I already pointed out to you that existence being relative, not absolute has no correlation to realism/idealism. Maybe you disagreed with me, but then you need to make a case for the correlation.

I don't want to play a simplistic game of 'words' chasing 'words' round the houses.
At the risk of being heckled by the traditionalists, I quote Derrida...'there is nothing beyond context'.
That for me means every word we use, including 'objective' and 'confidence' takes its meaning from the real life contexts of its usage, and not from artificial 'word play' which I like to describe occasionally as 'seminaritis'.

Is that a response to this:

"If we don't have objective/observable expectancy, then (a) how do we have a social form of that? and (b) how are we getting to external meaning? "

If so, I take the response as you simply not having an argument for what you were claiming. Or it's at least you not being willing to get down to the details necessary to understand the discrepancies between our different claims.

And I'm pointing out to you that the 'realism-idealism' debate has nothing to do with the contextual use of the word 'reality'. Dichotomous dimensions are another aspect of 'seminaritis' and before you jump on it, 'relative and absolute' do not constitute such a dichotomy.

Okay...we're talking past each other. I suggest you look up non-representationalism before you get back to me.

You claimed that the title of this thread rejects "axioms of" naive realism.

No it does not. Because naive realism has no correlation to relative vs absolute.

Re the other comment, I wrote this above:

"What's something you'd recommend on nonrepresentationalism, though? I'll read it and comment to you as I do."

I don't know if you just didn't read that or what, but you didn't respond. (I'm assuming that you're specifically talking about linguistic nonrepresentationalism, by the way, since that's the context in which you brought this up earlier.)

The reference to 'human' implies that different species with non human physiologies might be able to communicate different expectancies. We might conceive of dolphins, say, with specialised acoustic systems being able to co-ordinate their hunting activities through what Maturana called 'languaging' which promotes 'structural coupling — fresco

All of this suggests a transcendent vantage point, yet your point seemed to be that it's only relatively true.

If it's convenient for me to disagree with you, you'd have to say we're both relatively correct. This would be the case no matter how or why I disagree.

That sort of renders your thesis sort of flimsy, doesnt it?

I suggest anthing on Rorty's or Wittgenstein's 'antirepreentationalism in language.

I don't recall either calling any phil of language stance "antirepresentationalism." Can you be a bit more specific with a reference? (Again, I'm assuming that you're not really just talking about phil of perception, or epistemology, or something else like that)

It would only appear 'flimsy' if you were not familiar with the plethora of literature behind it.
I would suggest perhaps Rorty's ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" since this comes to mind regarding Terrapin's comments, but both know what your dismissal procedure is !

would only appear 'flimsy' if you were not familiar with the plethora of literature behind it. — fresco

My argument was simple. Why do you need a plethora of literature to answer it?

Per you, your thesis is relatively true. It's just one way of expressing your interactions with repetitive phenomena.

I'm free to discard it in favor of a view more convenient to myself.

I have PMN handy here. A lot of it isn't about phil of language or anything that Rorty is characterizing as "nonrepresentationalism" specifically re phil of language (again, I don't recall him using that term as specifically a phil of language term--but maybe I just don't recall that). Anyway, since you're ostensibly better-versed in it than I am, and it's supposedly providing support for views you agree with, could you give page or at least chapter references for the relevant part?

The first level of measurement is 'nominal' i.e. naming of 'the thing to be measured'. The naming of 'space' or 'time' is no exception. 'Space' and 'time' are 'things' by virtue of being useful concepts fof some human endeavours.

There is no point in arguing about naive realistic axioms. The thesis rejects them by definition. — fresco

It can’t be entirely nominal or else how could we even have common, reliable experiences at all? At some point there must be primitive referents to which we can slap on symbols.

It can’t be entirely nominal or else how could we even have common, reliable experiences at all? At some point there must be primitive referents to which we can slap on symbols. — aporiap

Wait, is he somehow arguing that "it's all language" (a la "it's turtles all the way down") and that no language is actually referring to anything other than itself?

Of course that 'I' feels free by definition, but the concept of 'self' which might emerge according to the thesis may decide to deconstruct the idea of 'feels free'. Thats part transcendene issue !

course that 'I' feels free by definition, but the concept of 'self' which might emerge according to the thesis may decide to deconstruct the idea of 'feels free'. Thats part transcendene issue ! — fresco

You might be trying to tell me that I may be bound to the conventions of my time.

Not sure, though. I'll take your obscurity as a sign that you don't wish to pursue it further. So we'll leave it there.

Bon voyage.

This is from the Stanford Enc. Phil suggesting appropriate PMN references.

,

…Sellars and Quine invoke the same argument, one which bears equally against the given-versus-nongiven and the necessary-versus-contingent distinctions. The crucial premise of this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation. (PMN 170)
The upshot of Quine's and Sellars' criticisms of the myths and dogmas of epistemology is, Rorty suggests, that "we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature." (PMN 171) Rorty provides this view with a label: "Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism,’ an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein." (PMN 174)

No. Its meaningless because we are not engaged on any mutual, everyday project. Its what Wittgenstein called 'language on holiday'. Words like 'mind' are irrelevant to a thesis which ultimately implies that 'observers' with 'minds' are inseparable from the so-called 'objects' they appear to contemplate. That point is precisely why Heidegger for one, needed to resort to neologisms — fresco

Congratulations! You've wiped away subjectivity and the subject in one swift stroke and redefined "minds" as "objects".

What is a Wittgenstein and what is its relationship with "language on holiday"? It seems to me that you are saying that Wittgenstein IS language on holiday if Wittgenstein is inseperable of the "objects" it contemplates.

It seems to me that all of your posts are a "Wittgenstein" (language on holiday).

fresco
63
↪Frank Apisa

Keep up the mission Frank ! :smile: — fresco

You know me, Fresco. Never relent.

Common physiology and common physical needs imply agreement on 'naming' i.e. producing 'concepts'. Anthropology gives examples of how cultures vary on what you want to call 'fundamental', kinship relationships being an example of one 'hot issue' for some. Or consider for example, the four classic elements of antiquity, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water. What could be more 'fundamental' than those at the time.

This is from the Stanford Enc. Phil suggesting appropriate PMN references.
,

…Sellars and Quine invoke the same argument, one which bears equally against the given-versus-nongiven and the necessary-versus-contingent distinctions. The crucial premise of this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation. (PMN 170)
The upshot of Quine's and Sellars' criticisms of the myths and dogmas of epistemology is, Rorty suggests, that "we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature." (PMN 171) Rorty provides this view with a label: "Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism,’ an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein." (PMN 174) — fresco

But that's not philosophy of language, it's epistemology (and implicationally phil of perception). I'm very familiar with representationalism and its alternatives in this realm. As a direct realist, I'm obviously not a representationalist.

You initially seemed to be saying something specifically about representationalist versus non-representationalist theories of language.

To Terrapin...Wiki quote on Rorty...

Richard Rorty and anti-representationalism
Richard Rorty was influenced by James, Dewey, Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Heidegger. He found common implications in the writings of many of these philosophers. Namely, he believed that these philosophers were all in one way or another trying to hit on the thesis that our language does not represent things in reality in any relevant way. Rather than situating our language in ways in order to get things right or correct Rorty says in the Introduction to the first volume of his philosophical papers that we should believe that beliefs are only habits with which we use to react and adapt to the world.[11] To Rorty getting things right as they are "in themselves" is useless if not downright meaningless.

In 1995 Rorty wrote: "I linguisticize as many pre-linguistic-turn philosophers as I can, in order to read them as prophets of the utopia in which all metaphysical problems have been dissolved, and religion and science have yielded their place to poetry."
Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, edited by Herman J. Saatkamp (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995).

This "linguistic turn" strategy aims to avoid what Rorty sees as the essentialisms ("truth," "reality," "experience") still extant in classical pragmatism. Rorty writes:

"Analytic philosophy, thanks to its concentration on language, was able to defend certain crucial pragmatist theses better than James and Dewey themselves. [...] By focusing our attention on the relation between language and the rest of the world rather than between experience and nature, post-positivistic analytic philosophy was able to make a more radical break with the philosophical tradition."

Richard Rorty was influenced by James, Dewey, Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Heidegger.

What is a Rorty, James, Dewey, Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Derrida, or Heidegger? I'm focusing on your use of language here. Are words just scribbles and sounds or are they about things that arent words themselves? Is Wittgenstein a word, mind, or what? You used the term, Wittgenstein, not me. What is it?

Not a clue what you are talking about, but thanks for the congratulations.

it's a simple question. If "mind" is an irrelevant term given your thesis, then I'm asking you to explain the use of the terms you are are using (and because you are using them you are implying that they are relevant), like "Wittgenstein".

Namely, he believed that these philosophers were all in one way or another trying to hit on the thesis that our language does not represent things in reality in any relevant way.

If language does not represent things in reality, then what does the above quote even mean? Is it not a use of language that represents some state of affairs other than it just being a string of scribbles on a screen?

The issue was perhaps highlighted my Niels Bohr's argument with Einstein about the existence of 'electrons'.
Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. — fresco

In bold and underlined are other "things" which Bohr should not have used as definitive and yet he did. The argument about the non-definitiveness of reality because of our "unreal" percepts and concepts MUST be a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. What it doesn't answer is, "what are we perceiving or conceiving?" "Can the resources or aspects of perception and conception be non-existent or unreal?"

If what you are implying from that Bohr-Einstein argument is true, then everything we designate as something are illusions/representations. Illusions/representations of what? Illusions/representations in what?

What is existence that it should be relative, instead of absolute? If it's a concept, then, a concept of what? Whence and how is the concept derived?

A current book by Rovelli (the Order of Time) underscores Bohr's view with the phrase 'things are just repetitive events. — fresco

Please tell us what Bohr and Einstein and Rovelli took "existence" to mean, and maybe even what they took existence to be. I am certain that unlike us, they would not have proceeded without first having established a common understanding of the terms they were using, thus to avoid the figure-8 race that many of these TPF threads become. Or in short, can you grace with some definitions, mainly of "existence"?

don’t you imply an inherently reliable physical reality by presupposing that things like common physiologies exist? If you argue organisms that have common perceptual systems exist then you are already implicitly assume a physical reality that can independently give rise to organisms like that.

Referring to something different, where Rorty was actually doing phil of language, would be another matter of course.

However, re this:

he believed that these philosophers were all in one way or another trying to hit on the thesis that our language does not represent things in reality in any relevant way. Rather than situating our language in ways in order to get things right or correct Rorty says in the Introduction to the first volume of his philosophical papers that we should believe that beliefs are only habits with which we use to react and adapt to the world.

The second part of that doesn't cohere very well with the first part, unless Rorty was asserting that beliefs are necessarily linguistic. Otherwise comments about beliefs can't be taken to be comments about language per se.

The rest of that is Rorty commenting contra so-called "ordinary language philosophy," which would have nothing to do with a representationalism/non-representationalism divide re phil of language.

It seems like this is kind of turning out to be you commenting on Wikipedia articles are similar stuff you read on the Internet, by the way.