That's an abbreviated way of referring to processes one has gone through which were "lived." It just seems like a stupid term, where we're adding words where there's no need to add words--adding words to make it sound more "intellectual"/theoretical. We can't come up with an example where simply "experience," unmodified by a redundant adjective, wouldn't do just as well. — Terrapin Station

And there is a distinction between going through a process and referring to a process, between experiencing a feeling and talking about a feeling. In saying "lived experience" we're putting the focus on what it's like to go through that experience, rather than merely referring to it. The "neglect of lived experience" is the neglect of what it's like to experience, rather than the neglect of the experience you listed in your resume when we decide whether to hire you or not. You not seeing the distinction does not mean we're "adding words to make it sound more intellectual/theoretical".

How about addressing the fact that you're forwarding strawmen? — Terrapin Station

How about describing what you see as strawmen, instead of expecting others to do the work for you?

And there is a distinction between going through a process and referring to a process, between experiencing a feeling and talking about a feeling. In saying "lived experience" we're putting the focus on what it's like to go through that experience, rather than merely referring to it. The "neglect of lived experience" is the neglect of what it's like to experience, rather than the neglect of the experience you listed in your resume when we decide whether to hire you or not. You not seeing the distinction does not mean we're "adding words to make it sound more intellectual/theoretical". — leo

You completely ignored that referring to experience is referring to something that was necessarily "lived," necessarily processual.

It's like running. You can't refer to running in a way that it's not dynamic and not something done by living things. There's a difference between running at the moment and referring to running that you did previously, but there's no need to qualify running as something that was action-oriented and that was something you needed to be alive to do.

How about describing what you see as strawmen, instead of expecting others to do the work for you? — leo

I already did so in my first post in the thread. You were repeating some of the same strawmen.

For example, no materialist neglects ("lived") experience.

You completely ignored that referring to experience is referring to something that was necessarily "lived," necessarily processual. — Terrapin Station

That an experience was necessarily lived does not imply that "the neglect of experience" has only one meaning. Again, if I hire you without looking at the experience you listed in your resume, I neglect experience.

Now if I'm a physicist and I assume I am dealing with a mind-independent world, and I model that world and hypothesize what its fundamental constituents are and how they behave, and I find that I can predict a lot of things that way and call my model a success, and conclude that myself and others are made of these fundamental constituents and nothing else, but I don't pay attention to the fact that all this time I have been experiencing, and that my model cannot hope to predict that any arrangement of these fundamental constituents is going to be experiencing anything at all, then I have neglected experience in a much more profound and different way than by neglecting the experience on your resume.

Usually we use different words to refer to different things, so how do I differentiate the latter neglect of experience from the former? The former was about experience listed on a resume. The latter is about experiencing, living, feeling, being aware, conscious. So it is useful to qualify the latter as action-oriented to differentiate it, and I find that "lived experience" does the job fine. Myself I usually use the verb "to experience" instead of "lived experience", to differentiate it from "an experience".

For example, no materialist neglects ("lived") experience. — Terrapin Station

I think what I just wrote above answers this. They do not neglect that they experience, but they neglect the fact that they experience when they attempt to make a model of everything that exists, and seem to assume that somehow the fact that they experience will emerge from their equations, but it can't if they don't take it into account right from the start.

That an experience was necessarily lived does not imply that "the neglect of experience" has only one meaning. Again, if I hire you without looking at the experience you listed in your resume, I neglect experience. — leo

What? What is the non-lived sense of experience that you'd be referring to there?

Let's just solve that first, because this is going way too many rounds without you clarifying that.

What is the non-lived sense of experience that you'd be referring to there?

Let's just solve that first, because this is going way too many rounds without you clarifying that. — Terrapin Station

I clarified it in the rest of the post, but I can't clarify it to you if you don't read what I say.

As succinctly as I can, the physicist neglects the fact that he experiences when he builds his models of reality, while the employer neglects the experiences listed on a resume. It wouldn't be accurate to say that the physicist neglects experiences, because he doesn't neglect what he sees, but he does neglect the fact that he sees (when he builds his models).

For the more detailed version, see above.

As succinctly as I can, the physicist neglects the fact that he experiences when he builds his models of reality, while the employer neglects the experiences listed on a resume. — leo

Why are you talking about neglecting experiences in that section anyway? That part wasn't about that. This quote: "You completely ignored that referring to experience is referring to something that was necessarily 'lived,' necessarily processual" is about whether "lived" is redundant.

You're confusing the second half with the first half. (Hence a reason why the best course of action is to stick to one thing at a time . . . against my better judgment, I addressed more than one thing in a post and you're conflating the two.)

Why are you talking about neglecting experiences in that section anyway? That part wasn't about that. This quote: "You completely ignored that referring to experience is referring to something that was necessarily "lived," necessarily processual" is about whether "lived" is redundant.

You're confusing the second half with the first half. (Hence a reason why the best course of action is to stick to one thing at a time . . . against my better judgment, I addressed more than one thing in a post and you're conflating the two.) — Terrapin Station

It is precisely because you want to always focus on one thing at a time that you fail to see the connection. Sure an experience was necessarily lived. I claim that this does not imply that "lived experience" is redundant, because "lived experience" can be used to refer to something that "experience" alone cannot.

Do you agree that "neglecting an experience" is not the same as "neglecting the fact that you experience"? If so, how would you call the neglect of "the fact that you experience"? The authors of the article have chosen to call it "lived experience", that's all. Sure, "lived experience" might seem like a pleonasm, but only if you insist on focusing on the fact that an experience was necessarily lived, rather than on the idea that "an experience you have" is not the same as "the fact that you experience".

Well the irony is that one point of this approach is to heal the ‘Cartesian split’ which has given rise to this sense of ‘otherness’. The whole point of emphasizing ‘lived experience’ is to draw attention to the fact that science is a human enterprise, and that perspective is an ineliminable part of it. Whereas the whole gist of Galilean science has been that ‘what can be quantified’ is what most truly exists. — Wayfarer

Of course science is a human enterprise conducted from a human perspective. As I see it, the article itself presents a dualist framing. It repeatedly makes claims with dubious modifiers such as "reality as it is in itself", "a God's eye view of nature", "experiential time", "lived experience", "absolute knowledge" and so on. This all serves to set up the thesis that science neglects experience and the human perspective when, to the contrary, science has always been grounded in experience and observation. That's why it works.

Sure an experience was necessarily lived. I claim that this does not imply that "lived experience" is redundant, because "lived experience" can be used to refer to something that "experience" alone cannot. — leo

What can it refer to that experience alone can not, if experience is necessarily lived?

Do you agree that "neglecting an experience" is not the same as "neglecting the fact that you experience"? — leo

Just in case that's supposed to be part of the answer, no, I don't agree that those are not the same. What is the difference supposed to be?

What can it refer to that experience alone can not, if experience is necessarily lived? — Terrapin Station

I explained that in the second paragraph. "Lived experience" can refer to "the fact that you experience", while experience refers to "an experience you have".

How would you say "the neglect of the fact that we experience" more succinctly? "The neglect of lived experience" doesn't sound bad to me, there could be worse choices. What better choices do you have? It would have been clunky to name the article "The blind spot of science is the neglect of the fact that we experience". Or maybe that would have been better, if "lived experience" is so confusing to some.

I explained that in the second paragraph. "Lived experience" can refer to "the fact that you experience", while experience refers to "an experience you have". — leo

I really can't type more than one sentence with you, or you'll ignore stuff. At the risk of a second sentence, what's the difference between the fact that you experience and an experience you have?

Nobody who advocates physicalism would admit this, would they? The whole point of physicalism is specifically to deny such a claim. — Wayfarer

Here are some things informed physicalists acknowledge we do not yet understand:

Dark matter. Dark energy. Quantum gravity. String theory. Multiverse. Time. Beginning of time. Life. Unity of micro/macroscopic.

On the other hand, those who reject physicalism will point to consciousness as if it is well enough understood to demonstrate that it cannot be explain in physical terms.

I really can't type more than one sentence with you, or you'll ignore stuff. — Terrapin Station

I haven't ignored stuff, you just haven't understood how what I said addressed what you believe i ignored.

At the risk of a second sentence, what's the difference between the fact that you experience and an experience you have? — Terrapin Station

If you don't see the difference I don't believe I can make you see it, it will just be an endless back and forth with you asking a question and me answering, and you asking another question and so on and so forth, I don't see an end to it so unless you want to say where you're going with it it's probably best we stop here.

All I will give you here is an analogy. "The fact that there is a thing in a box" is not the same as "the thing that is in the box". Maybe you will then ask "why do you think this analogy applies?" or something of the sort, and I will then answer, and you will pick something I said and ask another question, and if I give a well-thought-out reply you will stop reading after the first sentence and ask a question on that while ignoring all the rest, and I don't want to have to deal with that. You have a pattern of focusing on semantics and technicalities and detracting threads from their original subject, to me there is really not much point in debating endlessly on whether "lived experience" is redundant or not.

But if you want to play the game the other way, I can ask the questions and you answer. Why do you think the fact that you experience and an experience you have are the same?

This all serves to set up the thesis that science neglects experience and the human perspective when, to the contrary, science has always been grounded in experience and observation. That's why it works. — Andrew M

Physicists do not neglect what they experience when they build their models of reality, but they neglect the fact that they experience, and that's a huge omission. They claim to describe the fundamental constituents that make up everything, but because of their initial omission their constituents cannot be used to explain why we experience anything at all. What makes a particular arrangement of particles conscious rather than not conscious? Their equations don't say, they can't say. But then many say that because fundamental physics describe the fundamental constituents that make up reality, then choice is an illusion and we are simply machines behaving according to laws of physics, our feelings and desires do not cause anything and life is an accident. Which are beliefs that do not follow from observation.

Basically, if we want to assume that there is such a thing as a mind-independent world, and we claim to have a model that describe the fundamental constituents of that mind-independent world and how they behave, then that model ought to be able to explain, even in principle, why we experience anything at all, otherwise we haven't built a model of that mind-independent world, we have just built a model of what we experience, which is definitely not the same. And if we acknowledge that we have just built a model of what we experience, then we can't use that model to say what we are made of and what we can or cannot do, because it is not a model of ourselves, it is a model of what we experience.

All I will give you here is an analogy. "The fact that there is a thing in a box" is not the same as "the thing that is in the box". — leo

Are you trying to say "the fact that there is a thing in a box" versus "the thing that is in the box, conceptually abstracted from that situation, so that one is just thinking about the thing on its own, not in relation to the box"?

Here are some things informed physicalists acknowledge we do not yet understand:

Dark matter. Dark energy. Quantum gravity. String theory. Multiverse. Time. Beginning of time. Life. Unity of micro/macroscopic. — Fooloso4

Indeed! And these are among the reasons for the 'decline of materialism'. However the conundrums about dark matter have only become apparent about 50 years ago - they weren't known in materialism's heyday. But convinced materialists will still insist that all these issues are amenable in principle to physicalist explanations - Karl Popper's 'promissory notes of materialism'. Which is why, maybe, the theory is one of dark matter - 'matter' being the suitable metaphor to stand in for some unknown force.

the article itself presents a dualist framing. It repeatedly makes claims with dubious modifiers such as "reality as it is in itself", "a God's eye view of nature", "experiential time", "lived experience", "absolute knowledge" and so on. This all serves to set up the thesis that science neglects experience and the human perspective when, to the contrary, science has always been grounded in experience and observation. That's why it works. — Andrew M

ALl due respect, you're not appreciating the point being made. As we have discussed philosophy of physics many times, think about this in relation to the Bohr-Einstein debates. Einstein was a convinced realist who believed exactly that physics should provide a grasp of sub-atomic phenomena 'as they are in themselves'. It was Heisenberg (so, the Copenhagen interpretation) who said that 'What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” Einstein debated Henri Bergson in public forums about exactly the question of 'experiential time'. And the scientific view, by purportedly arriving at a quantitative understanding of the primary qualities of phenomena, does indeed aspire to what Thomas Nagel has described as 'the view from nowhere', which, I contend, amounts to the absolutisation of knowledge. This is why the discovery of uncertainty (which you solve with respect to the belief in 'many worlds') is such a big deal!

Incidentally nobody has taken a shot at an alternative term for 'lived experience'. How about 'being' and the subject of the essay being the 'forgetfulness of being'?

Is it possible to reconcile the uniqueness of human existence with being “at home” in the world? Can we live authentically human lives – ones fundamentally different from those of any other beings – without being compelled to regard ourselves as “aliens”, set apart from the rest of reality? To this question, Heidegger gave a single answer throughout his career, albeit one that was significantly modified. This answer was that we must overcome “the forgetfulness of Being”, for to “recall” and reflect on Being (Sein) enables us both to appreciate our uniqueness and to feel at home in the world.

It just happens to be the one that was purportedly concerned with 'the fundamental constituents of reality'. And that does have philosophical significance, because of the way in which physics has been seen as paradigmatic for other sciences. — Wayfarer

Yes, physics is concerned with the micro-physical, and some of what is observed there seems counter-intuitive, even paradoxical, to our ways of thinking which have evolved in the 'macro' world of daily experience. Should that result surprise us given also the general fact that how we think about things is not the things themselves, but a dualistically oriented reflection of experience?

Should that result surprise us given also the general fact that how we think about things is not the things themselves, but a dualistically oriented reflection of experience? — Janus

It's a matter of history. After the European Enlightenment, there was a movement away from religion as an explanatory framework, to the sciences. Obviously a mandatory step, what with the demolition of Ptolmaic cosmology by Galileo and Copernicus, among many other things. So the alternative to the philosophical theology was felt to be Newton's laws as paradigm and Descartes and Galileo's 'new science' as method. So for many of the post-Enlightenment philosophers, it was then natural to assume that atoms were the fundamental reality. Remember Bertrand Russell's essay, Free Man's Worship? Jacques Monod Chance and Necessity? They are canonical statements of 20th century scientific materialism. And they still form at least the backdrop for what many educated people in the secular West believe about the world, even if, when pressed, they won't really know what scientific materialism means. But I'm sure that if you ask the proverbial man in the street what's behind it all, many will answer, 'nothing is behind it, it's Russell's meaningless collocation of atoms'. You see people joining this forum every single day who believe this even if, again, when pressed, many of them are really quite unclear about what they believe.

But what happened in the meanwhile, was that the very idea of 'the atom' as an indivisible material unit vanished into probability waves. So just as the Ptolmaic cosmology was demolished by Copernicus and Newton., Victorian-era materialism has been demolished by quantum physics. But it hasn't really sunk in yet. Hence this critique.

Science has becomes more wholistic, more systems-based. That this may not have sunk into the general public's ways of thinking should not be all that surprising. Really, we don't know what the ontological or metaphysical implications of QM theory and results are, no one does, and the experts all admit that. Reality is stranger than we imagine, stranger than we can imagine.

As J B S Haldane put it:
"I have no doubt that in reality the future will be vastly more surprising than anything I can imagine. Now my own suspicion is that the Universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose."

The story you tell above is just one tiny thread in the tapestry of history, an interpretation derived from a certain perspective, a particular tendentious story. There are many, many others, and none of them priveleged over all the others.

if we discuss the subject on philosophy forums we are met with people who don't see the problem because they are mostly scientifically illiterate — leo

You are assuming without evidence that those who reject the OP are scientifically illiterate.

I very much doubt that to be the case. I am scientifically literate, having grown up in a a family where both my parents where scientists (and both Christian by the way - somehow defying this dogma that scientists must be reductive materialists), I have a number of friends and relatives that are professional scientists (some of them reductive materialists, some of them not), I solve theoretical physics problems for fun in my spare time and I'm a Science Advisor on physicsforums. I am also philosophically literate, and am not a reductive materialist. It's perfectly possible that plenty of others that point out how the OP is an attention-seeking straw man are similarly literate in both science and philosophy. Simply assuming that anybody that doesn't agree must be scientifically illiterate is nonsense.

That's the thing, it would be so different that you can't imagine what that would be like while reasoning within the framework of a mind-independent world. — leo

How do you know it would be "so different that you can't imagine", if you can't imagine how it would be different?

What we desire shapes geology and the climate, it shapes everything we do, which shapes geology and the climate. — leo

Sure what we do affects the climate and may (apart from the immediate effects of, for example, drilling and excavation) over much longer timescales even affect the geology. But the climate and geology prior to the existence of humans would not have been affected by us, would it?

And it would put back living beings in an important place, as beings that can shape the world through their will, rather than seeing ourselves and others as meaningless accidents, as heaps of particles that blindly follow physical laws while having the illusion of choice. — leo

That we might be thought of as "heaps of particles that blindly follow physical laws while having the illusion of choice" just shows one way of thinking that obviously does not tell the whole story of human, or even animal, beings. Contemporary science is not so reductive as this outmoded Newtonian vision; but that seems to be taking longer to sink in with some of those who like to call themselves philosophers than it should. By reacting against this reductionist model you are actually perpetuating it, because you see only the "either/or" of (necessarily reductively materialist) science versus some kind of idealism. A painfully facile approach!

It seems this thread has amply demonstrated where the BLIND SPOT really lies.

On the other hand, those who reject physicalism will point to consciousness as if it is well enough understood to demonstrate that it cannot be explain in physical terms. — Fooloso4

And why cannot we just accept that we don't know consciousness just as we don't know dark matter etc?

That we might be thought of as "heaps of particles that blindly follow physical laws while having the illusion of choice" just shows one way of thinking that obviously does not tell the whole story of human, or even animal, beings. Contemporary science is not so reductive as this outmoded Newtonian vision; but that seems to be taking longer to sink in with some of those who like to call themselves philosophers than it should. By reacting against this reductionist model you are actually perpetuating it, because you see only the "either/or" of (necessarily reductively materialist) science versus some kind of idealism. A painfully facile approach! — Janus

As you said above, this doesn't go through at all.

A true blind spot.

Here are some things informed physicalists acknowledge we do not yet understand:

Dark matter. Dark energy. Quantum gravity. String theory. Multiverse. Time. Beginning of time. Life. Unity of micro/macroscopic.
— Fooloso4

Indeed! And these are among the reasons for the 'decline of materialism'. — Wayfarer

That may be true if one has a very narrow view of materialism.

However the conundrums about dark matter have only become apparent about 50 years ago - they weren't known in materialism's heyday. — Wayfarer

Our understanding of what the "stuff" that the universe is made of has changed. That is the way science works. Some prefer the term 'physical' or 'natural' to 'material' since the term is easily misunderstood.

But convinced materialists will still insist that all these issues are amenable in principle to physicalist explanations - Karl Popper's 'promissory notes of materialism'. Which is why, maybe, the theory is one of dark matter - 'matter' being the suitable metaphor to stand in for some unknown force. — Wayfarer

It may be that we will never have a complete explanation, but the assumption is that any satisfactory explanation we do have will be a physical explanation. If that turns out not to be the case then science will change in response to the evidence. But without evidence it does not make sense to assume or look for some unknown. The history of science is littered with arguments for why a physical explanation of this or that is insufficient, only to have such explanations emerge. The only 'promissory note' I see is the one that declares that there is some non-physical something that maybe we will find or maybe we won't but that must nevertheless be.

And why cannot we just accept that we don't know consciousness just as we don't know dark matter etc? — ssu

That is my point. We do not understand and so arguments that claim that consciousness cannot be understood in physical terms are unconvincing. We cannot point to something we do not understand as evidence that an explanation of it cannot be a physical explanation.

By reacting against this reductionist model you are actually perpetuating it, because you see only the "either/or" of (necessarily reductively materialist) science versus some kind of idealism. A painfully facile approach! — Janus

:point: Yep. Rather than point out and engage with the myriad of places where these concerns are being addressed in science - and not necessarily by means of science - the bullshit dichotomy between bad science and equally shitty spiritualist hot takes is simply perpetuated. It's in Wayfarer's interest that science remain a shitty, reductive undertaking: he feeds off it.

. It's in Wayfarer's interest that science remain a shitty, reductive undertaking: he feeds off it. — StreetlightX

Sounds psychoanalytic to me.

I think there is some truth to the claim that some reductive views of science have had a negative effect on human understanding, including the ways in which the natural world, including of course humans, has been seen as a mere resource to be exploited, monetized and owned however power elites see fit.

And the notion of a transcendent "realm" being set over against, and being of ultimate value as opposed to, the "mere material world" has been exacerbated by some reductionist views of science. But I think those reductionist views stem predominately from Platonism and Christianity, not from science itself, which is now, and has been for some time, busy ridding itself of those outmoded paradigms.

In any case, it's a complex, nuanced story, not a simplistic "either/ or" scenario as some would like to paint it.

Our understanding of what the "stuff" that the universe is made of has changed. That is the way science works. Some prefer the term 'physical' or 'natural' to 'material' since the term is easily misunderstood. — Fooloso4

The authors address that exact point, with reference to Hempel's dilemma:

if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.

This problem is known as Hempel’s dilemma, named after the illustrious philosopher of science Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97). Faced with this quandary, some philosophers argue that we should define ‘physical’ such that it rules out radical emergentism (that life and the mind are emergent from but irreducible to physical reality) and panpsychism (that mind is fundamental and exists everywhere, including at the microphysical level). This move would give physicalism a definite content, but at the cost of trying to legislate in advance what ‘physical’ can mean, instead of leaving its meaning to be determined by physics.

We reject this move.

I am also philosophically literate, and am not a reductive materialist. It's perfectly possible that plenty of others that point out how the OP is an attention-seeking straw man are similarly literate in both science and philosophy. Simply assuming that anybody that doesn't agree must be scientifically illiterate is nonsense. — andrewk

The article in question is not about science, nor hostile to science; it is a criticism of two tendencies, namely, objectivism and physicalism, which, it argues, 'are philosophical ideas, not scientific ones'. It seems to me that many who are so hostile to this article don't actually defend the very beliefs that the article is criticizing. So, why the pique? I just don't understand your hostility, it's just the kind of thing that I would have expected a person with your background and interests to be sympathetic to. As I said, these are not hacks and charlatans, they're interesting academics, writers and philosophers. Why the fury?

Science has becomes more wholistic, more systems-based. — Janus

And the essay is just an example of this fact. The authors note:

Our account of the Blind Spot is based on the work of two major philosophers and mathematicians, Edmund Husserl and Alfred North Whitehead. Husserl, the German thinker who founded the philosophical movement of phenomenology, argued that lived experience is the source of science. It’s absurd, in principle, to think that science can step outside it. The ‘life-world’ of human experience is the ‘grounding soil’ of science, and the existential and spiritual crisis of modern scientific culture – what we are calling the Blind Spot – comes from forgetting its primacy.

Is that 'hysterically anti-science'? Are those who claim such things 'in need of psychoanalysis?' Really, this is verging on the hilarious.

The story you tell above is just one tiny thread in the tapestry of history, an interpretation derived from a certain perspective, a particular tendentious story. — Janus

The 'scientific revolution' and Enlightenment values based on science are not my invention. It's an historical narrative. The next chapter that is emerging is indeed a holistic and even idealist philosophy that you find in many 'systems scientists', although not all of them are able to imagine the transcendent domain.

And the essay is just an example of this fact. The authors note:

Our account of the Blind Spot is based on the work of two major philosophers and mathematicians, Edmund Husserl and Alfred North Whitehead. Husserl, the German thinker who founded the philosophical movement of phenomenology, argued that lived experience is the source of science. It’s absurd, in principle, to think that science can step outside it. The ‘life-world’ of human experience is the ‘grounding soil’ of science, and the existential and spiritual crisis of modern scientific culture – what we are calling the Blind Spot – comes from forgetting its primacy. — Wayfarer

Yes, but the fact that science is (fairly obviously) an aspect of human experience; a story told by humans, is not something that any sensible scientist would deny. As I said in my previous post, Christianity and Platonism would seem to be the primary culprits behind the objectification and devaluation of the natural world.

Perhaps the rise of science, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution would not have happened without Platonism and Christianity, which is a question explored in this book book: https://www.amazon.com/Patterning-Instinct-Cultural-History-Humanitys/dp/1633882934/ref=sr_1_1?crid=HQW0U2XUQTMA&keywords=the+patterning+instinct+by+jeremy+lent&qid=1560395176&s=gateway&sprefix=the+patterning+instinct%2Caps%2C447&sr=8-1

But the salient point is that the fault does not lie with science per se, and nor do all scientists, past and present, hold to the kind of reductionist views that the article seems to want to claim are near universal among scientists and lay people alike, and seems to want to claim are solely due to the methods and practices of science itself.

Science can have no truck, by virtue of the way it is practiced, with the transcendent. And just as phenomenology can safely perform its epoché and bracket the question as to whether the objective or external world exists, so science can perform its own epoché, and bracket concerns about the "lived experience" of humans and indeed even the question as to whether the objective or external world exists.