You’re too unwilling to state the obvious. — I like sushi

Do you mean explain things like I'm teaching a 101 level course? I avoid doing that here because everyone wants to act like they're the expert, like they're the teacher. So I acquiesce to the positioning that they're familiar with all of this stuff already.

"Numerically identical": if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious. — Janus

Again, there actually are people who assert that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. So in their view, this isn't "defining away" the possibility of indenticality in two instances.

Nominalists disagree with the view that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. Realists (on universals, genidentity, etc.(the latter you'd probably prefer to call "genidenticality," given what's being claimed)) are who we're disagreeing with.

As usual this is nonsense/strawmanning. If I am to view things from a nominalist perspective I can certainly account for change. I highlighted already in my previous post the duplicity behind this. Just because things that are very similar - and often within a limited set of experience - appear as being as good as the SAME it doesn’t mean they are NON-CHANGING. If two bananas are rotting at the same rate then relative to each other they are NON-CHANGING, so to suggest that anyone saying so isn’t accounting for ‘a thing changing’ is simply deceptive. — I like sushi

What exactly have I said which you consider "nonsense/ strawmanning'? I corrected you for apparently claiming that I had referred to "strict nominalists", and you responded by quoting a passage form me that doesn't contain that term, and one from @creativesoul which does. What's the relevance of the latter having used the term? I am not creativesoul. We are not the same entity. :wink:

As to the above passage of yours; you need to read more carefully. Where have I said that change cannot be accounted for from a nominalist perspective. My criticism was that if the nominalist wants to say that an entity is only the same or identical to itself at a given time T, that this is false, or at least facile, because there is no actual time T during which there is absolutely no change. I have said that there is no absolute sameness and an entity may be across time the same entity with out the nonsensical requirement that it be absolutely unchanging.

I don't need a "101 philosophy lesson" on what nominalists say. This is just patronizing bullshit designed to make you look like the teacher, an image which I find laughable given your apparently poor grasp of philosophical concepts and inability to engage with and address actual arguments.

Your first passage above seems to be speaking not about nominalism but about those who disagree with it; so what is the relevance of that to my statement that if you define, as I believe nominalists generally do, identity across time as recurring "numerically identical instantiations of some single thing" you are "defining away" identity altogether?

So, your second passage above says that nominalists do disagree with that view, which I was already well aware of. I am also well aware that nominalists are anti-realists in regard to universals, essences, and genidentity and so on, so what was the purpose of pointing that out if not just to try to make yourself look smart?

My argument has been that identity consist in continuity (not absolute lack of change) across time, and that this continuity is not merely conceptual, or if it is then the world, considered independently of minds is always already "conceptually shaped", as per something like John McDowell's or Robert Brandom's ideas, such that it can be intelligible to minds. In fact if identity wasn't grounded in something more than merely mentally occurring concepts, then there would be nothing at all in the world to correspond with our concepts.

Your first passage above seems to be speaking not about nominalism but about those who disagree with it; — Janus

And yet you say you don't need 101 material. You're not understanding simple things I'm writing.

Such as?

Such as understanding what the different sides of what the nominalism versus realism debate are even claiming.

What specific thing written by you do you claim I am not understanding? On the basis of what exactly that I wrote are you claiming that I didn't understand something that you wrote?

For one, not understanding that people don't universally deny identicality multiply instantiated.

Where have I said that people do "universally deny identicality multiply instantiated".

I acknowledge that there are those who claim that there are real essences, or souls or what-have-you. I have not been concerned with those kinds of claims at all, and you would know that if you had read with care. The irony is that I have understood what you have written; it is rather that you have not understood and responded to what I have written, because as always you process everything and distort it through the muddied lens of your own presuppositions.

Where have I said that people do "universally deny identicality multiply instantiated". — Janus

"if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life"

This is becoming ludicrous as it often does with you. Where in that passage have I said that people "universally deny identicality multiply instantiated"?

Via saying that a simple description of identicality being multiply instantiated "defines it away" so that no one would hold the view.

No, fuckwit, it only "defines it (identity) away" for those who accept that definition of identity, such as yourself.

As I always seem to end up saying to you: if you don't present something cogent and relevant to what I have actually been saying, then I won't respond further.

No, fuckwit, it only "defines it (identity) away" for those who accept that definition of identity, such as yourself. — Janus

You're calling me a fuckwit and you still can't even get straight if we're talking about identicality or identity per the distinction you introduced earlier.

You're calling me a fuckwit and you still can't even get straight if we're talking about identicality or identity per the distinction you introduced earlier. — Terrapin Station

What do you think "that' refers to in the passage below, which you quoted from me (and lifted out of context) if not identity? (In future quote the whole relevant passage and/or use the 'quote' function instead of copying and pasting so that I can easily refer back to the context of the passage being quoted).

"if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life" — Terrapin Station

What do you think "that' refers to in the passage below — Janus

"Numerically identical." You preceded "if you define that . . ." with "Numerically identical," followed by a colon, because that's what I had just explained.

There are people, including philosophers, who posit that multiple instances of things, whether temporal or spatial or both, can somehow be (not just conceptually, not just in name, etc.) identical in some regard--that is "exactly the same," numerically identical in some regard. — Terrapin Station


"Numerically identical": if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious. — Janus

Yes, but this is in response to your passage quoted above where you say that people claim that a thing's identity is dependent on it being numerically identical in the way you have defined it. We were discussing identity. So, if identity is dependent on numerical identicality and you define the latter "as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious." It should have been obvious to you that "any entity could be the same entity throughout its life" is a reference to identity.

Yes, but this is in response to your passage quoted above where you say that people claim that a thing's identity is dependent on it being numerically identical in the way you have defined it. — Janus

The passage you quoted there does not use the word "identity," it's not saying anything about identity (per the distinction between identity and identicality as we've been employing it), and I'd not say that identity (again, per the distinction as we've been using it) hinges on something being numerically identical. I was pointing out that nominalism is about identicality per the distinction we're using, not identity.

Well, I hadn't realized that you accepted the distinction between identity and identicality that I had proposed. If that is so then I have misunderstood you. But in that case I don't know what we have been arguing about, because identicality taken as "meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next " is obviously impossible. The others (realists) who argue for an essence or soul which is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next would not be claiming that impossible condition either. So, just what have we been arguing about, according to you?

Who knows why you're arguing with me? :wink:

I was simply explaining that nominalism is about indenticality, and there are people who claim identicality over multiple instantiations. If you do not, then you're actually on the nominalist side of things, at least for this issue.

Saying that nominalism is about identicality just is saying that identity is, for nominalists, about identicality, which is what I have been saying all along and which you seemed to have been disagreeing with. So, I have no idea as to what you have actually been arguing. Most of what you have said has been based on misunderstanding what I have said, as far as I can tell.

And again I would point out that even those who are realists about universals, essences, souls or whatever are not claiming total and absolute identicality of entities over multiple instantiations; to claim such a thing would be patently absurd. In any case I haven't been concerned about those kinds of metaphysical issues, but I have been saying that identity is about recognizable continuity over time as a real phenomenon, so I am most certainly not "on the nominalist side of things".

Who knows why you're arguing with me? :wink: — Terrapin Station

Well, I can't help you there because I have no idea; it seems to offer no satisfaction and to be a complete waste of time. In fact I don't believe I have been arguing with you,(since I haven't been able to discern a cogent position on your side to actually argue against) so much as correcting your repeated misinterpretations of what I have said.

Perhaps it will be better if we ignore one another in the future.

You agreed with what creativesoul said and added more. If you didn’t agree and think saying “Yes” mean you don’t agree I’m at a loss.

I didn’t confuse you with what creativesoul wrote. Don’t play that game.

I cannot honestly agree or disagree with what people are saying here because no one seems to be able, or willing to try, to articulate what they mean concisely - creativesoul being an active participant in doing the exact opposite with obscurantism.

Terrapin seems to think nominalism is a doctrine that doesn’t possess any nuanced views (and that they are not “views” merely evident obviousnesses) and you seem to be floundering between two poles trying to understand them, but no one is playing.

I’ve stated my position as clearly as possible and don’t feel the need to call it ‘nominalism,’ ‘realism’ or ‘relativism’. I think it is easy enough to sum up by saying “a dog” is real, but “dog” is not real - in the nominalist sense. There are problems embedded within I would’ve liked to have discussed but there seems an unwillingness (not on your part) to look at this. I’ve also posed the question to Terrapin about psychologism given that conceptual nominalism is often called psychologism (something I am highly dubious about and that few people hold to).

Saying yes indicates general agreement in my view and should not be taken to guarantee agreement with or even cognizance of every minor point or nuance. I'm not "playing any game" with this; that is merely your presumption.

Saying that nominalism is about identicality just is saying that identity is, for nominalists, about identicality, — Janus

No, that's not correct given the distinction as it's been made.

Yeah right, got it.... :roll: