Learning in humans is different than say, crows, parrots, apes, monkeys, dolphins, and whales, powerful learners that those species are. Human learning usually takes its form not just by memory of action, but through conceptual integration with long-term potentiation- hippocampus and connections with neocortex and all that. This is mainly due to having linguistic capabilities especially, Wernickes and Brocas regions come to mind. — schopenhauer1
...compare the cardinal to a human. What are the major differences in cognition that both use to survive? — schopenhauer1
What does it mean cognitively, for the point of view of a cardinal to survive "instinctually" versus a human who is driven through cultural learning? — schopenhauer1
Because it is not a controversial claim to presume a bird and a human have different cognitive frameworks — schopenhauer1
What are the major differences in cognition that both use to survive? — schopenhauer1
What does it mean cognitively, for the point of view of a cardinal to survive "instinctually" versus a human who is driven through cultural learning? — schopenhauer1
how did this decoupling occur over time between survival through instinctual mechanisms and surviving through cultural learning mechanisms? — schopenhauer1
Probably none. There are many social animals who rely on complex social relationships to survive, and there are a number who rely on higher cognative strategies. Given that, and very little physical differences in the brain, its likely we use the same cognition. — Isaac
Nothing. I don't see you having presented any evidence that human survival is driven by cultural learning any more than other animals. — Isaac
It didn't. You've not provided any evidence that it did. If you find any evidence I don't see why that evidence would not also contain your answer, but until then Occam's razor applies. — Isaac
Besides the probable critique that this is a "false" dichotomy, what are the implications as to human nature? Also, how did this decoupling occur over time between survival through instinctual mechanisms and surviving through cultural learning mechanisms? — schopenhauer1
The mechanisms and implications of this are my focus. — schopenhauer1
I do not think it is very debatable that humans have a niche way of surviving, and it is very unique. The question is the nature of how this came about, — schopenhauer1
Oh so birds set up institutions of learning to teach about the latest technology? Of course not. There must be some sort of difference there, don't you think? I can't believe I'm actually debating this point. — schopenhauer1
So when a bird finds seeds, it was explicitly taught and integrated how to do so? When a goose goes south for the winter, that was through painstaking research? — schopenhauer1
I'd like to focus on how humans developed the... minimal amounts of reliance on internal drives, automatic functions, etc — schopenhauer1
Unlike nonhuman apes, who exploit others’ perspectives primarily for their own purposes (28), human infants put their perspective-taking skills to work in the contexts of sharing attention with others and communicating cooperatively with one another. Importantly, human children also expect their social partners to be similarly motivated, creating a reciprocally cooperative framework for communicative and collaborative endeavors. For example, around their first birthdays, human children begin to produce pointing gestures simply to call others’ attention to objects of interest, and, when others point for them, children assume a cooperative motive relevant to the common ground between the two communicators (29). In contrast, whereas great apes can learn to point imperatively, for example when requesting food (30), they do not produce pointing gestures simply to share information with others, and, when others point cooperatively for them (e.g., to indicate the location of hidden food), nonhuman apes tend to perform poorly, most likely because they do not understand their partner’s cooperative intention. Shortly after 1 y of age, human prosocial and cooperative motives begin to evidence themselves more explicitly through acts of (unsolicited) instrumental helping, which again are critically supported by the ability to infer others’ intentions, knowledge, and desires (31). Therefore, unlike nonhuman apes, human cognition seems to be most tailored for cooperative and prosocial rather than Machiavellian purposes (32). — MacLean Article
In addition, other important aspects of cultural learning in humans
derive from their special cooperative skills and motivations,
and these add to the power of the human cultural ratchet as
well. Specifically, adults teach children things intentionally—
whereas teaching is not an important dimension in the lives
of other great apes, if it exists at all—and teaching is a form
of altruistic cooperation (free donation of information). Human
children are especially attuned to adults teaching them things
(Gergely & Csibra, 2006), and they trust adult instruction
implicitly based on their cooperative motives. Indeed, when
adults teach them things, children trust this so much they
often jump to normative conclusions. Thus, they learn not just
that this is how the adult did it, but that this is how it is done—
this is how we in this group do it, how it ought to be done. For
example, in a recent study, 3-year-old children who witnessed a
puppet playing a game in a manner discrepant with the way
they had been taught objected strenuously: The puppet was not
doing it ‘‘right’’ (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008).
Such normative judgments derive, almost certainly, from identifying with the group in terms of how ‘‘we’’ do things.
And so to complement their special skills of collaborating
with others in the moment, human children also come into the
world ready to ‘‘collaborate,’’ as it were, with forebears in their
culture, by adopting their artifacts, symbols, skills, and practices via imitation and instructed learning. Their cooperative
identification with the group leads them to learn not just that
this is a useful way to do things to meet individual goals, but
it is the ‘‘right’’ way to do things, at least for members of this
group. This almost moral dimension makes human cultural
learning especially powerful in comparison to that of their closest primate relatives....What most clearly distinguishes human cognition from
that of other primates, therefore, is their adaptations for
functioning in cultural groups. Groups of individuals cooperate together to create artifacts and practices that accumulate improvements (rachet up in complexity) over time,
thus creating ever-new cognitive niches (Tomasello, 1999).
Children must be equipped to participate in this process during their development by means of species-unique cognitive
skills for collaboration, communication, and cultural learning. Humans are thus characterized to an inordinate degree
by what has been called niche construction and gene–culture
coevolution (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), as the species has
evolved cognitive skills and motivations enabling them to
function effectively in any one of many different self-built
cultural worlds. — Tomasello Article
Human brain interneurons express the enzymes tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) and DOPA (3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine) decarboxylase (DDC). The two proteins are involved in dopamine biosynthesis.
While the ancestors of chimps and gorillas lost the ability to express these enzymes in the neocortex, a human ancestor likely recovered it. The scientists do not know which human ancestor recovered this ability, or when.
Since dopamine in the midbrain plays many roles in the central nervous system tied to cognition and behavior, humans would seem to have won the evolutionary brain jackpot. The definition of intelligence is subjective, but our working memory, reflective exploratory behavior, and other cognitive skills appear to be uniquely enhanced versus these abilities in other animals.
"After all, to the best of our knowledge, we are the only living species that is trying to understand how our brain works and what makes our brain different from other species' brains," Sousa said. — Viegas Article
We are not beholden to mainly automatic/inherent modules of behavior, but rather are more prone to deliberate actions, higher degrees of freedom of actions related to a certain goal — schopenhauer1
We can even choose to commit suicide, decide to go on a hunger-strike, and judge life itself as not that great. These are things that other animals cannot do. — schopenhauer1
I've read through it a couple of times, including the article, but I'm not seeing any link to motives at all. It all seems to be about the fact that humans can respond more appropriately to shared intention than other primates. Some of the work I've read about primate empathy would seem to contradict these conclusions, but that's not necessarily relevant unless I can see how you are using them as evidence for your key argument. — Isaac
Again we're back to unsubstantiated claims. There is scientific debate around whether animals commit suicide, they certainly self-harm and refuse food in response to stress. So all you're left with it the bare assertion that "when humans do it, it's for different reasons". — Isaac
I mean because you say it ain't so, don't make it ain't so. — schopenhauer1
Just because actions are similar, doesn't mean they are the same. — schopenhauer1
You're saying that humans are not primarily driven by instinct, but by 'higher motives'. — Isaac
Because it is not a controversial claim to presume a bird and a human have different cognitive frameworks — schopenhauer1
I'd like to focus on how humans developed [...] minimal amounts of reliance on internal drives, automatic functions, etc. — schopenhauer1
These implications being that we are a species which such high degrees of freedom we can evaluate our situation as we are doing it. We can put an emotional marker on what we are doing, and know that we are doing so. We can say- "I do not like doing this task, but it is the best course of action in order to survive right now". We can also realize that we can be doing any number of other tasks than the ones at hand now, giving us the responsibility of authenticity. — schopenhauer1
Yet you then leap to emotional self-reflection and authenticity. The evidence you've provided doesn't even hint at this, let alone demonstrate it as a necessary conclusion. What has a complex, culturally learned, technology got to do with emotional self-reflection? I'm not seeing the link you're drawing. — Isaac
Essentially one of the main philosophical implications of our degrees of freedom (i.e. plasticity), is our self-reflection, and awareness of ourselves in relation to "existence" in general. — schopenhauer1
Then you jump to saying that somehow because of this we can judge what we're doing emotionally and animals can't. What has judging our situation emotionally got to do with technological complexity, cultural learning, or adaptability? — Isaac
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