I will try again.

My argument is that if one's beliefs and actions are determined by external causes, whether biological or other, then one cannot claim to have joined a forum and entered a post about this topic of one's own free will. To say that one has done so, is already to admit the very faculty which the poster has set out to deny. (And the poster did admit exactly this here.)

Consequently, it is impossible for anyone else to persuade the poster of the falsehood of this view, because causing the poster to change his or her mind, amounts to declaring that those views can be changed by something other than the supposed biological (or other) determinants of his/her actions, so, are not, after all, determined.

How does having free will make one any more amenable to reason? With free wiil, you have two initial choices when presented with an argument in reason...

1. Accept the most reasonable argument.
2. Reject the most reasonable argument.

If you choose 2 then you are not amenable to reason. If you reject 2 as a method, then you have only one choice, which is the definition of determinism. — Isaac

And how does this resolve the dilemma that I have posed?

if one's beliefs and actions are determined by external causes, whether biological or other... — Wayfarer

...then

causing the poster to change his or her mind... — Wayfarer

...would be exactly one of those "other" external causes.

Is it not possible that one's mind could be changed, even despite one's own will, by an argument that one cannot but find convincing?

Nope. Some types of obstinacy are immovable rocks, unstoppable forces have no effect.

Oh dear! :rage: So a permanent state of deadlock, or dreadlock?

I suppose the deadlocks and dreadlocks just can't get along. :cry:

But I decided to take up the argument, of my own free will. I could just as easily have not done so. So if my participation is by my own choice, and he then is persuaded, then his response was determined by nothing other than my free choice.

So, not determined.

But I decided to take up the argument, of my own free will. I could just as easily have not done so. So if my participation is by my own choice, and he then is persuaded, then his response was determined by nothing other than my free choice. — Wayfarer

Well then that's just begging the question. Your assertion that you could have just as easily not done so is without support.

I choose not to attempt to refute that.

Meaning, the argument is unprovable.

My first question is do you believe that the illusion of free will was a necessary evil for the advancement and survival of the human race? — jamesfive

The results of evolution are not the product of necessity, but regardless, free will is not an illusion- it just isn't what you think it is. Free will means that we can make choices, do what we want. We do what we are disposed to do, and these dispositions include beliefs, desires, bodily urges, and short term impulses. All of these are consistent with determinism.

But think about this. The same idea can be represented in a huge variety of different ways - different languages, different media, and so on - yet still convey exactly the same information. So I say that information can be represented physically, but that essentially it's something other than physical. — Wayfarer

Do ideas in different languages convey exactly the same information? Do speakers of the same language, even, extract exactly the same information from the same sentence? Definitely not! i think the reference point for analysing whether "ideas" have a life of their own has to be the language of mathematics, which consists of the most precise ideas expressed presicely.

SO....can mathematical ideas exist independently of physical reality? Yes. Can they exist independently of a physical imagining? Not so sure ... it is possible to imagine a physical perfect sphere for example. And 1+1=2 is tied to the notion of object....and so forth....

Furthermore I cannot imagine a person born with a brain but without any sensory perception - without efffective contact with the real world (including their own body) in other words - being able to have any thoughts or ideas whatsoever.

Well, this grew out of a consideration of the nature of ideas, and whether or in what sense they're physical.

Do ideas in different languages convey exactly the same information? — Kippo

In the case of plans, formulas, and specifications, this is quite feasible. As you say, mathematics often plays a part in this as it's inherently not as ambiguous, or more precise, than language as such. But it's plainly possible to translate the same idea or information across many languages and media. So the question I raise is, what differs, and what stays the same? It's quite a tricky question, as it touches on linguistics, semiotics, and other disciplines. But I think it also helps draw out something which we generally don't notice, which is that in all these case, meaning and intention are determinative - not the actual physical constituents which convey it.

Now, something like that applies to genetics, also. There is a lot of research now on epigenetics, on how the environment and other facts cause genes to be expressed in different ways.

It turns out that genes can embody high level abstractions such as “do what it takes to form an eye.” Pluck out the Eyes Absent gene from a mouse and insert it into the genome of a fruitfly whose eyeless gene is missing, and you get a fruit-fly with eyes. Not mouse eyes, mind you, but fruit-fly eyes, which are built along totally different lines. A mouse eye, like yours or mine, has a single lens which focuses light on the retina. A fruit-fly has a compound eye, made up of thousands of lenses in tubes, like a group of tightly packed telescopes. About the only thing the eyes have in common: are that they are for seeing.

What does this tell us? Information, organized into concepts, is demonstrably out there in the world, and without violating the laws of physics it can guide processes as they unfold. As in the genes, so in the mind.

Clay Naff, A Fabulous Evolutionary Defense for Dualism

So again that radically undermines determinism; it's not as if genes determine an outcome, oftentimes a situation will feed back into the genes. If there's genuine novelty at the heart of evolution, then it can't be pre-determined.

Most people don't believe in determinism or that biology explains and predicts everything we will do, — jamesfive

Biology: the study of living organisms.

It's very clearly false, this assumption that biology explains and predicts everything we will do. Sorry jamesfive, but if you want to defend determinism you'll have to do better than that.

People generally accept as much free will as they can tolerate.

We are at risk of confusion on this thread between "biological determinsm" which is how influential biological material components are in determining an organism's behaviour, and "strict " determinism which is whether all events in the universe are precisely predetermined.

The truth or falsity of the latter, though it is extreme in scope and rigidity, has no scientific bearing on any issue. - including biological determinism. Biological determism is certainly true to an extent - there is no controversy there - only disagreement as to how much culture and randomness affect behaviour.

If you believe in "strict" determinsim then the randomness is pseudo-randomness - in other words there appears to be true randomness to all intnents and purposes.

If you believe in dualism , then this can be represented as randomness without prejudicing the study of biological determinism. Not so with "strict" determism of course...

If you read the OP I think you will find that @jamesfive is really wanting to talk about free will, which is really the provence of a discussion of "strict" determinism, rather than a discsussion of biological functioning. Unfortunately he referred to "our biology" when I think he meant "our universe".

Perhaps your’re right. As as I said before, I don’t see how strict determinism can be defended in light of uncertainty. It seems to undermine it at the most fundamental level. And the OP does say in several places ‘determined by biology’. Anyway, the OP seems to have lost interest. As he was always bound to do. :grin:

I don’t see how strict determinism can be defended in light of uncertainty. — Wayfarer

I'm no expert but just because we cannot find out position and momentum of a particle simultaneously it does not mean that these things are undefined simultaneously. Try ducking (www.duckduckgo :smile: ) "Heisenberg and uncertainty" . But QM is sure weird, and I wouldn't be suprised if causality as we know it vanishes at some point. But I am not "afraid" of strict determinsm - it doesn't "scare" me, probably because I have happily accepted materialism. But then again I wouldn't mind if some sort of "spirit" existed - it would be very exciting!

Anyway, the OP seems to have lost interest. — Wayfarer

well all sorts of sub themes inevitably popped up. I wish we could have branches to threads - perhaps limited to one or two ply. ATM it seems that many threads effectively have them anyway, in a messy sort of way.

Biological determism is certainly true to an extent - there is no controversy there - only disagreement as to how much culture and randomness affect behaviour. — Kippo

There's a big problem with saying that biological determinism is true to an extent, whether or not you think there is no controversy here. When there is exceptions to a rule, this is evidence that the rule does not capture an understanding of what is going on, even if you might say that the rule is "true to an extent". Exceptions render the rule meaningless, and "true to an extent", really indicates that the rule is false.

If a creature is observed to act in a certain way, due to habit, then we might make a rule concerning that activity. One might call this "biological determinism". But when the creature displays the capacity to break the habit, then the claim of "determinism" is falsified. So there's really no such thing as "biological determinism", or 'soft determinism", those terms are smoke and mirror illusions which veil misunderstanding and false rules, whereas "freewill" represents something substantial, the capacity to break out of habits.

Exceptions render the rule meaningless, and "true to an extent", really indicates that the rule is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

The real world doesn't work in words, and definitions. For example, consciousness can be present in different species to a greater or lesser extent; also in individuals of the same species exhibiting varying degrees of trauma to the brain. Biological determism is the domain of science. It has nothing to do with free will, which is logically compatible with biological knowledge - (even if possibly not a proven or scientifically meaningful entity). Just because you believe in free will you don't have to jettison the findings of science - for example that babies (and adults) are hardwired to respond to faces and smiles; snake shapes etc etc.

Try ducking (www.duckduckgo :smile: ) "Heisenberg and uncertainty" . — Kippo

I'm not trained in physics past high school level, but I've read quite a bit about the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics. It's a lot more mysterious and therefore controversial than most people realise.

The basic question is, 'determined by what'? If you're familiar with the current state of science, then you would know that there are many massive explanatory gaps, like physics only being thought to account for 4% of the totality of the cosmos (the remainder being 'dark'). Big bang cosmology itself is almost mystical. The idea of 'determinism' really belongs with LaPlace, who lived and wrote shortly after Newton. As I said before, I think it's a way to avoid the responsibility of life NOT being determined.

The real world doesn't work in words, and definitions. — Kippo

But you were talking about what is "true". And truth concerns how the words and definitions correspond with the real world. So words and definitions are just as important to truth as is "the real world". To say that biological determinism is "true to an extent" is really meaningless, because it's like saying that the words vaguely correspond with reality. And what this means is that there appears to be some semblance of correspondence, but when it comes right down to the specifics, correspondence is just not there, and the semblance of correspondence is just an illusion.

Biological determism is the domain of science. It has nothing to do with free will, which is logically compatible with biological knowledge — Kippo

Let me get this straight. Free will is compatible with biological knowledge. Then there is something called "biological determinism" which has nothing to do with free will. But since determinism is not compatible with free will, I conclude that biological determinism is not compatible with biological knowledge, which is compatible with free will. Why adopt the position of biological determinism, which grasps for some semblance of correspondence, but is really not compatible biological knowledge?

If a creature is observed to act in a certain way, due to habit, then we might make a rule concerning that activity. One might call this "biological determinism". But when the creature displays the capacity to break the habit, then the claim of "determinism" is falsified — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. The behavior may be due to a complex set of factors that are unobserved or unobservable. As an extreme example, consider a deterministic account of a human choice: it is determined by the prior beliefs (short and long term), desires, dispositions, transient urges ....

QM is sure weird, and I wouldn't be surprised if causality as we know it vanishes at some point. But I am not "afraid" of strict determinism - it doesn't "scare" me, probably because I have happily accepted materialism. — Kippo

The point about qm, is that it casts into doubt the notion that on a fundamental level, the real universe exists in a particular way, independently of our observation of it. In other words, it seems to undermine the notion of the mind-independent nature of fundamental particles. And mind-independence is a strong assumption in modern science. This was the bone of contention between Albert Einstein and Neils Bohr in their decades-long debates over interpretation of qm. Einstein was a staunch scientific realist and couldn't accept the notion of observer-dependency which seemed at the heart of this 'new physics'. Bohr was (in my view) more philosophically sophisticated, and had less trouble with ambiguity and the uncertainty implied by physics.

I suggest that we regard the paradoxes of quantum physics as a metaphor for the unknown infinite possibilities of our own existence. This is poignantly and elegantly expressed in the Vedas: “As is the atom, so is the universe; as is the microcosm, so is the macrocosm; as is the human body, so is the cosmic body; as is the human mind, so is the cosmic mind.”

Edward Frenkl

No it doesn't. The behavior may be due to a complex set of factors that are unobserved or unobservable. — Relativist

But that's just invoking magic, claiming unobservable causes.

As an extreme example, consider a deterministic account of a human choice: it is determined by the prior beliefs (short and long term), desires, dispositions, transient urges .... — Relativist

This is not a good example of unobservable causes, because these causes are observable, to the person acting. They are not properly unobservable. And when they are properly observed these things are understood to influence actions (affect them) but not cause them.

But that's just invoking magic, claiming unobservable causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's argument from ignorance to insist there are no causes just because we're ignorant of them.

This is not a good example of unobservable causes, because these causes are observable, to the person acting. They are not properly unobservable. And when they are properly observed these things are understood to influence actions (affect them) but not cause them. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're focusing too much on the unobservable. I also said they can just be unobserved. You were claiming determinism is falsified by observing a behavioral pattern to be broken. You're wrong, because we may simply be unaware of all the factors that collectively cause the behavior, some of which are less frequent.

I'm not claiming these possibilities prove determinism, just pointing out that determinism may still be true- therefore it's not falsified.

You're focusing too much on the unobservable. I also said they can just be unobserved. You were claiming determinism is falsified by observing a behavioral pattern to be broken. You're wrong, because we may simply be unaware of all the factors that collectively cause the behavior, some of which are less frequent. — Relativist

No, I was not claiming that determinism is falsified in this way, I was claiming that "biological determinism" is falsified in this way. Biological determinism is dependent on what is known to biology, so you can't just claim that the cause of the behaviour is something unknown to biology because that is self-refuting to biological determinism. Either the cause of the behaviour is something known to biology or it is not. If it is not, then biological determinism is falsified.

Biological determinism is dependent on what is known to biology, — Metaphysician Undercover

News to me, and sounds like an odd definition. Determinism, as typically used, is ontological or metaphysical. You're defining it epistemologically. Is this your personal definition, or is this a standard I've never heard of?