Field equations = things that all six-year-olds ought be able to comprehend.

Einstein was not a god... assuming the veracity of the quote.

I completely agree with the demand of explanation coming in the simplest adequate terms.

...

Based on everything we know, it's a reasonable a justifiable assumption that amoeba can't have experience. I can't make assumptions on what I don't know. — Unseen

Based on a definition of experience as ‘an event or occurrence which leaves an impression on someone’, it’s a reasonable and justifiable assumption that amoeba CAN have experiences. We know that because we can reliably attribute a specific activity of amoeba as a physical response to a specific event or occurrence. The response is evidence that this event leaves an impression on the amoeba.

So what is it that prevents you from recognising response to stimuli as experience?

So, if you have a point, make it again briefly and in plain language. Remember that Einstein once said "If you can't explain it to a six year old, you don't understand it yourself." — Unseen

For the record, this is a poor justification for insistence on brief and plain language. Clearly we are not attempting to explain this to a six year old, but to an adult who stubbornly refuses to accept anything he doesn’t already know. There’s a big difference. Have you even read any of Einstein’s papers?

For me, to be conscious is to be having experiences, and they are given to me by my pre-conscious mind. My brain. The only "contact" is the passive one in which the brain offers up an experience. In the case of conscious actions, the brain gives me the impression of both initiation and follow through. — Unseen

You seem to make a marked distinction between ‘me’ and ‘my brain’, as if they were two separate entities. How do you justify this, and what do you think ‘me’ is if it is not the brain or body?

Based on a definition of experience as ‘an event or occurrence which leaves an impression on someone’, it’s a reasonable and justifiable assumption that amoeba CAN have experiences... — Possibility

Because amoebas are people too.

So what is it that prevents you from recognising response to stimuli as experience? — Possibility

Having an outdoor lighting system which responds to physical stimulus.

Good god man. It's only a few paragraphs. That is brief.

Based on everything we know, it's a reasonable a justifiable assumption that amoeba can't have experience. — Unseen

It's one thing to say your belief that some creatures are not conscious is a reasonable assumption (debatable but not particularly controversial) but quite another to say you know it with certainty as you did earlier:

I know it with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon. — Unseen

It's this that I take issue with.

I understand the resistance to this train of thought. It feels like such a slippery slope. And you’ve clearly pointed out that not every instance of stimulus and response involves an experience for the system in question.

It makes sense to assume that a stimulus and response involves the system as a whole, but it’s a different story in reality, when you think about it.

It’s likely that a reverse bias photodiode enables an electrical current when the sunlight level drops (or something similar), switching your outdoor lights on at night. The essence of the stimulus and response you’re referring to occurs at the level of the electrons in the space between the anode and cathode. The event leaves no impression on any part of the lighting system itself.

In an amoeba, however, irreversible chemical process takes place within the integrated system as a direct result of an event outside the system. You cannot say that the event leaves no impression on the amoeba. This is the essence of an experience, whether it’s possible for the amoeba itself to be aware of having the experience or not (I don’t think it is aware, mind you - but that’s not the question).

You might enjoy this lecture by Peter Watts on the exact question you proposed.
The TL:DW is "No one knows, maybe consciousness is a parasite?, anyway it's a really good lecture and I highly recommend watching it entirety (don't be discouraged by the low amount of views)

↪Unseen
You might enjoy this lecture by Peter Watts on the exact question you proposed.
The TL:DW is "No one knows, maybe consciousness is a parasite?, anyway it's a really good lecture and I highly recommend watching it entirety (don't be discouraged by the low amount of views) — FreeEnergy

Looks interesting. I will take a look.

Do you think it's possible you are actually on the surface of the Moon? I mean, Cartesian doubt is always possible, so maybe we can't be sure about anything outside mathematical certinties(?).

I feel this discussion is largely tapped out, so I'm tapping out and moving on to my new discussion of the ethics of space travel.

Do you think it's possible you are actually on the surface of the Moon? — Unseen

No, why do you ask?

I'm simply saying that your claim to know that some creatures are not conscious with the same certainty that you know you're not on the surface of the moon is an unjustified leap of faith.

The reasonable approach, given the impossibility of any direct evidence, would be to keep an open mind.

I just think that the evidence for any belief that "Some of the most successful creatures on the planet, in terms of survival, are not conscious." i — ChrisH

I'm not sure what we're referring to re "some of them are not conscious."

I'm not sure what we're referring to re "some of them are not conscious." — Terrapin Station

Why ask me? It was Unseen's claim:

Some of the most successful creatures on the planet, in terms of survival, are not conscious. — Unseen

I was actually responding to a misread. I thought you said, "You assume that other creatures ARE conscious."

Special pleading. I'll ask you the same question I asked the OP.

What is the criterion for consciousness such that when it is met by any and all candidates, those candidates and only those candidates are the ones sensibly said to have consciousness whereas any and all candidates that do not meet the criterion are likewise sensibly denied to have consciousness?

You may replace consciousness with experience if you'd like.

Stimulus/response is inadequate. Experience takes more than that. The definition you've invoked references impressions on humans.

What is the criterion for consciousness such that when it is met by any and all candidates, those candidates and only those candidates are the ones sensibly said to have consciousness whereas any and all candidates that do not meet the criterion are likewise sensibly denied to have consciousness? — creativesoul

This is where the problem has been in this, and continues to be in many discussions about consciousness. The OP defined consciousness as ‘having experiences’, yet the impression I got from the discussion was that ‘being aware of having experiences’ was what they meant. I only wanted to clear up the confusion.

If ‘consciousness’ is defined as ‘having experiences’, then I would argue that all living entities may be considered conscious. If, however, consciousness was defined as ‘being aware of having experiences’, then only those animals that exhibit self-awareness would be considered ‘conscious’.

Stimulus/response is inadequate. Experience takes more than that. The definition you've invoked references impressions on humans. — creativesoul

I agree on both counts. The term ‘someone’ implies human only, but doesn’t state it explicitly enough to rule out non-humans, in my opinion. The definition was quoted from the Oxford dictionary, and invoked to try and clear up the confusion I described above.

Personally, I don’t see consciousness as defined by a set of criterion or a line below which nothing is conscious. To me, consciousness describes a gradual development in the way that matter integrates information.

Why are we conscious? — Unseen

We are conscious (at the level we are conscious at) because God is creating a man in His image.

If you irrationally presuppose that your existence is a result of "randomness", your question is arbitrary, because everything, including consciousness, would ultimately result from "randomness", which would be the answer for the question. What hinders you is that you not only seem to presuppose that your existence is a result of "randomness", but that "survival value" is a thing in such case, which it cannot be with "randomness" as the root cause. So you shouldn't be perplexed about consciousness' role in adding or subtracting "survival value".

We are conscious (at the level we are conscious at) because God is creating a man in His image. — Henri

So, like man, God has a pre-conscious mind feeding his passive conscious mind experiences? Weird.

BTW, I'm assuming the God you're referring to is Zeus. Or is it Ahura Mazda?

So, like man, God has a pre-conscious mind feeding his passive conscious mind experiences? — Unseen

Oh, so you claim to understand inner workings of God.

BTW, I'm assuming the God you're referring to is Zeus. Or is it Ahura Mazda? — Unseen

Don't sweat it, you'll know when the time comes.

So, like man, God has a pre-conscious mind feeding his passive conscious mind experiences?
— Unseen

Oh, so you claim to understand inner workings of God. — Henri

Didn't you say we were created modeled after him? That how human beings work.

God has no emotions, feelings, instincts, cravings, vices etc. It is emptiness and vastness. I believe in a higher power and if called God so be it . Something bigger and more profound than we can imagine created the place where we live but that's it. Now we just have to figure out what to do with our place and all the inhabitants, flora, fauna, etc.

By the way, every "being" that is alive has a conscience. Meaning that they know they are alive and most want to procreate and most will protect the offspring. Plants, animals, insects. Call it instinct but it's really not. There is actually a plan for everything.

What is the criterion for consciousness such that when it is met by any and all candidates, those candidates and only those candidates are the ones sensibly said to have consciousness whereas any and all candidates that do not meet the criterion are likewise sensibly denied to have consciousness?
— creativesoul

This is where the problem has been in this, and continues to be in many discussions about consciousness. The OP defined consciousness as ‘having experiences’, yet the impression I got from the discussion was that ‘being aware of having experiences’ was what they meant. I only wanted to clear up the confusion.

If ‘consciousness’ is defined as ‘having experiences’, then I would argue that all living entities may be considered conscious. If, however, consciousness was defined as ‘being aware of having experiences’, then only those animals that exhibit self-awareness would be considered ‘conscious’. — Possibility

Yes. We agree that those are consequences of those starting points and neither is adequate.

Stimulus/response is inadequate. Experience takes more than that. The definition you've invoked references impressions on humans.
— creativesoul

I agree on both counts. The term ‘someone’ implies human only, but doesn’t state it explicitly enough to rule out non-humans, in my opinion. — Possibility

An event that leaves an impression on someone needs to be parsed in terms of what such an impression consists of and what those things are themselves existentially dependent upon.

Some impressions are left in a fluent listener by hurtful language use of a fluent speaker. Those impressions are existentially dependent upon language use. Such experience cannot be had by a language less creature, let alone an amoeba.

The definition was quoted from the Oxford dictionary, and invoked to try and clear up the confusion I described above.

Not a problem. We're on the same page.

Personally, I don’t see consciousness as defined by a set of criterion or a line below which nothing is conscious. To me, consciousness describes a gradual development in the way that matter integrates information.

Interesting suggestion...

"In the way that matter integrates information"

I would say that that is also inadequate. It would hinge upon what the integration of information requires.

I say that - at a bare minimum - all experience takes a creature to whom the experience is meaningful. In short, all experience consists of and/or requires thought/belief about what's happening.

I readily agree that experience comes in 'degrees'(for lack of a better description).

Didn't you say we were created modeled after Him? — Unseen

"Creating in likeness of x" is not "creating exactly x". And "creating" is an active tense, work in progress.

And, by the way, a theory of how consciousness works is not necessarily how things are. Mind is quite an enigma for us. For example, you actually believe there is such a thing as "survival value" in a universe established by "randomness".

An event that leaves an impression on someone needs to be parsed in terms of what such an impression consists of and what those things are themselves existentially dependent upon.

Some impressions are left in a fluent listener by hurtful language use of a fluent speaker. Those impressions are existentially dependent upon language use. Such experience cannot be had by a language less creature, let alone an amoeba. — creativesoul

I understand what you’re saying here, and I do agree - however if we’re trying to get to an understanding of what consciousness is and how it emerges or evolves/develops, then exploring it (or experience) from the top down, so to speak, is a bit like trying to understand algebra by reading an advanced level university textbook on the subject, starting with the final chapter. It might be possible to eventually work it out, but that’s gotta be one of the most difficult and convoluted ways to do it, in my view. To parse an impression left on someone at such a complex level of experiencing without grasping what happens at the most basic level of ‘someone’ (however you may interpret this) during the simplest ‘experience’ (event that leaves an impression) is going to be guesswork at best.

I say that - at a bare minimum - all experience takes a creature to whom the experience is meaningful. In short, all experience consists of and/or requires thought/belief about what's happening. — creativesoul

Not necessarily. If we go back to the example of bacteria chemotaxing towards a chemical gradient, the experience of receiving the chemical gradient stimulus would have to be ‘meaningful’ to the bacteria in order for it to respond in this way, even without thought/belief about what’s happening. The event leaves an impression because the bacteria expends energy (an irreversible process) in changing its movement action according to two-dimensional information received: relating a chemical stimulus to direction.

I readily agree that experience comes in 'degrees'(for lack of a better description). — creativesoul

FWIW I tend to see experience as coming not just in degrees but in dimensions of awareness.