Seems so.

Though it isn't so surprising that we learn how to look for things. :)

To know something is to have a rule for interpreting some sensory data.
— Harry Hindu

It is? How do you know? — Banno

I provided the answer, but you simply asked the same question again. Your question, not my answer, is circular.

Are you capable of observing your own mental processes of recognition and familiarity, or are you a p-zombie as your response would seem to indicate? Would it be possible to say that a p-zombie knows anything? It seems to me that "recognition" and "familiarity" are the same as "knowing".

Are you capable of knowing anything that you haven't experience before - of having some rule of thumb for interpreting present sensory data (and that rule of thumb is prior experiences)? To say that you know something - what are you doing mentally (other than just making sounds or scribbles) if not some kind of recognition of some present experience based on prior experiences?

You match the prints to the culprit, Bananno. :ok:

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him...

And if there is no justification, then do we not know that it is a picture of him? — Banno

Banno, the answer to your question is similar to the answer given in On Certainty to Moore's propositions. So, I might ask the same question of Moore's proposition, namely, "How do I know this is a hand?" As Wittgenstein pointed out, in Moore's context the use of the word know is senseless. The context in which Moore makes the assertion is before an audience (he holds up his hand and says, "This is one hand.) as a rebuttal against the skeptics about whether there exists an external world. He claims to know this is his hand, or a hand. Wittgenstein immediately points out how unclear the statement is by considering its negation, namely, "I don't know this is a hand." This tells us something about the use of the word know in reference to a doubt, and the logic behind the correct use of these words. It's very similar to following a rule and making a mistake, they are logically linked.

Wittgenstein also points out that there are situations where one could doubt that that is my hand or a hand. For example, waking from an operation with bandages around my hand and not knowing if my hand was amputated or not. So, in one context it may be correct to use know, and in another incorrect. One might ask, "Does it make sense to doubt in a given context?"

So, do I know it's a hand because I know it's a hand, just like the question you asked about the picture. No, it's not a matter of knowing, it's simply the way we act. In another situation we may be presented with two pictures that closely resemble each other, in this situation it makes sense to doubt whether they are one and the same person. In such a context it makes sense to ask what is your justification (the doubt makes sense)? In one context the proposition is hinge or bedrock, in another it is not. The example you gave is an example of a hinge-proposition.

Keep in mind there are many statements/beliefs that fall into this category, namely, they are hinge-propositions, or as I call them bedrock beliefs that fall outside the epistemological language-game.

"Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

"Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

"Doubt comes after belief (OC 160)."

"I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing (OC 162)."

All of these quotes fit the kind of question your asking. Again, it gets back to certain propositions/beliefs that are so basic that they are outside epistemological questions.

Knowing how to add two numbers is shown in the act of adding numbers. Knowing how to ride a bike is shown in getting on the bike and taking off up a hill. The same is true of knowing that it is N. in the picture. — Banno

Face recognition software analyzes a picture and compares it to a standard. The computer could ask someone to verify the accuracy of the standard, but that would just be a quality check. One shouldn't think of external checks like that as the basis of all facial recognition.

Humans have the ability to store reliable standard images as well. Maybe consciousness works like the computer in some ways.

Also, armchair, a priori speculation about how the computer works isn't the best approach. How could it be the best approach to understanding humans?

Knowing that this is a picture of N. is different to knowing that water freezes at zero degrees. — Banno

I suspect that we could differentiate the various ways one acquires knowledge, but as a general matter it all arises from some sort of sensory input. There are legalistic distinctions that follow basic epistemological standards. Perhaps you know the picture is of N because you were told that and perhaps you know that water freezes at zero degrees because you were told it. In both cases, it would be based upon what you heard said (hearsay). Or, both could be based upon direct knowledge, where you actually witnessed N in person and then by picture or you witnessed the mercury fall to zero and then the water freeze.

What is your justification in each? In the hearsay examples, it's your belief in the veracity of the statements. In the direct knowledge examples, it's your belief in the veracity of what you saw.

I've now spent enough years sorting through these types of threads you post that I believe I've earned the right to the great reveal as to what's at stake in these discussions. If you accept my position that the justification for N is as I've stated it is and that it is not circular, what wheel falls off of Wittgenstein's little red wagon?

The justification would typically be something like one's visual memory of what the person looks like.

If you ask for a justification of the visual memory--for example, say that we change it to "I visualized him. Did I know it was a visualization of him?" Then typically the justification would be something like the inductive reliability of one's memory in general.

Those aren't circular, because the justification isn't the same thing that one is asserting.

Justifications do not need to be infallible, of course. (If they did, almost nothing would be justified--certainly not any empirical claims or empiricism-based claims.)

Perhaps you know the picture is of N because you were told that and perhaps you know that water freezes at zero degrees because you were told it. In both cases, it would be based upon what you heard said (hearsay). Or, both could be based upon direct knowledge, where you actually witnessed N in person and then by picture or you witnessed the mercury fall to zero and then the water freeze. — Hanover

Yes, and one can know "2 + 2 = 4", and that would all entail knowing how to say and write these things but not what the scribbles and sounds actually mean. Knowing how to imitate language use is not the same as knowing what the words mean, or what the words refer to that aren't words themselves. That would require an experience of using the words at the same moment of experiencing the sensory data that they refer to, such as hearing the word, "red" and seeing the color red at the same moment. In that instance, you would know what the word, "red" meant, not just how to form the word with your mouth.

Yes, and one can know "2 + 2 = 4", and that would all entail knowing how to say and write these things but not what the scribbles and sounds actually mean. Knowing how to imitate language use is not the same as knowing what the words mean, or what the words refer to that aren't words themselves. That would require an experience of using the words at the same moment of experiencing the sensory data that they refer to, such as hearing the word, "red" and seeing the color red at the same moment. In that instance, you would know what the word, "red" meant, not just how to form the word with your mouth. — Harry Hindu

And there's nothing controversial about any of this, but I'm still left with so what? I understand that we logically arrive at conclusions and that logic forms a part of our justification for our knowledge.

I understand that I justify my conclusion that 2+2=4 based upon how I've designated my logical operators to work and that I justify that N is the guy in the picture based upon my past recollections of N.

Are we now just pointing out the difference between rationalism and empiricism and asking if there is truly a priori knowledge or whether all knowledge has its roots in experience? Is that what the OP is about? If so, I didn't realize it was that basic.

"Suddenly I had to think of him." Say a picture of him suddenly floated before me. Did I know it was a picture of him, N.? I did not tell myself it was. What did its being of him consist in, then? Perhaps what I later said or did.

The underlying question, as the context makes clear, is about meaning. One answer is that meaning is a mental activity, that in this case consists in having a mental picture of N.

16. "Your meaning the piano-playing consisted in your thinking of the piano-playing."
"That you meant that man by the word 'you' in that letter consisted in this, that you were writing to him."
The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in.

[Emphasis on 'consist', 'consists', and 'consisted' in the quotes added.]

As to the question of whether I know that the picture that forms in my mind of N. is a picture of N. - on the one hand, there is no mistaking that it is my picture of N., but on the other, I might have mistaken M. for N. Seeing N. and M. or photographs of them I will realize my mistake and might say: "Oh, I meant M." And here we see why my meaning N. or M. does not consist in having a mental picture.

The underlying question, as the context makes clear, is about meaning. One answer is that meaning is a mental activity, that in this case consists in having a mental picture of N. — Fooloso4

What follows in your post is an examination of intention, not reference. Or do you see the two as inextricable?

I am not familiar with the literature on intention and reference so this may not address you question. I do not think it is an examination of either intention or reference as those terms are used in a non-technical sense. If I mean N. it is not my intention to mean N., although it may be the case that the person I have in mind or am talking about (referring to) is not N. but M.. It may also be that I have the names right but there are things that M. said or did that I mistakenly attribute to N.

But what I take to be at issue in the paragraph under discussion is whether there is anything that meaning something consists in.

But what I take to be at issue in the paragraph under discussion is whether there is anything that meaning something consists in. — Fooloso4

If we look back at the quote:

"Suddenly I had to think of him." Say a picture of him suddenly floated before me. Did I know it was a picture of him, N.? I did not tell myself it was. What did its being of him consist in, then? Perhaps what I later said or did.

(Zettel, 14) — Banno

Is this quote supposed to imply that thinking of N reduces to something later said or done? Or what exactly?

Wittgenstein asks: what did its being him consist of? Its being him is shown by what he does and what he says, that is, how he responds to the picture that floated before him.

Wittgenstein is not providing an explanation of cognition. If it were a picture of someone else he would not respond as he does.

I think this could easily be tweaked to be a Gettier problem, which is, imho, much more interesting.

So, usually, yes, knowing what someone looks like, seeing a picture of that person, and recognizing them as that person constitute a justified, true belief, thus a valid knowledge claim.

But let's say I have a friend X, someone (possibly X himself?) hands me a picture and says X is in it and indeed I see a person in it who looks just like X, thus I believe that my friend X is in this picture. Later I find out that the person I thought was X in the picture was actually his identical twin Y (whom I didn't know about, perhaps), but that X is still in the picture, just a ways off in the distance, possibly with his back turned to the camera.

I was justified in believing X was in the picture, since that was what I was told, and I recognized a person who looked just like him.
Also, it was true that he was in the picture.

Justified and true, and yet I did not know he was in the picture.

Wittgenstein asks: what did its being him consist of? Its being him is shown by what he does and what he says, that is, how he responds to the picture that floated before him.

Wittgenstein is not providing an explanation of cognition. If it were a picture of someone else he would not respond as he does. — Fooloso4

It's either true or false that he recalled the correct image of N.

Case A. His memory is accurate
Case B. His memory is inaccurate.

It's possible that he might act in exactly the same way in regard to both A and B, for instance if he suffered from delusions. So, I'm sorry, I'm just not following you at all. Where am I dropping bits?

You are quite right to compare the note to the first part of On Certainty. I agree with you. And thanks for your reply



I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...)

The justification, it seems, is knowing the names of things. This is called "a hand". This is a picture of a person called "N".

Witt wouldn't agree though, would he? For him, we can only know things that can be doubted, right?

Wasn't that his argument against Moore?

That we could not doubt Moore's proposition, so it makes no sense to say that we know it?

It's possible that he might act in exactly the same way in regard to both A and B, for instance if he suffered from delusions. So, I'm sorry, I'm just not following you at all. Where am I dropping bits? — frank

Yes, if he were mistaken or delusional he might act in the same way. What is at issue, however, is not the veracity of the image. Suppose a picture of someone you know appears in your mind. Do you ask who it is or doubt who it is? Or do you immediately know who it is in the same way you know who it is if you see him in person? Do you tell yourself that is N.? Do you need to tell yourself this? Of course there may some situation in which you do question who it is or ask yourself "Is this N.?", but consider how odd it would be if every time you think of someone and an image comes to mind of that person you doubt that the image of the person is the image of that person. It may even be that the person does not really look like that. Someone who falls in love may picture the beloved as far more beautiful than that person actually is, but nevertheless, he is not mistaken that the image is his image of that person.

Edit: To be clear, this is not an epistemological problem and has nothing to do with verified true belief.

The justification for saying that I know a picture of someone is a picture of that person is my well-tested faith in being able to remember what that person looks like.

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N. — Banno

This isn't philosophy, but just incorrect empirical generalization. I can in fact see a picture of N and be completely at a loss that it's N, but maybe figure it out that it's N from his hat or his polka dotted tie.

It's like you're trying to convince yourself that you know it's N in an instantaneous unprocessed way, like the mind just knows without thought. Granted the mind arrives at conclusions quickly, but that's not because it's not processing justifications, it's just because it moves quickly.

I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...) — Banno

I'm not sure what else to say. I guess you could say that one is perceived directly "the hand," and one indirectly by looking at a picture, but generally both are hinge or bedrock beliefs. I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia, which is a book that G. J. Warnock's constructs from J. L. Austin's notes.

Where your statements aren't hinges, i.e., where it makes sense to doubt them, then, they can be justified in various ways. One way of justifying them is through linguistic training. In other words, when teaching a child the correct names of things or persons, or when teaching someone a new language. There is no significant difference between showing a child a picture of "N," and pointing them out in a crowd, we learn how to name things using both methods.

When teaching a child to use the word hand there is no issue of doubt. Learning to doubt is a language-game that comes much later. We seem to swallow down certain basic beliefs as part of the reality we live in. Something has to stand fast for us in order to learn anything.

Both of these propositions need a context in order for them mean anything. There is no intrinsic meaning to these sentences apart from some context (not that you suggested otherwise).

The logic behind the use of these sentences seems very similar.

There is knowing as a skill, i.e., learning to ride a bike, or learning to count is a skill. Knowing that bikes have wheels is a belief, and knowing that 1+1=2 is also a belief. As philosophers we are mainly interested in beliefs.

I'm not sure if any of this is what you're looking for, so take it for what its worth.

but consider how odd it would be if every time you think of someone and an image comes to mind of that person you doubt that the image of the person is the image of that person. — Fooloso4

Right. I could question it, but I usually don't.

Therefore we know that thinking of N is not a matter of passively recognising a mental image. Is that it?

When the picture comes to mind I might think: "Oh, I am supposed to meet N. for lunch", or I might smile and wonder how he is doing, or various other responses that have nothing to do with asking myself if the picture is a picture of N.

I think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. To mean N. does not mean to have a picture of N. in my mind. Having a picture of N. in my mind is not to mean N. The picture may come unbidden. I do not have to mean N. to have that picture. It may come "suddenly".

When the picture comes to mind I might think: "Oh, I am supposed to meet N. for lunch", or I might smile and wonder how he is doing, or various other responses that have nothing to do with asking myself if the picture is a picture of N. — Fooloso4

True. Likewise, if I see a stop sign, I don't ask myself if that's a stop sign. I just know it is. Under some circumstances, I might stop my car when I see it.

I think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. — Fooloso4

I've never thought that meaning consisted of holding a mental picture. Did you ever think that?

I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia — Sam26

A favourite of mine.

Thanks for your input.

Do you, @Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing?

So,

That it looked like him would be my justification. — Hanover

I am justified due to experiential knowledge of what the person looks like and the difference between the person and a picture of the person. — I like sushi

...typically the justification would be something like the inductive reliability of one's memory in general. — Terrapin Station

The justification for saying that I know a picture of someone is a picture of that person is my well-tested faith in being able to remember what that person looks like. — Janus

The seed of the note, and of On Certainty, with regard to knowledge, seem not to have found fertile ground here.

For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on.

And all this towards @Bitter Crank's admonition for us not to over specify th rules.

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him... — Banno

I don't think recognising the person in a picture is necessary for me to know that this is a picture of N (for example, N is the author of a book, I don't know what he looks like, but I see what I recognise as an "author photo"), nor do I think that me recognising N in a picture necessarily means that I know it's a picture of N (for example, if I know that the picture is a picture of an event X and I know that N was no longer alive at the time of event X, I have sufficient reason to doubt my recognition, and yet the recognition could be compelling enough to spook me). So, no, I don't think recognising N makes that justification circular.

It does point out the source of a possible error, though, and if you specify "How do you know this is a picture of N?" as "How do you know you're not mistaking the person in the picture?" then that would indeed be circular. Basically, every justification for a knolwedge claim involves itself knowledge that you can question, and I don't think "I know this is a picture of N" and "I recognise N in this picture," are on the same level of abstraction. The latter is more concrete.

The wording in the quote, though, is interesting: "suddenly I had to think of him", "suddenly, a picture of him floated before me..." The language leaves open (and even suggests to me) the possibility of an illusion. In that case, since there's no objective picture, isn't the act of recognition consitutitive? Is it even recognition?