You could swap “believe” for “accept” — AJJ
Not really, and maintain rational integrity. Acceptance is analytic, insofar as that which is accepted is self-sufficient (accepted because it’s a fact). Belief is synthetic, insofar as there remains a contingency to the proposition which some additional proposition would need to rectify (if one does not believe the fact he should be able to justify his dissention). — Mww
To go a step further, acceptance grants that some particular cause and effect are empirically manifest, the primary conditions for facts in general. If one believes he ought not to accept some fact, by association he does not grant that particular cause and effect to be at least sufficient, and at most he does not grant those conditions to be possible and/or non-contradictory. — Mww
Much more parsimonious to either accept facts as facts or not, and leave such vagaries as “ought to believe” by the metaphysical wayside. — Mww
If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ
I think other respondents have already commented that a fact (in the context of this discussion) simply reflects something in the world that is. There is no ought here; what is, is.Ought - expresses an emotional, practical, or other reason for doing something — WordWeb
If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ
Your bridge example is a practical illustration of why it is we ought to believe facts, but I’m simply saying we ought to believe facts because they’re true, because it’s absurd to say otherwise. In practice the things we believe may or may not actually be facts, but I’m talking abstractly - that it is abstractly the case that we ought to believe facts. — AJJ
Facts in no way generally hinge on us or anything about us. — Terrapin Station
I know mate. Again: that is what makes them objective, rather than subjective. That is why we ought to believe them. — AJJ
Facts don’t depend on whether or not we believe them, sure, but I don’t see how that has a bearing on whether we ought to believe them. — AJJ
The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ
First, "Continually inviting a question" is sufficient for "absurd"? What definition of "absurd" are you using, then, and what does it have to do with logical validity? — Terrapin Station
So in what way does "Continually inviting a question" fit the definition of "absurd" you're using? — Terrapin Station
Because you’re in effect saying “there is nothing that we ought to believe, including the proposition that there is nothing we ought to believe.” — AJJ
So the issue isn't continually inviting a question, but something else. — Terrapin Station
Re your comment here, if we're saying that it's not true, it's not a fact, that there is anything that we ought to believe, why is that absurd? How does it fit your definition of absurd? — Terrapin Station
The issue is continually inviting the question, which in effect makes an insensible statement, the one I just gave. — AJJ
Because it invites the question, “Ought we believe that there isn’t anything we ought to believe?” It’s like I’ve said, this question is continually invited, which in effect makes the insensible statement I gave in my previous post. — AJJ
Yeah, I think we should part ways now in this argument. I don’t want to discuss this with anyone who can’t see why the below statement makes no sense: — AJJ
If it is the case that facts are things we ought to believe, then the OP argument works. The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ
As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one. — AJJ
As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one.
— AJJ
This is what's absurd. It's not the lie itself which is beneficial it's the belief in the lie which is beneficial. The lie would be useless if no one believed it. If the people know that it is a lie, then they will not believe it, regardless of whether they ought to believe it or not. — Metaphysician Undercover
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