"Trees" is a word. Trees are not. The tree is not a "tree" in linguistic thought. It is part of a correlation which attributes meaning and as such makes the tree meaningful/significant to the creature. — creativesoul

Wait a second.

This needs to be further explained. How it is a tree not a "tree" in linguistic thought?

The only way I can parse it is that no concept can be identical to any nonlinguistic thought, and that all linguistic thought begins with a nonlinguistic distinction/correlation that comes to be correlated with a linguistic form that holds conceptual significance. Linguistic thought cannot apprehend the nameless thing present in nonlinguistic thought, it can only apprehend the idea of it, and retroactively impose its conceptualization on that nameless thing. In this way, I can completely agree that a tree is never really a "tree", for any notion of "tree" is nothing but a correlation.

Nonlinguistic creatures cannot think of "existence" for it is a word. Non linguistic creatures cannot think of existence because it is not directly perceptible. — creativesoul

Even if nonlinguistic thought could hypothetically apprehend "existence" as some unnamed distinction/correlation, it cannot be identified as "existence" until it is correlated with the linguistic form. And even then, it isn't really existence, it is only the idea of existence that is retroactively imposed on an unnamed distinction/correlation.

:smile:
How about 'non linguistic creatures' don't 'think' !

How about 'non linguistic creatures' don't 'think' ! — fresco

I'm totally willing to consider that point.

The thing I can't get past, is the idea that there is some indication of cognitive activity occurring in certain nonlinguistic species, the ability to draw basic distinctions/correlations from direct experience.

But since the general view is that perception is 'active' not 'passive', whan can 'direct experience' mean ?

I think we can validly conceive of a sequence of 'perceptually receptive states' which are associated with shifting 'physiological needs', for all creatures, which defines for them the nature of their shifting world. Where 'language' might come in (at the crudest level) is as a facility to delay any automatici stimulus response linkage, by allowing for internal 'considering' (aka 'thinking') .
NB One psychological definition of 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a response'.

perception is 'active' not 'passive', whan can 'direct experience' mean ? — fresco

Direct experience refers to the nondescript content that is mediated through perception into basic thought.

I have no idea what 'basic thought' can mean other than a state of suspension or interruption of an S-R sequence.

Where 'language' might come in (at the crudest level) is as a facility to delay any automatici stimulus response linkage, by allowing for internal 'considering' (aka 'thinking') . — fresco

I would say, this is probably a function of 'thought' at some basic level, not 'language'. Language is a form into which thought can be mediated, and a means by which thought can be communicated/expressed and carried into further correlation with other linguistic thoughts.

I have no idea what 'basic thought' can mean other than a state of suspension or interruption of an S-R sequence. — fresco

I can agree with that. I have been trying to really enter the core of nonlinguistic thought. At best, it seems to occurs as an immediate cognitive distinction/correlation, overlayed on my direct experience. I would agree that this operates to disrupt the autonomic S-R sequence of the creature.

Hmmm...'language' and 'languaging' differ only in as much that the first implies the human version with a syntax which allows for 'reasoning'. The second, exmplified perhaps by the command 'no' to a dog, merely interrupts or facilitates changes in behavior. It looks like we don't require the word 'thought' at all, unless we take an anthropomorphic view of other species.

The second, exmplified perhaps the command 'no' to a dog, merely interrupts or facilitates changes in behavior. It looks like we don't require the word 'thought' at all, unless we take an anthropomorphic view of other species. — fresco

I'm not a big fan of thinking about how nonhumans think...in fact, I think its fucking stupid. But I am aware of the evolutionary implications posited through neuro-biology, in which the developmental structure of the brain is recapitulated in evolutionarily related species. So I will entertain animal thought just so I don't have digress into this debate.

'language' and 'languaging' — fresco

The former seems to merely be a medium of thought. The latter seems to be the practical application of thought, perhaps thought in action.

the command 'no' to a dog — fresco

The command: "no" to a dog, indicates some mode of thought in the dog. I wonder, is that mode of thought nonlinguistic for the dog? After all, it cognitively responds to language (as opposed to passively reacting to stimuli), and to a distinct and meaningful term at that: "no". No?

The question is about the content of non-linguistic thought/belief. In particular some folk seem to wonder whether or not a non-linguistic creature is capable of thinking about trees and/or existence. To be blunt...

There is no such thing as non-linguistic thought/belief of and/or about existence. Bear with me while I help the reader to understand. Thought/belief is not all that hard to grasp if we just avoid all the unnecessary language use and the bag of historical mistakes it carries alongside and within.


1Thinking about "tree". 2Thinking about a tree. 3Thinking about "existence". 4 Thinking about existence.

Which of these scenarios, if any, are capable of happening prior to language acquisition?

All thought/belief consists of correlations drawn between different things.

1All thinking about "tree" is drawing correlations between the term "tree" and something else. "Tree" is a term. It is a proxy. It picks out trees. "Trees" are not trees. "Tree" is what we've named some of the things in my yard. Trees are not names. Trees are not terms. "Trees" is a term. All thought/belief about the term "trees" is existentially dependent upon language use, for all terms are existentially dependent upon language.

There is no non linguistic thought/belief about the term "trees"(aside from first learning how to use it).


2All thinking about a tree is drawing a correlation between that tree and something else. One without language can have the tree in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" simply by drawing a correlation between the tree and other things. Not all thought/belief about trees requires language use.

Some creatures without language can think about trees. There is non linguistic thought/belief about trees.


3All thinking about "existence" is drawing correlations between "existence" and something else. "Existence" is a term, a proxy. It is always attached to something already named. We begin talking about trees and other things long before we begin talking about then in terms of their existence. All thought/belief about "existence" requires language use replete with a rich background of things to already talk about in terms of their existence.

One without language has no such background, and thus cannot think about a thing's "existence".


4All thinking about existence is drawing correlations between "existence" and something already named. A thing's existence is not directly perceptible. One without language cannot think about existence. All thought/belief about existence requires language use.

One without language cannot think of and/or about a thing's existence.

Sever the term "tree" from everything and we're left with the term while the tree no longer remains. Sever the tree from everything, and we're left with the tree while the term "tree" no longer remains.

However, very strange and telling things happen when we attempt to sever "existence" from everything, because we're left with the term "existence", and if it works like other names/proxies, then existence no longer remains although the term does. That doesn't work. The term remains. If anything remains then something exists.

A tree severed from everything is still a tree. The term "tree" severed from everything is still the term "tree". The term "existence" severed from everything is still the term "existence".

Existence severed from everything is nothing.

No has the flavour of sauerkraut, Good Boy has the flavour of fillet mignon.

One without language has no such background, and thus cannot think about a thing's "existence". — creativesoul

And

One without language can have the tree [or existence] in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" [or "existence"] simply by drawing a correlation between the tree [or the existent] and other things [things that may or may not exist]. — creativesoul

What about when nonlinguistic correlations don't pan out as expected? E.g. I see a riverbed in the distance, riverbed correlates with a source of hydration, but when I arrive, the riverbed is dry. That would seem to be grounds for thinking about existence in the absence of language . No?

I do not appreciate the misquote.

I do not appreciate the misquote. — creativesoul

Please, everything in brackets "[...]" is me. Sorry, I assumed it to be obvious.

I'm trying to understand this shit, and I'm attempting to show you that in nonlinguistic thought, existence is just as possible as tree.

Here is what I meant as the point of contrast:

One without language can have the tree in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" simply by drawing a correlation between the tree and other things. — creativesoul

One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist.

I'm trying to understand this shit, and I'm attempting to show you that in nonlinguistic thought, existence is just as possible as tree. — Merkwurdichliebe

You cannot show that. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. That can be shown.

One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist. — Merkwurdichliebe

The existent is not existence.

In non philosophical situations, 'existence' is never attributed except in disputes about the utility of a concept on which the word 'existence' is invoked instead of 'utility' in order to suggest the authority of 'an absolute'. That is the whole crux of my thesis..

You cannot show me that. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. — creativesoul

Why? Because all thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification?

But thought is not existence, and that is why a correlation can be wrong, and that brings up the question of how "thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification, yet which some/all of the presupposed content does not correspond to anything concrete or actual?

I think this is a reasonable question.

The existent is not existence. — creativesoul

Okay Terrapin Station. :cool:

In non philosophical situations, 'existence' is never attributed except in disputes about the utility of a concept which the word 'existence' is invoked instead of 'utility' in order to suggest the authority of 'an absolute'. That is the whole crux of my thesis.. — fresco

Then maybe you can help me to get my point across. Existence is present at all levels of thought, linguistic or nonlinguistic.

. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

Why? — Merkwurdichliebe

Wrong question. It's not a matter of why. It's a matter of how we come to think in terms of existence.

Existence is present at all levels of thought, linguistic or nonlinguistic. — Merkwurdichliebe

Stuff exists prior to thinking about it. That's not the same as saying that existence can be in the mind of a non-linguistic creature. Existence is not directly perceptible. Only directly perceptible things can be the content of non linguistic thought/belief.

Wrong question. It's not a matter of why. — creativesoul

Don't make it an ethical contest. :grin:

Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. — creativesoul

Existence is attributed to things merely experienced. Making any distinction/correlation , linguistic or nonlinguistic, is predicated on the pressupossition of existence. So it it rather illogical to say that existence does not factor into thought prior to language acquisition.

I hope you can convince me otherwise.

I think we can validly conceive of a sequence of 'perceptually receptive states' which are associated with shifting 'physiological needs', for all creatures, which defines for them the nature of their shifting world. Where 'language' might come in (at the crudest level) is as a facility to delay any automatici stimulus response linkage, by allowing for internal 'considering' (aka 'thinking') .
NB One psychological definition of 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a response'. — fresco

Nicely put.