve or succeed as a whole.

Merkwurdichliebe

Perhaps the good of our existence is found in chasing awareness and interconnectedness, and in fulfilling the overall potential of the universe. We should then choose to find value in the way our lives intertwine with everything else, and how our own potential is broadened in the awareness and fulfilment of a universal potentiality: the capacity to develop, achieve or succeed as a whole. — Possibility

Everything up to "the capacity to develop, achieve or succeed as a whole".

At this point, if everyone had proceeded into their "own potential [...] broadened in the awareness and fulfilment of a universal potentiality", then bellum omnium contra omnes would be a paradise-in-the-flesh.

TheMadFool

I agree with these themes. Due to pleasure only existing in relation some suffering or desire being negated, it cannot given as that which gives life its value or meaning. If one agrees with the outline of pleasure in the this thread, and also takes a hedonic view on the good in life, then the conclusion would be reached that the highest good belongs to the dead (which is essentially the view of the Buddhists). — Inyenzi

Hedonism is a philosophy and but philosophy is not all about pleasure is it?

Shamshir

↪TheMadFool

In that sense:
1. Pleasure is acquisition.
2. Medicine is denial.

Just one more thing VS no more.

Shawn

And in a wider sense, how we should respond if so. — Inyenzi

I'm going to go on a limb here and say that should responses are pleasure driven. Once you realize this the map is fully defined and complete in regards to Schopenhauer and his pessimism.

If the good of our existence is not found in chasing pleasure, satisfying desires, fulfilling our needs, then where is it found? — Inyenzi

According to Schopenhauer in the transcendental and aesthetic, where the self diminishes and eventually vanishes into the horizon.

How should we then choose to find value in our lives? — Inyenzi

Yeah, first paragraph.

Joshs

↪Inyenzi

There is an alternative view of pleasure and suffering, espoused by Nietzsche and poststructuralist philosophers, among others. This view does not treat pleasure and pain in terms of a hedonic economic model , but in terms of valuative meaning. Pleasure and suffering are not opposites in the sense of lack vs plenitude, as if pain is the being deprived of some sort of substance that pleasure replenishes, or that pain is the active destruction of something in the body or soul, and pleasure halts this destruction.
Rather than this oppositional, static equilibrium account, the post-Nietzscheans, as I'll call them, understand pleasure-pain as complicit in the creation of subjective meaning. The meaning in our lives always aims beyond itself and is anticipatory, The meaning of meaning is its 'aboutness', We are creatures of becoming rather than just being. This means that not only are our positive affects(joy, contentment, awe) future-oriented, but so is unpleasant experience. Furthermore, if our positive experiences are creative, then so are our negative experiences. Suffering doesn't simply take away from what is positive, as a lack . It has its own positive meaning that addresses the particularity of what matters to us , even as it disrupts the good feeling in that situation. Unpleasant experieince comes from, speaks to , belongs to, and advances the story that our positive experience unfolds

If we are on the way elsewhere in the midst of joy and contentment, then the suffering that emerges to interrupt that enjoyment addresses, belongs to and further meaningfully changes our existential situation. So when we 'recover' from a spate of suffering, it is not as if we have simply returned to a prior state of pleasantness. The suffering meaningfully changes us, and the new state of positivity is based on, uses as a foundation, the suffering it 'recovers' from. The reason we enjoy horror or suspense movies and novels, sad music and scary roller coasters, is because the suffering is a part of a meaningful story and has a significant role to play in contributing to the creative unfolding of life's narratives. If pain were nothing but empty lack, there would be no reason to insert sadness, fear and violence into our dramas. There would be no reason to create dramas.

One may argue that even if we accept this view, we still have a kind of a lifelong stalemate between what we enjoy and what makes us suffer. But the post-Nietzschean view sees no static equilibrium. Because meaningful existence is a becoming, the nature of our suffering changes as our lives unfold, along with the changing meanings that we create. As an adult, I do not experience the intensity and primalness of affects like fear, rage and sadness that I did as a child or even in my 20's, because I don't understand my world in the stark , polarized terms I did then.. By the same token ,the way I experience my joys has changed also, becoming more modulated and nuanced.

Possibility

Everything up to "the capacity to develop, achieve or succeed as a whole".

At this point, if everyone had proceeded into their "own potential [...] broadened in the awareness and fulfilment of a universal potentiality", then bellum omnium contra omnes would be a paradise-in-the-flesh. — Merkwurdichliebe

I’m not sure that I follow how this comment relates. In my view there is a difference between everyone pursuing our own needs as a priority, and the broadening of our own potential by pursuing the fulfilment of a universal potentiality as the priority. The latter I think is more in line with this Buddhist concept of not-self, and the view of pleasure as described in this thread.

Pardon my ignorance, but you might have to explain what you mean a little further before I can respond.

Terrapin Station

There is an everyday view of suffering and pleasure that sees suffering as being positively negative, — Inyenzi

Positively negative?

Inyenzi

↪Joshs

Fantastic post :up:

schopenhauer1

Can we not analyze all things we call the good in life in the same way? As not being genuinely good in themselves but rather as some combination of a reduction or cessation in suffering/dissatisfaction/lack, a drive satisfied, or an experience of selflessness where ones subject-object relation to the world dissolves within the experience (eg, loss of self within the orgasm sensation). After all, we call a film 'good' based on the degree that one was immersed and absorbed within it, forgetting oneself. Likewise with music, sex, conversation. Put simply (in terms of the hedonic value of our lives) there is only suffering and its negation, in some form or another.

Do you agree with this (admittedly) bleak view? Why/why not? — Inyenzi

So, I thought this was a very good post. This essentially outlines negative utilitarianism and deprivationalism in regards to positive value of good. This is where Buddhism and Schopenhauer are agreeable to me. To be a bit of the devil's advocate here:

Can it be said that there are several categories of pleasure that are truly, positively sought? For example, physical pleasure seems to have a quality that is good intrinsically. Physical pleasure especially, only provides satisfaction in the short-term, however. This is why it is often viewed as fleeting, and one of the major reasons why Buddhism, Stoicism, Pessimism, et al. frown upon focusing solely on it, or even desiring it at all.

Another category that can be argued is positively good is aesthetic pleasure. This would be the pleasure of seeing natural beauty, the pleasure of artistic contemplation, the pleasure of be absorbed in a novel, and I would also put the pleasure of laughter and comedy in this category.

Then there is the category of the feeling of accomplishment. When a large task is completed, and done well, there is a feeling of satisfaction in its completion.

There is also the experience of flow states. Perhaps you are working on some project or sport even, and you are absorbed in the moment. Time doesn't seem to drag, but flows in a way that is highly engaging.

There is also the experience of having deep relationships with friends, intimate others, family, etc. This can invigorate you and make you feel close to others, wanted, loved, and that you have a sense of belonging, etc. It is also a way that can be enjoyable to pass the time.

There is also the experience of curiosity and seeking new information. The satisfaction of learning something new, can also be considered a positive good.

These six things: physical pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, accomplishment, flow states, deep relationships, and learning can all be considered absolutely positive goods- things that are just intrinsically satisfying.

I would like to see your response to that perspective. There is very much the utilitarian calculus of whether life is worth these six goods. If someone said, that all the neutral/negative states that are necessary to maintain these six intrinsic good states, are the cost of the six intrinsic goods, would you feel that it is worth it?

Inyenzi

There is very much the utilitarian calculus of whether life is worth these six goods. If someone said, that all the neutral/negative states that are necessary to maintain these six intrinsic good states, are the cost of the six intrinsic goods, would you feel that it is worth it? — schopenhauer1

If we grant their being truly positive hedonic experiences within lives, and the worth of ones life is based entirely off a cold hedonic calculus of the individual life, then the answer would depend on the life of whom is being asked, no? According to this calculus, a life with great pleasure and little pain would be worth it, whereas a life with great suffering and little pleasure would not be.

I could hypothetically program a conscious robot to only experience the raw sensation of orgasm for 80 years (or some other experience held to be intrinsically good), then shut down having never experienced anything else. According to this calculus, this life would be worth it.

But this kind of 'life' strikes most people as utterly meaningless and insignificant. It is not seen as worthwhile to exist in this way. If given the option to continue their own lives, or switch to being the robot, most would choose to stay. What would determine whether people chose the robot experience over their own, is (I imagine) the degree to which their present experience is characterized by hedonic 'bad'. That is, if one was presently suffering greatly and offered the switch, one would choose the robot as a form of escapism. Most everyday people however would chose their connections to the 'real world' (including the suffering and dissatisfaction it entails) over a total absorption of themselves into pleasure. Likewise, most people don't shoot heroin all day, nor kill themselves to end their suffering.

I tend to think the degree to which one is suffering proportionally nudges someone towards making a hedonic calculus of their own lives worth. Suffering pushes one towards viewing their lives through a hedonic lens. You find this quite clearly in depressed people. They lack a meaningful connection to the world, they aren't caught up in some pursuit or another they deem worthwhile, all that is left to give their lives value is pleasure, which is far outweighed by the pain. But people who are not suffering greatly, and are caught up in their projects and aims don't make this calculus. I'm sure if you asked a whole bunch of fathers why they are living, you would get a lot more, "to provide for my wife and kids", rather than, "through applying a hedonic calculus to my own life, I have determined the good outweighs the bad and therefore it's worth living."

So it's not that the hedonic view of ones life is wrong in-itself, rather it's that the view arises from a life lacking in meaning and purpose, pervaded by suffering. One doesn't argue against the hedonic view of lifes worth, but instead dissolves it by rectifying the causes (i.e. getting up in meaningful pursuits, aims, connections to others). The problem is the existential crisis prevents this - no aims are seen as genuinely worthwhile, no connections are viewed to be truly meaningful, none of the ends in this world make the suffering worth it. But, you don't cure this worldview through seeing life as a bucket of pleasurable experiences and a bucket of bad ones.

Inyenzi

There is very much the utilitarian calculus of whether life is worth these six goods. If someone said, that all the neutral/negative states that are necessary to maintain these six intrinsic good states, are the cost of the six intrinsic goods, would you feel that it is worth it? — schopenhauer1

To actually answer this question,

If I grant that human lives are made worthwhile only by the presence of pleasurable experiences balanced against the bad, then I believe no human life is worth living, let alone starting.

schopenhauer1

↪Inyenzi

I agree. I saw that you might have had a longer post, but it seemed like it was deleted. I'm thinking there's an argument that these goods are rarely purely "positive". There seems to always be a form of harm or suffering surrounding even good things- either to obtain them, maintain them, etc. But the biggest argument is simply that the overall cost of maintaining these intrinsic positive goods overwhelmingly exceeds the actual benefit of experiencing these intrinsic goods.

But, one can say this is just my perspective or assertion as well as yours. What is your response to that? Others will simply say that the intrinsic goods are worthwhile, for ourselves and future people. My argument has always been that it is absolutely wrong to foist and expose challenges for a future person, even if that future person considers the challenge good. Providing challenges to overcome for another person, when there was none necessary, simply to see this carried out in another person is not good. Mixed with this is, exposing a future person to harmful experiences, whether everyday adversity or undue harm, is also not good. Finally, and less absolute but considerable, is that projecting future outcomes as always good for a future child would be foolhardy. Many children will experience much more adversity and harm than they would like, and many will see the intrinsic goods as not worthwhile. Not procreating will never harm anyone. Procreating will always harm someone. But those are some of my arguments. I'd like to see some of yours.

schopenhauer1

So it's not that the hedonic view of ones life is wrong in-itself, rather it's that the view arises from a life lacking in meaning and purpose, pervaded by suffering. One doesn't argue against the hedonic view of lifes worth, but instead dissolves it by rectifying the causes (i.e. getting up in meaningful pursuits, aims, connections to others). The problem is the existential crisis prevents this - no aims are seen as genuinely worthwhile, no connections are viewed to be truly meaningful, none of the ends in this world make the suffering worth it. But, you don't cure this worldview through seeing life as a bucket of pleasurable experiences and a bucket of bad ones. — Inyenzi

I see you saying that life is mainly about the meaning one gets from it through roles in society or esteem from a role in society. That can be added maybe as another category, I'll grant that. However, it is not really saying much more than there is more intrinsic positive goods you can add to the equation, not that the hedonic view is wrong itself. Perspective can be simply part of the hedonic equation.

But you answered the question in the negative- no, the goods are not worth the negatives in purely hedonic terms. I'm adding "meaning through perspective" in hedonic terms. How else would you answer then?

My response is that it's always bad to give somebody a challenge, stress, harm, work to do, and harms- even if somehow the person might identify with these things at some point in the process.

As to why people want to connect with the "real world", usually this is after the fact, not while they are going through the actual undue suffering. This is just the Pollyanna nature of human response to present suffering (in hindsight to it). Rather, people like challenges if they have hope that they can either learn from them or overcome them (the intrinsic goods of learning and accomplishment). They are necessary for these goods to be satisfied, so are almost a "part" of it.

Humans have a natural stance to fear death and fear the pain of death- that whole suicide trope is not a very good argument.

Inyenzi

I see you saying that life is mainly about the meaning one gets from it through roles in society or esteem from a role in society. That can be added maybe as another category, I'll grant that. However, it is not really saying much more than there is more intrinsic positive goods you can add to the equation, not that the hedonic view is wrong itself. Perspective can be simply part of the hedonic equation.

But you answered the question in the negative- no, the goods are not worth the negatives in purely hedonic terms. I'm adding "meaning through perspective" in hedonic terms. How else would you answer then? — schopenhauer1

I was somewhat playing devils advocate. In my life I have noticed that most people are just simply 'caught up' in their day to day lives, rarely reflecting on what it is they are doing and why they are doing it. On what the worth, meaning and value of their activities are. And it is only when one is in a state of not being caught up in their day to day existence that these questions even arise. And so perhaps we can view antinatlist thought as nothing more than a symptom of some sort of deficiency, some sort of lack of engagement or involvement in living. The antitnatalist is in a sense, "stepping back" from actually living his or her life, and instead focuses on a broad overall perspective of life in general (be it, his personal autobiography, or the entirety of the human project, or perhaps the entirety of a material universe). The suggestion here is that perhaps it is only when the way in which one is living fails to engage oneself with the world does this "stepping back" (as a prerequisite for antinatalist thought and conclusion) even take place. Under this outline, antinatalists are just ill in a sense, with the cure being to live in such a way that one is engaged in the world again, where this "stepping back" in perspective doesn't arise. To lose oneself in living again.

But as I say, I am neither fully convinced, nor fully sincere in making this argument.

Humans have a natural stance to fear death and fear the pain of death- that whole suicide trope is not a very good argument. — schopenhauer1

Humans also have a natural stance towards breeding. We want sex. Babies are cute. Yet antinatalists opt out of procreation. I don't think opting out of life as a response to our 'existential situation' can be taken off the table so easily. If we are truly convinced that the things that make living good are zero-sum, just a reduction in bad (or if there are intrinsic goods in our lives, but they aren't worth the cost), why live at all? Why prolong a bad deal? For no other reason than instinct? Simply being too afraid to pull the trigger today, and so go on suffering tomorrow?

Myself, I think it's possible that antinatalist thought and conclusions may just be a symptom of a severely ill human being, and so it would be a huge mistake to end your life based on it (although - that could just be my own fear of death speaking). A lot of the time I'm just caught up in my life and activities so the question of the worth of life, procreating, suicide, doesn't even arise.

schopenhauer1

And it is only when one is in a state of not being caught up in their day to day existence that these questions even arise. And so perhaps we can view antinatlist thought as nothing more than a symptom of some sort of deficiency, some sort of lack of engagement or involvement in living. The antitnatalist is in a sense, "stepping back" from actually living his or her life, and instead focuses on a broad overall perspective of life in general (be it, his personal autobiography, or the entirety of the human project, or perhaps the entirety of a material universe). The suggestion here is that perhaps it is only when the way in which one is living fails to engage oneself with the world does this "stepping back" (as a prerequisite for antinatalist thought and conclusion) even take place. Under this outline, antinatalists are just ill in a sense, with the cure being to live in such a way that one is engaged in the world again, where this "stepping back" in perspective doesn't arise. To lose oneself in living again. — Inyenzi

I think this objection arises from a sort of category error you are making or at the least, a false dichotomy between being "caught up" and "stepping back" from the world. I think there can be both, either at the same time or separately. An example of "at the same time" would be when we are evaluating an activity as we are engaged with it. We can evaluate any (X) activity in a number of ways- boring, dreadful, exciting, interesting, tedious, etc. This can then have its own evaluations that lead to life itself- "Life has tedious, boring, experiences, but I must get this done for some (X) outcome". One can separately step back from the world too and evaluate it. "This world is full of minutia mongering activities in order to get such and such outcome achieved". I explained in another thread that we are the only animal that can evaluate while we are doing an activity. We can evaluate an activity as negative, but still follow through with it to "get something done". Other animals, probably don't have this evaluative aspect to their psyche. It is mainly instinct, minimum routine learning modules, and immediate response to environmental stimuli that dictate their psyches. We can try to extrapolate some evaluative aspect to "preference" (berries to seeds for some birds, for example), but preference and evaluation in the human sense, are apples and oranges, and a category mistake to try to equate.

What you seem to be talking about with "caught up" is flow states, which are peak experiences, and much harder to actually achieve than average, everyday work, maintenance, entertainment activities allow. I'm sure there are thousands of books trying to make everything into a flow state, or achieve it readily, but that is a different topic, and let's just agree at it is not easy to simply achieve without a high level of engagement and interest in the project.

Humans evaluate life as a whole in various ways, but are not as overt. Religion, for example, is a way for people to try to see the universe in a holistic way. It may not be accurate, and may be a kind of shortcut to proper evaluation of our situation, but it is existential non-the-less.

What you do bring up, which I think is crucial is that antinatalists tend to be more contemplative of life as a whole. This is not a negative though. This is analogous to being trapped in a maze and not realizing it. The antinatalist is simply putting the whole maze in perspective rather than simply calculating the next avenue to turn in the maze. It evaluates the structures of life- its social mechanisms, procreation itself, and examines it thoroughly. It does not forget what is the case, rather than merely trying to "get lost" in it. It gives back the human the dignity and power to understand their situation. Otherwise, we truly would be like other animals, but we are not. We can see the forest for the trees. The fact that we can evaluate work as we are doing it, belies the fact that we can evaluate life as we are living it. To forget this, would be to have "bad faith". We would be abrogating our ability to reflect on existence as a whole. To make authentic decisions would be to have in the back of one's mind one's own existential situation- that one is always a part of a larger existential, social, historical story that one did not choose, but one must participate in.

luckswallowsall

As David Benetar would have it: Suffering is bad and pleasure is not bad. One good example he gave is the fact that it's very much a good thing that there isn't extreme suffering on Mars ... but the fact that nobody is there enjoying themselves doesn't really matter.

Once I stop suffering there's no real urge for me to enjoy myself. It's only the unpleasantness of boredom and restlessness that strives me to enjoy myself.

Pleasure is only really good as a way to cope with suffering.

This is from a moral perspective though. In terms of axiology, pleasure is intrinsically good in the same way that pleasure is intrinsically bad. They're both good and bad experientially. It's merely that from a strictly moral perspective it's only suffering that matters. And there is no real striving or desire without suffering either. If we're perfectly satisfied we don't actually want anything.

ernestm

There is an everyday view of suffering and pleasure that sees suffering as being positively negative, and pleasure as being positively good. — Inyenzi

We already had exactly the same discussion last month in a different thread. I observed it is a false dichotomy because the opposite of pleasure is pain, not suffering. Some others agreed with me but now this thing gets reposted with even more verbage.

I dont see why its necessary for you to repost exactly the same discussion in a new thread. Have you some particular axe to grind on this issue?

luckswallowsall

Pain and pleasure can coincidence together but suffering and pleasure cannot. If you're suffering then your pain outweighs your pleasure. If you're in pain then you could still cope with it provided that the pain is not too bad. If you're suffering then it already means that the pain is too bad.

The nature of pleasure

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