I have just looked up de re and de dicto. I think you had better say a bit more on how you are taking these terms for this thread. And, how rigid?

I'll try and provide you with everything that seems pertinent to the issue; but, am apprehensive of trying to rationalize this due to my own lack of knowledge on the issue:


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re#Context_of_modality

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vivid_designator

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operator_(linguistics)#Quantifier_raising

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html

Hope that provides some background context we can work on here.

Thanks.

Could you rewrite the OP in plain English? I find modal logic incredibly obtuse.

Could you rewrite the OP in plain English? I find modal logic incredibly obtuse. — I like sushi

OK, so let me elaborate at risk of spewing babble. De re counterfactuals seem to imply that quantification is limited to the scope of the singular individual expressing a "belief" such as:

Ralph believes that someone is a spy, instead of the de dicto assertion that,
Someone is such that Ralph believes s/he is a spy.

The limitation of the scope of quantification is the point here because, in a counterfactual world, it could be that case that de dicto there is no-one that is a spy or that nobody is out to get Ralph. De re, the assertion still obtains (perhaps because Raph is schizophrenic or is such that he is paranoid for some reason.), thus the rigidity of the de dicto assertion does not necessarily obtain because it encompasses the scope of the domain of individuals in the sum total of the "world", whereas the de re assertion is endowed with a sense of rigidity, due to the characteristics or quality of the person that is Ralph.

Now, this all seems to imply in my mind, that it boils down to essentialism, such that de re: "Because Ralph is a schizophrenic because he believes his neighbor is a spy." Whereas de dicto: "Nobody is a spy because Ralph falsely believes his neighbor is a spy due to his (essentialist?) quality of being a schizophrenic."

Hope that elucidates the difference I am trying to outline here.

Some more reading on the epistemic validity of de re/de dicto assertions:

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0002.019/--epistemic-modality-de-re?rgn=main;view=fulltext

Or to put this into a standard form:

De re (rigid counterfactual): Ralph believes someone is a spy. (True in possible worlds where Ralph is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.)

De dicto (non-rigid counterfactual): Nobody is out to get Ralph because he is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.

What do you think, @Banno. Essentialism, or what?

The Barcan formula deserves a mention here due to the de re/de dicto difference meshing together without implying actualism:

I still don’t see the point of it. Sorry :(

Not what you’re saying btw, just the whole necessity versus probability stuff.

Not what you’re saying btw, just the whole necessity versus probability stuff. — I like sushi

See my latest response in regards to the Barcan formula. Actualism vs. possibilism.

This might help a little:

Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals — Wallows

So re Kripke's views, my first thought is, "Wait--I don't recall Kripke saying anything like 'de re counterfactuals are impossible.'" Can we review where he said this, or why we believe that he'd say it?

(Maybe you meant de dicto counterfactuals? Remember that "The shortest spy might not have been a spy," on the conventional view, isn't possible de dicto, that is, in the reading where we're talking about whatever person--we don't know exactly which person--who would be the shortest spy. It's not person for that person to not be a spy.)

I've no clear idea what a "de re counterfactual" might be.

Here is an appetizer of what I am getting at:



Available:
http://ge.tt/6y5U3Ow2

That didn't help.

It looks like you are trying to aim Quine at Kripke to see if you can score a hit. Is that right?

I’m saying to myself as much as I am to you. Don’t rely so heavily on the text of others as it is not all that likely people here have read extensively on specific items. By all means provide links, but if you cannot get across the gist it doesn’t give me reason to engage.

I asked for a reiteration of the OP in PLAIN ENGLISH. I didn’t ask for an elaboration of something I really didn’t grasp in the first place.

Note: this is not to say I will be satisfied with a dumbed down version, just that I may need a dumbed down version in order to enter more fully and offer you an attempt at a response. Communicating difficult ideas to idiots like me is useful because it highlights points that you that for granted.

Suppose Ralph believes there is a spy, but has not determined the person who is a spy, so he says "there is a spy", this is de dicto. If Ralph believes his neighbour is a spy, and says "John is a spy", this is de re. The two are not incompatible, the neighbour may be a spy, and the de dcito instance may be true even if Ralph suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.

Now, this all seems to imply in my mind, that it boils down to essentialism, such that de re: "Because Ralph is a schizophrenic because he believes his neighbor is a spy." Whereas de dicto: "Nobody is a spy because Ralph falsely believes his neighbor is a spy due to his (essentialist?) quality of being a schizophrenic." — Wallows

I think you misunderstand the nature of de dicto. Ralph thinks there is an object which fulfills the conditions of being " a spy", and therefore is a spy. Perhaps what is confusing you is the fact that you cannot proceed logically from the de dicto to confirm the de re. The "therefore is a spy" does not follow. In other words, Ralph may produce an endless list of the properties of "a spy", and the object (the neighbour) may match every property, but this cannot produce the logical conclusion that the neighbour is a spy, because Ralph needs a further premise which says that every object with such and such properties is a spy. But Ralph's list of properties of a spy does not necessitate that any object with those properties is a spy. So despite the de dicto (Ralph believes there is a spy), and the fact that the neighbour fulfills all Ralph's criteria of "a spy", Ralph cannot validly produce the de re conclusion that the neighbour is a spy. That's the nature of human judgement, it's fallible.

It looks like you are trying to aim Quine at Kripke to see if you can score a hit. Is that right? — Banno

So, here's the question again:

Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals only obtains for rigid designators? — Wallows

And here is the reasoning:

If Ralphs believes his neighbor is a spy, then this can only obtain for stipulated worlds where Ralph is paranoid or has some essentialist feature of being a paranoid schizophrenic. Therefore, the rigid designator becomes the fact that Ralph will believe in any possible world where he is not treating his disorder (such as paranoid schizophrenia) and continues to believe in those worlds that the government is out to get him or his neighbor is a spy.

I don't think that this is an incredulous assumption and one that makes some sense in an essentialist manner?

Perhaps, the term "vivid descriptor" is more apt here than "rigid designator", since we are talking about abstract "objects" such as Ralph having paranoid schizophrenia, which incorrectly leads him to believe that his neighbor is a spy.

As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. Logic doesn't work that way, it's backward. He must start with the designation, the neighbour is a spy, and proceed logically from there. But that proposition is supported by evidence, not a logical conclusion, and Ralph's mental state is relevant in his judgement of evidence.

As I explained, Ralph cannot validly conclude that his neighbour is a spy, whether he suffers delusions or not is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude?

Logic doesn't work that way, it's backward. He must start with the designation, the neighbour is a spy, and proceed logically from there. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that would be a de dicto assertion, based on epistemic validity under my understanding of the issue. This is the difference between de dicto and de re, as much as I understand.

Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude? — Wallows

Now how do you make it into a counterfactual de re attitude?

If Ralphs believes his neighbor is a spy, then this can only obtain for stipulated worlds where Ralph is paranoid or has some essentialist feature of being a paranoid schizophrenic. Therefore, the rigid designator becomes the fact that Ralph will believe in any possible world where he is not treating his disorder (such as paranoid schizophrenia) and continues to believe in those worlds that the government is out to get him or his neighbour is a spy. — Wallows

That makes little sense to me. Seems you were answering @Metaphysician Undercover.

There is a lack of perspicuity in your question. The distinction between de ditto and de re is a mark of natural languages, there being no equivalent ambiguity in formal logic. Further, in Kripke's account all proper names are rigid designators, while descriptions are non-rigid.

Kripke's semantics bypasses Quine's objection to modal logic, to my eye, and I think this is a common belief. IF you think otherwise you will need to set it out in some detail and clarity.

Further, in Kripke's account all proper names are rigid designators, while descriptions are non-rigid. — Banno

That's perhaps what I'm trying to address here as this was the most prominent feature of the N&N thread that stuck in my mind. Let me elaborate once more. In every possible world where Ralph is a paranoid guy, he will think that his neighbor works for the government and is a spy. Therefore, how does one call his paranoia as a form of rigidity? Does that make it at least a vivid designator in terms of de re statements?

Now how do you make it into a counterfactual de re attitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, how do you make an abstract descriptor as "paranoia" into a, in a sense, a vivid designator for all Ralphs that posses the attribute of being "paranoid" manifest in his de re statement that his neighbor is a spy?

If Ralphs believes his neighbor is a spy, then this can only obtain for stipulated worlds where Ralph is paranoid or has some essentialist feature of being a paranoid schizophrenic. Therefore, the rigid designator becomes the fact that Ralph will believe in any possible world where he is not treating his disorder (such as paranoid schizophrenia) and continues to believe in those worlds that the government is out to get him or his neighbor is a spy.

I don't think that this is an incredulous assumption and one that makes some sense in an essentialist manner? — Wallows

? When do you get to the "impossibility of de re counterfactuals" part or why we'd think that Kripke would say that there's any sort of de re counterfactuals that are impossible?

Yes, but, doesn't that make it a de facto a de re attitude? — Wallows

What makes something de re is that it's positing a property (or lack of a property) to some (particular) thing(s) in the world, and it's not about the language per se. At least so the normal distinction goes, where we're at least pretending the distinction holds water/doesn't wind up falling apart.

An easy way to think of it and remember it is to think of English words related to the Latin words in question, such as "real"/"reality" versus "diction," "dictionary" etc. And then in short, are we saying something about a (particular/specific) real thing or set of specific things ("the dogs at the Main St. Shelter" for example) or are we saying "something about the dictionary" or about language qua language.

So if we suppose that someone is saying that some sort of de re counterfactual is impossible, we're saying that the person is saying that it's not possible to posit a real thing having or lacking different properties in possible worlds. But that's not what people say unless they're simply denying possible world talk altogether.

In every possible world where Ralph is a paranoid guy, he will think that his neighbour works for the government and is a spy. — Wallows

What about the possible worlds in which he is paranoid and thinks his neighbour is one of the alien lizards?

Your question still needs work.

What about the possible worlds in which he is paranoid and thinks his neighbour is one of the alien lizards? — Banno

Well, there you have it. The counterfactual still obtains due to the attribute of Ralph being a paranoid guy? Call this a definite description or vivid designator for the (essential?) trait of Ralph being one of the paranoid types?

The counterfactual still obtains — Wallows

What?

No, forget that. I'm done here.

What? — Banno

Never heard of the Barcan formula?