'Splonk' is a term (perhaps no longer) used in the automotive body repair industry (in Adelaide at least) to refer to the two part body fillers that are used to fill dents. — Janus

I thought splonk was a term used in auto repair that refers to the reinsertion of a johnson rod back into its housing . :snicker:

It's still a dreadful question. Look at how necessity and existence are used in modal logic.

It's still asking if existence is red. — Banno

How so? Could you please elaborate?

Modal logic or not, to ask: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?" is nothing like asking: "is existence red?"

Yes, that too!

The Serbian panel beater from Adelaide who used the term, also extended its use to other areas.

"Where are Steve and Shirley"?
"They are upstairs splonking each other".

"Splonk 'er up".

"He splonked all over her abdomen"

Etc., etc. as you may be able to imagine.

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

"what is necessary for a tree to exist?" is nothing like asking: "is existence red?" — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, here we disagree.

In both cases, words have been concatenated in such a way that they appear to ask a question, but don't.

Well, here we disagree. — Banno

My argument is that the question: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?" makes sense, and can be answer sensically. Whereas, the question: "is existence red?" is complete nonsense.

If it is possible to hallucinate or imagine a tree, then there is a logical distinction between existent and non-existent (hallucinated or imagined) trees. What's the problem?

We could fix the question up a bit by dropping the word "necessary", and hence all its baggage. Perhaps "what must be the case for a tree to be a tree?"; but is that different from "What must be true for a tree to be a tree?"

And as you say, it must not be an hallucination of a tree; nor an imagined tree.

It must be a real tree...

SO here is philosophical progress: what must be true in order for a tree to be a tree, is that it must be a tree.

Hm.

And I am pointing out that you are wrong.

Edit: well, not so much wrong as mislead by your words.

Yes, the question as to whether there is anything independent of human or animal experience is a reasonable question about absolute existence. If there were not, then existence would be relative to percipience and there would be nothing at all beyond that; no absolute existence. The only problem is that we can never answer the question definitively, but that realization shows that we can see where we stand by asking the question.

"True" is a much more problematic term than "necessary". And I could swear you were the one talking against muddling things up?

Yes, the question as to whether there is anything independent of human or animal experience is a reasonable question about absolute existence. If there were not, then existence would be relative to percipience and there would be nothing at all beyond that. The only problem is that we can never answer the question definitively. — Janus

Exactly.

Let me add: we can never answer the question independent of our own percipience, which suggests that existence for us is relative. But when you consider your own percipient experience, it seems to be a closed system, complete into itself, which would make it absolute. It is very paradoxical to exist as a human being.

SO here is philosophical progress: what must be true in order for a tree to be a tree, is that it must be a tree. — Banno

We distinguish between hallucinated or imagined trees and actual trees on the basis that the latter can physically act upon us. The corollary of that is that actual trees can be seen by others. Or if there are no others I can make sure the tree is real by touching it, smelling it, rubbing against it and hearing the sound of the rubbing, and so on.

Then there is the further question as to what kind of existence the tree must have, whether mind-independently physical or merely mental (in some unknown "shared" way), in order that it should be perceptible to all. These kinds of questions may be ultimately unanswerable, but I don't think it follows from that unanswerability that they are therefore unequivocally nonsense questions.

We distinguish between hallucinated or imagined trees and actual trees on the basis that the latter can physically act upon us... — Janus

The natural tree is physically dependent upon many factors (water and light amongst the basic). The conditions that allow for the possibility of a tree are necessary for the existence of any natural tree.

The there is the further question as to what kind of existence the tree must have, whether mind-independently physical or merely mental (in some unknown "shared" way), in order that it should be perceptible to all. These kinds of questions may be ultimately unanswerable, but I don't think that means they are therefore unequivocally nonsense questions. — Janus

If asking those questions is nonsense, then so is philosophy. Although such epistemological/metaphysical concerns may have no practical or ethical application to life, I still find an unquantifiable value in working out the answers to these philosophical questions.

Yes, looked at in physical. chemical and biological terms there are environmentally and genetically mediated energy relations, exchanges and interactions which are necessarily involved in the germination and continuing existence of trees.

We can observe and infer these relations, exchanges and interactions; and then the question becomes 'Are these relations, exchanges and interactions totally dependent on our observations and inference of them, or do they have some kind of independent existence or reality?'.

If asking those questions is nonsense, then so is philosophy. Although such epistemological/metaphysical concerns may have no practical or ethical application to life, I still find an unquantifiable value in working out the answers to these philosophical questions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes, for one thing asking the questions expands the poetic imagination, and the sense of the numinous. It shows us just what kinds of question we are capable of imagining.

"True" is a much more problematic term than "necessary". — Merkwurdichliebe

Hm. I don't agree. And also, it's not the terms themselves that cause issues, but the way philosophers misuse them.

SO there is a pretty straight forward grammar for true. Some statement 'p' will be true only if: p. Tarski's T-sentence, disquotation, redundancy and so on. Within this grammar we can manage much of what was once considered philosophically contentious.

And another, not unrelated, grammar for necessity, using possible world semantics to set out how to use necessary and possible.

And running through both is a rather good grammar for existence - existential quantification.

Now there is a grammar for relative and absolute that works well, too. It derives from the principle that the laws of physics will be the same from any point of reference; the Principle of Relativity.

But it seems from your OP that you want to use these terms to talk about existence. And that strikes me as misguided.

Or at the least, there will be much to do in order to show it to be a useful thing to do.

There is too little care being taken. So

'things are just repetitive events' — fresco

becomes

Existence is relative, not absolute — fresco

without so much as a wink.

My argument is that the question: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?" makes sense, and can be answer sensically. — Merkwurdichliebe

becomes

the question as to whether there is anything independent of human or animal experience is a reasonable question about absolute existence. — Janus

Thankyou all for many examples of what I think Witt might call 'language on holiday' !
The central point which I think is being missed is how is the word 'existence' used in non philosophical contexts.
We do not normally going around asking whether 'trees exist'. In fact to do so might imply a social interaction within a 'mental health' context. (or parochially, in the UK at least, 'existence of trees' can be a problem for building permissions).
I suggest, on the basis of Witt's meaning is use, that all normal utterances of the word 'exist' arise in contexts where mutual action is being negotiated...e.g. 'existence of human causes of global warming'...'existence of God as a valid subject in education'...'existence of sub-atomic particles in social paradigms we call 'science' '
I assert that all those usages make 'existence' inextricable from the social contexts in which they are embedded, and in that sense 'existence', like all concepts acquired via mutual language, is relative to human projects, never absolute. Those who would put 'existence' on an absolutist pedestal are playing the game of 'ultimate axiom chasing', which I suggest is futile.

I did answer your point by asserting that only 'philosophers' tend to talk about 'a tree's existence' (period). — fresco

What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence?

That was the question. I'll let the reader decide whether or not the answer is relevant. By my lights, it's not. I did not ask who tends to talk about a tree's existence most. Besides that, more than just philosophers use the term, and often. So...

You'll have to do better than that.

Thankyou for enlightening me about the contextual usage of the word 'splonk' which I thought I had invented !

(Actually, many verbal jokes rely on sudden 'switched' contexts.
...Foreign official going round inspecting native village....everywhere he goes the natives enthusiastically greet him with shouts of 'ngombo ! ngombo !...he comes to the last hut and asks what's inside...his guide advises him 'Don't go in there - its just full of ngombo !' )

We do not normally going around asking whether 'trees exist'. — fresco

Indeed; in English, existence is I suppose more likely to be asserted using is, as in "there is a tree", or "is there a tree?".

I suggest, on the basis of Witt's meaning is use, that all normal utterances of the word 'exist' arise in contexts where mutual action is being negotiated...e.g. 'existence of human causes of global warming'...'existence of God as a valid subject in education'...'existence of sub-atomic particles in social paradigms we call 'science' ' — fresco

Firstly, I'm not too sure what "contexts where mutual action is being negotiated" might mean.

Secondly, I think I see a true Scotsman. How are we to act if we come across an exception to your rule? Will we count it as a falsification, and look for a better rule? Or will we simply count such exceptions as being not normal, and exclude them?

What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence? — creativesoul

Nothing, of course.

What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence? — creativesoul


Nothing, of course. — Banno

That's just not true, since existence is the one attribute all things, however diverse, share. It is the most general attribute. Also it is common to distinguish between things which exist physically and things which don't, and you may gain insight by considering the different ways in which different kinds of things are thought to exist.

It's an odd comment coming from you @creativesoul who so often talks about "existential dependency", apparently not being satisfied with mere dependency.

That's just not true, since existence is the one attribute all things, however diverse, share. — Janus

Let's think on that. If existence is had by all things, then there can be no difference between things that exist and things that don't...

And hence, that such-and-such exists adds nothing to it that's not already implicit in the such-and-such.

It's an odd comment coming from you creativesoul who so often talks about "existential dependency", apparently not being satisfied with mere dependency. — Janus

Understandable. I'm trying to work through Quine and the notion that "existence" is not a predicate.

I find that talking in terms of something's existence is just talking about the thing.

Existential dependency doesn't require talking in terms of something's 'existence'. It's more about a common sense method of approach. It requires talking in terms of something's elemental constituency. If something consists of something else, it is existentially dependent upon that something else. If something exists prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Etc.

Put to use:All statements consist of common language use, and thus all are existentially dependent upon common language use. Whatever common language is existentially dependent upon, so too are statements. Etc.

So, that's not talking in terms of a statement's 'existence'. It's talking about what statements consist of, which then offers ground for saying what it takes for statements to first emerge/exist.

Existence is presupposed within all thought/belief. All thought/belief is correlation. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

Or at the least, there will be much to do in order to show it to be a useful thing to do. — Banno

I have done very little, and already shown its usefulness.

Also , what you say presupposes that usefulness is what we should be aiming at, and that's debatable.

in English, existence is I suppose more likely to be asserted using is, as in "there is a tree", or "is there a tree?". — Banno

Good for English. But this is philosophy, and in philosophy, "exist" is likely to be asserted as a fancy word for "is" or "to be".

asserted as a fancy word for "is" or "to be". — Merkwurdichliebe

Deus Ex ist Machina. :up: